

PLATONIS OPERA

PHAEDO



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PLATO'S PHAEDO

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PLATO'S PHAEDO

EDITED
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PREFACE

THE text of this edition is that prepared by me for the Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis with a few corrections and modifications. Such as it is, it is the only text based on the three archetypal MSS., the Clarkianus (B), the Marcianus (T), and the Vindobonensis (W). The readings of T are taken from a photograph in my possession, those of W from the collation of Professor Král of Prague.

In the Introduction and Notes I have chiefly endeavoured to elucidate the argument, and to show the importance of the *Phaedo* as an historical document. Grammatical points have only been dealt with when they seemed to have a direct bearing on these problems. The interpretation of an ancient document must always be based on grammar, but an edition of the *Phaedo* is not the place for a full discussion of general grammatical problems like the constructions of $v \dot{v} \mu \dot{\eta}$ and $\mu \dot{\eta} o \dot{v}$.

I have given references throughout to the second edition of my Early Greek Philosophy (E. Gr. Ph.2), where I have discussed more fully the historical background of the dialogue. I hope to have an early

opportunity of discussing certain textual problems in a more scientific way than is possible in an edition like the present.

The reader will see that I am under great obligations to the editions of Wyttenbach and Heindorf. Of more recent editions I owe most to that of the late Sir William Geddes.

J. B.

CONTENTS

									PAGE
Introduction		•	-	٠	•		•	٠	ix
Text									
Notes		٠	a	4					1
APPENDIX I.	DEATH	ву ј	TEMLO	OCK	•		٠		149
APPENDIX II.	Γλαύκο	υ τέχν	η.	•	•	•		•	150
INDEX TO THE	Notes	S :							
I. Prop	er Nam	nes		6	•		•	•	151
II. Gree	ek Wor	ds		6		•			152
III. Gran	nmatica	1 .							158



INTRODUCTION

Ι

IF only we may take the *Phaedo* for what it professes to be, it surely stands quite by itself in European literature. It does not, indeed, claim to be a word for word report of all Socrates said to the inner circle of his followers on the day he drank the poison in prison. By letting us know incidentally (59b 10) that he was not present, Plato seems to decline responsibility for the literal exactitude of every detail. But, for all that, it does on the face of it bear to be such an account of that memorable day as its author could conceive a favourite disciple giving not long afterwards to a group of deeply interested listeners. That means a great deal. Though he was not present when the Master died, it is certain that Plato continued in close association with others who were, and they must often have talked about Socrates together. Further, the narrative is put into the mouth of Phaedo of Elis, who was certainly still living when the dialogue called by his name was written. So. no doubt, were the chief interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, and

¹ The statement in Diog. Laert. ii. 106, iii. 6 that, just after the death of Socrates, Plato retired with other Socratics to Megara, the home of Euclides (cp. 59 c 2 n.), rests on the authority of Hermodorus, who was a disciple of Plato and wrote a book about him. Even apart from this, it is certain that the Socratics kept together and remained in touch with Plato. Some of them, like Theaetetus and the younger Socrates, were subsequently members of the Academy.

probably others of the company. In these circumstances, it is not easy to believe that Plato intended his readers to regard the *Phaedo* simply as an 'imaginary conversation'.

Of course, as has been indicated, he need not have meant every detail to be taken as historically exact. If we choose to suppose that he introduced into the Phaedo sayings and doings of Socrates which really belonged to other occasions, there is nothing to be said against that; for such concentration of characteristic traits in a single scene is quite legitimate in dramatic composition. A certain idealization might also be allowed for; but we should expect the idealizing process to have taken place in the minds of Plato and the rest before the dialogue was written, and to have been in the main unconscious. We may say, then, that the Phaedo professes to be nothing less than a faithful picture of Socrates as Plato conceived him when he wrote it. It professes to be even more. We are certainly led to believe that it gives us a truthful record of the subjects on which Socrates discoursed on the last day of his life, and of his manner of treating them. No reader who made his first acquaintance with Socrates here could possibly suppose anything else. This, then, is what the Phaedo professes to be; and if only it is this, it is the likeness of a great philosopher in the supreme crisis of his life, drawn by a philo-

¹ It is impossible to discuss the date of the *Phaedo* here; for this would involve an inquiry into that of the *Republic*. I may say, however, that I regard it as proved that the *Phaedo* is earlier than the *Republic*, and as probable that it was written within ten years of the death of Socrates. But, in any case, Phaedo, who lived to found the school of Elis, is a mere lad in 399 B. c. (cp. 89b3), while Simmias and Cebes are νεανίσκοι (89a3). No one would assign the *Phaedo* to a date at which it is reasonable to suppose they were dead.

sopher who was greater still, and was also one of the most consummate dramatic artists the world has known. It would not be easy to find the match of such a work.

H

But are we entitled to take the Phaedo for what it professes to be? The general opinion apparently is that we are not.1 It is admitted, indeed, that the narrative portion of the dialogue is historical, but most interpreters doubt whether Socrates talked about immortality at all, and many deny that he held the belief set forth in our dialogue. Hardly any one ventures to suppose that the reasons given for holding this belief could have been given by Socrates; it is assumed that they are based on doctrines formulated by Plato himself at least ten years after Socrates had passed away. I cannot accept this account of the matter. I cannot, indeed, feel sure that all the incidents of the narrative are strictly historical. These are, in my opinion, the very things for which a dramatic artist might fairly draw on his imagination. I have only an impression that they are, broadly speaking, true to life, and that they all serve to bring before us a picture of Socrates as he really was. But the religious and philosophical teaching of the Phaedo is on a very different footing. Whatever Plato may or may not have done in other dialogues—and I say nothing here about that 2—I cannot bring myself to believe that he falsified

¹ I refer mainly to current opinion in this country. Some references to views of another character will be found below (p. xiv, n. 2).

It is obvious that we must apply a somewhat different standard to a dialogue like the *Phaedo*, which is supposed to take place when Plato was twenty-eight years old, and to one like the *Parmenides*, which deals with a time at least twenty years before he was born. If it can be

the story of his master's last hours on earth by using him as a mere mouthpiece for novel doctrines of his own. That would have been an offence against good taste and an outrage on all natural piety; for if Plato did this thing, he must have done it deliberately. There can be no question here of unconscious development; he must have known quite well whether Socrates held these doctrines or not. I confess that I should regard the *Phaedo* as little better than a heartless mystification if half the things commonly believed about it were true.

III

The interpretation which finds nothing in the Phaedo but the speculations of Plato himself is based on the belief that 'the historical Socrates', of whom we may get some idea from Xenophon, is quite a different person from 'the Platonic Socrates'. What the latter is made to say is treated as evidence for the philosophy of Plato, but not for that of Socrates himself. This does not mean merely that Plato's Socrates is idealized. That might be allowed, if it were admitted that Xenophon too idealized Socrates after his own fashion. If it were only meant that each of these men drew Socrates as he saw him, and that Socrates was, in fact, a different man for each of them, the truth of such a view would be self-evident. We should only have to ask which of the two had the better opportunity of seeing Socrates as he really was, and which was the more capable of understanding and portraying him. But very much more than this is meant.

shown, as I believe it can, that the latter dialogue is accurate in its historical setting (cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 192) and involves no philosophical anachronism, the *Phaedo* will a fortiori be a trustworthy document.

It is meant that Plato has used Socrates as a mask to conceal his own features, and that the Platonic 'Socrates' is, in fact, Plato.

The general acceptance of this view in recent times is apparently due to the authority of Hegel. Speaking of Socrates, he lays down that 'we must hold chiefly to Xenophon in regard to the content of his knowledge, and the degree in which his thought was developed', and this dictum became a sort of dogma with the Hegelian and semi-Hegelian writers to whom we owe so much of the best nineteenth-century work in the history of Greek philosophy. It can only be made plausible, however, by isolating the *Memorabilia* from Xenophon's other writings in a way which seems wholly illegitimate. We must certainly take the *Oeconomicus* and the *Symposium* into account as well; and, in estimating Xenophon's claim to be regarded as a historian, we must never forget that he was the author of the *Cyropaedia*.

The Apology of Socrates which has come down to us under Xenophon's name raises another question. It is pretty clearly based on Plato's Apology, and it contains a rather clumsy plagiarism from the Phaedo. This has led many scholars to deny the authenticity of the work; but the more Xenophon's methods are studied the less cogent do such arguments appear, and there is now a growing disposition to regard the Apology as Xenophon's after all. If so, we have to face the possibility that he derived much of his knowledge of Socrates from the writings of Plato.

As for the *Memorabilia* itself, there is no doubt that it is a strangely constructed work, and the 'higher critics'

¹ Gesch, der Phil, ii, 69.

⁸ Cp. 89 b 2 n.

have condemned whole chapters as interpolations.¹ It is not necessary to discuss their theories here; I only mention them at all in order to show that the book presents a real problem, and that the time has gone by for speaking of its historical character as something beyond cavil. If, however, we wish to avoid the conclusions of the critics, we can only do so by putting something better in their place. The question we must ask is whether it is possible to give an account of Xenophon's Socratic writings which will explain them as they stand. I believe that it is; but I also believe that it is 'the historical Socrates' who will then appear as the fictitious character.²

IV

By his own account of the matter, Xenophon was quite young—hardly more than five and twenty—when he saw

¹ It has quite recently been argued that two of the most important conversations (i. 4 and iv. 3) are derived from Plato's *Timaeus*, and were inserted in their present place by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism (K. Lincke, *Xenophon und die Stoa*, Neue Jahrbücher, xvii (1906), pp. 673 sqq.).

This view is gradually making its way. Raeder, while speaking of the distinction between the Platonic and the historical Socrates as 'a recognized truth', is equally emphatic in stating that the Platonic Socrates must be distinguished from Plato himself (Platons philosophische Entwickelung, p. 53). Ivo Bruns Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 1896) insists upon the fact that both Plato and Xenophon give faithful portraits of Socrates as they knew him, only it was a different Socrates that they knew. C. Ritter (Platon, i, p. 71) says that Plato's Socrates, 'even though poetically transfigured, is yet certainly the true one, truer not only than the Socrates of comedy, but also than that of Xenophon'. My colleague Professor Taylor's Varia Socratica (St. Andrews University Publications, No. IX. Oxford, Parker) came into my hands too late for me to refer to it in detail. Though I cannot accept all his conclusions, I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with him.

Socrates for the last time. When he made his acquaintance we do not know; but of course Socrates was a familiar figure to most Athenian lads. We can see pretty clearly, however, that Xenophon cannot have associated regularly with Socrates after he reached the age of military service. It is very significant that, as he tells us himself (An. iii. 1. 4), it was the Boeotian Proxenus who wrote to him suggesting that he should attach himself to the expedition of Cyrus. That certainly looks as if he had already served a pretty serious military apprenticeship, and in these years most of the fighting was at a distance from Athens. The fact that a Boeotian professional soldier knew him to be a likely man for an adventure of this kind seems to imply that he had already given proof of such inclinations; and, if so, his intercourse with the teacher who had not left Athens for years must have been intermittent at best.

That Xenophon did know Socrates personally, I see, however, no reason to doubt.² What he tells us on the subject in the *Anabasis* rings true, and is in complete harmony with what we know otherwise. He says (*An.* iii. 1. 5) that, when he had read the letter of Proxenus,

¹ The youth of Xenophon at the time of the expedition of Cyrus was first pointed out clearly by Cobet (Novae Lectiones, pp. 539 and 543). In the Anabasis (iii. 1. 14 and 23) he tells us himself that he hesitated to take command of the Ten Thousand because of his youth. Now two of the generals who had been killed were thirty-five and Proxenus was thirty, so Xenophon must have been appreciably younger. Cp. also iii. 2. 37, iii. 3 sq., and iv. 2 where he insists upon his youth. As Croiset says (Litt. grecque, vol. iv. p. 340, n. 1), 'Si l'on se laissait aller à l'impression générale que donne l'Analase, on attribuerait à Xénophon en 399 plutôt vingt-cinq ans que trente 'The fact that Al ollodorus gave his floruit as the archonship of Xenaenetus (401/0 B.C.) does not weigh against this; for that is merely the date of the expedition.

² It has been doubted by E. Richter, whose work I have not seen.

he consulted Socrates the Athenian on the matter. Socrates had misgivings. He was afraid—and the event proved him right—that, if Xenophon attached himself to Cyrus, it would damage his prospects at Athens, so he advised him to consult the Delphic oracle. But Xenophon had already made up his mind, and only asked the Pythia to what gods he should pray and sacrifice to ensure a prosperous issue to the journey he had in view and a safe return. The oracle, of course, gave him the answer he sought, but Socrates blamed him for not asking first whether he should undertake the journey at all. As it was, he bade him do as the god commanded. This story throws great light on what Xenophon afterwards wrote in the Memorabilia. We read there (i. 1. 4) that Socrates used to warn his friends to do this and not to do that, on the strength of premonitions from his 'divine sign', and that for those who did as he told them it turned out well. while those who did not repented of it later on. We are also told that Socrates used to advise his friends to consult oracles on difficult questions, but in matters within the reach of human intelligence to use their own judgement.

It is not, surely, without significance that Xenophon should tell us this at the very beginning of the *Memorabilia*, just as the story given above from the *Anabasis* occurs at the precise point in the narrative where he introduces his own personality. It seems as if it had been the centre round which his personal memories of Socrates naturally grouped themselves. In those days, as we know from other sources, Socrates struck many young men chiefly as one possessed of a sort of 'second sight'. In the *Theages* (wrongly included in the Platonic canon, but still an early work) we read (128 d 8 sqq.) how

Charmides consulted Socrates before beginning to train for the foot-race at Nemea. He neglected the advice given him, 'and it is worth while to ask him what he got by that training!' So, too, Timarchus declared, when he was being led to execution, that he owed his plight to disregard of a warning given by Socrates. And there were others. A certain Sannio consulted Socrates, just like Xenophon, before starting for the wars, and Socrates is represented as saying that he expects him either to lose his life or come within an ace of doing so.

It was not his second sight alone, however, that attracted these young men to Socrates. If they had regarded him as a mere clairvoyant, their feelings to him would not have been what they plainly were. No doubt it was Alcibiades who did most to make Socrates the fashion; but we can see from the Symposium that Plato had good grounds for believing that his enthusiasm was based on a conviction that Socrates was a man of no common strength of character. In particular, all these young men knew him to be a brave soldier and a good citizen. His services at Potidaea, where he saved the life of Alcibiades, and at Amphipolis, and above all his personal courage in the field of Delium, were matter of common report. In the dialogue called by his name (181 a 7 sqq.), Plato makes Laches express the high esteem in which Socrates was held in military circles, and all that would appeal strongly to the group of young men I am trying to characterize. The close of the war with Sparta had left them without any very definite occupation, and they were very ready to try their luck as soldiers of fortune They were not all Athenians—the Thessalian Meno was one of them—and in any case they had no local

patriotism to speak of. They were willing to fight for any one who would employ them, and they were naturally attracted by a man who had not only given proof of bravery in the field, but had also a mysterious gift of foreseeing the chances of military adventures.

Nor would these young men think any the worse of Socrates because he was an object of suspicion to the leaders of the Athenian democracy. They were mostly hostile, if not actually disloyal, to the democracy themselves. They would certainly be impressed by the action of Socrates at the trial of the generals after Arginusae. Xenophon was very likely present on that occasion, and he mentions the matter with some emphasis in the Hellenica (i. 7. 15).

That Xenophon belonged to this group we may readily admit, without supposing him to have been a member of the more intimate Socratic circle. As we have seen, he can have had little time for that, and this makes his testimony to the existence of such an inner circle all the more valuable. In dealing with the charge that Critias and Alcibiades had been associates of Socrates, he points out that they were so only for a time and to serve their own ends. Besides these, and others like them, there were many who associated with Socrates in order to become good men, and not to further any political ambitions of their own. The names he gives—Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas 1—are all familiar to the readers of Plato.

¹ Mem. i. 2. 48. The mention of the Theban Phaedondas, of whom nothing is known (cp. 59 c 2 n.), might suggest the suspicion that Xenophon merely took his list from the Phaedo, were it not that Plato calls him Phaedondes, just as he calls Archytas Archytes. It almost seems as if Xenophon knew him personally by his Boeotian name.

With one doubtful exception,¹ they are those of men whom he represents as supporting Socrates at the trial or in the prison or both.

Now, if Xenophon is here speaking from his own personal knowledge, he confirms the statements of Plato in the most remarkable way; for he bears witness to the existence of a circle of true disciples which included the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes. If, on the other hand, he has merely taken his list of names from Plato's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, he must mean at the very least that Plato's account of the matter is quite in keeping with the memories of his youth. The reference to Simmias and Cebes in the conversation with Theodote (Mem. iii. 11. 17) shows further that he knew they had been attracted to Athens from Thebes by their desire to associate with Socrates, or at least that he accepted this as a true account of the matter.

There is nothing so far to suggest that Xenophon had any special information about Socrates, or that he was in any real sense his follower. His behaviour in the matter of the Delphic oracle is highly characteristic, and he tells the story himself. It represents him as a self-willed lad who thought he might guard against the consequences of his actions by getting a favourable response, no matter

¹ Most editors follow Groen van Prinsterer in changing the MS. Έρμοκράτης to Έρμογένης, which would bring Xenophon and Plato into complete agreement. It is to be observed, however, that, in the Timaeus and Critias, Plato represents Hermocrates as present, and that he meant to make him the leading speaker in the third dialogue of the trilogy. I do not think it likely that Plato should have invented an impossible meeting, and Hermocrates may have come to Athens and made the acquaintance of Socrates during his exile. If he did, the fact would certainly interest Xenophon.

how, from the Pythia. That is quite human, and we need not be too severe upon him for it; but it hardly inspires confidence in him as a witness to the beliefs of Socrates about things unseen and eternal.

V

Turning a deaf ear to the warnings of Socrates, young Xenophon left Athens to join the expedition of Cyrus, and he never saw Socrates again. He had, therefore, no first-hand knowledge of his trial and death, while Plato was certainly present at the trial. Further, though it is just possible that Xenophon revisited Athens for a short time in the interval between his return from Asia and his fresh departure with Agesilaus, he spent practically all the rest of his life in exile. He was, therefore, far less favourably situated than Plato for increasing his knowledge of Socrates by conversation with others who had known him. Phaedo, indeed, was not far off at Elis, but he never mentions Phaedo at all. He might very easily have made inquiries among the Pythagoreans of Phlius; but, in spite of the exceptional sympathy he shows for Phlius in the Hellenica, he never says a word about Echecrates or any of them. We have seen that he does mention Simmias and Cebes twice (in both cases for a special purpose), but it is very significant that no conversations with them are reported in the Memorabilia. It seems to follow that Xenophon did not belong to the same circle as these men did, and we can very well believe his sympathy with them to have been imperfect. He does appear to have known Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus (*Phaed.* 59 b 7 n.), but that is apparently all.

Where, then, did he get the conversations recorded in

the Memorabilia? To a considerable extent they are discussions at which he cannot have been present, and which he had no opportunity of hearing about from oral tradition, as Plato may easily have done in similar cases. It does not seem probable that they are pure inventions, though he has given them an unmistakable colouring which is quite his own. In some cases they seem to be adaptations from Plato. It is difficult to believe that what he makes Socrates say about Anaxagoras, and the hazy account he gives of the method of hypothesis, have any other source than the Phaedo. It is highly probable that some of the conversations come from Antisthenes, though I think it a mistake to regard Antisthenes as his main source. We must bear in mind that there were many 'Socratic discourses', of which we get a very fair idea from what Wilamowitz calls 'the Socratic Apocrypha'. If we take up the Memorabilia when we are fresh from the Theages or the Clitopho (to the latter of which there seems to be an allusion in the Memorabilia 2). we shall find the book much easier to understand in many respects. If I mistake not, we shall have the feeling that Xenophon got the substance of many of his conversations from sources of this kind, and fitted these as well as he could into his own recollections of the

¹ For Anaxagoras cp. Mem. iv. 7. 6 with Phaed. 97b8, and for $i\pi \delta\theta \epsilon \sigma \iota s$ cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 and Phaed. 92 d 6 n. That both passages are misunderstood proves nothing against this view.

² Clitopho 408 d 2 πως ποτε νῦν ἀποδεχόμεθα τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπὴν ἡμων ἐπ΄ ἀρετην; ὡς ὅντος μόνου τούτου, ἐπεξελθεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἔνι τῷ πράγματι καὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέως;... 410 b 4 νομίσας σε τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δρῶν... μακρότερον δὲ οὐδέν. Cp. Χεπ. Μεπ. ὶ. 4. Ι Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν κτλ.

brave old man with the gift of second sight, whose advice he had sought in early life without any particular intention of taking it.

VI

It is not even necessary for our purpose to discuss the vexed question of Xenophon's veracity, though it is right to mention that, when he claims to have been an evewitness, his statements are not to be trusted. At the beginning of his Symposium he says he was present at the banquet which he describes, though he must have been a child at the time. He also claims in the Oeconomicus to have heard the conversation with Critobulus. in the course of which (4. 18 sqq.) Socrates discusses the battle of Cunaxa, though it is certain that Xenophon saw Socrates for the last time before that battle was fought. These things show clearly that we are not to take his claims to be a first-hand witness seriously, but the misstatements are so glaring that they can hardly have been intended to deceive. Xenophon was eager to defend the memory of Socrates; for that was part of the case against the Athenian democracy. He had to eke out his own rather meagre recollections from such sources as appealed to him most, those which made much of the 'divine sign' and the hardiness of Socrates, and occasionally he has to invent, as is obviously the case in the passage of the Oeconomicus referred to. When Plato

¹ The banquet is supposed to take place in 421/0 B.C. In Athenaeus 216 d we are told that Xenophon was perhaps not born at that date, or was at any rate a mere child. It follows that Herodicus (a follower of Crates of Mallos), whom Athenaeus is here drawing upon, supposed Xenophon to have been only twenty years old at the time of the Anabasis. This is probably an exaggeration of his youth at that date.

reports conversations at which he cannot have been present, he is apt to insist upon the fact that he is speaking at second- or third-hand with what seems to us unnecessary elaboration, but Xenophon's manner is different. He says 'I was there', or 'I heard', but that is only to make the narrative vivid. We are not supposed to believe it.

VII

In view of all this, it is now pretty generally admitted that Xenophon's Socrates must be distinguished from the historical Socrates quite as carefully as Plato's. That seems to leave us with two fictitious characters on our hands instead of one, though of course it is allowed that in both cases the fiction is founded upon fact. But how are we to distinguish the one from the other? We require, it would seem, a third witness, and such a witness has been found in Aristotle. It is pointed out that he was a philosopher, and therefore better able to appreciate the philosophical importance of Socrates than Xenophon was. On the other hand, he was far enough removed from Socrates to take a calm and impartial view of him. a thing which was impossible for Plato. Where, therefore, Aristotle confirms Plato or Xenophon, we may be sure we have at last got that elusive figure, 'the historical Socrates.'2

This method rests wholly, of course, on the assumption that Aristotle had access to independent sources of infor-

¹ Cp. especially the openings of the Parmenides and the Symposium.

This is the distinctive feature of Joel's method in his work entitled Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates. Though I cannot accept his conclusions, I must not be understood to disparage Joel's learning and industry.

mation about Socrates. There can be no question of first-hand evidence; for Socrates had been dead fifteen years when Aristotle was born, and a whole generation had passed away before he came to Athens for the first time. He might certainly have learnt something from conversation with Plato and the older members of the Academy, and he might have read Socratic dialogues no longer extant. It is impossible to suggest any other source from which he could have derived his information, and these do not come to much. It is to be supposed that Plato and his friends would represent Socrates much as he appears in the dialogues, while the lost Socratic writings would not take him far beyond Xenophon.

In practice, too, this criterion proves of little value. Aristotle himself does not tell us a great deal, and the Aristotelian Socrates has to be reconstructed with the help of the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia. This seriously vitiates the results of the method: for the considerations urged in support of Aristotle's trustworthiness cannot be held to cover these later works. As to the remainder, Zeller is clearly right in his contention that Aristotle never says anything about Socrates which he might not have derived from works which are still extant. There is no sign that he had even read the Memorabilia, and in fact the presumption is that, when Aristotle says 'Socrates', he regularly means the Socrates of Plato's dialogues. No doubt, like all of us, he sometimes refers to the Platonic Socrates as Plato, but that is natural enough on any supposition; the really significant fact is that he so often calls him Socrates. Indeed, he was so much in the habit of regarding the dialogues

¹ Phil. der Griechen ii. 94, n. 4.

of Plato as 'discourses of Socrates' that he actually includes the Laws under this title.1 It is surely quite impossible to suppose that he really meant to identify the Athenian Stranger with Socrates. If he was capable of making a blunder like that, it would not be worth while to consider his evidence on the subject at all. It is far simpler to assume that, for Aristotle, Socrates was just the Platonic Socrates, and that, in speaking of the Laws as 'discourses of Socrates', he has made a slip which would be intelligible enough on that supposition, but wholly inexplicable on any other. If that is so, and if 'discourses of Socrates' meant to Aristotle 'dialogues of Plato', we can make no use of what he says to check the statements of Xenophon, and still less to support the view that the Platonic Socrates is unhistorical. Aristotle is always ready to criticize Plato, and if he had been in a position to contrast the real Socrates with Plato's, we may be sure he would have done so somewhere in unmistakable language.

It cannot be said either that Aristotle's statements as to what 'Socrates' really meant are of much help to us. He is by no means a good interpreter of philosophical views with which he is not in sympathy. He is, for instance, demonstrably unfair to the Eleatics, and the Platonic Socrates is almost equally beyond his range.

¹ Pol. B. 6. 1265 a 11 τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν κτλ. Aristotle has just been speaking of the Republic, the paradoxes of which he also ascribes to Socrates, and he goes on to the Laws with these words (1265 a 1) τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν (sc. ὁ Σωκράτης). The editors say that the Athenian Stranger is identified with Socrates, and seem to be unconscious of the absurdity of such an identification.

VIII

It looks after all as if our only chance of learning anything about Socrates was from Plato, but we must of course subject his evidence to the same tests as we have applied to Xenophon and Aristotle. In the first place we must ask what opportunities he had of knowing the true Socrates. He is singularly reticent on this point in his dialogues. We learn from them that he was present at the trial of Socrates but not at his death, and that is all. He has completely effaced his own personality from his writings. We may note, however, that he likes to dwell on the fact that his kinsmen, Critias and Charmides, and his brothers, Glaucon and Adimantus, were intimate with Socrates.

Plato was twenty-eight years old when Socrates was put to death, and we cannot doubt that he had known him from his boyhood. The idea that Plato first made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was grown up may be dismissed. It is inconsistent with all we know about Athenian society, and especially that section of it to which Plato's family belonged. It was common for parents and guardians to encourage boys to associate with Socrates, and to beg Socrates to talk with them. Plato was the nephew of Charmides, and we know that

¹ This rests on the authority of Hermodorus (ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 6), Cp. p. ix, n. 1.

² The current story that Plato made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was twenty does not rest on the authority of Hermodorus at all, though it is quoted in Diogenes Laertius just before the statement referred to in n. n. Others said that Plato associated with Socrates for ten years. Both figures, I take it, are arrived at by a calculation based on the solitary datum furnished by Hermodorus. Some counted from the beginning and others from the end of Plato's two years as an $\epsilon \phi \eta \beta os$. If that is so, there was no genuine tradition.

Charmides was warmly attached to Socrates when Plato was in his 'teens. Even later, as we know from Xenophon, Socrates prevented Glaucon from speaking in public before he was twenty, 'being well-disposed to him because of Charmides and Plato.' In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that Plato did not meet Socrates over and over again in the gymnasia and elsewhere. Xenophon may have known Socrates in this way too, but the presumption is far stronger in the case of Plato. Moreover, the son of Ariston would certainly be a far cleverer boy than the son of Gryllus, while his artistic susceptibility and his keen eye for the characteristic would be early developed. The sketches he has left us of the Master's way with boys in the gymnasia are too vivid to be wholly imaginary.

When he grew up, Plato does not seem to have left Athens. No doubt he saw some service; but he tells us himself that his ambitions were political,² and by his time the political and military careers were quite distinct. If he had qualified himself, like Xenophon, to be a professional soldier, we should have known something about it.

We learn from the dialogue called by his name that Charmides came under the influence of Socrates as a boy, three or four years before the birth of Plato. We learn from Xenophon that he kept up the close relationship to him which began then. It was Socrates who did him the doubtful service of urging him to enter public life in spite of his shyness (Mem. iii. 7), and in the Symposium (1.3) Xenophon represents him as associating with Socrates along with Critobulus, Hermogenes, and Antisthenes. He is made to say that he could associate more freely with Socrates when reduced to poverty by the war. For the conversation with Glaucon, cp. Mem. iii. 6. 1. These data cover the whole period of Plato's boyhood and early manhood.

² Ep. vii. 324 b 8 sqq.

Plato, then, had exceptional opportunities of knowing Socrates, but this does not prove that he belonged to the inner Socratic circle.1 The evidence does not carry us beyond the probability that he belonged to the group of young men-'the sons of the richer citizens, who have most time to spare' 2—who gathered round Socrates for the pleasure of hearing him expose the ignorance of pretenders to knowledge. That is a different group from the one to which Xenophon belonged, but it is equally well marked, and it is not the inner circle. We can infer no more from the passage in the Apology where Socrates offers to call Adimantus to prove that Plato had got no harm from associating with him.3 The fact that Phaedo thinks it necessary to explain Plato's absence from the scene in the prison may mean a little more, but that refers to a later date.

If we regard the Seventh Epistle as Plato's—and I do not see who else could have written it—the matter appears in a clearer light. Plato does not say a word in it about having been a disciple of Socrates, though he speaks of him as an older friend for whose character he had a profound admiration. His ambitions, as we have seen, were political, not scientific. He was in his twenty-fourth year when the Thirty were established, and his kinsmen urged him to take office under them; but the behaviour of Socrates in the affair of Leon of Salamis 5

¹ We cannot draw any inference from Xenophon's omission of his name from the list. To mention the kinsman of Critias and Charmides would have spoilt the point he is trying to make.

² Apol. 23 c 2. ³ Apol. 34 a 1.

⁴ Ερ. vii. 324 d8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη, δν ἐγὰ σχεδδν οὐκ ὰν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὰν δικαιότατον εἶναι τῶν τότε.

⁵ Ep. vii. 324 e 2 ἐπί τινα τῶν πολιτῶν μεθ' ἐτέρων ἔπεμπον, βία ἄξοντα ώς

opened his eyes to the real character of the oligarchy. When the Thirty fell, he was at first impressed by the moderation of the restored democracy, and once more thought of entering public life, but the condemnation of Socrates proved to him that there was no hope in that direction either.¹ In fact, though his first awakening went back to the year of the Thirty, his final conversion dated only from the death of Socrates. He probably rose a new man from the sick-bed on which he was then lying. It would not be the only case of a man called to be an apostle after the death of his Master.

Such seems to me the most probable account of the relations between Socrates and Plato; but, even if he was not a disciple in the strict sense, his opportunities for learning to know Socrates as he really was were vastly greater than those of Xenophon. Above all, he was at Athens during the last two years of his life, while Xenophon was in Asia. So far as the *Phaedo* is concerned, the statement of our earliest authority, Hermodorus, that, after the death of Socrates, Plato threw in his lot with the Socratics and retired with them to Megara, the home of Euclides and Terpsion, is of the first importance.² We may be sure that he made it his business to hear every detail of the Master's last words and actions from all who had been present, and he makes Phaedo express the delight they all took in speaking of him, while Echecrates

ἀποθανούμενον, ἵνα δὴ μετέχοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς, εἴτε βούλοιτο εἴτε μή ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐπείθετο, πῶν δὲ παρεκινδύνευσεν παθεῖν πρὶν ἀνοσίων αὐτοῖς ἔργων γενέσθαι κοινωνός. The story is told in Apol. 32 c 4 sqq., where the name of Leon is given.

¹ Ep. vii. 325 a 5 sqq. Plato says that he was prevented from entering public life by the impossibility of effecting anything without a party and the proved impossibility of acting with either party.

² Cp. p. ix, n. 1.

voices the desire of all admirers of Socrates for exact information about him. That Plato was really in a position to give a full and true account of the day described in the *Phaedo* is not, therefore, open to doubt.

IX

Still, it will be said, the ancient idea of historical truth was so different from ours, that we cannot look for what is called an 'objective narrative' from such a writer as Plato. It is usual to refer to the speeches of Thucydides in support of this contention, and they are really rather to the point. It seems to me, however, that they prove something different from the position they are supposed to illustrate. Thucydides tells us that he has put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as he thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time endeavouring, as nearly as he could, to give the general purport of what was actually said.1 Even that would carry us a considerable way in the case of the Platonic Socrates in the Phaedo. It would surely mean at the very least that Socrates discussed immortality with two Pythagoreans on his dying day, and that implies a good many other things.

But it is really the contrast between the speeches of Thucydides and the dialogues of Plato that is most instructive. Broadly speaking, all the orators in Thucydides speak in the same style. Even Pericles and Cleon can hardly be said to be characterized. In Plato

¹ Thuc. i. 22. Observe that he only professes to give τὰ δέοντα, what was called for by the occasion, not τὰ προσήκοντα, what was appropriate to the character of the speakers.

we find just the opposite. Even the Eleatic Stranger and the speakers in the Laws have a character of their own, and only seem shadowy by contrast with the rich personalities of the earlier dialogues. This realism is just one of the traits which distinguishes the literature of the fourth century from that of the fifth. Aristotle had observed the existence of the new literary genre and calls attention to the fact that it had not received a name. It had two distinctive marks, it used prose for its instrument and it was an imitation. It included the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and also 'the Socratic discourses'.1 This classification of the Platonic dialogue with the mime is one of Aristotle's happiest thoughts. If the anecdotes which are told of Plato's delight in Sophron are historical, we can see what suggested it; but in any case, it is true. Plato's dialogues really are mimes, but with this difference, that the characters are all real and well-known people. They are just the opposite of the speeches in Thucydides.

The critics have, no doubt, discovered a certain number of apparent anachronisms in the dialogues. It is said that, in the Symposium (193a 2), Plato makes Aristophanes refer to the διοικισμός of Mantinea which took place in 385 B.C., and that, in the Meno (90 a 4), he makes Socrates refer to the enrichment of Ismenias by Persian gold as recent, whereas it happened after the death of Socrates. The latter instance, however, is extremely doubtful; for Ismenias was an important figure at Thebes considerably before the death of

¹ Poet. 1447 b 2 sqq.

² The story that Socrates was a student and imitator of Sophron rests on the authority of Duris of Samos (FHG. ii, p. 480).

Socrates.¹ and the former is probably a misunderstanding. Aristophanes does not mention Mantinea, and what he says about the διοικισμός of the Arcadians by Sparta may very well refer to the dissolution of the Arcadian Confederacy, which was quite recent when the banquet described in the Symposium is supposed to take place.² For my part, I am quite ready to accept the dictum of Wilamowitz that there are no anachronisms in Plato; but, even if there were one or two of the kind just mentioned. they would be of little account. They would have to be regarded as slips which no one would have noticed unless he had been looking for them, and which do not detract in the least from the historical character of the dialogues in which they occur.

On the other hand, we must note certain positive features which show that Plato was not only a realist in his character-drawing, but had also a strong sense of historical perspective and a genuine feeling for historical values. In particular, he has avoided completely a very subtle form of anachronism. He has a wonderful way of keeping up the illusion that his dialogues belong to the pre-revolutionary period. The Revolutions of 404 and

¹ Cp E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. v. §§ 854, 855. The chronology of the Hellenica is certainly at fault in regard to these transactions, and Persian gold may well have found its way to Thebes before the supposed date of the conversation described in the Meno.

² Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Die Xenophontische Apologie, Hermes xxxvi (1897), p. 102. n. I. He points out that Plato does not make Aristophanes mention Mantinea at all, and that the allusion does not correspond to what we know of the Spartan treatment of Mantinea in 385 B.C. The Arcadian League struck coins with the superscription 'Αρκαδικόν, and these coins cease after the battle of 418 B.C. As the Symposium is supposed to take place in 416 B.C., Aristophanes is alluding in a natural way to an event then recent.

403 B. C. made a complete break in the politics and literature of Athens. A new world had arisen, and the carry-over, so to speak, was far less than at the French Revolution. There is hardly a single statesman or writer of the fifth century whose activity was prolonged into the fourth. Aristophanes is the exception that proves the rule; for the Aristophanes of the Ecclesiazusae and the Plutus is a different man from the Aristophanes of the Lysistrata and the Birds. It is important to realize this gap between the centuries and to keep it constantly in view if we wish to understand Plato's art.

The majority of the dialogues are supposed to take place before the Revolutions, and Plato never loses sight of this for a moment, though many of his personages came to play a leading part in the troubled times which he had cause to remember so vividly. Critias and Charmides were kinsmen of his own, and he must have been affected by the tragedy of the life of Alcibiades. Yet there is not the slightest hint of all this in the Charmides or the Symposium. Critias is still a cultured politician and poet; Charmides is still a modest and beautiful lad; Alcibiades is still at the height of his wild career. Coming events are not even suffered to cast their shadows before, as an inferior artist would have made them do. Like the great dramatist he was, Plato has transported himself back to the age of Pericles and the age of Alcibiades, and portrayed them as they seemed to the men who lived in them, not as they must have appeared to his contemporaries and to himself, when the glamour of the great time had passed away.

Nowhere, perhaps, is Plato's self-restraint in this respect better seen than in the picture he has drawn

of Aristophanes. It is almost the only one of his literary portraits which we can fully appreciate. We can form a fairly clear idea of Aristophanes from his comedies. and there can be no doubt that Plato's Aristophanes corresponds admirably to it. The Platonic Aristophanes is thoroughly Aristophanic, and this raises at least a presumption that the Platonic Socrates is Socratic. But, above all, what strikes us is the relation of good fellowship in which Socrates and Aristophanes stand to one another. The Clouds had been produced some years before, but they are still the best of friends. At that time, there was really no reason why Socrates should resent the brilliant caricature of Aristophanes, and Alcibiades does not hesitate to quote it in his encomium (Symp. 221 b 3). No one in these days would take a comedy too seriously. At a later date, things were rather different. Even if what Socrates is made to say about Aristophanes in the Apology is not to be taken quite literally, the Socratic circle must have felt some resentment against him after the condemnation. Yet Plato keeps all that out of sight; such thoughts belong to the fourth century and not to the fifth.

It seems to me that the reason why Plato's power of transporting himself back to an earlier time has met with such scant recognition is just the success with which he has done it. As we read him, we can hardly realize that he is calling up a time which was passing away when he himself was a boy. The picture is so actual that we feel it must be contemporary. That is why so many writers on Plato speak as if the first half of the fourth century ran concurrently with the second half of the fifth.¹ They

¹ It is no wonder that lesser writers should be deceived, seeing that

think of Plato as the adversary of the 'Sophists', though when he wrote, there were no longer any sophists in the sense intended. They were merely memories in his day; for they had no successors. Even Thrasymachus belongs to the generation which flourished when Plato was a child.¹ So, too, the problems discussed in the dialogues

Eduard Meyer, who has done more than any one to make the historical background of Plato's life intelligible, falls under the illusion. He says (Gesch, des Alterthums, vol. iv, p. 429) that the Symposium 'proves nothing as to the relations of Socrates with Aristophanes, but only as to those of Plato. . . . Two such diametrically opposed natures as Socrates and Aristophanes could have no relations with one another, but it is quite natural that Plato and Aristophanes should have found and understood each other'. He finds a confirmation of this in the Ecclesiazusae, which he regards as a parody of Plato's Republic, but which he says is quite free from the bitterness and malice of the Clouds, so that Plato and Aristophanes may have been on excellent terms. Now Meyer also holds (loc. eit.) that Aristophanes was in earnest when he attacked Socrates, and that Plato was quite right in ascribing the chief responsibility for his master's death to him. We must apparently believe then that, some half-dozen years after the death of Socrates (the Ecclesiazusae was probably produced in 392 B.c.), and within a few years of the time he wrote the Phaedo, Plato 'found and understood' the man whom he rightly regarded as mainly responsible for the death of Socrates, and then thought it appropriate to write a dialogue in which he represents Socrates and Aristophanes as boon companions. If that can be true, anything may. The fact is that the Aristophanes whom Plato might very well have 'found and understood' is just the Aristophanes of the Symposium, not the revenant who wrote the Ecclesiazusae and the Plutus. But Plato was only a baby when the Clouds was produced, and a mere boy at the time the Symposium took place. What we may really infer is that the references to Aristophanes in the Apology are little more than Socratic persiflage like the similar allusion in the Phaedo itself (70 c 1), and that Plato knew very well that Aristophanes was not in earnest, and that no one supposed he was. Constantin Ritter has, in my opinion, put this matter in a truer light (Platon, i, p. 50, n. 1).

1 Thrasymachus is about the last representative of the 'Sophists' (though Plato never gives him that name), and he was early enough to be satirized in the Δαιταλῆs, the first comedy which Aristophanes wrote. That was in 427 B.C., before Plato had learned to speak. It is improbable

are those which were of interest at the time they are supposed to take place. That of the Strong Man, for instance, which is the subject of the Gorgias, belongs to the end of the fifth century. It is also the theme of the Herakles of Euripides.

It naturally follows from this that, when Plato does wish to discuss questions which had come up in his own time, he is quite conscious of the impropriety of making Socrates the leading speaker. If we adopt the chronology of the dialogues now generally received, the Theaetetus is, with one striking exception, the latest in which Socrates leads the discussion. In the Parmenides, he is quite a youth, and the immature character of his views is shown by Parmenides and Zeno. In form, the Sophist and the Statesman are a sequel to the Theaetetus; but Socrates, though present, takes hardly any part in the argument, which is conducted by an anonymous stranger from Elea. The Timaeus and the Critias profess in the same way to continue the Republic, but here too Socrates is no more than an 'honorary president', as a recent writer puts it. We can see that the same was meant to be the case in the Hermocrates, a dialogue which Plato designed but never wrote. In the Laws, Socrates disappears altogether, and his place is taken by an 'Athenian Stranger' who seems really to be Plato himself. The only exception to this rule is the Philebus, and that exception is easily accounted for, as the dialogue deals with subjects which Plato makes Socrates discuss elsewhere. In fact the *Philebus* is the crucial case. It must

that he was still living when Plato began to write, and the theories which he is made to uphold in the *Republic* are not such as any one is likely to have maintained in the fourth century.

be later than some, at least, of the dialogues just mentioned, and the fact that Plato once more makes Socrates take the lead shows that it was solely in the interests of historical verisimilitude that he refrained from doing so in other dialogues.

X

Of course, if we are to regard Plato as our best authority, we shall have to revise our estimate of Socrates as a philosopher. The need for such a revision has long been felt, though it has never been taken thoroughly in hand. Even before Hegel laid down that Xenophon was our only authority for the philosophy of Socrates, Schleiermacher had suggested a much more fruitful method of studying the question. He started from the consideration that, as Xenophon himself was no philosopher, and as the Memorabilia does not profess to be anything more than a defence of Socrates against certain definite accusations, we are entitled to assume that Socrates may have been more than Xenophon is able to tell us, and that there may have been other sides to his teaching than Xenophon thinks it convenient to disclose in view of his immediate purpose. He goes on to show that Socrates must have been more than Xenophon tells us, if he was to exercise the attraction he did upon the ablest and most speculative men of his time. The question, then, is: 'What may Socrates have been, besides what Xenophon tells us of him, without, however, contradicting the traits of character and principles of life which Xenophon definitely sets up as Socratic; and what must he have

¹ Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen (Works, Section III vol. ii, pp. 287 sqq.).

been to give Plato the occasion and the right to represent him as he does in his dialogues?' This is surely the proper light in which to regard the question, and it was formally acknowledged to be so by Zeller, though the consequences of so regarding it have not been fully recognized. I would only add one more question to Schleiermacher's, and it is quite in harmony with his method. We must ask, I think, very specially 'What must Socrates have been to win the enthusiastic devotion of the Pythagoreans of Thebes and Phlius and of the Eleatics of Megara?' That question is forced upon us by any serious study of the Phaedo, and the answer to it reveals Socrates to us in a very different light from Xenophon's Memorabilia.

XI

For one thing, this consideration suggests that Socrates cannot have stood aloof from the scientific movement of his time. Xenophon does not really say that he did. He tells us, indeed, that Socrates dissuaded his friends from spending their lives in the study of higher mathematics and astronomy, but he adds in both cases that Socrates was not unversed in these subjects himself. It would be quite like Socrates to tell a young man to leave these things alone till he had learnt to know himself, and that would account for all Xenophon says.¹ Nor does

¹ Mem. iv. 7. 3 καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν (sc. τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων, as Xenophon quaintly calls them), ib. 5 καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν (sc. the planetary orbits, their distances from the earth, the times of their revolutions and their causes, i.e. the whole higher astronomy of the Pythagoreans). Certainly Socrates held that there was something more important than this knowledge, and what Xenophon tells us as to his advice not to waste one's life in such studies would be amply accounted for by the recollection of some such saying as that re-

Aristotle say anything inconsistent with the account given by Socrates of his intellectual development in the Phaedo (96 a 6 sqq.). He only says that he applied his new method of universal definitions to ethical subjects alone; and, as the Phaedo represents the discovery of the new method as subsequent to the scientific studies of Socrates, there is no contradiction at all. On the other hand, the narrative in the Phaedo is confirmed in a striking way by our earliest witness, Aristophanes. As was pointed out long ago by F. A. Wolf,2 Socrates was only about forty-five years old, and Plato and Xenophon were babies, when the Clouds came out (423 B.C.), and it is quite possible that Socrates was still known chiefly as a student of natural science at that time. The really decisive argument, however, is this, that, if we take the Phaedo and the Clouds seriously, making due allowance for comic exaggeration in the latter, we get an account of the scientific position of Socrates which fits exactly into what we know of the intellectual atmosphere of the middle of the fifth century B. C., and which would be inconceivable at any other date.

In the first place, the cosmological theories burlesqued in the *Clouds* are mainly those of Diogenes of Apollonia, who had revived the theory of Anaximenes that Air was

corded in the Phaedrus (229 e5) οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. Cp. Mem. i. 1. 12 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες Ικανῶς ἥδη τὰνθρώπινα εἶδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν κτλ.

¹ Cp Met. 987 b r; 1078 b 17. Part. An. 642 a 28. These statements only mean that Socrates did not apply his special method to cosmological subjects. Aristotle nowhere denies that Socrates started from the science of his time.

² See his edition of the Clouds (1811), pp. ix sqq.

the primary substance. Indeed, the whole comedy is based on this. According to Diogenes, Air condenses into Mist, and becomes visible in the form of Clouds. That is why the Clouds are the divinities of the Socratic school. Further, Diogenes held that Air was what we think with, and that is why Socrates swings aloft in the air. The damp of the earth would clog his thought. The theories of Diogenes were fashionable at Athens when Socrates was a young man, and it would only be natural for him to adopt them at that date.

Another influence with which we must reckon is that of the Anaxagorean Archelaus. The statement that Socrates was his disciple is far too well attested to be ignored. Ion of Chios apparently said that he visited Samos with Archelaus, and in any case the statement was known to Aristoxenus and (what is more important) to Theophrastus.⁴ It is, therefore, no Alexandrian figment. Archelaus is not mentioned in the *Phaedo* by

¹ See Diels in *Rhein. Mus.* N.F. xlii, p. 12 sqq. and *Vors.*² pp. 340, 341. Cp. also E. Gr. Ph.² p. 408, n. 3.

⁸ See E. Gr. Ph. ² pp. 409 sqq.

 $^{^3}$ Cp. Phaedo $\mathbf{96}$ b 4 n and Clouds 225 sqq. where Socrates explains that he could not rightly have discovered 'the things aloft', εὶ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα | λεπτὴν καταμείξας ἐς τὸν ὅμοιον ἀέρα. If he had tried to do so on the ground, he would have failed οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' ἡ γῆ βία | ἔλκει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἰκμάδα τῆς φροντίδος. Cp. Theophrastus, de Sens. 44 (of Diogenes) φρονεῖν δ', ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῷ ἀέρι καθαρῷ καὶ ξηρῷ κωλύειν γὰρ τὴν ἰκμάδα τὸν νοῦν.

⁴ Diog. Laert. ii. 22 Ίων δὲ ὁ Χῖος καὶ νέον ὅντα (sc. Σωκράτη) εἰς Σάμον σὺν ᾿Αρχελάφ ἀποδημῆσαι. Ion may, however, have meant another Socrates, as Wilamowitz suggests (*Philol. Unters.* i. 24), viz. Socrates of Anagyrus, who was a colleague of Pericles and Sophocles in the Samian War For the evidence of Aristoxenus, see Diels, *Vors.*² p. 323. 34 sqq. For Theophrastus, cp. Diels, *Dox.* p. 479. 17 Καὶ ᾿Αρχέλαος ὁ ᾿Αθηναῖος, ῷ καὶ Σωκράτη συγγεγονέναι φασίν, ᾽Αναξαγόρου γενομένφ μαθητῆ. See also Chiapelli in *Arch. f. Gesch. der Phil.* iv, pp. 369 sqq.

name, but Socrates says he had heard the book of Anaxagoras read aloud by 'some one' and had been deeply impressed by it (97 b 8 sqq.).

The narrative in the *Phaedo* goes on to tell us how Socrates grew dissatisfied with the doctrines of Anaxagoras. That also is characteristic of the time. Gorgias certainly, and Protagoras probably, had given up science in the same way. And we can see pretty clearly that the dialectic of the Eleatic Zeno was what shook the faith of all three.¹ In the *Parmenides*, Plato has told us this of Socrates in so many words, while the problem of the unit, which had been raised by Zeno, holds a prominent place in the enumeration of his doubts and difficulties in the *Phaedo* (c6 e 7 sqq.).

But there is another influence at work and from a different quarter. In the *Phaedo* there are several references to the doctrines of Empedocles. Socrates was in doubt whether 'what we think with' was Air or Blood (96 b 4). The latter was the doctrine of Empedocles, and Aristotle tells us it was adopted by Critias. What is more important still is that Socrates was troubled in his youth by the question whether the earth was flat or round (97 d 8), and that implies Pythagorean influence. The philosophers of Ionia all held that the earth was flat, and it was only from some Italian source that Socrates could have learned the other theory.

¹ Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 417. Gorgias had been an Empedoclean (*ib.* p. 234, n. 4), and Plato at least suggests that Protagoras had been a Heraclitean (*ib.* p. 188). The experience of Socrates was only one effect among others of the 'bankruptcy of science' in the middle of the fifth century (*ib.* 406).

³ Arist. de An. A. 2. 405 b 6. As Empedocles joined the Athenian colony of Thurii in 444 B.C., his views may easily have become known at Athens.

³ Cp. 97 d 8 n.

This influence of Western cosmological ideas upon Socrates is confirmed in a curious way by Aristophanes. It is quite natural that Socrates should be classed with those who busy themselves with 'things aloft' (7à μετέωρα), but we regularly find that 'the things beneath the earth ' $(\tau \alpha \ \upsilon \pi \delta \ \gamma \hat{\eta} s)$ are associated with these in his case.1 Now it was Empedocles who first paid much attention to the subterranean. The volcanic phenomena of Sicily and the Orphic interest in the House of Hades both led him to dwell upon the question of the earth's interior,2 and this double interest is beautifully brought out in the closing myth of the Phaedo. Aristophanes knows this point too, and his words έρεβοδιφῶσιν ὑπὸ τον Τάρταρον³ might have been written in ridicule of the very theories which Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates at the end of our dialogue.

Further details as to the science of the *Phaedo* will be found in the notes; here I only wish to point out that the curious fusion of Ionian and Western theories which characterizes it is inexplicable unless we regard it as belonging to Athens in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At no other date, and in no other place, could such a fusion well have taken place.⁴

¹ Cp. Apol 18 b 7 τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστης καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκώς, Clouds 188 ζητοῦσιν οὕτοι τὰ κατὰ γῆς.

² E. Gr. Ph. ² p. 277, n. 2. Diels, Vors. ² p. 164. 1.

³ Clouds 192. The interest of the myth in the Phaedo is mainly eschatological, but it also gives us a complete theory of $\tau \hat{\alpha}$ $i\pi \hat{\alpha}$ $\gamma \hat{\eta} \hat{\tau}$, explaining incidentally tides, volcanoes, earthquakes, and the like. The subterranean rivers are specially Empedoclean.

⁴ The Ionians remained unaffected by the more scientific cosmology of the West. Democritus still believed that the earth was a disk hollow in the centre. As explained in the note to *Phaedo* 109 b 3, the theory of Socrates represents an attempt to combine this view with the theory of a spherical earth. At any date earlier or later than that of Socrates.

XII

According to the Phaedo, when Socrates gave up natural science in despair, he found satisfaction in what is generally known as the Theory of Ideas. I have tried to explain this theory simply in the Notes, so far as such an explanation is necessary for a right understanding of the Phaedo; we have only to do here with the fact that it is represented in our dialogue as already familiar to Socrates and all his associates, whereas it is generally held to be a specifically Platonic doctrine, and one which was not even formulated by Plato in any dialogue earlier than the Phaedo itself. This is evidently a problem of the first magnitude and cannot be treated fully here. I can only restate the conclusion to which I have come elsewhere, namely, that the doctrine in question was not originated by Plato, or even by Socrates, but is essentially Pythagorean, as Aristotle tells us it was.1 A few further considerations, which tend to confirm this view are, however, strictly pertinent to the present inquiry.

We have seen that there was a point beyond which Plato did not think it right to go in making Socrates the leader of his dialogues. Now, if the 'Ideal Theory' had originated with himself, and if, as is commonly believed, it was the central thing in his philosophy, we should certainly expect the point at which Socrates begins to take a subordinate place to be that at which the theory is introduced. What we do find is exactly the opposite.

such an attempt would have been an anachronism, and it is only at Athens that it would seem worth making. The Ionians did not trouble themselves about a spherical earth nor the Westerns about a flat one.

¹ E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 354 sqq.

The dialogues where Socrates falls into the background are just those in which the 'Ideal Theory' is criticized, or in which nothing at all is said about it; where it is assumed and affirmed, Plato has no hesitation in making Socrates its mouthpiece. Indeed, with one remarkable and significant exception, no speaker but Socrates is ever made to expound the doctrine at all, and the exception is the *Pythagorean* Timaeus.¹

It has been said that to question Plato's authorship of the 'Ideal Theory' is 'to deprive him of his birthright'. It is at any rate a birthright he has never claimed; indeed, he has done everything in his power to bar any such claim on his part. He has made Socrates discuss the theory with Parmenides and Zeno almost a generation before his own birth, and he has indicated that it was not unknown to the Eleatics. Nor is it only Socrates who is represented as familiar with the theory. In the Phaedo, the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, know all about it and are enthusiastic believers in it. Men of such divergent views as Antisthenes and Euclides of Megara are present, but no one asks for a proof of it. or even for an explanation. It is simply taken for granted. When Phaedo repeats all this to the Pythagoreans at Phlius, the same thing happens. Echecrates. who shows himself anxious for exact information on other points, asks no questions about this one. As I have argued elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 3.55), it is surely incredible that any philosopher should introduce a novel

¹ Tim. 5Ic 4 εἶναί τἱ φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν. Here we have the 'we', which is such a marked feature of the discussions of the Phaedo, and this time it is used by a Pythagorean. The Timaeus was written years after the Phaedo, but it still preserves the old way of speaking.

theory of his own by representing it as already familiar to a number of distinguished living contemporaries, and that in reporting a conversation at which he distinctly states he was not present.

Plato's own contribution to philosophy is a great enough thing, quite apart from the theory of 'forms' expounded in the Phaedo. This is not the place to discuss it, but it seems worth while to consider how it has come about that in modern times the 'Ideal Theory' of the Phaedo and the Republic has often been regarded as practically the whole of it. In the first place, about the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the dialogues from which we can learn anything of Plato's riper thought, the dialogues in which Socrates no longer takes the leading part, were declared to be spurious. In the second place, the importance of Plato's oral teaching in the Academy, which did not find full expression in his dialogues, was seriously underrated. This was due to a natural reaction against the theory of an 'esoteric doctrine', which had been much abused; but it cannot really be disputed that many of Plato's fundamental doctrines were only expounded orally. Aristotle over and over again attributes to him precise statements which may be implicit in the later dialogues, but are certainly not to be found there in so many words. The task of reconstructing Plato's mature philosophy from the unsympathetic criticisms of Aristotle is a delicate but not, I believe, an impossible one.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the later dialogues were reinstated one by one in the positions from which they had been thrust, and a serious attempt was made to understand Aristotle's criticism of Plato.

It was assumed that there was a 'later theory of Ideas' 1 which in many respects contradicted that set forth in the Phaedo and the Republic, and this had one very salutary effect, that of directing attention once more to those dialogues which had always been held in antiquity to contain the genuine philosophy of Plato. At the same time. I am convinced that the theory of an earlier and later theory of Ideas is only a half-way house. Aristotle knows nothing of such a distinction, and he would have delighted to insist upon it if he had. The time has come. I believe, for a return to the older and better view. I prefer, accordingly, not to speak of 'Plato's earlier theory of Ideas', because I do not believe the theory was Plato's at all; and I prefer not to speak of 'Plato's later theory of Ideas', because I am not clear that Platonism proper is adequately described as a 'theory of Ideas', however true it may be that it is based on the Pythagorean doctrine to which alone that name is really appropriate.2

¹ This view is specially associated with the name of Professor Henry Jackson. Though I cannot accept all his results, I must not be taken to undervalue his great services to Platonic study. The genuineness of Plato's later dialogues was first clearly established by my predecessor, Professor Lewis Campbell.

² Aristotle is commonly said to have denied that Socrates held 'the theory of Ideas', but there is really no such statement in all his writings. What he does say is that Socrates did not make universals 'separate' ($\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\tau\dot{\alpha}$) from particulars, and that is quite true of the Platonic Socrates. In the Parmenides he is represented as puzzled about the precise relation of the forms to particular things, and in the Phaedo (100 d 5) he is not sure whether $\pi\alpha\rho\rho\sigma\dot{\alpha}$ or $\kappa\rho\iota\nu\omega\dot{\alpha}$ is the right term. So, too, particulars 'partake in' or 'imitate' the forms; but always and everywhere the particular thing is what it is because the $\epsilon l\delta\sigma s$ is immanent in it. We know from Plato's Sophist that there were 'friends of the $\epsilon l\delta\eta$ ' who did 'separate' the intelligible from the sensible, and it is with these that Aristotle contrasts Socrates. The true Peripatetic interpretation is preserved

It remains to be added that I have only discussed in the notes that aspect of the theory of Ideas with which we are concerned in reading the Phaedo. So far as that dialogue goes, it is a purely logical and scientific doctrine. The possibility of science extends just as far as the theory of Ideas will carry us and no further. Where it can no longer be applied, the region of myth begins. I am well aware that the doctrine has another aspect, to which attention has been specially called by Professor Stewart In certain dialogues the Ideas are regarded as objects of ecstatic contemplation, and appear, to some extent, in a mythical setting. With that we have nothing to do at present. I may say, however, to avoid misunderstanding, that, while I quite agree with the demand for a 'psychological' explanation of this way of presenting the doctrine, I can by no means admit that the explanation is to be looked for in the ψυχή of Plato son of Ariston. The idea of ecstatic vision is most prominent in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, that is to say, in just those dialogues where Plato's dramatic art is at its best, and where, therefore, if my general principles of interpretation are sound, Socrates is most truly Socrates. The soul of the man who stood transfixed in silent, brooding thought for twenty-four hours in the camp at Potidaea is surely the soul to which we must look for a psychological explanation of the beatific vision described in the Phaedrus. On what else can his thoughts

by Aristocles the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fr. 1) Ούχ ήκιστα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης, αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐγένετο πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρί, καθάπερ αὐτὸς ἔφη Πλάτων. εὐφυέστατος γὰρ ὧν καὶ δεινὸς ἀπορῆσαι περὶ παντὸς ότουοῦν, ἐπεισήνεγκε τάς τε ἡθικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς σκέψεις, ἔτι δὲ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν, πρῶτος ἐπιχειρήσας ὁρίζεσθαι πάντα δὲ ἐγείρων λόγον καὶ περὶ πάντων ζητῶν, ἔφθη τελευτήσας.

have been concentrated during that day and night? Surely not on the things he discusses in the *Memorabilia*?

XIII

The best book on Greek beliefs about the soul has no chapter on Socrates. Even Plato, the writer says, had not clearly conceived the thought of immortality so long as he continued to regard the world from the standpoint of a slightly developed Socraticism.\(^1\) This view is based on two considerations. It is said, in the first place, that in the Apology Plato makes Socrates treat the question of immortality as an open one, and that the Apology is more historical than the Phaedo. In the second place, it is pointed out that Xenophon does not make Socrates say anything about immortality in the Memorabilia. The inference is that the belief was foreign to 'the historical Socrates'.

When, however, we look a little closer at these facts, their significance is seen to be rather different. Plato's Apology professes to give us the speeches delivered by Socrates at his trial; and, though it would be absurd to treat it as a word for word report, it is doubtless historical in its main outlines.² Even if it is not, it is clear that Plato has taken pains to make it such a speech as might actually have been delivered in an Athenian court, and it is quite certain from the practice of the orators that, in addressing the judges, it was impossible to assume immortality as distinct from mere survival. The old belief in powerful and dangerous ghosts had disappeared and nothing very definite had

¹ E. Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 265 (557).

² As Gomperz puts it, the Apology is 'stilisierte Wahrheit'.

taken its place. No doubt the average Athenian would allow that the souls of the departed had some sort of existence—the religious observances connected with the dead imply that—but he had lost all faith in the primitive belief that they continued to interest themselves in the affairs of this world. 'If by any means,' says Demosthenes, 'the departed should be made aware of what is now taking place,' and that is the standing formula.1 Nor is there any evidence that people thought of the next life as a better life, or of the house of Hades as a better world. It was believed, indeed, that those who had been initiated at Eleusis enjoyed a better lot than others. They alone could properly be said to live after death; but even that was a shadowy sort of life, and as far removed as possible from the immortality preached by the Orphic sectaries and the Pythagoreans. According to them, the soul was divine and immortal in its own right, and it was only after separation from the body that it could become truly itself. The soul of the Orphic votary dwelt with God and the saints and attained to complete purity and wisdom, while the initiated of Eleusis were at best a class of privileged shades.

Had there been any real belief in a better life, it must have found expression in the Funeral Speeches, and especially in that part of them which was regularly devoted to the consolation of the survivors²; but we

¹ Cp. Dem. Lept. 87 εἴ τινες τούτων τῶν τετελευτηκότων λάβοιεν τρόπφ τινὶ τοῦ νυνὶ γιγνομένου πράγματος αἴσθησιν. At the end of his speech against Eratosthenes (100) Lysias goes so far as to say οἶμαι δ' αὐτοὺς (τοὺς τεθνεὼτας) ἡμῶν τε ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς εἴσεσθαι τὴν ψῆφον φέροντας, which is the strongest statement in the orators. Cp. also Isocr. 19. 42 εἴ τίς εστιν αἴσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων, Plato, Menex. 248 b γ εἴ τις ἔστι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν αἴσθησις τῶν ζώντων.

² Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 203 (495), n. 3.

find nothing of the sort even in the *Menexenus*, which is put into the mouth of Socrates. The writer, whether Plato or another, has felt bound to conform to the usual practice in this respect. Nor is there any trace in Aeschylus or Sophocles of a belief in a blessed immortality. It is Euripides who says 'Who knows if life be death and death be life?', and is laughed at by Aristophanes for doing so. We see from this how foreign such a thought was to the Athenian mind. Euripides, like Socrates, had been influenced by strange doctrines, and he, like Socrates, was considered 'impious'.

In the Apology, then, Socrates only speaks as he was bound to speak. He wishes to show that death is no evil to a good man even if the ordinary view of it is correct. At the worst, it is a dreamless sleep, and a night of dreamless sleep is better than most waking days. But that is only one possibility. There are certain 'sayings' according to which death is really a migration of the soul to another world; and, if these are true, we may hope after death to join the company of Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer. It is surely clear that Socrates himself is more in sympathy with this belief than the other, though he may not say so in as many words, and though he speaks with a certain reserve on the subject. Even in the Phaedo he makes certain reservations. He is sure that the soul is immortal, and that the purified soul only leaves the

¹ This, and not 'popular opinion', I take to be the meaning of τὰ λεγό-μενα in Apol. 40 c γ. d 6. Cp. notes on Phaedo 63 c 6 and 70 c 5. The term belongs originally to the language of the mysteries, in which τὰ λεγόμενα are opposed to τὰ δρώμενα, and is used elsewhere in Plato of the mystic doctrine or iερδς λόγος.

body to be with the wise and good God; he is not sure that it will enjoy the company of the saints and heroes of old. Both in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere he steadily declines to commit himself to the details of the Orphic doctrine. It is a 'probable tale', and we may hope that it, or something like it, is true. In this respect the *Phaedo* does not go a step further than the *Apology*, and the language of the *Apology* really implies the belief explicitly stated in the *Phaedo*. Whatever concessions he may make for the sake of argument, Socrates lets it be clearly seen that his beliefs about the soul are not those of the man in the street.

The same considerations help to explain the silence of Xenophon in the Memorabilia. He is seeking to prove that the belief of Socrates about the gods was just the same as that of other pious people,² and it would never have done to suggest that he held peculiar views about the soul. The doctrine of the soul's immortality was, and remained, a heresy. Even Plato's brother Glaucon is represented in the Republic as startled when Socrates propounds it as something he seriously believes and thinks he can prove.³ And yet Xenophon knew the doctrine perfectly well. Even in the Memorabilia, he lets slip the statement that the soul 'partakes in the divine', a phrase which really implies the whole theory.⁴

¹ Phaed. 63 c 1.

⁹ Mem. i. 1. 3 δ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων κτλ.

 $^{^{\}circ}$ Rep. $608 \, \mathrm{d} \, \mathrm{3}$ Οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ-δέποτε ἀπόλλυται;—Καὶ δς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε $^{\circ}$ Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε $^{\circ}$ σὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν;

⁴ Mem. iv. 3. 14 άλλα μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῶν φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή. The invisibility and divine nature of the soul are just the

Further, this view, which could not safely be developed in the *Memorabilia*, is worked out at considerable length in the *Cyropaedia*, where the dying Cyrus is made to formulate it in language almost identical with that of the *Phaedo*.¹ Of this fact there can only be two explanations. Either Xenophon is borrowing from the *Phaedo*, or Plato and Xenophon are drawing from a common source. Further, this source must be Socratic; for the kinship of the dying speech of Cyrus with the argument about the invisibility of the soul ascribed to Socrates in the *Memorabilia* is patent.² It is possible that Xenophon derived it from Hermogenes, from whom he professes to have heard what he knew of the trial and death of Socrates³; but, on the whole, it is more likely

points made in Phaedo 79 b 1 and 80 a 8, while βασιλεύει refers to the argument of Phaedo 79 e 8. Cp. Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 2 (205). 'If the soul is immortal, it is in its essential property identical with God. Among the Greeks, whoever says immortal says God; these are interchangeable notions. Now in the religion of the Greek people the true fundamental proposition is that, in the divine order of the world, humanity and divinity are locally and essentially distinct and must remain so. A deep gulf separates the worlds of man and God.' Even so innocent-looking a phrase as τοῦ θείου μετέχει ignores this gulf, and therefore implies the mystic doctrine. There are some other passages about the ψυχή which seem to be reminiscences of the Phaedo. Cp. i. 2. 4 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν (cp. Phaed. 65 a 10), i. 4. 13 τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε (ὁ θεόs), i. 2. 53 τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ἡ μόνη γίγνεται φρόνησις. These go far beyond the popular use of the word ψυχή.

¹ Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 17 sqq. Cp. especially 19 οὕτοι ἔγωγε, ὧ παίδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πώποτε ἐπείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἕως μὲν ἀν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ἢ, ζῷ, ὅταν δὲ τούτου ἀπαλλαγῷ, τέθνηκεν . . . οὐδέ γε ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσται ἡ ψυχἡ, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἄφρονος σώματος δίχα γένηται, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέπεισμαι ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῷ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον αὐτὸν εἰκὸς εἶναι.

² Cp. Cyr. vii. 7. 17 οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τήν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑωρᾶτε with the passage about the invisibility of the soul quoted p. li., n. 4.

³ Xen. Apol. 2.

that he simply took it from the *Phaedo*, adding some touches of his own. If so, he at least knew nothing inconsistent with the ascription of such arguments to Socrates.

But we can go much further than this. We have positive evidence, dating from a time when Plato and Xenophon were children, that Socrates was commonly believed to hold strange doctrine about the soul. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 94), Strepsiades says, pointing to the house of Socrates—

ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φροντιστήριον, and, however natural such a way of speaking may appear to us, it was not natural for an ordinary Greek in the fifth century B.C. It is sufficiently established that the use of the word ψυχή to express a living man's true personality is Orphic in its origin, and came into philosophy from mysticism. Properly speaking, the ψυχή of a man is a thing which only becomes important at the moment of death. In ordinary language it is only spoken of as something that may be lost; it is, in fact, 'the ghost' which a man 'gives up'.¹ Yet we find Aristophanes trying to raise a laugh by representing Socrates and his disciples as 'souls' or 'ghosts' even in their lifetime.²

¹ The φιλόψυχος is the man who clings to life. To risk one's life is $\theta \epsilon \tilde{\nu} \nu$, $\tau \rho \epsilon \chi \epsilon \nu \nu$, $\kappa \iota \nu \delta \nu \nu \epsilon \epsilon \epsilon \nu \nu$ $\tau \epsilon \rho i \psi \nu \chi \hat{\eta} s$. Cp. Rohde, Psyche, i, p. 47 (43), n. 1; ii, p. 141 (432), n. 1. From Homer downwards, the $\psi \nu \chi \hat{\eta}$ is so regarded; wherever it means more than this, we may trace the influence of mysticism or philosophy.

² Cp. van Leeuwen, ad loc. 'innuit non vivos vegetosque illic habitare homines sed mera εἴδωλα καμόντων, νεκύων quaedam ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα quibus φρένες οὐκ ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν, Socrati ψυχαγωγῷ (Av. 1555 qui locus omnino est conferendus) obtemperantia. Cf. infra vs. 504, ubi unus ex eorum numero dicitur ἡμιθνής.' This is the popular view of the μελέτη θανάτου (81 a 1) See note on θανατῶσι, Phaed. 64 b 5.

The same point is made in the chorus of the Birds where Socrates is represented as calling up the souls of the dead. This, at any rate, cannot be aimed at 'the Sophists', and the caricature would be wholly pointless unless the real Socrates taught even at that date something like the doctrine of immortality and the 'practice of death' $(\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\tau\eta~\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\sigma\upsilon)$ which, as we know from the Phaedo itself, seemed so ridiculous to the mass of men.²

The truth is that, apart from the prejudice which insists on seeing Socrates as a 'rationalist', there is nothing to cause surprise in the fact that he was influenced by mystic doctrines. We have only to remember the character of the man and the times he lived in. The fusion of science and mysticism, to the great advantage of both, had been the characteristic feature of the generations immediately preceding his own, and his youth was passed at a time when it was much in evidence. He had even spoken with Parmenides at Athens,³ and he was only about twenty years younger than Empedocles, who joined the Athenian colony of Thurii when Socrates was about five and twenty.⁴ A little later, the Pythagoreans were expelled from the cities of Magna Graecia, and took refuge at Thebes, Phlius, and

¹ Cp. van Leeuwen, ad loc. 'Sic ridetur philosophus de animi immortalitate disputare solitus dum vitae lenocinia aspernatur'. The context makes it clear that $\psi v \chi \alpha \gamma \omega \gamma \epsilon \hat{i}$ is to be taken in the strict sense of ghost-raising. Chaerephon 'the bat' is represented as playing the part of the 'spirit'.

² Phaed. 64 b 1 sqq.

³ E. Gr. Ph.² p. 192, and, for the connexion of Parmenides with Pythagoreanism, ib. pp. 194 and 221.

⁴ E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 229 and 237. It is nowhere stated that Empedocles visited Athens, but it would be strange if he did not, seeing that he went to Thuru.

elsewhere.1 All this could not but impress a young man who had a strong vein of mysticism in his own nature, as is shown by what we know of his ecstatic trances and the 'divine sign'. We are told expressly that he had the latter from boyhood.2 It would be much more difficult to account for all this, if we were to suppose Plato rather than Socrates to have been the mystic. By his time Orphicism had degenerated into a mere superstition, and the barefooted Pythagorists who still maintained the original practices of their order would be quite unsympathetic to him.8 The Pythagoreans whom he knew had dropped all that, and busied themselves only with science and politics.4 It is a fine historical touch in the Phaedo that the young Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, are not very familiar with the mystic doctrine, and require to have it explained to them by Socrates.

XIV

But Socrates was no Orphic for all that. He had another characteristic which kept him from turning mystic out and out. That was the Attic εἰρωνεία, that shrewd, non-committal spirit, natural to a people of farmers and tradesmen, which Aristophanes has depicted for us in his typical Athenian figures, and which Demosthenes denounced.⁵ Enthusiasm tempered by

¹ E. Gr. Ph.² p. 99.

² Apol. 3I d 2 ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὰν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον. The twenty-four hours trance at Potidaea happened when Socrates was about thirty-seven, five years before Plato was born.

³ E. Gr. Ph.² p. 103, n. 2.

⁴ E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 319 sq.

⁵ The proper meaning of εἴρων is 'sly', 'cunning', malin, and εἰρωνεία is not regarded as exactly a good quality. In the Platonic dialogues, it is

irony (using both words in their Greek sense) may serve as a formula for the Socratic $\hat{\eta}\theta os$. Xenophon gives us too little enthusiasm and Aristophanes too little irony; it is only in the Platonic Socrates that both elements are harmoniously combined in a character with a marked individuality of his own. The Platonic Socrates is no mere type, but a living man. That, above all, is our justification for believing that he is in truth 'the historical Socrates'.

only the opponents of Socrates who ascribe it to him. The Scots words 'canny' and 'pawky' express something similar. Demosthenes speaks of it as a bad trait in the Athenian character (Phil. i. 7, 37). At its worst, it leads people to shirk their responsibilities; at its best, it is a salutary $\nu\hat{a}\phi\epsilon$ $\kappa\hat{a}$ $\mu\hat{\epsilon}\mu\nu\alpha\sigma$ $\hat{a}m\sigma\tau\hat{\epsilon}\hat{\nu}$. For the way in which Socrates refuses to commit himself to the positive details of the mystic theology cp. 63 c 1 n. It is clearly a personal trait.

1 Or, as Gomperz puts it, 'a hot heart under a cool head."

NOTE UPON THE TEXT

THE dialogues of Plato were arranged in nine tetralogies by the grammarian Thrasyllus in the reign of Tiberius. The first tetralogy comprised the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*, i.e. those dialogues which deal specially with the trial and death of Socrates.

At some subsequent date the dialogues were edited in two volumes, the first of which contained tetralogies I-VII, the second, tetralogies VIII-IX, with some spurious works. As one or other of the two volumes was apt to be lost, the MS. authority for tetralogies I-VII is quite different from that for tetralogies VIII-IX and the spurious dialogues.

The leading representatives of the first volume are the Bodleian MS., E. D. Clarke 39 (B), the Venice MS. App. class. 4, 1 (T), and the Vienna MS. 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 (W).

- B. The Bodleian MS., commonly called the *Clarkianus* after E. D. Clarke, who discovered it in the island of Patmos, was written for Arethas in the year 895 A.D. It was held by Cobet and others that it was our sole independent authority, and all recent texts of the *Phaedo* are based more or less consistently on this hypothesis.
- T. The Venice MS. or *Marcianus* (tenth century A.D.?) is the original of the great majority of existing Plato MSS., and in particular of the MS. from which the Aldine text was derived. The text of Stephanus also goes back to the same source. These MSS. were arbitrarily classed by Cobet and at one time by Schanz as *deteriores*, and the chief work of Platonic critics

down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was to bring the text more and more into accordance with B, and to eliminate readings which came from other MSS.

The credit of inaugurating a better method belongs to Schanz himself. In 1877 he showed that T was of co-ordinate authority with B, and that we must take account of both. In some ways T represents the tradition even more faithfully than B. For instance, it contains the old *scholia*, while B has a new set composed in the ninth century A.D., probably by Arethas himself.

Unfortunately, Schanz had edited the *Phaedo* before he made this discovery, and he has not republished it since. The readings of T were first published by the present editor in 1899.

W. The importance of this MS. had been seen by Bast, and an imperfect collation of it was used to some extent by Stallbaum, but its omission from Bekker's apparatus criticus led to its being generally ignored till Professor Král of Prague once more called attention to it. Its claims to be regarded as a coordinate authority with B and T were warmly contested by Schanz, but on insufficient grounds. The publication of the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus from a Berlin papyrus showed conclusively that W represented a very ancient tradition of the text. The MS. was brought to Vienna from Florence, and it seems to have come there from Sicily. The Latin version of the Phaedo made by Euericus Aristippus, Archdeacon of Catana, in the twelfth century, A.D., was made either from it or from a very similar MS. It is to be noted further that the corrections made by the second hand in the Clarkianus (B2), which is probably that of Arethas himself, are taken from a MS. closely resembling W, so that it must represent a tradition older than B.

A special feature of W is the number of ancient variants which it records in the margin. If all the other MSS. were lost, we could still construct a good text from W alone, and that is more than can be said either of B or of T.

In this edition, when W alone is quoted, it is to be understood that B and T have the reading adopted in the text; when B and T alone are quoted, it is to be understood that W agrees with B. Thus, on the first page, it may be inferred that B and T have τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν and ἀγγεῖλαι, while W has ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι, οἶός τ' ἦν and τί οὖν ἦν.

An interesting addition to our knowledge of the text was made by the publication by Professor Flinders Petrie of some papyrus fragments which must have been written within a century of Plato's death (Ars. i.e. papyrus Arsinoitica). On the whole, their text is inferior to that of our MSS., though these are more than a thousand years later. The papyrus represents the cheap texts current in early times, while our costly MSS. are copied from careful editions.

The quotations in ancient writers, especially Eusebius and Stobaeus, sometimes preserve old readings, and often confirm TW as against B. They are, however, taken from MSS. of various degrees of authority and must be used with great caution.



ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ



$\Phi AI\Delta \Omega N$

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

St. I p. 57

ΕΧ. Αὐτός, ὧ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῆ α ἡμέρᾳ ἦ τὸ φάρμακου ἔπιευ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὧ Έχέκρατες.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἄττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανά- 5 του; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἃν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὕτε [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φλειασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν ᾿Αθήναζε, οὕτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκείθεν ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγείλαι οἴός τ' ἦν περὶ b τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε δυ τρόπου 58 ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῶν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὧ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὧ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῆ προτεραία τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὁ εἰς Δῆλον ᾿Αθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ώς φασιν 'Αθηναῖοι, ἐν Ες Θησεύς ποτε είς Κρήτην τους "δίς έπτα" εκείνους ώχετο b ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν ᾿Απόλλωνι ηὔξαντο ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν είς Δήλον· ην δη ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ένιαυτον τῶ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς 5 θεωρίας, νόμος έστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν την πόλιν και δημοσία μηδένα αποκτεινύναι, πρίν αν εls

ένίστε έν πολλώ χρόνω γίγνεται, όταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀποc λαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ ίερεὺς τοῦ ᾿Απόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τούτο δ' έτυχεν, ώσπερ λέγω, τη προτεραία της δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν 5 τῷ δεσμωτηρίω δ μεταξύ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

Δηλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ'

ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὧ Φαίδων; τί ην τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι

των ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι,

άλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε. đ ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ως σαφέστατα ἡμῖν άπαγγείλαι, εί μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. 'Αλλά σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ύμιν διηγή-5 σασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούουτα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.

ΕΧ. 'Αλλά μήν, & Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους έτέρους έχεις άλλὰ πειρώ ώς αν δύνη ακριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάν α.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. ούτε γὰρ ώς θανάτω παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος

α 11 ποτε θησεύς W b 7 τε B: om. Τ c6 τί ην BT: τίνα $\hat{\eta}_{\nu}$ B^{2} W d_{4} γ_{ε} B: τ_{ε} T d_{8} έτέρους B T: έταίρους W d_{9} διεξελθε $\hat{\iota}_{\nu}$ B: διελθε $\hat{\iota}_{\nu}$ T

b

εἰσήει εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι άνηρ ἐφαίνετο, ω Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ώστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς 'Αιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ 5 θείας μοίρας ιέναι, άλλα και εκείσε αφικόμενον εθ πράξειν είπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάιν μοι 59 έλεινον είσηει, ώς είκος αν δόξειεν είναι παρόντι πένθει, οὖτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφία ἡμῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ εἰώθεμεν -καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν-ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς άτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρην καί τις άήθης κρασις από τε της 5 ήδουης συγκεκραμένη όμου και από της λύπης, ενθυμουμένω ότι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι ούτω διεκείμεθα, τοτε μεν γελώντες, ενίστε δε δακρύοντες, είς δε ήμων καὶ διαφερόντως, 'Απολλόδωροςοἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Έκεινός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν ούτως είχεν, και αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧ. "Ετυχου δέ, ω Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὖτός τε δη δ Απολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρήν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογέυης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Αντισθένης ην δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν έπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δε οίμαι ήσθενει.

ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ c Φαιδώνδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δέ; 'Αρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνη γὰρ ἐλέγοντο είναι.

e 3 ἀνὴρ B: ὁ ἀνὴρ T e 4 τῶν λόγων B² T W: τοῦ λόγου Bt e 5 ιστε μοι B T: ιστ' ξμοιγε W παρίστασθαι ἐκεῖνον W et transp. signis fecit T a 6 ἀπὸ B: om. T a 8 τότὲ T: ότὲ B: \neg ὸ W b γ κριτόβουλος T: ὁ κριτόβουλος B αὐτοῦ B T: αὐτοῦ κρίτων B² W b 11 δὲ om. pr. T c I τε B T: om. W c 2 φαιδώνδης B² T: φαιδωνίδης BW

ΕΧ. "Αλλος δέ τις παρῆν;
 ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἷμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.
 ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες φὴς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Έγω σοι έξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσαd σθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτᾶν

d σθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ῷ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἑκάστοτε ἔως

5 ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀνεώγετο γὰρ οὐ πρώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωαίτερον συνελέγημεν· τῆ γὰρ προτεραία [ἡμέρα]

e ἐπειδη ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ῆκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περι-

5 μένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύση· "Λύουσι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ ἕνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῆδε τῆ ἡμέρα τελευτᾶ." οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμῶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσιόντες οὖν

60 κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Εανθίππην—γιγνώσκεις γάρ—ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Εανθίππη, ἀνην-φήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οῖα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ 5 γυναῖκες, ὅτι "³Ω Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δή σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὰ τούτους." καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, "°Ω Κρίτων," ἔφη, "ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν

οἴκαδε."

Καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν

b τε καὶ κοπτομένην· δ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν

 κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῆ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἄμα, 'Ως ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὧ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὁ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφνκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἄμα μὲν 5 αὐτὼ μὴ 'θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκη τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω δύ ὅντε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, c μῦθον ἃν συνθεῖναι ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ῷ ἄν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι 5 ἔοικεν· ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἤκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

'Ο οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών, Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους ἀ καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν 'Απόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὕηνος πρώην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν 5 με αὖθις ἔρωτῷ—εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται—εἰπὲ τί χρὴ λέγειν.

Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὧ Κέβης, τάληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα—ἤδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον εἴη—ἀλλ' e ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν.

ην γαρ δη άττα τοιάδε πολλάκις μοι φοιτών τὸ αὐτὸ έν-5 ύπνιον έν τῷ παρελθόντι βίφ, ἄλλοτ' έν ἄλλη ὄψει φαινόμενου, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγου, " Ω Σώκρατες," ἔφη, "μουσικήν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου." καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ έπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε 6ι καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ έμοι ούτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικήν ποιείν, ως φιλοσοφίας μεν ούσης μεγίστης μουσικής, έμου δε τούτο πράττοντος. νύν δ' έπειδή ή τε δίκη 5 εγένετο καὶ ή τοῦ θεοῦ έορτὴ διεκώλυε με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρήναι, εί ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην την δημώδη μουσικήν ποιείν, μη απειθήσαι αὐτῷ αλλά ποιείν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ είναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώb σασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα [καὶ] πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. ούτω δή πρώτον μεν είς τον θεον εποίησα οδ ήν ή παρούσα θυσία μετά δε του θεόν, εννοήσας ὅτι τον ποιητην δέοι, είπερ μέλλοι ποιητής είναι, ποιείν μύθους άλλ' οὐ λόγους, 5 καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οθς προχείρους είγου μύθους και ήπιστάμην τους Αισώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οις πρώτοις ενέτυχον. ταθτα οθν, ω Κέβης, Εθήνω φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῆ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. c ἄπειμι δέ, ως ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ 'Αθηναΐοι.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἶον παρακελεύη, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὧ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ. πολλὰ γὰρ ἥδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἤσθημαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἑκὼν 5 εἶναι πείσεται.

Τί δέ; ή δ' ős, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνος;

"Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

'Εθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὔηνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῷ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αῦτόν·

3.8 εἶναι B T : εἶναι ἐνόμιζον B^2W πρὶν B T : πρότερον πρὶν ἃν B^2W b I καὶ B T W : om. W et punct. not. t πειθόμενον B T W sed ει ex ι T b 5 δ ħ B : om. T b 6 καὶ ἢπιστάμην μύθους B^2TW τούτων T : τούτους B b 8 ὡς τάχιστα B : om. T c 4 σοι B : ἄν σοι T c 9 μέντοι B T Olymp. : μέντοι γε B^2W

οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἄμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε 10 τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ đ διελέγετο.

"Ηρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἃν τῷ ἀποθυήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι;

Τί δέ, ὧ Κέβης; οὖκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφ συγγεγονότες;

Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ἃ Σώκρατες.

'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὰ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοὼς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως το καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν ε τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν 5 ἀποκτεινύναι, ὧ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὰ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῶν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῦν σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.

'Αλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἃν καὶ ἀκού- 62 σαις. ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνου τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον ⟨δυ⟩ τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως 5 σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ὲαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἢρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτοῦ φωνῆ εἰπών.

d ι σκέλη B Olymp. : σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης W et marg. Τ d 8 σαφές Τ W : σαφῶς B e 6 νῦν δὴ B Τ : δὴ νῦν W a ι ἀκούσαις B : ἀκούσαιο Τ a 3 τῷ ἀνθρώπω B Τ : τῶν ἀνθρώπων t a 4 ὄν add, ci. Heindorf a 6 ὅσιον B Τ : ὅσιόν ἐστιν B² W s. v, W Olymp. : ἴττι ὧ B : ἶττίω b : ἶττιω Τ : ειττίω W ξενς B Τ : ξενς W

b Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρῷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης

5 λύειν οὐο ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διιδεῖν οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὧ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμῶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;

10 "Εμοιγε, φησίν δ Κέβης.

C Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὰ ἃν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἔ τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἃν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν;

5 Πάνυ γ', έφη.

"Ισως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψη, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

'Αλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν
d ἀποθυήσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπω, εἴπερ ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἷναι τὸν ἐπιμε-λούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας
5 ἀπιόντας, ἐν ἡ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὅντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὕτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἃν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον و εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἃν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ

b 2 γ' B T : om. W b 4 post ἐσμεν add. πάντες B² b 10 φησιν B : ἔφη T W c 1 κτημάτων B : om. T c η πρίν (αν) Heindorf θεὸς B : δ θεὸς B² T W Olymp. c 8 παροῦσαν ἡμῖν W d 2 ἔχει B² T W : ἔχειν B d 6 που B Olymp. : πω T d η ἐπιμελήσεσθαι B Olymp. : ἐπιμελέσθαι T

άλογίστως αν φεύγοι· ο δε νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που αν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὧ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἡ ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μεν γὰρ 5 φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δε ἄφρονας χαίρειν.

'Ακούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθηναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῆ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, 'Αεί τοι, 63 ἔφη, [δ] Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾳ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις εἴπη.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης τί γὰρ ἃν βουλόμενοι 5 ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς.

Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε· οῗμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με **b** πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίω.

Πάνυ μεν οθν, έφη δ Σιμμίας.

Φέρε δή, η δ' σ'ς, πειραθω πιθανωτερον προς ύμας απολογήσασθαι η προς τους δικαστάς. Ενω γάρ, Εφη, ω Σιμμία 5 τε και Κέβης, εί μεν μη φμην ηξειν πρωτον μεν παρα θεους άλλους σοφούς τε και αγαθούς, Επειτα και παρ' ανθρωπους τετελευτηκότας αμείνους των ενθάδε, ηδίκουν αν ουκ αγανακτων τῷ θανάτων υῦν δὲ εῦ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω αφίξεσθαι αγαθούς—και τοῦτο μεν ουκ αν ουκ αν διισχυρισαίμην—ὅτι μέντοι παρα θεους δεσπότας πάνν αγαθους ηξειν, εῦ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο των τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην αν και τοῦτο. ὥστε δια ταῦτα ουχ ὁμοίως αγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὕελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῦς τετελευτηκόσι καί, 5

ώσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς.

Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὧ Σώκρατες; αἰτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; d κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εῖναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἄμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἄπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης.

'Αλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστιν δ βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.

Τί δέ, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἣ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν ε τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, "Εα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἐαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ, 5 καὶ τρίς.

'Αλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ἤδη, ἔφη δ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι πάλαι

πράγματα παρέχει.

"Εα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ τοῦς ἔντι ἐν φιλοσοφία διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων 64 ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὕελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήση. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι 5 φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθυήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ

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βίφ μηδεν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δε δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ος πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οῗμαι b γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εῗ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας—καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ—ὅτι τῷ ὅντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν 5 τοῦτο πάσχειν.

Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἃν λέγοιεν, ὧ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεί- c νοις ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι;

Πάνυ γε, έφη ύπολαβων ὁ Σιμμίας.

³ Αρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς 5 ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἦ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.

Σκέψαι δή, ώγαθέ, έὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῆ ἄπερ ἐμοί το ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἷμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκο- d ποῦμεν. φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων [τε] καὶ ποτῶν;

"Ηκιστα, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

Οὐδαμῶς.

a 9 $\,^\circ$ B et s. v. t: $\,^\circ$ T b 3 $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ B T Olymp.: $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ B T: $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ B T: $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ B T: $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ $\,^\circ$ B T: $\,^\circ$ $\,$

Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἶον ἱματίων διαφερόντων το κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἡ ἀτιμάζειν, e καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;

'Ατιμάζειν έμοιγε δοκεῖ, έφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.

Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγ-5 ματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;

"Εμοιγε.

⁸Αρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ 65 φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὧ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις 5 ὧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αι διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν.

Πάνυ μεν οὖν ἀληθη λέγεις.

Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότο τερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὕ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ ζητήσει

b κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνη; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει
ἀλήθειάν τινα ὅψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε
τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὕτ' ἀκούομεν
ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὕτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αῦται τῶν περὶ τὸ
σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῷ
αἴ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ
σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν:

Πάνυ μεν οθν, έφη.

Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἄπτεται; ὅταν

d 9 διαφερόντων $B^{\circ}TW$: καὶ διαφερόντων B d I I σοι δοκεῖ W a 4 γέ που TW: γε δήπου B a 5 μετέχει C Iambl.: μετέχειν BTW b 3 ἡμῖν ἀεὶ B: ἀεὶ ἡμῖν T Iambl. Olymp.

μεν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῆ τι σκοπείν, δῆλον ὅτι 10 τότε ἐξαπατάται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

'Αληθη λέγεις.

С

Αρ' οὖν οὖκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῆ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων;

Naí.

Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων 5 μηδὲν παραλυπῆ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.

"Εστι ταῦτα.

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Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' d αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι;

Φαίνεται.

Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὧ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι είναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἡ οὐδέν;

Φαμέν μέντοι νη Δία.

Καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;

Πῶς δ' οΰ;

"Πδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς.

'Αλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἶον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγω ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὁ τυγχάνει ἔκαστον ὄν· ἄρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ e ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· δς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οῦ σκοπεῖ, οὖτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον;

Πάνυ μεν οθν.

...

 \mathbf{c} 5 τότε \mathbf{B}^2 T W Iambl. : τοῦτό τε \mathbf{B} μηδέν τούτων αὐτὴν W \mathbf{c} 6 μηδὲ B Iambl. : μήτε T W \mathbf{d} 6 μέντοι B : τοι T W Olymp. \mathbf{d} 7 αὖ Heindorf e Ficino : οὐ T : om. B \mathbf{d} 9 ἥδη \mathbf{B}^2 T W : τί δὴ B \mathbf{e} I τἀληθέστατον αὐτῶν T Olymp.

"Αρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἃν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῆ τῆ διανοία ἴοι ἐφ' ἔκαστον, μήτε τιν' ὅψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινὰ] ἄλλην 66 αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῆ διανοία χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖ τῆ διανοία χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἔκαστον ἐπιχειροῦ θηρεύειν τῶν ὅντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὅτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμτοντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῖ; ἃρ' οὐχ οὖτός ἐστιν, ὧ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;

Ύπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὧ 10 Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι b δόξαν τοιάνδε τινά τοις γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ώστε καὶ πρὸς άλλήλους τοιαθτα άττα λέγειν, ὅτι "Κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ατραπός τις εκφέρειν ήμας [μετα τοῦ λόγου εν τη σκέψει], 5 ότι, έως αν το σωμα έχωμεν και συμπεφυρμένη ή ήμων ή ψυχή μετά τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανώς οῦ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο είναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μεν γαρ ήμιν ασχολίας παρέχει το σώμα δια την αναγκαίαν ς τροφήν έτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, έμποδίζουσιν ήμων την του όντος θήραν. Ερώτων δε και επιθυμιών και φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπών καὶ φλυαρίας εμπίμπλησιν ήμας πολλής, ώστε τὸ λεγόμενον ώς άληθως τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' 5 αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ Φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γαρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴυ τῶυ χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα

αναγκαζόμεθα κτασθαι δια το σωμα, δουλεύοντες τη τούτου d θεραπεία καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ήμιν καὶ σχολή γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπείν τι, εν ταίς ζητήσεσιν αθ πανταχού παραπίπτον 5 θόρυβου παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴυ καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τὰληθές. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέου αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῆ τῆ ψυχῆ θεατέου αὐτὰ τὰ e πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὖ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν έρασταὶ είναι, φρονήσεως, επειδάν τελευτήσωμεν, ως δ λόγος σημαίνει, ζωσιν δε ού. εί γαρ μη οδόν τε μετά τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρώς γνώναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, 5 η οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι η τελευτήσασιν τότε γαρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, 67 πρότερον δ' ού. καὶ ἐν ὧ αν (ωμεν, ούτως, ως ἔοικεν, έγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ είδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν όμιλωμεν τω σώματι μηδε κοινωνωμεν, ότι μη πάσα ανάγκη, μηδε άναπιμπλώμεθα της τούτου φύσεως, άλλα καθαρεύωμεν 5 ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἄν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύση ἡμᾶς καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροί ἀπαλλαττόμενοι της τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πῶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές. b μη καθαρώ γαρ καθαρού έφάπτεσθαι μη οὐ θεμιτὸν η." τοιαθτα οίμαι, ω Σιμμία, αναγκαίον είναι προς αλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς Φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεί σοι ούτως: 5

Παντός γε μαλλου, ω Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὧ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένφ οἶ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς,

 $\begin{array}{llll} \mathbf{d}\, 6 & \pi \alpha \rho \acute{\epsilon} \chi \epsilon_{\rm I} \, B \, Iambl. : & \pi \alpha \rho \acute{\epsilon} \acute{\epsilon} \epsilon_{\rm I} \, T & \text{e}\, 3 & \text{φρον \'η} \sigma \epsilon \omega s \,] \, \text{φρόνησι} \, s \, Iambl. \\ \mathbf{a}\, \mathbf{t} & \mathring{\eta} & \psi \chi \mathring{\eta} & \mathring{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \alpha_{\rm I} \, B \, T : & \mathring{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \alpha_{\rm I} & \mathring{\eta} & \psi \chi \mathring{\eta} \, B^2 \, W \, Plut. \, Iambl. & \mathbf{a}\, 6 & \alpha \mathring{\upsilon} \tau \mathring{\upsilon} s \\ B^2 \, T \, W \, Plut. \, Iambl, \, Olymp. : om. \, B & \mathbf{a}\, 8 & \tau \epsilon \, om. \, Iambl. \, Olymp. \\ \mathbf{b}\, \mathbf{4} & \tau \epsilon \, B : om. \, T & \mathbf{b}\, 8 & \mathring{\epsilon} \kappa \epsilon \mathring{\imath} \, i\kappa \alpha \nu \mathring{\omega} s \, B : i\kappa \alpha \nu \mathring{\omega} s \, \mathring{\epsilon} \kappa \epsilon \mathring{\imath} \, T \, W \, Olymp. \end{array}$

εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὖ ἔνεκα ἡ πολλὴ το πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε c ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ δς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.

Πάνυ μεν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

5 Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ῗρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζεω ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ đ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;

Πάνυ μεν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς 5 ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;

Παντάπασί γε, η δ' δς.

Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ως φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθως, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν των φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ο ἀπὸ σώματος ἡ οὖ;

Φαίνεται.

Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῆ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἃν εἴη ἄνδρα e παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὅντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;

Γελοῦον πῶς δ' οὔ;

Τῷ ὄυτι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες 5 ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ δια-

βέβληνται μεν πανταχή τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν έπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοίντο καὶ ἀγανακτοίεν, οὐ πολλὴ αν ἀλογία είη, εἰ μὴ άσμενοι ἐκείσε ἴοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οῦ διὰ βίου 68 ήρων τυχείν--ήρων δε φρονήσεως-- ή τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου άπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; η ἀνθρωπίνων μεν παιδικών καὶ γυναικών καὶ ὑέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ηθέλησαν είς Αιδου μετελθείν, ύπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι της 5 έλπίδος, της τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῶ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα την αὐτην ταύτην έλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι έντεύξεσθαι αὐτη άξίως λόγου η έν "Αιδου, αγανακτήσει τε αποθυήσκων και b οὐχ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ή, ω έταιρε, φιλόσοφος σφόδρα γαρ αὐτώ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρώς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἡ ἐκεί. εὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ αν 5 άλογία είη εί φοβοίτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;

Πολλή μέντοι νή Δία, ή δ' ős.

Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, δν αν ἴδης ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἢν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που c οῦτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἔτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.

[°]Αρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία 5 τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει;

Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μἢ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλὰ 10 ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφία ζῶσιν;

d 'Ανάγκη, ἔφη.

Εὶ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος.

Πῶς δή, ὧ Σώκρατες;

5 Οἶσθα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάιτες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν φόβφ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν;

10 Έστι ταῦτα.

 $T\hat{\omega}$ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλην οἱ φιλόσοφοι καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλία ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.

e Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασων ἀκολασία τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτω ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκο-69 λασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει

69 λασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν.

c8 ή BT Iambl, Stob.; om. W c 10 μόνον Ars. d 1 ξφη om. Ars. d 2 ἐθέλειs BT Iambl. Stob.: ἐθελήσεις W γε T W Iambl. Stob.: τε B d 6 μεγάλων Β γρ. T Iambl. Olymp. Stob.: μεγίστων B^2TW κακών B t Iambl. Olymp.: κακών εἶναι B^2TW κακών B t Iambl. Olymp.: κακών εἶναι B^2TW Ars. Stob. d 9 ὑπομένωσιν] ὑπομειμω . . Ars. d 12 ἄλογον B Ars. Iambl. Stob.: ἀτοπον B^2TW e 3 ⟨σωφρον⟩ουσιν Ars. γε B Iambl. Stob.: γέ που B^2TW e 4 τοῦτο Ars. ὅμοιον Ε Iambl, Stob.: ὅμοιον είναι B^2TW e 5 τὸ περὶ ταύτην] τοι επ αυτην Ars. εὐήθη] ἀνδραποδώδη Ars. θ 6 στερηθῆναι ἐτέρων ἡδονών Ars. e 7 κρατούμενοι ὑπ' ἄλλων W ἄλλων] ἐκείνων Ars. Δι τῶν om. Ars. ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει δ' οὖν Ars.

τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ῷ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι.

"Εοικε γάρ.

Ω μακάριε Σιμμία, μη γαρ ούχ αΰτη ή ή όρθη πρὸς άρετην άλλαγή, ήδουας προς ήδουας και λύπας προς λύπας καὶ φόβου πρὸς φόβου καταλλάττεσθαι, [καὶ] μείζω πρὸς έλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα όρθόν, αντί οῦ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, το [καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα] καὶ μετὰ τούτου [ώνούμενά τε καὶ b πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην άληθης άρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων χωριζόμενα 5 δὲ φρονήσεως [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ή ή τοιαύτη άρετη καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχη, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ή κάθαρσίς τις των τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ή σωφροσύνη καὶ ς ή δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ή. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὖτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αινίττεσθαι ὅτι ος αν αμύητος και ατέλεστος είς 5 Αιδου αφίκηται εν βορβόρω κείσεται, ό δε κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος εκείσε αφικόμενος μετα θεων οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, [ως] φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, "ναρθηκοφόροι μεν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παθροι" οθτοι δ' είσιν κατα την d εμην δίξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι η οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθώς. ών δη καὶ εγώ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδεν ἀπέλιπον εν τῶ βίω

ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπω προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς τρουθυμήθην καί τι ἢνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ἀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὡ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει] εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῷ ἀπολογία ἡ τοῖς 'Αθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ τὸ ἄν ἔχοι.

Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· Ὁ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μή, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῆ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῆ ἡμέραδιαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ἢ ἃν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκη, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα τοῦ ὅσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἢ. ἐπεί, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὰ νυνδὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπὶς καὶ καλή, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἃ σὰ λέγεις ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ἀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.

' Αληθη, έφη, λέγεις, δ Σωκράτης, ὧ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή;

d 8 ἀπολείπων T W : ἀπολιπὼν B e 2 ἐταίροις B² T W : ἐτέροις B e 3 τοῖς . . παρέχει secl. Ast e 7 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ Bt Stob. : δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε T W a 2 ἔτι $\hat{\eta}$] ἐστι Stob. a 3 διαφθείρεται Stob. άπόλλυται Stob. δ B T Stob. : om. W άποθνήσκη B² : ἀποθνήσκει B : ἀποθάνη B² (marg.) T V Stob. a 5 σίχηται . . . $\hat{\eta}$ secl. Schanz σίχεται Stob. a 8 νῦν δὴ B² W : νῦν ἢν B : νῦν T Stob. ἐλπὶς είη T b 2 ἴσως B T W Stob. σαφῶς s.v. W b 3 ψυχὴ T : ἡ ψυχὴ B W Stob.

Έγω γουν, έφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως αν ακούσαιμι ήντινα δόξαν έχεις περί αὐτῶν.

Οὔκουν γ' αν οἶμαι, η δ' δς δ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν 10 άκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ c περί προσηκόντων τους λόγους ποιούμαι. εί ουν δοκεί, χρη διασκοπείσθαι.

Σκεψώμεθα δε αὐτὸ τῆδέ πη, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Αιδου εἰσὶν αί ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὖ. παλαιὸς 5 μεν οθν έστι τις λόγος οθ μεμνήμεθα, ώς είσιν ενθένδε άφικόμεναι έκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγυουται έκ των τεθνεώτων καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι έκ των ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζωντας, ἄλλο τι ἡ εἶεν αν αί ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ d οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῶ ουτι φανερον γίγνοιτο ότι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οί ζωντες ή έκ των τεθνεώτων εί δε μή έστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. 5

Πάνυ μεν οθν, έφη δ Κέβης.

Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εὶ βούλει ράου μαθεῖυ, αλλά καὶ κατά ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτών, καὶ συλλήβδην όσαπερ έχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ίδωμεν ᾶρ' ούτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἡ ἐκ τῶν Ε έναντίων τὰ έναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ον τοιοῦτόν τι, οίον τὸ καλὸν τῶ αἰσχρῶ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκω, καὶ ἄλλα δη μυρία ούτως έχει. τούτο οθυ σκεψώμεθα, άρα ἀναγκαίου όσοις έστι τι έναντίον, μηδαμόθεν άλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι 5 η ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναμτίου. οἶον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ανάγκη που έξ ελάττονος όντος πρότερον έπειτα μείζον γίγνεσθαι;

T (ut vid.) W: κωμωδιοποιός Bt C4 $\delta \epsilon$ B: om. T C6 λόγος B: δ λόγος οὖτος B^2TW Olymp. : λόγος οὖτος Stob. d I αi υχαὶ ἡμῶν Β: ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ Τ W Stob. αὶ 3 γίγνοιτο Β Τ: γένοιτο W Stob. αλ βρᾶον Β Stob.: ἡαδιον Τ W ει ἔδωμεν Β Τ W οῦτως W πάντα Β W Olymp. Stob.: ἄπαντα Τ ελ τοῦτο οῦν Β W Stob.: οm. Τ εξ ἔστι τι Β Τ Stob.: ἐστιν W ε6 ἐαντῶ W

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Naí.

10 Οὐκοῦν κὰν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον 71 ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;

"Εστιν οὕτω, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον;

5 Πάνυ $\gamma \epsilon$.

Τί δέ; ἄν τι χείρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ αν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ίκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται,
10 ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;

Πάνυ γε.

Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἶον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὅντοιν δύο γενέσεις,

b ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξά-

νεσθαι, τὸ δὲ Φθίνειν;

5 Nal, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς
ἀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν
ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι
το ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, η δ' ὅς.

Τί οὖυ; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν;

Πάνυ μεν οὖν, ἔφη.

Tί;

a 2 οὖτω ἔφη B: ἔφη οὖτω TW Stob. a 3 γ ε T Olymp. Stob. ; om. B a γ εξ B T: οὖκ εξ Wt Stob. a 12 ἔστι γ 1 B T: ἔστω ετι B2: ἔστι W b 2 μεν B: γ αρ T: μεν γ αρ B2 W Olymp. b 10 έκατέρου T: ἐξ ἐκατέρου B W b II μεν σ 0ν B: γ ε T W

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Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Την μεν τοίνυν ετέραν συζυγίαν ων νυνδη έλεγον εγώ σοι, έφη, ερω, δ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτην καὶ τὰς γενέσεις σὰ 10 δέ μοι την ετέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μεν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ εγρηγορέναι, καὶ εκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ εγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ εκ τοῦ εγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῦν d τὴν μεν καταδαρθάνειν είναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἱκανως σοι, ἔφη, ἡ οὖ;

Πάνυ μεν οῦν.

Λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. 5 οὖκ ἐναντίον μὲν φὴς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;

*Εγωγε.

Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων;

Naí.

Έξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;

Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη.

Tί δέ, η δ' ος, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;

'Αναγκαίον, ἔφη, ὁμολογείν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.

Έκ των τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ω Κέβης, τὰ ζωντά τε καὶ οἱ ζωντες γίγνονται;

Φαίνεται, έφη.

Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν "Αιδου.

"Εοικέν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἡ γ' ἐτέρα σαφὴς οῧσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, 5 ἡ οὕ;

Πάνυ μεν οῦν, ἔφη.

 $\Pi \hat{\omega}_{S}$ οὖν, $\hat{\eta}$ δ' ὄς, ποιήσομεν; οὖκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν

εναντίαν γένεσιν, άλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκι το ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθυήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;

Πάντως που, ἔφη.

Τίνα ταύτην;

Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν 72 τεθνεώτων ἃν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι;

Πάνυ γε.

'Ομολογείται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτη τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν 5 τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων, τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων 10 ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

'Ιδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐο' ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ

b ἔτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα, ἀλλ'
εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὰ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν
ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη
5 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα;

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὁ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' c ⟨ἀν⟩ λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείζειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἀν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κὰν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ

a 4 ἄρα ἡμῖν B T Stob. : ἡμῖν ἄρα W a 6 ἐδόκει B Stob. : om. T a 11 οὕτως B : om. T W b 4 ποιοῖτο B : ποιοῖ T b 7 ἐννοῆσαι B B² T W : ἐννοήσασιν B b 9 πάντ' αν Bekker : πάντα B T W c 3 διακρίνοιτο T : διακρίναιτο B W

μή, ταχὺ αν τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, " Όμοῦ πάντα χρήματα." ὡσαύτως δέ, ὡ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθυήσκοι 5 μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθυάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εὶ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ἀ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θυήσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

*Εστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλοι οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὅντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώ-των τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι [καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς e κάκιον].

Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὧ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὰ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οἰκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμνησις 5 τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρω τινὶ χρόνω μεμαθηκέναι ὰ νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀν - 73 θρωπίνω εἴδει γενέσθαι ὥστε καὶ ταύτη ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εῖναι.

' $A\lambda\lambda\dot{a}$, δ $K\epsilon\beta\eta s$, $\check{\epsilon}\phi\eta$ δ Σ ιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων $a\check{\iota}$ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι 5 μέμνημαι.

Ένὶ μὲν λόγω, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστω, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾳ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἦ ἔχει—καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ

το δοθός λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι—ἔπειτα b έάν τις έπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγη ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ένταθθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεί ὅτι τοθτο οὕτως ἔχει.

Εί δὲ μὴ ταύτη γε, ἔφη, πείθη, ὧ Σιμμία, δ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι αν τήδε πή σοι σκοπουμένω συνδόξη. απιστείς γαρ

5 δη πως ή καλουμένη μάθησις ανάμνησίς έστιν;

'Απιστώ μέν [σοι] έγωγε, η δ' δς δ Σιμμίας, ού, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθείν περί οὖ δ λόγος, ἀναμνησθηναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε έξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ήδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῆ σὺ ἐπ-

10 εχείρησας λέγειν.

Τηδ' έγωγε, η δ' ος. όμολογοθμεν γαρ δήπου, εί τίς τι άναμνησθήσεται, δείν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Αρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε δμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παρα-5 γίγνηται τρόπω τοιούτω, ανάμνησιν είναι; λέγω δε τίνα τρόπου; τόνδε. ἐάν τίς τι ἔτερον ἢ ἰδων ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα άλλην αἴσθησιν λαβών μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ έτερον εννοήση οῦ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἆρα ούχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οδ τὴν ἔννοιαν d $\tilde{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon\nu$;

Πῶς λέγεις:

Οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ:

Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον η άλλο τι οίς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρησθαι, πάσχουσι τούτο έγνωσάν τε την λύραν καὶ έν τη διανοία έλαβον τὸ

α 10 ποιήσαι Hirschig: ποιήσειν Β: ποιείν TW b 4 σοι TW: σοι τοῦτον Τ ετέρον Τ: πρότερον Β Ölymp. ή (post ετέρον) Β Olymp.: τι Τ ο λέγομεν Τ W: ελέγομεν Β d6 αλλο τι Β: τι TI T άλλο Τ

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είδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὖ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἀν εἴη.

Μυρία μέντοι νη Δία, έφη δ Σιμμίας.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα e μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθη περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο;

Πάνυ μεν οὖν, έφη.

Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ 5 λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι;

Έστι μέντοι, έφη.

10 74

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³Αρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμυησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

Συμβαίνει.

'Αλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνήσκηταί τίς τι, αρ' 5 οὖκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὖ ἀνεμνήσθη;

'Ανάγκη, ἔφη.

Σκόπει δή, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθω οὐδ' ἄλλο το τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;

Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θανμαστῶς γε.

⁹Η καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν;

 $\Pi \dot{\alpha} \nu \nu \gamma \epsilon$, $\tilde{\eta} \delta$ ős.

 $\Pi \delta \theta \epsilon \nu \lambda \alpha \beta \delta \nu \tau \epsilon s$ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες 5

d 9 γε B^2TW : om. B e 9 αὐτοῦ B: αῦ τοῦ T a 10 ἄλλο BT: ἄλλο τ ι B^2W a 11 ταῦτα πάντα B: πάντα τ αῦτα TW a 12 τὸ B^2TW : τ ε B b 1 μέντοι B: τοίνυν T b 2 ἐστιν BT: ἐστιν ἴσον W: ἴσον in marg. B^2T^2

ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἔτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἔτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἆρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῶ δ' οὖ;

10 Πάνυ μεν οὖν.

c Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;

Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ἃ Σώκρατες.

Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τ ο ἴσον.

Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὧ Σώκρατες.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας;

10 'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου;

Πάνυ γε.

Διαφέρει δέ γε, η δ' ős, οὐδέν· ἕωs ἃν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ d ταύτης της ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι.

Πάνυ μεν οῦν.

Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἢ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οῖς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ῗαρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οῖον τὸ ἴσον, ἣ οὐδέν;

Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ.

Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδῶν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βού-10 λεται μὲν τοῦτο ὁ νῦν ἐγῶ ὁρῶ εἶναι οῖον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅντων, e ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οῖον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ'

IO

έστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ῷ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;

'Ανάγκη.

Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς $\mathring{\eta}$ οὖ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον;

Παντάπασί γε.

'Αναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι 75 ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως.

Έστι ταῦτα.

' Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε όμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐν- 5 νενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.

Ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὧ Σώκρατες, πρός γε δ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.

'Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὁ b ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

Ούτως.

Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ 5 τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.

'Ανάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς έωρωμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς 10 ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν;

Πάνυ γε.

 e_2 τυχείν BT: τυγχάνειν B^2W e_6 τὸ Tb: om. B B^2 TW: om. B a.9 γὰρ in marg. T a.11 γε TW: om. B b.1 τε BT: γε W τοῦ B: τοῦθ' T b.4 τοῦ ἄρα B: γὰρ τοῦ T prius καὶ B: B T D γτοιαῦτ' B: τὰ τοιαῦτα T

c "Εδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι;

Naí.

Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰλη- 5 φέναι.

"Εοικέν.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ το καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἁπάντων οἶς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ " αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι" καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.

"Εστι ταῦτα.

Καὶ εἰ μέν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἔστιν, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὧ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν;

e Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Εὶ δέ γε οἷμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἄς ποτε καὶ πρὶν 5 εἴχομεν, ῗρ' οὐχ δ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἃν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἃν λέγοιμεν;

Πάνυ γε.

C Ι τούτων BT : τούτου B² C ΙΙ η TW: om. B d 2 τδ αὐτὸ scripsi: τοῦτο BTW: τδ Iambl. d 4 ημῖν B: ημῖν εἶναι B²TW πάντων B: ἀπάντων B²TW d 7 μη έκάστοτε B²TW d 8 εἶδόταs BWt: εἶδότας Tb καὶ ἀεὶ TW: καὶ B d 10 ὧ Σιμμία om. T e I πάντως BT: παντελῶς B²W e 3 αὐτὰ BT: ταῦτα W e 5 αν T: om. B e 6 εἴη T: αν εἴη B

Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα 76 ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἔτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ῷ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ῷ ὅμοιον ιῶστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῦν θάτερα, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, 5 ἢ ιὅστερον, οῦς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλὶ ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὖτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.

Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Πότερου οὖυ αἱρῆ, ὧ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμυήσκεσθαι ὕστερου ὧυ πρότερου ἐπιστήμηυ b εἰληφότες ἦμευ;

Οὐκ ἔχω, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι.

Τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῆ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἃν δοῦναι λόγον 5 $\mathring{\eta}$ οὖ;

Πολλη ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες.

⁹Η καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;

Βουλοίμην μεντάν, έφη ὁ Σιμμίας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον 10 φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἶός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.

Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία, c πάντες αὐτά:

Οὐδαμῶς.

'Αναμιμνήσκονται άρα ά ποτε έμαθον;

'Ανάγκη.

Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οῦ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Πρότερον ἄρα.

Naí.

IO

a 1 αἰσθανόμενόν W a 4 θάτερον B^2TW : τὰ ἔτερα B b 4 τόδε W: om, BT c 4 ἅ ποτε B: ποτε ἃ T c 6 αὐτῶν B: om, T

 $^{\circ}$ Ησαν ἄρα, $^{\circ}$ ω Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι $^{\circ}$ εἶναι $^{\circ}$ ν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἄμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὧ Σώκρατες, 15 ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας οὖτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος.

d Εἶεν, ὧ ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ;
 —οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν—ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ῷπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον;

ο Οὐδαμῶς, ễ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

Αρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὧ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναε φέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς・εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἃν ὁ λόγος 5 οὕτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἄρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά

ουτος ειρημένος ειη; αρ ουτως έχει, και ιση αναγκη ταυτα τε εΐναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εί μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;

Υπερφυῶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἡν σὸ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὰ 5 σὸ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα π είθειν.

Ίκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι καίτοι καρτερώ-

c 11 $\pi\rho l\nu$ $\&\nu$ W c 14 $\&\mu a$ W : om. B T c 15 δ om. W d 3 $\&\nu$ $&\phi\pi\varepsilon\rho$ B : $&\phi\pi\varepsilon\rho$ T d 7 $&\varepsilon\phi\eta$ $&\eta\mu\hat{l}\nu$ $&\varepsilon\chi\varepsilon l$ W d 8 τl B^2T W ; om. B e 8 $&\varepsilon\phi\eta$ & swherth such a 4 $\pi\acute{a}\nu\tau a$ B T : $&\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ B^2W a 5 $&e\mu ol$ &ever b : &ever b 2 T : $&\mu ol$ &ever w

τατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' οῗμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμῶς ἡν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ὑ ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖ-χθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὁ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἄμα ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῆ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἢ. τί 5 γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτον, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτῶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;

Εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ c ὅσπερ ῆμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὖ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔξειν.

'Αποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εὶ 'θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτον ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῆ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε ἀ καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἡ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνη εῖναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς 5 σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἃν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος δια-

α 9 ἐστὶν . . . ἀπιστεῖν in marg. Τ τοῖs in ras Τ b 2 δοκετ om. pr. W ἀ σώκρατες ἔφη Τ b 4 ἄμα B^2TW : om. B διασκεδαννῦται Matthiae b 6 ἄμόθεν Bekker: ἄλλοθεν B T W c 3 δει B: δεῖν Τ ὅτι B: ἔτι εἰ Τ (εἰ s. v.) W c 5 ἔξειν Τ: ἔχειν B c 9 μὲν B: om. T W d 2 καὶ B: τε καὶ ἐκ Τ d 3 αὐτὴν Τ b: αὐτῆν B (u vid.) W d 4 γε B: δὲ Τ sed punct. not. αὐτὴν αδθις W d 5 λέγετε Par. 1811: λέγεται B T W

 φυσᾶ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχη τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμία ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλω τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ʿΩς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' 5 ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῦν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

'Αλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἕκάστης ἡμέρας ἔως ᾶν ἐξεπάσητε.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπῳδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;

Πολλή μεν ή 'Ελλάς, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ἐν ἡ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὖς 5 πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὖκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅτι αν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἴσως γὰρ αν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εῦροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

'Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένω ἐστίν.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένω γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ' δs ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι 5 ξαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθη αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ⟨οὖ⟩ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον [ἡ] ψυχή ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;

'Αληθη, ἔφη, λέγεις.

c 'Αρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῷ ὄντι φύσει

προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθηναι ταύτη ἡπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀσύνθετον, τούτω μόνω προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τω ἄλλω;

Δοκεί μοι, έφη, ούτως έχειν, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα;

*Εμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

Ἰωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ' ἄπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν 10 λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ῆς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρω- d τῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἔκαστον δ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον δ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς δν αὐτὸ 5 καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;

΄ Ωσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἶον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ το [ματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων [ἢ καλῶν] ἢ <math>[ματίων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὕτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὕτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά;

Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ταῦτα οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. 5 Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις 79 αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτω ποτ αν ἄλλω ἔπιλάβοιο ω τω τῆς διανοίας λογισμω, αλλω ἔστιν ἀιδω τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ δρατά;

 \mathbf{c} 4 ταῦτα \mathbf{B} (sed punct. not.): τὰ αὐτὰ \mathbf{T} \mathbf{c} 7 τὰ] $\mathbf{\hat{a}}$ Heindorf \mathbf{c} 8 δὲ \mathbf{B} \mathbf{T} : δὲ εἶναι $\mathbf{B}^2\mathbf{W}$ t \mathbf{d} 2 κατὰ ταὺτὰ $\mathbf{B}^2\mathbf{T}$: κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ \mathbf{W} : καταντὰ \mathbf{B} \mathbf{d} 10 καλῶν secl. Classen \mathbf{e} 1 $\mathbf{\hat{p}}$ ante ἴσων om. \mathbf{T} $\mathbf{\hat{p}}$ καλῶν seclusi \mathbf{e} 3 οὕτε $\mathbf{B}^{\mathbf{T}}$: καὶ οὕτε $\mathbf{B}^{\mathbf{z}}\mathbf{W}$ οδδεπώποτε $\mathbf{B}^{\mathbf{z}}\mathbf{W}$ \mathbf{e} 4 ταὺτά \mathbf{B} : ταὺτά $\mathbf{\hat{e}}$ στιν $\mathbf{B}^{\mathbf{z}}\mathbf{T}\mathbf{W}$ \mathbf{e} 5 αὖ \mathbf{T} 5: om. \mathbf{B} ταῦτα $\mathbf{B}^{\mathbf{z}}\mathbf{T}$ 5: om. \mathbf{B} α4 ἀιδῆ] ἀιδές, ἀιδῆ constanter pr. \mathbf{T} Ars.: ἀειδές, ἀειδῆ \mathbf{B} όρατά \mathbf{B} : ὁραται \mathbf{T} (sed ex emend.) \mathbf{W} PLATO, VOL I.

5 Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

 Θ ωμεν οὖν βούλει, έφη, δύο εἴδη των ὄντων, τὸ μὲν δρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές;

Θωμεν, έφη.

Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀιδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν 10 μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.

b Φέρε δή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή;

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη.

Ποτέρφ οὖν όμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμὲν αν εἶναι καὶ 5 συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα;

Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δηλου, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ.

Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; δρατὸν ἢ ἀιδές;

Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων το φύσει ἐλέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει;

Τη των ανθρώπων.

Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; δρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι;

Οὐχ δρατόν.

'Aidès ăpa;

15 Naí.

'Ομοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός έστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ δρατῷ.

C Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ 5 ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—

a 6 βούλει B T Stob. : εὶ βούλει B 1 W b 4 φαμὲν T Stob. : φαῖμεν B Eus. b 9 μην T W Eus. Stob. : οπ. B b 10 ελέγομεν B 2 T W (ante φύσει) Eus. Stob. : λέγομεν B b 12 λέγομεν B T Eus. Stob. : ελέγομεν B T W t † λάρατον B Eus. Stob. : οπ. T c 2 ελέγομεν B T W Eus. Stob. : λέγομεν Theodoretus c 5 αἰσθήσεων B 2 T W Stob. : αἰσθήσεων B

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τότε μεν έλκεται ύπο του σώματος είς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουτα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιᾶ ώσπερ μεθύουσα, άτε τοιούτων έφαπτομένη;

 $\Pi \dot{a} v v \gamma \epsilon$.

Όταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αύτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς d τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ώς συγγενής οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ότανπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, 5 άτε τοιούτων έφαπτομένη καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὧ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρω οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ των νθν λεγομένων ψυχή δμοιότερον είναι καὶ συγγενέστερον; е

Πας αν μοι δοκεί, $\mathring{\eta}$ δ' ος, συγχωρ $\mathring{\eta}$ σαι, $\mathring{\omega}$ Σώκρατες, $\mathring{\epsilon}$ κ ταύτης της μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλω καὶ παντὶ όμοιότερόν έστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον η τω μή.

Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;

Τῷ ἐτέρφ.

"Ορα δη καὶ τῆδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὧσι ψυχη καὶ σωμα, τω μεν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ή φύσις προστάττει, 80 τη δε άρχειν και δεσπόζειν και κατά ταθτα αθ πότερόν σοι δοκεί όμοιον τῷ θείω είναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἡ οὐ δοκεί σοι τὸ μὲν θείον οίον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θυητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν;

"Εμοιγε.

Ποτέρω οῦν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν;

Δηλα δή, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.

B T Eus. Olymp. : δέ W Stob. a 2 τῆ ex τῶ Τ κατὰ ταὐτὰ Β² T W : καταυτὰ Β 8*

Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων b τάδε ἡμιν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εῗναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ δμοιότατον αῗ εῗναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὧ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῆ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιατο λύτω εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου;

c Πως γαρ ού;

Έννοεις οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν όρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν όρατῷ κείμενον, ὁ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ῷ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαστοῦθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήση καὶ ἐν τοιαύτη ιρα, καὶ πάνυ μάλα· συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ισπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῷ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ικον μένει ἀμήχανον ισον χρόνον, ἀ ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἃν σαπῆ, ὀστὰ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ως ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν ἢ οὕ:

Naí.

5 Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀιδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀιδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδον ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οῖ, ἂν θεὸς

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θέλη, αὐτίκα καὶ τῆ ἐμῆ ψυχῆ ἰτέου, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖυ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ώς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ 10 ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὧ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, e άλλα πολλώ μαλλον ωδ' έχει έαν μεν καθαρα απαλλάττηται, μηδέν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἄτε οὐδέν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίφ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἐαυτήν, ἄτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο- 5 τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ὀρθώς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετώσα ράδίως η οὐ τοῦτ' αν εἴη μελέτη 🛭 χ θανάτου:

Παντάπασί γε.

Οὐκοῦν οῦτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῆ τὸ ἀιδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ Φρόνιμον, οἶ 5 άφικομένη ύπάρχει αὐτῆ εὐδαίμονι είναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ανθρωπείων απηλλαγμένη, ώσπερ δε λέγεται κατά των μεμυημένων, ώς άληθως τον λοιπον χρόνον μετά θεων διάγουσα; ούτω φωμεν, ω Κέβης, ή άλλως;

Ούτω νη Δία, έφη δ Κέβης.

Έαν δέ γε οίμαι μεμιασμένη και ακάθαρτος του σώματος b άπαλλάττηται, άτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν έπιθυμιών καὶ ήδονών, ώστε μηδέν άλλο δοκείν είναι άληθες άλλ' η τὸ σωματοειδές, οῦ τις αν άψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι 5 καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς όμμασι σκοτώδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν,

d 8 θέλει Ars. : έθέλη B T W Eus. Stob. e 5 αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτὴν (αὕτὴν) B² T W Eus. Stob. : om. B e 6 τὸ Ars. : τοῦτο B T W Èus. Stob. a 1 ραδίως BTW Ars. Eus. Stob.: secl. Hirschig Ευς. Stob. Της Γράσιως ΒΤ W. Α. Ευς. Stob. Της Απος α. 8 ἀνθρωπείων Β Τ (sed ει εx ι) W : ἀνθρωπίνων C Ars. α. 9 θεών Β' Τ Ars. Ευς. Stob.: τῶν θεῶν Β b I οἶμαι] οι Ars. b 3 γοηπευσμένη pr. Τ Ars. : γεγοηπευμένη Bt Eus. Stob. ὑπ' αὐποῦ οπ. Ars. τε οπ. Ars. b 4 ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν W b 5 ἀλλ'] ἄλλο Ars. ἄν τις Ars. φάγοι καὶ πίοι W b 7 σοφία Ars. τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω c δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αύτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;

Οὐδ' δπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

'Αλλὰ [καὶ] διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, 5 ὁ αὐτῆ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφυτον; Πάνυ γε.

Έμβριθες δέ γε, ὧ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὰ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη 10 ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς τε καὶ ἄλιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ ἀ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οῗα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῦσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.

5 Εἰκός γε, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὧ Κέβης· καὶ οὖ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αλ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὖσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἔως ἂν τῆ ε τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμία πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα· ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίω.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὧ Σώκρατες;

5 Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διηυλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη 82 καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι. ἡ οὐκ οἴει;

Πάνυ μεν οθν εικός λέγεις.

C 4 καὶ B: om. B² T Ars. Stob. διειλημμένη pr. B C 5 τε om. W C 8 δέ γε τοῦτο (ὧ φίλε)? Ars. οἴεσθαί γε W C 9 δὴ καὶ B T Stob.: δὴ W d 2 . . . χων φαν . . . Ars. et mox ω ταφ . . . σθένει d 5 εἰκότως Ars. ὧ Σώκρατες] ἔφη Ars. d 7 αὐτὰς Ars.: ταὐτας B T W Stob. d 8 τροφῆς B Stob.: τρυφῆς T C 2 τοιαῦτα B T Stob.: τὰ τοιαῦτα W Eus. e 6 διευλαβημένους T (sed η punct. not.) b: διευλαβουμένους B Stob.

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Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραυνίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῦ αν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;

'Αμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὄς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἣ ἃν ἕκὰστα ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης;

Δηλον δή, έφη πως δ' ού;

Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς 10 βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ b δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

Πη δη ούτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι;

"Ότι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι 5 πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἤ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἣ μυρμήκων, καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.

Εἰκός.

Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς το καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλὶ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. c ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔνεκα, ὧ ἐταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὕ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ 5 πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.

Οὐ γὰρ ἃν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ős. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν d

a 3 γε om. W **a** 4 τε om. W **a** 5 lέγαι B^2T : εἶναι B a 7 $\mathring{\eta}$ BT W Eus. : $\mathring{\eta}$ Stob. : οἶ recc. $\mathring{\epsilon}$ καστα B W Stob. : έκάστη T Eus. **a** 11 καὶ B Eus. : τε καὶ T Stob. **b** 5 ὅτι B^2T W Eus. Stob. : ὅτι οὖ B ἐστιν om. Ars. ἀφικέσθαι Ars. **b** 6 καὶ T Eus. Stob. : τε καὶ B $\mathring{\eta}$ μέ γερον Ars. (ut vid.) **b** γ καὶ T: $\mathring{\eta}$ W: $\mathring{\eta}$ καὶ B W Eus. Stob. **c** 1 ἀλλ' B: ἄλλφ B^2T W Iambl. Stob. **c** 3 φιλόσοφοι T Ars. Iambl. : φιλοσοφοῦντες B ἀπέχονται T W Ars. Iambl. : ἔχονται B **c** 4 πασῶν B^2T W : οὖχὶ Iambl. : $\mathring{\delta}$ τι B

ἄπασιν, ὧ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οῗς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες, οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπη ἔρχονται, 5 αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῆ φιλοσοφία πράττειν καὶ τῆ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτη δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνη ἑπόμενοι, ἦ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.

Πῶς, ὧ Σώκρατες;

Έγω έρω, έφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ή δ' ος, οι φιλομαθείς e ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην εν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ώσπερ διὰ είργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπείσθαι τὰ όντα άλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αύτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάση ἀμαθία κυλιν-5 δουμένην, καὶ τοῦ είργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' έπιθυμίας έστίν, ως αν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ 83 είη τοῦ δεδέσθαι, -- ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθείς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν την ψυχην ηρέμα παραμυθείται καὶ λύειν έπιχειρεί, ένδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, 5 ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὥτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δε εκ τούτων μεν αναχωρείν, οσον μη ανάγκη αὐτοῖς χρησθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αύτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ άθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δε μηδενὶ ἄλλω ἀλλ' b η αὐτὴν αύτῆ, ὅτι ἃν νοήση αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αύτὸ τῶν ὄντων ὅτι δ' αν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῆ ἐν ἄλλοις ον άλλο, μηδεν ήγεισθαι άληθές είναι δε τὸ μεν τοιούτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ δρατόν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὴ δρὰ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀιδές. 5 ταύτη οθυ τη λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοθσθαι ή τοθ ώς

d 2 & B : ἔφη & B² T W d 3 σώματι B : σώματα B² T W d 4 πορεύσονται Ars. d 6 καὶ τῷ καθαρμῷ Ars. δὴ Ars.; om. B T d γ ἐκείνη om. Ars. d 8 πῶς] πῶς λέγεις ἔφη Ars. d 9 ἔφη om. Ars. e i ἡ B T : om. W e 2 δεδεμένην W a i τοῦ Heindorf : τῷ B T W Ars. a 5 ὤτων B T I ambl. : ἀκοῶν W καὶ] ἢ Ars. a 6 ἀποχωρεῖν W a γ τὰνοῖς om. Ars. a 8 ἀλλ' et mox αὐτὴν om. Ars. b i ὅτι ἃν] ὅταν Ars. et mox αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό τι (ut vid.) b 2 δν om. Ars. b γ το om. Ars. b γ οῦν] δὲ b

ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῷ ἢ φοβηθῷ [ἢ λυπηθῷ] ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη, οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας c διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό.

Τί τοῦτο, ὧ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

"Οτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται αμα τε ἡσθῆναι 5 σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἐπί τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ ὁ αν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὖχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα ⟨τὰ⟩ ὁρατά· ἢ οὖ;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ d σώματος;

Πῶς δή;

"Ότι ξκάστη ήδουὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλου ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερουᾳ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, 5 δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἄπερ ὰν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φᾳ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οῗμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἵα μηδέποτε εἰς "Αιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς το ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων e ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.

b η λυπῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν W καὶ φόβων B et in marg. T: om. T Ars. Iambl. b 8 τιs] τίς τι Ars. \hbar λυπηθῆ T: post ἡσθῆ B² W (sed καὶ pro ἡ W) Ars. Iambl.: om. B c ι ὧν B T W: ὧς Iambl. τις οἰηθείη ἃν Ars. c 2 κακῶν T Iambl.: κακὸν B c 3 ἐστι om. W c 6 σφόδρα ἡ λυπηθῆναι Ars. Iambl.: ἡ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα B et marg. T: om. T δ] οὖ Ars. c 7 τοῦτο . . . ἀληθέστατον] μάλιστα δὲ (δἡ) εἶναι τοῦτο Ars. c 8 τὰ add. Heindorf d ι ὑπὸ B T Iambl.: ἡπὸ τοῦ B² W d 6 καὶ om. Ars. d 8 ὁμότροφος καὶ ὁμότροπος B² W Ars. d 9 καθαρῶς εἰς ἄιδου W Ars. μηδέποτε post ἄιδου Ars. d 10 ἀναπλέα τοῦ σώματος T W Ars. Iambl.

'Αληθέστατα, έφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὧ Σώκρατες.

5 Τούτων τοίνυν ενεκα, ὧ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ενεκά φασιν ἢ σὰ οἴει;

84 Οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε.

Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἃν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἃν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ 5 λύπαις ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αῧ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἃν ζῆ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήση, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ, [ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα,] ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῆ ἀπαλλαγῆ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.

C Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι· Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο, Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ

^{05 &}amp; Κέβης om. Ars. 06 καl BT: τ ε καl B²W φασιν om. Ars. 33 αὐτὴν Ars.: έαυτὴν BT Iambl. 24 αὐτὴ Ars. 35 αὖ BT Iambl.: om. W έγκαταδεῖν] ἐπι in marg. B² αδ μεταχειριζομένης BTW Ars. Iambl.: μεταχειριζομένην vulg. α8 τὸ alternu et tertium om. Ars. b I σἴεται σὕτως δεῖν B Iambl.: σἵεται δεῖν οὕτω T Ars.: σὕτως οἵεται δεῖν W b4 δὴ B² TW Iambl.: δὲ B b5 δ'] γ' ci. Stephanus: inclusa secl. Ast \mathbf{C} δ λέγεσθαι BT: λελέχθαι \mathbf{B}^2 Wt \mathbf{C} 8 δέ τ ι B: δὲ \mathbf{T}

τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκυήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἴ πη ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον ⟨αν⟩ λεχθηναι, καὶ d αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μήν, ὡ Σώκρατες, τὰληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἔτερον προωθεῖ 5 καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ἦ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν.

Καὶ δε ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καί φησιν Βαβαί, ω Σιμμία. ή που χαλεπως αν τους άλλους ανθρώπους πείσαιμι ώς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε e γε μηδ' ύμας δύναμαι πείθειν, αλλά φοβείσθε μη δυσκολώτερόν τι νθν διάκειμαι ή έν τῷ πρόσθεν βίω καί, ώς ἔοικε, των κύκνων δοκω φαυλότερος ύμιν είναι την μαντικήν, οί έπειδαν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν 5 τω πρόσθεν χρόνω, τότε δη πλείστα και κάλλιστα ἄδουσι, 85 γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι οὖπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αύτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν 5 όρνεον ἄδει ὅταν πεινη ἡ ριγῷ ή τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπηται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ή τε ἀηδών καὶ χελιδών καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν. ἀλλ' οὕτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὕτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἄτε οἷμαι τοῦ ᾿Απόλ- b λωνος όντες, μαντικοί τέ είσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν "Αιδου άγαθὰ ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπουται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως η έν τω έμπροσθεν χρόνω. έγω δε και αὐτὸς ήγουμαι όμόδουλός τε είναι των κύκνων και ίερος του αὐτου θεου, 5 καὶ οὐ χείρου ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου,

C 9 τούτων B: τούτω T d 1 διελθεῖν BT: διεξελθεῖν B^2Wt των add. ci. Heindorf e 3 τι om. Stob. a 1 κάλλιστα W (coniecrat Blomfield): μάλιστα BT Stob. et s. v. W a 6 ριγοῖ BT W a 7 δ om. W b 3 καl B: τε καl TW b 4 ἡγοῦμαι Tb Stob. : του οἶμαι B (ut vid.) W b 5 τε TW Stob. : γε B b 6 χείρον Hermann

οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν 'Αθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα.

- 10 Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὁ c ἀπορῶ, καὶ αν ὅδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὧ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αν τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ
- 5 οὐχὶ παυτὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν αν πανταχῆ σκοπῶν ἀπείπη τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτό-
- d τατον, επὶ τούτου όχούμενον ὥσπερ επὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον επὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, [ἢ] λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυν-
- 5 θήσομαι ερέσθαι, επειδή καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' εμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι εν ὑστέρφ χρόνφ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἄ μοι δοκεῖ. εμοὶ γάρ, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδή καὶ πρὸς εμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς το εἰρῆσθαι.
- e Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἰσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ ἐταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπη δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς.

Ταύτη έμοιγε, η δ' σς, η δη και περι άρμονίας ἄν τις και λύρας τε και χορδών τον αὐτον τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ 5 μεν άρμονία ἀόρατον και ἀσώματον και πάγκαλόν τι και 86 θειον ἐστιν ἐν τῆ ἡρμοσμένη λύρα, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα και

αί χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδή καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη έστὶ καὶ τοῦ θυητοῦ συγγευή. ἐπειδὰυ οὖυ ἡ κατάξη τις την λύραν η διατέμη καὶ διαρρήξη τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι 5 την άρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μη ἀπολωλέναι—οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανή αν είη την μεν λύραν έτι είναι διερρωγυιών των χορδών και τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδείς οὖσας, τὴν δὲ άρμονίαν απολωλέναι την τοῦ θείου τε καὶ αθανάτου δμοφυή τε καὶ b συγγενή, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην—ἀλλὰ φαίη ανάγκη έτι που είναι αὐτὴν τὴν άρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθείν—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὧ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν 5 σε τούτο εντεθυμήσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν την ψυχην είναι, ώσπερ εντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ήμων καὶ συνεχομένου ύπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ Επροῦ καὶ ύγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινών, κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ c μετρίως κραθή πρὸς ἄλληλα—εὶ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα άρμονία τις, δήλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθή τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν αμέτρως η έπιταθη ύπο νόσων και άλλων κακών, την μέν ψυχην ανάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν 5 θειοτάτην, ωσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἴ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺυ χρόνου παραμένειν, έως αν η κατακαυθη η κατασαπη—όρα οῦν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν d λόγον τί φήσομεν, εάν τις άξιοι κράσιν οθσαν την ψυχην των εν τω σωματι εν τω καλουμενω θανάτω πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, 5

καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένω τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι ε τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγω, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα [δὲ] ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐἀν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὧ Κέβης, λέγε,

5 τί ην τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]. Λέγω δή, ή δ' δς δ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, 87 ταὐτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρίν είς τόδε τὸ είδος έλθειν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ως δε καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμων ἔτι που ἔστιν, 5 οὖ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχή σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῆ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει δοκεί γάρ μοι πασι τούτοις πάνυ πολύ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾶς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυ**b** χρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σώζεσθαι ἐν τούτω τῶ χρόνω; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω· είκόνος γάρ τινος, ώς ἔοικεν, κάγω ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. έμοι γὰρ δοκει όμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἄν τις περὶ 5 ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που σως, τεκμήριου δε παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιου δ ήμπείχετο αὐτὸς ύφηνάμενος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις c ἀπιστοίη αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτώη πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι

τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρεία τε ὅντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δή [τινος] ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὅ γε ἄνθρωπος σως έστιν, έπειδή τό γε όλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, 5 τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὧ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ à λέγω. πῶς [γὰρ] αν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὖηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ό γὰρ ὑφάντης οὖτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ίμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλων όντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι d μαλλον τούτου ένεκα ἄνθρωπός έστιν ξματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. την αὐτην δε ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' αν ψυχή προς σωμα, καί τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περί αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ 5 πολυχρόνιόν έστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, άλλως τε καν πολλά έτη βιω -- εί γαρ όξοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, άλλ' ή ψυχή ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι—ἀναγκαῖον ε μενταν είη, δπότε απολλύοιτο ή ψυχή, τὸ τελευταίον ὕφασμα τυχείν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς άσθενείας επιδεικνύοι τὸ σώμα καὶ ταχὰ σαπεν διοίχοιτο. 5 ώστε τούτω τῶ λόγω οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ώς έπειδαν αποθάνωμεν έτι που ήμων ή ψυχή έστιν. εί γαρ 88 τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ α σὸ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δούς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ είναι ήμων τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδεν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι είναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενή- 5 σεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις—οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει

C 3 ἀποκρινομένου Τ δή om. W τινος seclusi C 7 γὰρ B: om. T W c 9 ὕστερος BT et σ s. v. W: ὕστερον B² W d 3 ταύτην B² T W: τῶν αὐτῶν B μὲν ψυχὴ B: ψυχὴ μὲν T W d 8 κᾶν B² T W: καὶ εἰ B βιῷ T: βιῷη B W a 1 ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν T W a 4 τὰς ψυχὰs B: τὴν ψυχὴν T W

λοχυρου είναι, ώστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχήν ἀντέχειν -δούς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν 10 τινι των θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν b θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡ τῆ ψυχῆ φέρει ὅλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι-άδύνατον γὰρ είναι ότωοῦν αισθέσθαι ἡμῶν—ει δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροθντι μη οθκ ανοήτως θαρρείν, δς αν 5 μη έχη ἀποδείξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχη παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε

καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εῖναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα αποθανείσθαι δεδιέναι ύπερ της αύτου ψυχης μη έν τη νυν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

C Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ως υστερον ελέγομεν προς αλλήλους, ότι υπό του ξμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ήμας πάλιν έδόκουν αναταράξαι καὶ εἰς απιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς 5 προειρημένοις λόγοις, αλλα και είς τα ύστερον μέλλοντα ρηθήσεσθαι, μη οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ η καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ή.

ΕΧ. Νη τους θεούς, ω Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε έχω ύμιν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν ά πρός έμαυτου έπέρχεται "Τίνι οθυ έτι πιστεύσομευ λόγω; ώς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ών, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νθν είς απιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν." θαυμαστώς γάρ μου δ λόγος οὖτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἀρμονίαν 5 τινα ήμων είναι την ψυχήν, και ώσπερ ύπεμνησεν με ρηθείς ότι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχή. λέγε οὖν πρὸς

α 7 την ψυχήν W α 8 μηκέτι έκείνο Τ b τ ή TW: εί Β b3 αἰσθέσθαι Τ: αἰσθάνεσθαι Β b4 προσήκειν Stephanus b 6 ἀνάγκην BW t: ἀνάγκη Τ ο 3 πάλιν Τ: πάλαι Β ο 5 ὕστερον W sed a supra ον ο 6 εξημεν TW: ἡμεν Β ο 7 αὐτὰ Β² TW: om. B 🦸 είη Heindorf d Ι πιστεύσομεν Β: πιστεύσωμεν Τ

Διὸς πῆ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κἀκείνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φής, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἡ e οὕ, ἀλλὰ πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; [ἡ] καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἡ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ὧ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἢγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. 5 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἀλλὰ 89 ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἤσθετο ὁ ἀπεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας 5 καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧ. Πῶς δή;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾳ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ \mathbf{b} ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὖριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὣ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῷ.

"Εοικεν, ήν δ' έγώ, ω Σώκρατες.

Οὔκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθη.

'Αλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὰ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήση καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώ- 10 σασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἄν, εἰ σὰ εἴην καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ c λόγος, ἔνορκον ὰν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ 'Αργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ὰν υικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

e ι τι B: om. T e 2 $\mathring{\eta}$ B: $\mathring{\eta}$ T: om. al. Heindorf e5 τότε B'TW: ποτε B a9 καθήμενος έν δεξι \mathring{q} αὐτο \mathring{v} TW b ι πολύ B: πολλ $\mathring{\phi}$ Tb b5 ταύτας B'TW: om. B b7 γε έμοι BT: ξμοιγε W b 10 δυνώμεθα B'TW: δυνάμεθα B c ι διαφύγοι TW c 3 ἀναμαχόμενος in marg. T

5 'Αλλ', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' δ 'Ηρακλῆς οἶός τε εἶναι.

'Αλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν.

Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς το Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.

Τὸ ποῖου; ἢν δ' ἐγώ.

- d Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἥ τε γὰρ μισαν-
- 5 θρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἔτερον καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οῢς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο
- οἰκειστάτους τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;
 Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

5 Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχείρει τοῖς ὰνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως οὰν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

Πως λέγεις; έφην έγω.

 $^\circ\Omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$, $\mathring{\eta}$ δ' \check{o} s, $\pi\epsilon\rho$ ι τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων

οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἡ σφόδρα σμικρὸν 5 ἐξενρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἡ κύνα ἡ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἡ αν ταχὺν ἡ βραδὺν ἡ αἰσχρὸν ἡ καλὸν ἡ λευκὸν ἡ μέλανα; ἡ οὐχὶ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὸ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά;

Πάνυ γε, ην δ' έγώ.

IO

Οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἃν b ολίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι;

Εἰκός γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ.

Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, 5 ἀλλὰ ἐκείνη, ἢ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύση λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ἀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξη ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἔτερος καὶ ἔτερος.—καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευ- τῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὖτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὅντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν 5 οὐδενὶ μένει.

Πάνυ μεν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν, ὧ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἃν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὅντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ d λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ'

a 7 καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν T W οὐχὶ T W : οὐκ B a 10 γε B : οm. W b 3 γε W : δὲ B T h 4 οί B T : om. W b 5 ὰνθρώποις B : ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν T W ἐφεσπόμην T : ἐφεσποίμην B W b 6 ἢ secl. Madvig b 7 ὕστερον ὀλίγον T W b 8 δόξει W c 2 καὶ T W : τε καὶ B c 4 οὕτε τῶν λόγων] οὐδὲν τῶν ὕντων in marg. B² τὰ B² W : om. B T c 5 κάτω T W : καὶ κάτω B c 7 ἔφη B T : om. B² W c 9 δὴ B : γε T W d 1 τοιουτοισί τισὶ T : τοιουτοισὶ B t d 2 ἀληθέσιν B : ἀληθῆ λέγειν T d 3 μὴ alterum om. pr. T τις om. W

5 ξαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.

Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

- Πρώτον μεν τοίνυν, έφη, τούτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ e παρίωμεν είς την ψυχην ώς των λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδεν ύγιες είναι, άλλα πολύ μαλλον ότι ήμεις ούπω ύγιως έχομεν, άλλα ανδριστέον και προθυμητέον ύγιως έχειν, σοι μεν οθν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἔνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ ΟΙ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περί αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφιτβητώσιν, όπη μεν έχει περί ών αν δ λόγος ή ου φροντί-5 (ουσιν, όπως δε α αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσούτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παρούσιν α έγω λέγω δόξει αληθη είναι προθυμήσομαι, εί μη είη πάρεργου, άλλ' ὅπως αὐτῶ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως b έχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ω φίλε εταιρε—θέασαι ως πλεονεκτικώς—εὶ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθη ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλώς δη έχει τὸ πεισθήναι εί δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ήττον τοῖς 5 παρούσιν αηδής έσομαι όδυρόμενος, ή δε ανοιά μοι αύτη ου συνδιατελεί-κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν-αλλ' ολίγον ὕστερον ἀπολείται. παρεσκευασμένος δή, έφη, & Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ούτωσὶ έρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ὑμεῖς μέντοι, αν ἐμοὶ πεί-
 - ο θησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι

ὅπως μὴ ἐγὰ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἄμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι. 5

'Αλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ὰ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει d οὖσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν 5 αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὅλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ᾶρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὰ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;

Συνωμολογείτην δή ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω.

Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὖκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ' οὖ;

Τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὔ.

Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ῷ 5 ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι;

Έγω μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστως ως ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ως οὐδενὶ λόγω.

Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ầν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ τι δόξειεν. 5

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, 'Αλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὧ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ

c 7 γλρ B: om. T ώς ἐγφμαι om. W: ἐγφμαι s. v. w d r κάλλιστον W d5 νῦν ante τὸ τελευταῖον transp. T d8 δεῖ e δὴ T e4 ἐφάτην Tb Stob. : φάτην BW e5 λέγετε T Stob. : λέγεται BW e7 ἄλλοθι T: ἄλλο τι B Stob. : ἄλλοθι που W a3 ἐμμενῶ W a5 ἄλλο Tb: ἄλλα BW Stob. ποτέ τι scripsi: ποτὲ ἔτι T Stob. : ποτὲ BW a7 ἄλλα βW δtob. δόξαι T Stob. (sed δοξαι εν pr. T): δοξάσαι B W

σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι· οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξη γε

b σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἢν ἀρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν
ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξη;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Αλσθάνη οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγεω, 5 ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὅντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ῷ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ c οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὅντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἀρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὖτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνάσεται;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

5 Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἀρμονίας.

Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Οὖτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνωδός· ἀλλ' ὅρα πότερον αἱρῆ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν 10 άρμονίαν;

Πολύ μάλλου, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνου, ὧ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ d μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα 5 ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εῖναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ "δ ἔστιν"

C

έγω δε ταύτην, ως εμαυτον πείθω, ίκανως τε και όρθως άπο- e δέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ως ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ως ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.

Τί δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὧ Σιμμία, τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα 93 ἔχη ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται;

εξ ὧν ἃν συγκέηται;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιείν τι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἃν ἐκείνα ἡ ποιῆ ἡ πάσχη; Συνέφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἃν συντεθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι αν η φθέγξασθαι η τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.

Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν είναι εκάστη ἁρμονία ώς ἂν ἁρμοσθῆ;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

*Η οὐχί, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ b πλείων, εἰ δ' ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ῆττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;

Πάνυ γε.

 9 Η οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον 5 $\mathring{\eta}$ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν;

Οὐδ' δπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

Φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;

'Αληθώς μέντοι.

a ı ầν ἐκεῖνα B Stob. : ἐκεῖνα ầν T a 2 ἐξ B T : τὰ ἐξ W a 8 ầν Stob. : om. B T W a 14 ἢ om. Heusde b ı ầν B Stob. : om. T b 2 ἢττων B T W Stob. : ἦττον al. b 4 ἢ T b : ἢ B² et s. v. W : εl B W b 5 μᾶλλον secl. Heusde ψυχὴν Stob. b 6 ἐπ(ὶ) B T Stob. : om. W b 8 ἔφη B Stob. : om. T τε B Stob. : om. T W

Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῆ ἀρμονία οὖση ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῆ ἄλλην;

Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν δῆλον δ' ὅτι

10 τοιαθτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι δ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος.

d 'Αλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μησ' ἦττον ἔτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ' ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἄρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἢ γάρ;

5 Πάνυ γε.

Τὴν δέ γε μηδεν μαλλον μηδε ἦττον άρμονίαν οὖσαν μήτε μαλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως;

"Εστιν.

'Η δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅτι πλέον
10 ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον;

Τὸ ἴσον.

Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον ἄλλη e ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχή, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἤρμοσται;

Οΰτω.

Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπουθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ 5 ἀρμουίας μετέχοι ἄν;

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπουθυῖα ἆρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία εἴη;

Οὐδεν πλέον.

TO

Μάλλου δέ γέ που, ὧ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸυ ὀρθὸυ λόγου 94 κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ άρμονία ἐστίν· άρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελώς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας ούποτ' αν μετάσχοι.

Οὐ μέντοι.

10

Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχή, οὖσα παντελώς ψυχή, κακίας.

Πως γάρ έκ γε των προειρημένων;

Έκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζώων δμοίως άγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ δμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι.

Έμοιγε δοκεί, έφη, ὧ Σώκρατες.

⁹Η καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὄς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν αν ταθτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν b ϵ lval:

Οὐδ' δπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

Tί δ ϵ ; $\mathring{\eta}$ δ' \mathring{o} ς τ ων $\dot{\epsilon}$ ν \dot{a} νθρώπ ϕ πάντων $\check{\epsilon}$ σθ' \mathring{o} τι \mathring{a} λλο λέγεις ἄρχειν η ψυχην ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Πότερον συγχωρούσαν τοις κατά τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἡ καὶ έναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἶον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον Ελκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ένούσης έπὶ τὸ μὴ έσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που δρώμεν 10 έναντιουμένην την ψυχην τοις κατά τὸ σῶμα ἡ οὕ;

Πάνυ μεν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτήν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν οἶς ἐπιτείνοιτο

 a 9 ψυχαὶ secl. ci. Heindorf
 a 10 τοῦτο T W Stob. : τοῦτο
 τὸ B t
 ϵἶναι ψυχαὶ Stob.
 b 1 ἂν Stob. : om. B T W
 ἡ T W
 Stob. : om. B
 b 7 πάθεσιν BT : παθήμασιν W Stob.
 ἡ καὶ B2 T W Stob.: om. B b 8 εναντιουμένην T (sed add. in marg. παθήμασιν) W Stob. : ἐναντιουμένην παθήμασι Β το BT Stob. : om. W ο lov T W Stob. : ώς εί Β : ώσει et ώς καύματος in marg. b b 9 τὸ B T : τοῦ W b 10 που μυρία Stob. c 3 πρόσθεν B T Stob. : ἔμπροσθεν W μήποτ' ἃν αὐτὴν B² T W : μήποτε ταύτην B Stob.

5 καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὖποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν;

'Ωμολογήσαμεν, έφη· πως γὰρ οὔ;

Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πῶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη,
10 ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν
d εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου
καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ
τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ
νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη
οὖσα ἄλλφ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἴόν που καὶ Ὁμηρος ἐν
'Οδυσσεία πεποίηκεν, οῦ λέγει τὸν 'Οδυσσέα·

στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθφ· τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

ᾶρ' οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὖσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ 5 οὕσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἁρμονίαν;

Νη Δία, ω Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ὧ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῆ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν
95 ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εῗναι· οὕτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ
θείφ ποιητῆ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὕτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

"Εχει οῦτως, ἔφη.

Εἶεν δή, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν 'Αρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θ ηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγ ω ;

Σύ μοι δοκεις, έφη δ Κέβης, έξευρήσειν τουτονί γοῦν

C 5 ψάλλοιτο pr. T (ut vid.) Stob.: πάλλοιτο B T W C 6 τιγχάνοι T: τυγχάνοι B Stob. C 9 νῦν B T Stob.: om. W d ι ἐνατιουμένη B^2 T W Stob.: ἐναντιουμένην B d 3 τε B T Stob.: δὲ W e 3 παθημάτων B^2 T W Stob.: παθῶν B Stob. παθῶν B Stob. παθῶν B T Stob.: δὲ W e 5 πράγματος B: om. T e 7 ἔμοιγε B Stob.: ἐνρὸ T a 3 ἔχει T W Stob.: ἔχειν B t a 7 τουτονὶ B: τοῦτον T

τον λόγον τον προς την άρμονίαν θαυμαστώς μοι εἶπες ώς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἢπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον εἶ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ οὖν b μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἃν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

'Ωγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μη μέγα λέγε, μη τις ήμιν 5 βασκανία περιτρέψη τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. άλλα δη ταθτα μεν τω θεω μελήσει, ημείς δε Όμηρικως έγγὺς ζόντες πειρώμεθα εὶ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ων ζητείς άξιοις επιδειχθήναι ήμων την ψυχήν ανώλεθρόν τε καὶ αθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ανηρ μέλ- ς λων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρών τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανών ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλω βίω βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μη ανόητόν τε καὶ ηλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ αποφαίνειν ότι Ισχυρόν τί έστιν ή ψυχή καὶ θεοειδές καὶ ην έτι 5 πρότερου, πρίν ήμας ανθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδεν κωλύειν φης πάντα ταθτα μηνύειν άθανασίαν μεν μή, ὅτι δε πολυχρόνιόν τέ έστιν ψυχή καὶ ήν που πρότερον αμήχανον όσον χρόνον καὶ ήδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀν- d θρώπου σωμα έλθειν άρχη ην αὐτη δλέθρου, ωσπερ νόσος. καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δη τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζώη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε εν τῷ καλουμένω θανάτω ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φης οὐδεν εἴτε ἄπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός 5 γε τὸ εκαστον ήμων φοβεισθαι προσήκει γὰρ φοβεισθαι, εί μη ανόητος είη, τῷ μη είδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ώς αθάνατον έστι, τοιαθτ' άττα έστίν, οίμαι, ω Κέβης, α e

a 9 ὅτε] ὅτι ci. Forster b 1 χρήσασθαι B: χρήσθαι T οὖν T: μὲν οὖν B b 5 ἡμῶν W: ἡμῶν B T b 6 ἔσεσθαι B T: λέγεσθαι B^2 W t c 3 εI B: cm. T c 5 ἢν B T: ὅτι ἢν B^2 W c 7 ψὴς αν in marg, b πολυχρονιώτερον W c 8 ὅσον χρόνον B: cm. T d 4 διαφέρει al. Heindorf d 6 προσήκειν B aiter e 1 τοιαῦτ αν αν

λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγη ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἡ ἀφέλης.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, 'Αλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, 5 οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.

Ο οὖν Σωκράτης συχνον χρόνον ἐπισχῶν καὶ προς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν δια-96 πραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἃν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ.

'Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε.

"Ακουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται κατοτον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις b ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλου σκοπῶν πρῶτου τὰ τοιάδε "Αρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβη, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ῷ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μυήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἢρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; καὶ αν τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν

e 3 διαφύγη W: διαφεύγοι BT **e** 9 δε \hat{i} BT Stob.: δη W **a** 3 φανεῖται \hat{I} δη λέγεις Baumann: αν λέγης B: λέγεις T Stob. a 5–6 βούλομαι . . . Κέβης om. B: add. in marg. B^2 a 5 γε $B^2Wt:$ τε T a 8 ὑπερήφανος BTW (ὑπέρφρων schol.): ὑπερήφανον Eus. Stob. a 9 εἰδέναι $B^2TWEus.$ Stob.: om. B αἰτίας BWEus. Stob. et in marg. γρ. T: ἱστορίας T b I πρώτον $B^2TWEus.$ Stob.: om. B b 2 καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν T Eus. Stob.: καὶ ψυχρὸν Eus. Stob.: καὶ το ὑτρὸν Eus. Stob.: δὸν Eus. Stob.: Eus. Stob.: δὸν Eus. S

τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς c ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἰκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἢπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε 5 ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ῷμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ῷμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσ- d γένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὕτως 5 τότε ῷμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;

"Εμοιγε, έφη ὁ Κέβης.

Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ὤμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῆ τῆ κεφαλῆ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων e ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.

Νῦν δὲ δή, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;

Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῆ ἔν, ἢ τὸ εν ῷ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ⟨ἢ τὸ προστεθέν⟩, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ῷ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῷ δύο ἐγένετο· 97 θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἢν, εν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἢν καὶ οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ'

C I τε B² T W Eus. Stob. : om. B C 5 ὑπὸ ταύτης B T : ὑπὰ αὐτης W Eus. G6 ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα B² (in marg.) T W Eus. Stob. : ἄποτὰ ἔμαθον B C8 τὸ B : τοῦ T d Ι προσγένωνται B Β² T W : προσγεννῶνται B d8 γὰρ B : γὰρ ἐγὰν Τ : γὰρ ἔγωγ ε b d9 παραστὰς ἄνθρωπος W e I αὐτῆ] αὐτοῦ Wyttenbach ἵππον B : ἴππφ T b Θ3 τὸ B T : τὸ τὰ W προσεῖναι B² T W : προσθεῖναι B e 4 ἡμίσει B² T W : ἥμισυ B τοῦ B T e 9 ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν add. Wyttenbach

ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο 5 γενέσθαι, ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἐν διασχίση, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αῦ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι ἐναντία γὰρ βτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἔτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἔτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδέ γε δι' ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, 5 οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδον, ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῆ προσίεμαι.

'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, 'Αναξc αγόρου αναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ώς άρα νοῦς ἐστιν δ διακοσμών τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῆ αἰτία ήσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπου τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν 5 κοσμούντα πάντα κοσμείν καὶ έκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη όπη αν βέλτιστα έχη εί οθυ τις βούλοιτο την αlτίαν εύρειν περί εκάστου όπη γίγνεται η ἀπόλλυται η έστι, τοῦτο δείν περί αὐτοῦ εύρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ d ἄλλο ότιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιείν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπείν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπω καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. αναγκαίον δε είναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χείρον εἰδέναι. 5 την αὐτην γὰρ είναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος άσμενος ηθρηκέναι ώμην διδάσκαλον της αlτίας περί των όντων κατά νοῦν ἐμαυτω, τὸν ᾿Αναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρώτον μεν πότερον ή γη πλατειά έστιν ή στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ Φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν

καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ην τοιαύτην είναι καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσφ φαίη είναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ως άμεινον ην αθτην εν μέσω είναι καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ως οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος 98 αἰτίας ἄλλο είδος. και δη και περι ηλίου ούτω παρεσκευάσμην ώσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων άστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν άλλων παθημάτων, πη ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον 5 καὶ ποιείν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ώμην, φάσκοντά γε ύπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἡ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν έστιν ωσπερ έχει έκάστω οθν αθτων αποδιδόντα την αιτίαν β καὶ κοινή πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστω βέλτιστον ὅμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πάσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν καὶ οὐκ ἃν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδή λαβών τὰς βίβλους ώς τάχιστα οδός τ' η ἀνεγίγνωσκον, εν' ως τάχιστα είδείην το 5 βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

'Απὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὧ ἐταῖρε, ὡχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα c αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὑμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ὰν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ 5 ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἶα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν d σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα

τὰ νεθρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεί οδόν τ' είναι ἐμὲ νθν τὰ 5 μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην την αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία e τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ότι, ἐπειδὴ 'Αθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον είναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθήσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερου παραμένουτα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην 5 ην αν κελεύσωσιν έπει νη τον κύνα, ως έγωμαι, πάλαι αν ορ ταθτα τὰ νεθρα καὶ τὰ ὀστὰ ἡ περὶ Μέγαρα ἡ Βοιωτοὺς ἡν, ύπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ὅμην καὶ κάλλιου είναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ύπέχειν τῆ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν 5 τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνεν τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' ἢ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι ώς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ὰ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῶ πράττων, ἀλλ' οὐ τη τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλη αν καὶ μακρα ράθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οδόν τ' εδναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί έστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὖ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· δ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ 5 πολλοί ωσπερ εν σκότει, αλλοτρίω ονόματι προσχρώμενοι, ώς αίτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθείς τη γη ύπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δη ποιεί την γην, ό δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπω πλατεία βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει. ς την δε του ώς οδόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθηναι δύναμιν οὕτω νθν κείσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοθσιν οὅτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν Ισχύν έχειν, αλλά ήγοῦνται τούτου "Ατλαντα αν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπαντα

d 4 που om. W e 1 &s om. pr. T e 5 κελεύωσιν T a 1 καὶ T W Eus.: τε καὶ B a 6 ἄλλα ὅσα W a 7 ἀληθῆ ἃν λέγοι om. T a 8 ποιῶ \mathring{a} B 2 T W Eus.: ποιῶν \mathring{a} B πράττων Heindorf: πράττω B T W Eus. \mathring{b} I \mathring{a} ν T W Eus.: om. B (post $\mathring{\rho}$ αθυμία recc.) \mathring{b} 3 ἐστι τι T ἐκεῖνο B T Simpl. Stob.: ἐκεῖνο \mathring{b} \mathring{B}^{2} W \mathring{b} 4 δύρματι \mathring{a} 5 Stob.: \mathring{a} 4 καὶ \mathring{a} 5 \mathring{b} 6 α άρα \mathring{a} 7 \mathring{b} 7 Simpl. Eus. Stob.: \mathring{a} 5 \mathring{a} 6 \mathring{a} 7 \mathring{a} 7 Simpl. Eus. Stob.: \mathring{a} 6 \mathring{a} 6 \mathring{a} 7 \mathring{a} 8 \mathring{a} 7 \mathring{a} 8 \mathring{a} 7 \mathring{a} 8 \mathring{a} 9 $\mathring{a$

συνέχοντα έξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον 5 συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὕτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὕτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἴός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἡ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει d σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὧ Κέβης;

Υπερφυώς μεν οθν, έφη, ως βούλομαι.

Έδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ή δ' ός, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν 5 ήλιον εκλείπουτα θεωρούντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν διαφθείρονται γάρ που ένιοι τὰ όμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ή τινι τοιούτω σκοπώνται την είκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ e έγω διενοήθην, καὶ έδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὅμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη των αίσθήσεων έπιχειρών άπτεσθαι αὐτών. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρήναι είς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα έν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν 5 των όντων την αλήθειαν. ἴσως μεν οθν ῷ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινα ούκ ξοικεν ού γαρ πάνυ συγχωρώ του έν [τοις] λόγοις 100 σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν [τοις] έργοις. άλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος έκάστοτε λόγου ου αν κρίνω ερρωμενέστατον είναι, α μεν ἄν μοι δοκῆ τούτω συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ως ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ 5 περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων [ὄντων], ἃ δ' ἃν μή, ως οὐκ ἀληθη. Βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν α λέγω οίμαι γάρ σε νθν οὐ μανθάνειν.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

'Αλλ', $\mathring{\eta}$ δ' ős, $\mathring{\omega}$ δε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, $\mathring{\alpha}$ λλ' $\mathring{\alpha}$ περ $\mathring{\alpha}$ εί $\mathring{\mathbf{b}}$

C7 τοιαύτης B Stob.: αὐτῆς T d i η TWb Stob.: η B: ην b d2 ποιήσωμαι recc.: ποιήσομαι BTW Stob. d3 οὖν om. W d4 ἀπειρήκη T (η ex ει): ἀπειρήκει Stob.: ἀπείρηκα BWt d6 ἐκλιπώντα Τ πάσχουσιν B² TW Stob.: οm. B d7 ἔνιοι BT Stob.: ἐνίοτε B² Wt θ i η ἔν τινι T θ 6 ῷ Tb: &s BWt Stob. a. i τοῖς BW: om. T Stob. a. 2 ἐν om. W a. 3 τοῖς B Stob.: om. TW a. 4 τον Β² TW Stob.: om. B a 6 ἔντων BW: om. T Stob.: τῶν ἕντων vulg.

τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι [γὰρ] δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τής αἰτίας τὸ είδος ὁ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ είμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος είναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ὰ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς είναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον [ἡ] ψυχή.

ε 'Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν

φθάνοις περαίνων.

Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῆ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ 5 τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῆ τοιậδε αἰτία συγχωρεῖς;

Συγχωρώ, ἔφη.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν ἀλλ' ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ d δι' ὅτι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, —ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι—τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι 5 ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως †προσγενομένη οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εῖναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος e ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εῖναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

 $\Delta o \kappa \epsilon \hat{\imath}$.

Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, 5 καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;

Naí.

Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἃν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἔτερον ἐτέρου τῆ κεφαλῆ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῷ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις 101 ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πῶν ἔτερον ἐτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῷ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῷ ἔλαττον ἡ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι μή τίς σοι 5 ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήση, ἐὰν τῆ κεφαλῆ μείζονά τινα ψῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εῖναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῆ κεφαλῆ σμικρῷ σύση τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι ἡ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι ἡ οὐκ ἃν φοβοῖο ταῦτα;

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Έγωγε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἃν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ 5 μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος.

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ένὶ ένὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο c αν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα αν βοώης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἔκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστον οῦ αν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ο αν μέλλη εν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐψης αν χαίρειν, παρεὶς

e 6 ἐλάττω alterum in marg. t e 8 ἄρα ἃν T W: ἄρα B a 2 τὸ B T: τὸ μὲν W a 4 ἔλαττον 'ante ἢ) om. T b 2 εἶναι B: εἶδέναι T c 2 μέγα B² T W: μεγάλα B οἶσθα T: οἶόμεθα B: οἶώμεθα W c 4 μετάσχη T et η s. v. W: μετάσχοι B W 10 **

ἀποκρίνασθαι τοις σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις σὺ δὲ δεδιως ἄν, τὸ d λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐψῆς ἃν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο δεἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνει ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἃν διδοίης, ἄλλην αῦ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ῆτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, e ἔως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἄμα δὲ οὐκ ἃν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἰπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εύρειν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἶς περὶ τούτον λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν σὰ δ΄, εἴπερ εῖ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οῦμαι ἃν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.

'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης. ΕΧ. Νὴ Δία, ὧ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν 5 ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μεν οὖν, $\hat{\omega}$ Έχεκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

10 ΦΑΙΔ. 'Ως μὲν ἐγὼ οῗμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη,
b καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τακλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν,
τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, Εἰ δή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οῦτως λέγεις,
αρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος
5 δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμία ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;

"Εγωγε.

'Αλλὰ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ c Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος;

' $A\lambda\eta\theta\hat{\eta}$.

Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα;

"Εστι ταῦτα.

Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ 10 μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσφ ὢν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς d σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. Καὶ ἄμα μειδιάσας, "Εοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη.

Λέγω δὴ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. 5 ἔμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἄμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἔτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἔτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οῦτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα δυ 5 σμικρὸν εἶναι ὡς δ' αῦτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῦν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν

ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἢν, ἄμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε 103 καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

Παντάπασιν, έφη δ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεταί μοι.

Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ 5 σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λύγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ 10 ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλών τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, b 'Ανδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ

5 ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὕτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτε τὸ ἐν τῆ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὧ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῆ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμία, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζό-

c μενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἄμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, ³Αρα μή που, ὧ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν;

5 Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ώς οὖ πολλά με ταράττει.

Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἁπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε εναντίον ε΄αυτῷ τὸ εναντίον ε΄σεσθαι.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

Έτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. 10 θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;

"E $\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon$.

''Αρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

'Αλλ' ἔτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἔτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ Ψυχρόν;

Naí.

'Αλλὰ τόδε γ' οἷμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὖσαν 5 δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι.

Πάνυ γε.

Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ 10 \dot{v} πεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξά-μενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἢν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.

'Αληθη, ἔφη, λέγεις.

"Εστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει ὸὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅτανπερ ἢ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε 5 ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὁ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτον τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὕ;

Πάνυ γε.

"Αρα μόνον τῶν ὅντων—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ—ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ 104 μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριὰς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἆρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς 5

 \mathbf{c} 13 χιόνα \mathbf{B} : χιὸν \mathbf{T} \mathbf{d} 5 χιόνα $\mathbf{\gamma}'$ \mathbf{W} : χιόνα \mathbf{B} \mathbf{T} \mathbf{d} 6 πρόσθεν \mathbf{T} : ἔμπροσθεν \mathbf{B} \mathbf{d} 8 αὐτῷ \mathbf{T} \mathbf{W} : αὐτὸ \mathbf{B} \mathbf{d} 9-11 πάνυ . . . αἀπολεῖσθαι om. \mathbf{T} \mathbf{d} 11 τολμήσειν \mathbf{B}^2 \mathbf{T} \mathbf{W} : τολμήσειεν \mathbf{B} \mathbf{e} 5 τώδε \mathbf{T} : τοῖσδε \mathbf{B}

ονόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριὰς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ῆμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας, ὥστε b οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός καὶ αῦ τὰ δύο καὶ [τὰ] τέτταρα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἔτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἀεί· συγχωρεῖς ἡ οὖ;

5 Πως γὰρ οὖκ; ἔφη.

*Ο τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὅντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ το ἀν τῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕση ἐναντία ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι c ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;

Πάνυ μεν οθν, έφη δ Κέβης.

5 Οὐδὲ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα.

10 'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Βούλει οὖν, $\mathring{\eta}$ δ' őς, εὰν οῖοί τ' ὧμεν, δρισώμεθα δποῖα ταῦτά ἐστιν;

Πάνυ γε.

d ⁹Αρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, τάδε εἴη ἄν, ἃ ὅτι ἃν κατάσχῃ μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ ἀεί τινος;

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5

Πῶς λέγεις;

΄ Ωσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἃν ἡ τῶν 5 τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εῗναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.

Πάνυ γε.

Έπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῆ μορφῆ ἡ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι. 10

Οὐ γάρ.

Εἰργάζετο δέ γε ή περιττή;

Naí.

'Εναντία δὲ ταύτη ή τοῦ ἀρτίου;

Nal.

'Επὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἥξει. e

"Αμοιρα δη τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.

"Αμοιρα.

'Ανάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς.

Naí.

'Ο τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὅντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον—οῖον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ το τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ 105 οὕτως ὁρίζῃ, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὁ ἃν ἐπιφέρη τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτὸ τῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένον ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνήσκον οὐ 5 γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν

d 9 ἐπὶ B: ἐπεὶ T d το ἡ W: ἡ B T e 7 δρίσασθαι B T: δρίσασθαι δεῖν W e 10 αὐτῷ ἀεὶ T W a2 μὴ δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον T (add. sign. transp.) a3 ὅτι B T: ὅτφ B Ϣ a 4 τη T: ἡ B: εἰη W a 5 δέξεσθαι Madvig a 8 αὐτὸ T W: αὐτῷ B et ῷ s. v. W

b τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ήμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπῃ τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως.

Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

5 Πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὁ αν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δη παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ῷ αν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν c ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ῷ αν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ῷ αν πῦρ· οὐδὲ αν ἔρη ῷ αν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ῷ αν νόσος, ἀλλ' ῷ αν πυρετός· οὐδ' ῷ αν ἀριθμῷ τί ἑγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ῷ αν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ῷ αν μονάς, καὶ ταλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οὖσθ' ὅτι βούλομαι.

'Αλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

'Αποκρίνου δή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ῷ αν τι ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν το ἔσται:

°Ωι αν ψυχή, ἔφη.

d Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

 $\Pi \hat{\omega} s \ \gamma \hat{\alpha} \rho \ o \hat{v} \chi \ell; \ \hat{\eta} \ \delta' \ \tilde{o} s.$

Ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἃν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν;

5 "Ηκει μέντοι, ἔφη.

Πότερου δ' έστι τι ζωη εναντίου η οὐδέν;

"Εστιν, ἔφη.

Tί;

Θάνατος.

Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ῷ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή 10 ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται:

Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυνδὴ ἀνομάζομεν;

'Ανάρτιον, ἔφη.

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е

Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἃν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; *Αμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.

Εΐεν· δ δ' αν θάνατον μη δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν;

'Αθάνατον, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;

Oű.

5

'Αθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή.

' Αθάνατον.

Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὧ Σώκρατες.

Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὧ Κέβης; εὶ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἢν 10 ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἃν ἢν; 106

Πῶς γὰρ ού;

Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἢν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξήει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οῧσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αῧ ὑπο- 5 μένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.

'Αληθη, ἔφη, λέγεις.

'Ως δ' αὕτως οῗμαι κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἢν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπήει, οὕποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὸν ῷχετο.

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d 10 ψυχὴ B Stob.: ἡ ψυχὴ T W d 13 νῦν δὴ B² T W Stob.: νυνδὴ ταῦτα B d 14 ἀνομάζομεν B et in marg. Τ: ὁμολογήσαμεν Τ: ὀνομάζομεν W Stob. e4 ψυχὴ T W Stob.: ἡ ψυχὴ B e10 ἀναρτίφ B t Stob.: ἀρτίφ Τ a 1 ἢ B et post τι t Stob.: om. T a 3 ἄθερμον t: θερμόν B T W Stob. a4 ἐπάγοι T W : ἐπάγει Stob.: ἀπαγάγοι B οὖσα σῶς καὶ μένουσα Stob. a8 ὡς δ' αὕτως T W Stob.: ὡσαύτως B ἄψυκτον B T W : ψυχρὸν Stob.: ἄψυχρον Wyttenbach

'Ανάγκη, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ὰθανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῆ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἵη, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα,

5 ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὖκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὖδέ γ' αν τὸ περιττόν, οὖδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὖδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. "'Αλλὰ τί κωλύει," φαίη ἄν τις, "ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίον, ὥσπερ ὡμολόγη-

ται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;"
 τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελ Αόντος ποῦ ἀρπίον τὸ προσπόν καὶ τὸ ποία οἴνοται ἀπιόνται·

5 θόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἃν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὕ;

Πάνυ μεν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται
το καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι
d καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου.

'Αλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα σχολ $\hat{\eta}$ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται.

5 'Ο δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἃν ὁμολογηθείη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ θεῶν.

e 'Οπότε δη τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο

b ι εἰπεῖν B: om. T Stob. b 6 πῦρ B: τὸ πῦρ T Stob. c ι ἀπολομένου BT: ἀπολλυμένου W Stob. c 2 διαμαχέσασθαι T W: διαμάχεσθαι B Stob. c 4 ὡμολόγητο B: ὡμολογεῖτο T Stob. c 8 πάνν μὲν οὖν B t: om. T c 9 θανάτου pr. T Stob. ἡμῖν om. W c 10 τῷ B²T W Stob.: τὸ B d 3 εἰ τό γε B²T W: εἰ τό τε Stob.: εἴ γε τὸ B ἀίδιον δν B Stob.: καὶ ἀίδιον T d 4 δέξεται B Stob. et ε, αι s. v. W: δέξαιτο T W d 8 τέ γε B Stob.: τε T W sed γ s. v. W

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τι ψυχὴ ή, εὶ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οῦσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος αν εἴη;

Πολλη ἀνάγκη.

Έπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θυητόν, 5 ώς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθυήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.

Φαίνεται.

Παντὸς μῶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδον. 107

Οὕκουν ἔγωγε, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας ὅδε ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο 5 ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἤ τι εἰπεῖν ἣ ἀκοῦσαι.

'Αλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ' δς δ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπη ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, b ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.

Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ 5 πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.

'Αληθη, ἔφη, λέγεις.

'Αλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὧ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθηναι, ὅτι, c εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ

e 2 ψυχὴ B T Stob.: ἡ ψυχὴ W ἢ B: post τι Stob.: om. T a 3 οὐδέ πη B T: οὐδέτι W a 4 δδε B² T W: om. B a 5 τις B T: τις ἂν W ἀναβάλοιτο W (in marg. ἀνακρούοιτο) a,6 ἢ τι B T: ἤτοι W a 8 ἔτι T W: om. B b ι οὐκ ἀτιμάζων in marg. B² b 5 γε β² T W: om. B b 6 ἐπισκεπτέα Seager b γ διέλητε B² W: διέληται B: ἕληται T (ε s. v. t) ἀκολουθήσεται B T (ε s. v. t) b 8 κᾶν B W t: καὶ T c ι τόδε γ' B T: τόδε W: τό γ' Stob. c 2 ἀθάνατος B T Iambl. Stob.: αθάνατός ἐστιν B² W

χρόνου τούτου μόνον εν & καλοθμεν τὸ ζην, αλλ' υπερ τοθ παυτός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δη καὶ δόξειεν αν δεινὸς είναι, 5 εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἄμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχής νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία αν d εἴη αὐτῆ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ώς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο έχουσα εἰς Αιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφής, α δη και μέγιστα λέγεται ωφελείν η βλάπτειν τον 5 τελευτήσαντα εύθὺς ἐν ἀρχῆ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἔκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, όσπερ (ωντα είλήχει, ούτος άγειν επιχειρεί είς δή τινα τόπου, οἱ δεὶ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς 'Αιδου e πορεύεσθαι μετά ήγεμόνος εκείνου & δή προστέτακται τους ένθένδε έκείσε πορεύσαι τυχύντας δε έκεί ων δή τυχείν καὶ μείναντας δυ χρη χρόνου ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιυ ήγεμων κομίζει εν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ άρα ή πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει ἐκείνος 108 μεν γαρ απλην οξμόν φησιν είς "Αιδου φέρειν, η δ' ούτε άπλη οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ αν ἡγεμόνων έδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις αν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιας όδοῦ ούσης. νθν δε έρικε σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους πολλάς έχειν 5 ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ή μεν οθν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχή ξπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγυοεῖ τὰ παρόντα ή δ' ἐπιθυμητικώς τοῦ σώματος έχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολύν

C 5 ἀμελήσει B T Iambl. Stob. : ἀμελήσειεν B² W C 6 ἃν B t Iambl. : om. T Stob. κακοῖs] κακῶs Stob. d 4 μέγιστα λέγεται B : λέγεται μέγιστα T W Iambl. Stob. d 7 δσπερ . . . οὖτος] ᾶσπερ . . . οὖτος Stob. e 2 ἐνθένδε B Stob. : ἐνθάδε Τ πορεὖσαι B Stob. : δεῖ B T W Δ 2 οὐδὲν Stob. ἃν B Stob. : om. T sed add, post ἔδει α 3 οὐ B T Stob. : οὐδὲ B² W διαμάρτοι B : ἁμάρτοι T W Stob. α 4 τριόδουν Olymp. Proclus: περιόδουν B T W Stob. α 5 θυσιῶν T W Stob. : δσίων B et γρ. W t α 6 οὖν B³T W Stob. : οm. B α 8 ἔμπροσθεν B Stob. : πρόσθεν T

χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ b αντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθούσα, βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἵχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ όθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καί τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα 5 είργασμένην, α τούτων αδελφά τε και αδελφων ψυχων έργα τυγχάνει όντα, ταύτην μεν άπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὖτε συνέμπορος οὖτε ἡγεμων ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δε πλανάται εν πάση εχομένη απορία εως αν δή τινες c χρόνοι γένωνται, ων ελθόντων ύπ' ανάγκης φέρεται είς την αὐτῆ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν ή δὲ καθαρώς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν Βίον διεξελθούσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὤκησεν τὸν αὐτῆ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν 5 δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὕτε οΐα ούτε όση δοξάζεται ύπο των περί γης είωθότων λέγειν, ως έγω ύπό τινος πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὧ Σώκρατες; d περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν ἃν ἀκούσαιμι.

'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὧ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἄ γ' ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, 5 χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἄμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἃν οἶός τε εἴην, ἄμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἢπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὧ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἴαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει € λέγειν.

'Αλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

 Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν
5 ἐν μέσφ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῆ δεῖν μήτε
109 ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς
τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εῗναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν
ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῷ
5 τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι,
δμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς,
τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

*Ετι τοίνυν, έφη, πάμμεγά τι είναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκείν b τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλών ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίω, ώσπερ περί τέλμα μύρμηκας η βατράχους περί την θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοίσι τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκείν. είναι γὰρ πανταχή περί ε την γην πολλά κοίλα καὶ παντοδαπά καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, είς α συνερρυηκέναι τό τε ύδωρ και την δμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐν ῷπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζειν c τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οῦ δὴ ύποστάθμην ταῦτα είναι καὶ συρρείν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοίλα τῆς γης. ήμας οθυ οἰκοθυτας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτης λεληθέναι καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ αν εἴ τις ἐν 5 μέσφ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος δρών τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ άλλα άστρα την θάλατταν ηγοίτο οὐρανὸν είναι, διὰ δὲ d βραδυτήτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδε εωρακώς είη, εκδύς και ἀνακύψας έκ της θαλάττης είς του ευθάδε τόπου, όσω καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ων τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου

e 4 εl γη Stob. e 5 τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Stob. a 3 αὐτης B t Stob.: αὐτην Τ Eus. a 6 μένει B T W τοίνυν Τ W: δη Eus.: om. B Stob η δ΄ δς B Eus. Stob.: om. T (add. in marg.) W b 4 πολλοῖοι Τ: πολλοῖς B Eus. Stob. c 4 της B T Eus.: om. Stob. d 1 οὐδεπώποτε W d 4 καλλίω pr. T

άκηκοως είη του έωρακότος. ταυτον δη τουτο και ήμας 5 πεπουθέναι οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἔν τινι κοίλω τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οίους τε είναι ἡμᾶς e διεξελθείν επ' έσχατον τον άερα· επεί, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ επ' ἄκρα έλθοι ή πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ⟨αν⟩ ἀνακύψαντα, ωσπερ ενθάδε οἱ εκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες δρώσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, 5 καὶ εὶ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνωναι ἀν ότι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ. ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ 110 άπας ό τόπος ό ενθάδε διεφθαρμένα εστίν και καταβεβρωμένα, ωσπερ τὰ ἐν τῆ θαλάττη ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὕτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδεν εν τη θαλάττη, οὔτε τέλειον ώς έπος είπειν οὐδέν έστι, σήραγγες δε και ἄμμος και πηλός 5 άμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί είσιν, ὅπου αν καὶ [ή] γη η, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια. έκεινα δε αὖ τῶν παρ' ἡμιν πολὸ αν ἔτι πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν εί γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ω b Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα.

'Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως αν ἀκούσαιμεν.

Λέγεται τοίνυν, έφη, ὧ έταιρε, πρώτον μεν είναι τοιαύτη 5 ή γη αὐτη ίδειν, εξ τις ἄνωθεν θεώτο, ώσπερ αί δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαίραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ων καὶ τὰ ενθάδε είναι χρώματα ώσπερ δείγματα, οίς δη οί γραφης

PLATO, VOL. I.

e 2 ἄκρα B T Eus. Stob. : ἄκρον W e 3 ἃν Stephanus : δή Eus. : om. B T W Stob. \mathbf{e} 6 ἀνασχέσθαι W t: ἃν ἀνασχέσθαι T Stob.: ἀνέχεσθαι B Eus. et \mathbf{e} s. v. W \mathbf{e} 7 ἀληθινὸν \mathbf{B} T W Eus. Stob. ; ἀληθικὸν B \mathbf{a} 1 ἥδ \mathbf{e} B T W Eus. Stob. ; ἤδη B \mathbf{a} 4 οὐδὲν post λόγου T Eus. Stob. ; ante ἄξιον B : utrobique W \mathbf{a} 6 καλ post λογου Γ Els. Stob.: ante αξιου Τ W Eus. Stob.: πολλοῦ B t b ι δὴ Τ (e δεῖ) W Eus. Stob.: δεῖ Β καλόν B² T W Eus. Stob.: δοι. Β δεῖ ον Β Τ Eus. Stob.: καὶ άξιον B² W b 2 τῆς om. Stob. b 6 εἴ τις B² T W Eus.: πτις B Stob. θ εῷτο Τ Eus. Stob. : θεώτο αν Β : θεώτο αὐτην Β' W 11

ς καταχρώνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολύ έτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μεν γαρ άλουργη είναι [καὶ] θαυμαστην το κάλλος, την δε γρυσοειδή, την δε όση λευκή γύψου ή χιόνος λευκοτέραν, 5 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων η όσα ημεῖς έωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα d όντα, χρώματός τι είδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα έν τη των άλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλία, ώστε έν τι αὐτῆς είδος συνεχές ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτη ούση τοιαύτη ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς 5 καρπούς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ώσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τήν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ άγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους e καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ έτι τούτων καλλίω, τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι είσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ώσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο 5 συνερρυηκότων, α και λίθοις και γη και τοις άλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. την δε γην αὐτην κεκοσμήσθαι τούτοις τε ἄπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ ΙΙΙ τοις άλλοις αθ τοις τοιούτοις. ἐκφανή γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, όντα πολλά πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εῗναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατών. ζωα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν 5 μεσογαία οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς

C 3 καl B Stob.: om. T Eus. C 5 ἐγκειμένην W ἔτι Β² T W: ἐπὶ Β C 7 ἔκπλεα B T W Eus. Stob.: ἔμπλεα al. d ι παρεέχεσθαι B³ T W Eus.: παρέχεται B Stob. d 4 ἄνθη B T Eus. Stob.: ἄλση B² W d 6 * * * * * * * * τήν τε λειότητα T (τελειότητα B Stob.) e ι ὅτι οὺ B Τ: δτιοῦν Eus. et mox οὺκ εἶναι: ὅτι μὴ B² W: λμη δ Stob. e 3 εἰσὶ καθαροὶ B: καθαροὶ εἰσιν T W Eus. Stob. e 5 ἃ s. v. T: om. Stob. λίθοις τοῦς in marg. B² e 7 ἄπασι B Eus. Stob: πασιν T τε καὶ T Eus. Stob.: καὶ B a 2 πανταχοῦ T W: πολλαχοῦ B Eus. Stob. a 3 θεατῶν om. Stob. a 4 αὐτῆ B αὐτην T W: αὐτῆς Stob.

περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῷ ἠπείρῳ οὕσας· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὁ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας b αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῷ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποστάσει ἦπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος 5 πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οῖς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ ψήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τόν γε ῆλιον καὶ σελήνην c καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῆ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς 5 κύκλω περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν ῷ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπον, ἔστι δ' οὺς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε ἀ εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῆ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἡ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων 5 ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ρέοντες € ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξς ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους

a 7 τε om. Stob. b 2 αὐτοῖs T Stob. : αὐτῆs B b 6 ἄλση B Stob. : ἕδη T et ut vid. Timaeus c 2 δρᾶσθαι B T : θεωρεῖσθαι B²W c 3 τούτων B Stob. : om. T d I οὖs B S ob : οὖ pr. T d 3 καὶ κατὰ B T W : καὶ addubitavit Heindorf καὶ τὰ Stob. d 5 καὶ T W Stob. : ἐξ in ras. B d 8 δὲ B T Stob. : $\mathbf{\tau}$ ε B²W καθαρωδεστέρου in marg. B² e I ἐν B Stob. : οἱ ἐν T

πληροῦσθαι, ὡς αν ἐκάστοις τύχη ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν
5 τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῷ γῷ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν
τοιάνδε τινά. ἔν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε
μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς
γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Θηηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό

τῆλε μάλ', ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·

δ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρ-5 ταρον κεκλήκασιν. είς γαρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίγνονται δὲ ἔκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι' οίας αν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ b αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αλωρείται δη και κυμαίνει άνω και κάτω, και δ άηρ και τὸ πνεθμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν ποιεί: συνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ 5 όταν είς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς δρμήση καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ώσπερ των αναπνεόντων αξὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ αναπνεῖ ρέον τὸ πνεθμα, ούτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεθμα δεινούς τινας ανέμους καὶ αμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ ς είσιὸν καὶ εξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήση τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα [διὰ] της γης είσρει τε και πληροί αυτά ωσπερ οι έπαντλούντες όταν τε αθ εκείθεν μεν απολίπη, δεύρο δε δρμήση, 5 τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροί αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεί διὰ τῶν όχετων και δια της γης, και είς τους τόπους έκαστα αφικνούμενα, είς οθς εκάστοις ώδοποίηται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας ποιεί εντεύθεν δε πάλιν δυόμενα d κατά της γης, τὰ μεν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν

e 3 ὧs Stob. : ὧν B T a 5 τε B T Stob. : om. W b 4 αὐτὸ Heindorf: αὐτὸν B T Stob. e 1 οὖν B T Stob. : οὖν ὁρμῆσαν B² W e 3 διὰ B T : om. Stob. e 4 ἀπολείπη W e 6 καὶ διὰ om. W e 7 ἐκάστοιs T Stob. : ἐκάστοιs B ὧδοποίηται Stob : ὁδοποιεῖται B T : εἰδοποιεῖται W (sed ὁ s. v.) d 2 ἐλάττω W βραχυτέρουs B Stob. : βραδυτέρουs T

Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ⟨η̂⟩ ηι ἐπηντλείτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς, καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ⟨η̂⟩ ηι [εἰσρεῖ] ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ 5 κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος ἔστι δὲ ὰ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθύντα, ηι ἄπαξ ηι καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ την γην ωσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δέ ἐστιν ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσον καθιέναι, πέρα ε δι οὖν ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ἡεύμασι τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά έστι· τυγχάνει δ' άρα όντα έν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς 5 τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέον περί κύκλω δ καλούμενος 'Ωκεανός έστιν, τούτου δε καταντικρύ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων ᾿Αχέρων, δς δι᾽ ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρει άλλων και δη και ύπο γην ρέων εις την λίμνην αφικνείται 113 την 'Αχερουσιάδα, οὖ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλών ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας είμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αί μεν μακροτέρους, αί δε βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εκπέμπονται είς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. Τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατά 5 μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπου μέγαν πυρί πολλώ καόμενου, και λίμνην ποιεί μείζω της παρ' ήμιν θαλάττης, (έουσαν ύδατος καὶ πηλού εντεύθεν δε χωρεί κύκλω θολερός καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῆ b γη ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα της 'Αχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ύπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου οῦτος δ' ἐστὶν ου ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οῦ καὶ οἱ ρύακες ἀπο- 5

d 3 η η] η B T : η W d 5 η η] η B T W είσρεῖ om. Stob. e 2 γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις T Stob. : γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφοτέροις B t : πρὸς γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις B W : γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφότερα in marg. W (error ortus e v. πρόσαντες) e 5 τυγχάνειν W e 6 ἄττα B : om. T Stob. : ὅντα in marg. B² e 7 περὶ κύκλφ T : περικύκλφ B : τὰ περὶ κύκλφ Stob. e 8 ἐναντίως T Stob. : ἐναντίως B a 2 οὖ] οῖ Schanz a 5 τούτων B T Eus. Stob. : διὰ τούτων W a 7 μέγα T b ι τῆ γῆ B T W Stob. : οm. Theodoretus (habet Eus) b 5 ἐπονομάζουσι T W Eus. Stob. : ἔτι ὀνομάζουσιν B

σπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἀν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αν καταντικρὸ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ' ἔχοντα ὅλον οιον ὁ κυανός, ὁν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ἣν ποιει ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσῶν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρει ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ὁ ἀπαντῷ ἐν τῷ ᾿Αχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οι ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

Τούτων δε ούτως πεφυκότων, επειδαν αφίκωνται οί τετελευτηκότες είς τὸν τόπον οι δ δαίμων ξκαστον κομίζει, πρώτον μεν διεδικάσαντο οί τε καλώς και όσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ οἱ μὲν αν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευ-5 θέντες έπὶ τὸν 'Αχέροντα, ἀναβάντες α δη αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά έστιν, έπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται είς την λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι των τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν e τιμάς φέρονται κατά την άξίαν ξκαστος· οι δ' αν δόξωσιν ανιάτως έχειν δια τα μεγέθη των αμαρτημάτων, η ίεροσυλίας πολλάς καὶ μεγάλας η φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλούς έξειργασμένοι ή άλλα όσα τοιαθτα τυγχάνει όντα, 5 τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, őθεν οὖποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. οἱ δ' αν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ήμαρτηκέναι άμαρτήματα, οδον πρὸς πατέρα η μη-114 τέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἡ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτω τινὶ ἄλλω τρόπω γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον

ανάγκη, έμπεσόντας δε αύτους και ενιαυτον εκεί γενομένους έκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, 5 τους δε πατραλοίας και μητραλοίας κατά του Πυριφλεγέθουτα επειδάν δε φερόμενοι γένωνται κατά την λίμνην την 'Αχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οῢς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οῢς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται έασαι σφας έκβηναι είς την λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, b καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακών, εί δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις είς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ έκειθευ πάλιν είς τους ποταμούς, και ταυτα πάσχοντες ου πρότερου παύουται πρίν αν πείσωσιν ους ηδίκησαν αύτη γαρ 5 ή δίκη ύπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρός τὸ όσίως βιώναι, οὐτοί είσιν οἱ τώνδε μὲν των τόπων των έν τη γη έλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ απαλλαττόμενοι ώσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, άνω δε είς την καθαράν οίκησιν C άφικυούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ίκανως καθηράμενοι άνευ τε σωμάτων (ωσι τὸ παράπαν είς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ είς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ας οὕτε ράδιον δηλωσαι οὕτε δ χρόνος 5 ίκανὸς ἐν τῶ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, & Σιμμία, παν ποιείν ωστε αρετής και φρονήσεως έν τῷ βίω μετασχεῖν καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ῗθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ d διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως 5 ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος—καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον.

α 5 κῦμα ΒΤ Ευs. : $\hat{\rho}$ εῦμα Stob. \hat{b} 2 ἐκβαίνουσι \hat{B}^2 W Ευs. : ἀποβαίνουσι \hat{B} T Stob. \hat{b} 5 ἢδικήκασιν \hat{W} \hat{b} 7 βιῶναι \hat{B} T W Eus. Stob. : βιῶναι προσκεκλῆσθαι Clem. : βιῶναι προκεκρίσθαι Theodoretus \hat{C} 2 ἀρικόμενοι \hat{W} ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς Euseb. Stob. οἰκ . . . ζόμενοι \hat{T} \hat{C} 3 σωμάτων \hat{T} καμάτων Eus. \hat{C} 4 καλλίους τούτων \hat{W} d 1 ταῦτα \hat{B}^2 T \hat{W} Stob. : τοιαῦτα \hat{B} διισχυρίζεσθαι \hat{W} \hat{G} μοι \hat{B} Stob. : ἐμοὶ \hat{T}

άλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῷ ἑαντοῦ ψυχῷ e ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἴασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν 5 οὐκ ἀλλοτρίω ἀλλὰ τῶ αὐτῆς κόσμω, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ

5 οὖκ ἀλλοτρίφ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτης κόσμφ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ 115 δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιμένει την εἰς "Αιδου πορείαν [ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῆ]. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὧ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰς αὖθις ἔν τινι χρόνφ ἔκαστοι πορεύ-5 σεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἃν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εῖναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅτι ἄν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῦμεν;

5 "Απερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὧ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι
ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ὲμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς
καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἄττ' ἂν ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ
νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν [μὲν] αὐτῶν ἀμελῆτε καὶ
μὴ ἀθέλητε ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα
10 καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολοC γήσητε ἐν τῶ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε,

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον;

"Όπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ 5 μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἄμα ἡσυχῆ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν. Οὐ πείθω, ὧ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς

d 8 τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς W e 2 τε om, W a 7 δὴ B T: ἤδη B^2W b 2 ἐπιστέλλεις Coisl.: ἐπιτέλλεις T: ἐπιτέλλει B: ἐπιτέλλη B^2W b 4 ποιῶμεν B^2W b 5 ἔφη λέγω W b 6 καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς om, T b 8 μὲν B: om, T W c 2 προθυμησόμεθα T W: προθμυηθησόμεθα B c 3 θάπτωμεν B: θάπτομεν T W σε τίνα B: τίνα σε T c 4 με B: om, T C 6 ὧ T: ἔφη ὧ B²W: om, B

έγω είμι οῦτος Σωκράτης, δ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων έκαστον των λεγομένων, άλλ' οίεται με εκείνον είναι ου όψεται ολίγου ύστερου νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾳ δὴ πῶς με d θάπτη. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, έπειδαν πίω το φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ύμιν παραμενώ, αλλ' ολχήσομαι απιών είς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῶ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἄμα μὲν 5 ύμας, άμα δ' έμαυτόν. έγγυήσασθε οθν με προς Κρίτωνα, έφη, την εναντίαν εγγύην ή ήν ούτος πρός τους δικαστάς ήγγυατο. οθτος μεν γαρ ή μην παραμενείν ύμεις δε ή μην μη παραμενείν έγγυήσασθε έπειδαν αποθάνω, αλλα οίχήσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων βᾶον φέρη, καὶ μὴ δρῶν μου τὸ e σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῆ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ώς δεινα πάσχοντος, μηδε λέγη εν τη ταφή ώς η προτίθεται Σωκράτη η ἐκφέρει η κατορύττει. εῦ γὰρ ἴσθι, η δ' ὅς, ὧ άριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο 5 πλημμελές, άλλα και κακόν τι έμποιει ταις ψυχαις. άλλα θαρρείν τε χρη καὶ φάναι τουμον σώμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν ούτως όπως άν σοι φίλον ή καὶ μάλιστα ήγη νόμιμον είναι. 116

Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἴπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς 5 διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἡνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ b ὑεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἶς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο ἐκεῖναι, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἄττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία

 $[\]mathbf{c}$ 7 οὖτος \mathbf{B} : οὖτος δ \mathbf{T} \mathbf{W} \mathbf{d} 2 θάπτη \mathbf{B} : θάπτει \mathbf{T} \mathbf{W} : θάψει fecit \mathbf{W} (ψ s. v.) \mathbf{d} 8 ἡγγυᾶτο \mathbf{B} \mathbf{T} et γρ. \mathbf{W} : ἡγγυήσατο \mathbf{B}^2 \mathbf{W} \mathbf{d} 9 οὖν post ἐγγυήσασθε add. \mathbf{t} e \mathbf{I} βάρν \mathbf{T} : ἡάδιον \mathbf{B} e 3 δεινὰ πάσχοντος \mathbf{B} t: δεινὰ ἄττα σχόντος \mathbf{T} e \mathbf{e} 7 θάπτειν και om. pr. \mathbf{T} b 3 ἐκείναι ἐναντίον \mathbf{T} \mathbf{W} : ἐναντίον ἐκείναι \mathbf{B} (ἐκείναις fecit \mathbf{B}^4)

5 ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἐλθῶν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἕνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς

c παρ' αὐτόν, ³Ω Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως

5 ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον

d ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾳστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἄμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπήει.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἄμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, 5 'Ως ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσήει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίστε καὶ ἢν ἀνδρῶν λῷστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δή, ὧ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

e Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, 'Αλλ' οἷμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἷναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅρεσιν καὶ οὖπω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἄμα ἐγὼ οῗδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῆ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ συγγενο- μένους γ' ἐνίους ὧν ἃν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὧ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὺς σὰ λέγεις—οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες—καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ

οῗμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν ἄλλο γε ἡ γέλωτα 117 ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πείθον καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθῶν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἦκεν ἄγων 5 τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδῶν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὧ βέλτιστε, σὸ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;

Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιιέναι, ἕως ἄν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ b ποιήσει. Καὶ ἄμα ὤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει.

Καὶ δς λαβών καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, ὧ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας σὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὕτε τοῦ χρώματος οὕτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν 5 ἄνθρωπου, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὕ;

Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν.

Μανθάνω, ἢ δ' ὅςς ἀλλ' εὕχεσθαί γε΄ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί ¢ τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ὰ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὕχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. Καὶ ἄμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἶοί τε 5 ἢσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οῖου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἀ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οῖός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἔξανέστη. ᾿Απολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ

a i κερδανεῖν B^2 : κερδαίνειν $B\,T$ πιὰν $B^2\,t$: ποιῶν $B\,T$: ἀπιὰν W a $_3$ πείθου $T\,W$: πιθοῦ B a $_6$ δώσειν $B^2\,T\,W$: διδόναι B a $_8$ τί $B\,T$: εἰπὲ τί W b $_4$ post διαφθείρας add. οὕτε τοῦ σώματος W c $_3$ ἄμα λέγων W c $_7$ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ B: αὐτοῦ βία καὶ T: τε καὶ αὐτοῦ βία W ἀστακτ(ε') $B\,T$: ἀστακατί W: γρ. καὶ ἀβαστακι) καὶ βία W d i πρότερον pr. W ἐμοῦ B: μου T

 $_5$ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.

Έκεῖνος δέ, Οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὧ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ e τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημία χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἦσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθών, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ 5 σκέλη, κατεκλίνη ὕπτιος—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος—καὶ ἄμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὕτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κἄπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εὶ αἰσθάνοιτο,

- 118 δ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αῦθις τὰς κυήμας καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ῆπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῆ καρδία γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται.
 - 5 *Ηδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος—ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ—εἶπεν—ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο—՞Ω Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ ᾿Ασκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.

'Αλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο το λέγεις.

Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὅμματα ἔστησεν ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

15 "Ηδε ἡ τελευτή, ὧ 'Εχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

d 5 κατέκλασε T: κατέκλαυσε B e 3 τε BT: γ ε W επέχομεν ρ r. T e 5 κατεκλίθη BTW a 2 οὕτως ἡμ $\hat{\nu}$ ν B: ἡμ $\hat{\nu}$ ν οὕτως ἡμ $\hat{\nu}$ ν T: οὕτως ἡμ $\hat{\nu}$ ν αὐτοῖς B^2W α 3 διαμελήσητε W α 9 ταῦτα ἔσται ἔφη T α 14 καὶ B: τε καὶ T

Introductory dialogue in dramatic form, 57 a I-59 c 7.

The scene is the Pythagorean συνέδριον at Phlius. The only Pythagorean who speaks is Echecrates, but the presence of the others is implied (cp. especially 58 d 7 and 102a 8). The time is not long after the death of Socrates; for the Pythagoreans have not yet heard any details. As Geddes first pointed out, it would be natural for Phaedo to visit the Pythagoreans of Phlius on his way home from Athens to Elis. It is not far off the road.

For the Pythagoreans of Phlius, cp. Diog. Laert. viii. 46 τελευταΐοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τῶν Πυθαγορείων, οὖς καὶ ᾿Αριστόξενος εἶδε, Ξενόφιλός τε ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ἀπὸ Θράκης καὶ Φάντων ὁ Φλιάσιος καὶ Ἐχεκράτης καὶ Διοκλῆς καὶ Πολύμναστος, Φλιάσιοι καὶ αὐτοί. ἦσαν δ' ἀκροαταὶ Φιλολάου καὶ Εὐρύτου τῶν Ταραντίνων (cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 320).

Phlius lay in the upper valley of the Asopus (893 ft. above sealevel), where Argolis, Arcadia, and the territory of Sicyon meet. It was surrounded by mountains 4,000 to 5,000 feet high, 'under whose immemorial shadow' (δασκίοις Φλειοῦντος ἐν ὡγυγίοις ὅρεσιν, Pind. Nem. vi. 45) 'the high discourse is supposed to be held' (Geddes). The territory of Phlius, which was only a few miles square, consisted of a triangular valley with its apex to the north. The town was on the eastern side of the valley and built in the form of an amphitheatre. A few ruins are still left. The people were Dorians and faithful allies of Sparta.

Tradition connected Pythagoras himself with the place (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 94, n. 1), and he is said to have assumed the name of $\phi \iota \lambda \delta \sigma \sigma \phi \sigma$ for the first time there or in the neighbouring Sicyon (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 321, n. 2).

Phaedo of Elis is said (Diog. Laert. ii. 105) to have been a prisoner of war brought as a slave to Athens, where he attracted the notice of Socrates, who secured his liberation. At the time of

this dialogue he is quite a youth and still wears his hair long (89 b 5). At a later date he founded the school of Elis. We know nothing of his teaching; but, as the school of Eretria was an offshoot from that of Elis, and as both are commonly mentioned along with that of Megara, it is probable that he busied himself chiefly with the difficulties which beset early Logic. For us, as Wilamowitz says, he chiefly represents the conquest of the most unlikely parts of the Peloponnese by Athenian culture, which is the distinguishing feature of the fourth century B.C.

57 a r Αὐτὸς κτλ. We seem to be breaking in on a conversation already begun; for ἥκουσας has no expressed object. Perhaps Phaedo has already spoken of something Socrates said or did on the day of his death.

παρεγένου: the verbs παρείναι and παραγίγνεσθαι are specially used of being at hand to support any one in times of trouble or rejoicing. So in Lat. adesse alicui. We should say, 'Were you with Socrates?' Cp. also παρακαλείν, advocare.

- a 2 τὸ φάρμακον, sc. τὸ κώνειον. It is nowhere expressly stated in the Phaedo that it was hemlock; but that was the drug commonly employed, and the symptoms described at the end of the dialogue (117 e sqq.) correspond to those elsewhere ascribed to it. It has been doubted whether hemlock-juice would really produce these symptoms, but see Appendix I.
- a 5 Τί...ἐστιν ἄττα: this is the regular construction (cp. 58 c 6), though in 102 a 9 we have τίνα... ἢν...τὰ...λεχθέντα.
 ὁ ἀνήρ is an emphatic αὐτός or ἐκεῖνος. Cp. 85 c 8; 61 c 3, and

note on 58 e 3 άνήρ.

a 7 [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φλειασίων: Riddell (Dig. § 36) defends this by making Φλειασίων depend on οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν, 'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,' which seems unnatural. Most editors bracket Φλειασίων, but I think v. Bamberg is right in suspecting rather τῶν πολιτῶν. In Stephanus of Byzantium and elsewhere we regularly find notices like Οἶος' οἱ πολῖται, Οἰαῖοι καὶ τὸ ἐθνικὸν ὁμοίως, and we can understand how, in the absence of capital letters, such an explanation might seem desirable. Further, the form Φλειάσιοι is exceptional (cp. however ᾿Αναγυράσιοι), and Cicero tells us (ad Att. vi. 2) that he himself wrote Phliantii by mistake. A similar case

is possibly Meno 70 b 2 οί τοῦ σοῦ έταίρου [πολίται] Λαρισαίοι. The absence of the article with the εθνικόν is normal, and the form Φλειάσιοι (Φλιάσιοι MSS.) is guaranteed by inscriptions and coins.

ούδεις πάνυ τι, 'no one to speak of.' The phrase does not necesa 7 sarily mean 'no one at all', though it tends to acquire that sense. Cp. οὐ πάνυ (Riddell, Dig. § 139) and the English 'not very'. It is unnecessary to discuss, as most editors do, why communications between Athens and Phlius were interrupted. There is no statement that they were, and it must often have happened that no Phliasian had business in Athens and no Athenian at Phlius. There was, however, at least one such (58 a 3).

ἐπιχωριάζει . . . 'Αθήναζε: there seems to be no other instance of ἐπιχωριάζειν in this sense. It usually means 'to be native', and is used of local dialects, customs, &c. Here apparently it is equivalent to ἐπιδημεῖν and takes the construction of that verb. Cp. Parm. 126 b 3 επεδήμησα δεύρο εκ Κλαζομενών.

σαφές τι: in such expressions σαφής means 'sure', 'trustworthy' (not 'clear'). So σαφής φίλος, σαφής μάντις.

είχεν, sc. ὁ ἀγγείλας. He has not been mentioned, but he has b 3 been implied.

τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης: the normal construction would be τὰ περὶ τὴν 58 a I δίκην (cp. 58 c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον), but the prepositional phrase is influenced by ἐπύθεσθε. Heindorf compares Xen. Cyr. v. 3. 26 έπεὶ πύθοιτο τὰ περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου, Anab. ii. 5. 37 ὅπως μάθοι τὰ περί Προξένου.

a 4 πολλφ ύστερον: Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2 ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτφ

μετά την κρίσιν τριάκοντα ημέρας βιώναι.

Tύχη has always the implication of coincidence, which is here made explicit by the cognate verb ἔτυχεν. In most of its uses, the meaning of τυγχάνειν is best brought out in English by using the adverb 'just'.

έτυχεν . . . έστεμμένη, 'had just been crowned.' The Ionic στέφειν is only used in a ritual sense in Attic prose. So, with mock solemnity, in Rep. 398 a 7 έρίω στέψαντες. The common word is

στεφανούν.

a 8 πέμπουσιν. In the Bodleian (Clarke) MS. (B) Bishop Arethas, for whom the MS. was written, has added κατ' ἔτος in his own hand (B2). These words are also found in the Vienna MS. (W). The correc-

B 2

tions of B² were taken throughout from a MS, very closely resembling W. The additional words may well be an ancient variant.

- a 10 τὸ πλοῖον: i.e. the θεωρίς. For the Delian θεωρία, cp. Aristotle, 'Αθ. πολ. 56 καθίστησι δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχων) εἰς Δῆλον χορηγοὺς καὶ ἀρχιθέωρον τῷ τριακοντορίῳ τῷ τοὺς ἢθέους ἄγοντι. The seven youths and seven maids were technically called the ἢθεοι (masc. and comm. of παρθένοι). The story is told in Bacchylides xvi (xvii), a dithyramb entitled 'Ηΐθεοι. Cp. also Plut. Thes. 23 τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ῷ μετὰ τῶν ἢιθέων ἔπλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἐσώθη, τὴν τριακόντορον, ἄχρι τοῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως χρόνου διεφύλαττον οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι. Of course none of the original timbers were left, and Plutarch tells us the philosophers took it as their stock example in discussing the question of identity. Was it the same ship or not?
- a 11 τοὺς "δὶς ἐπτὰ" ἐκείνους: this was also a traditional name. Cp. Bacchyl, xvi. (xvii.) 1 Κυανόπρωρα μὲν ναῦς μενέκτυπον | Θησέα δὶς ἐπτά τ' ἀγλαοὺς ἄγουσα | κούρους Ἰαόνων | Κρητικὸν τάμνε πέλαγος. In the Laws (706 b 7) Plato says it would have been better for the Athenians to lose πλεονάκις ἐπτὰ . . . παίδας than to become ναυτικοί.
 - b 2 θεωρίων, 'pilgrimage', 'mission'. A θεωρός is simply a 'spectator' (θεαξόρος, Dor. θεᾶρός), but the word was specialized in the meaning of an envoy sent by the State to the Great Games, to Delphi or to Delos. The θεωρίαι were λητουργίαι (cp. Dict. Ant., s. v. Theoria).
 - b 3 ἀπάξειν: the ἀπο- has the same force as in ἀποδιδόναι and ἀποφέρειν, that of rendering what is due. Cp. the technical ἀπάγειν τὸν φόρον, φόρου ἀπαγωγή, and Ditt. Syll. p. 43 τὴν ἀπαρχὴν ἀπήγαγον.
 - b 5 καθαρεύειν, sc. φόνου, 'to be clean from bloodshed.' Cp. Plut. Phocion 37 καθαρεῦσαι δημοσίου φόνου τὴν πόλιν ἐορτάζουσαν. So Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2 διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα ἐᾶν δημοσία ἀποθνήσκειν ἕως ᾶν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθη.
 - b 7 δεῦρο, 'to Athens.' It is true that Phaedo is speaking at Phlius, but he is quoting the Athenian νόμος.
 - b 8 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, 'takes a long time.' This meaning of ἐν, which is not clearly explained in most grammars, is well brought out by an anecdote Plutarch tells of Zeuxis (Περὶ πολυφιλίας 94 f): ὁ Ζεῦξις αἰτιωμένων αὐτόν τινων ὅτι ζωγραφεῖ βραδέως, 'Ομολογῶ, εἶπεν, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γράφειν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς πολύν.

4

- b 8 ὅταν τύχωσιν . . . ἀπολαβόντες, 'at times when the winds detain them' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The regular term for 'cut off', 'intercept', is ἀπολαμβάνειν, especially of ships 'detained' by contrary winds. Cp. Hdt. ii. 115 ὑπ' ἀνέμων ἤδη ἀπολαμφθέντες, Thuc. vi. 22 ἤν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμβανώμεθα, Dem. Chers. 35 νόσω καὶ χειμῶνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀποληφθέντος, Plato, Menex. 243 c 2 ἀπειλημμένων ἐν Μυτιλήνη τῶν νεῶν.
- C I αὐτούs: the Greek thinks of the crew rather than the ship. In Thucydides and elsewhere a plural pronoun often stands for πόλις, ναῦς, and the like.
- C 3 ἔτυχεν ... γεγονός, 'had just been done.' Cp. a 6 n.
- c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον: cp. a I n. τί ຖ້ν: cp. 57 a 5 n. W has τίνα here also, and B² corrects accordingly.
- c 7 οι παραγενόμενοι: cp. 57 a I n. So παρείναι just below.
- c 8 οὐκ ϵἴων, 'would they not allow?' 'Did they not allow?' is οὐκ ϵἴασαν. The difference between a negatived imperfect and a negatived aorist may generally be brought out in some such way as this.

 οἱ ἄρχοντες, οἱ ἔνδεκα, as we shall see.
- d I καὶ πολλοί γε, 'quite a number in fact.' There is something to be said, however, for the division indicated in some MSS., ΦΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΕΧ. 'Αλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες; ΦΑΙ. Καὶ πολλοί γε. Cp. Euthyphro 2 b ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΕΥΘ. 'Αλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος; ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.
- d 3 εί μή . . . τυγχάνει οὐσα, 'unless you are engaged just now.'
- d 5 το μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους: cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 1. 1 ἐπεὶ καὶ το ἐκείνου μεμνήσθαι μὴ παρόντος οὐ μικρὰ ὡφέλει (a characteristic Xenophontean touch) τοὺς εἰωθότας τε αὐτῷ συνείναι καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ἐκείνον.
- d 8 τοιούτους έτέρους, 'just such others' (pred.), cp. 80 d 5, 'Well, you will find your hearers of the same mind.' The enthusiasm of the Pythagoreans for Socrates can hardly be an invention of Plato's.

 ως...ἀκριβέστατα, 'as minutely as you can.'
- e Ι παραγενόμενος (synchronous aor. pcp.), cp. 57 a I n. and παρόντα just below.
- e 2 οὖτε: the second οὖτε does not occur till 59 a 3 after this sentence has been resumed by διὰ δὴ ταῦτα κτλ.
 - με . . . είση ει : we can say δέος, έλεος, έλπὶς εἰσέρχεταί με, as here, or εἰσέρχεταί μοι, as at 59 a I.
- e 3 άνήρ: cp. 57 a 5 n. The MSS. have nowhere preserved this form.

but write either $\partial \nu'_1 \rho$ or $\delta \partial \nu'_1 \rho$, though we see from examples in the oblique cases (e. g. 58 c 8; 61 c 3) that the article is required. The existence of the *crasis* is proved by the metre in Aristophanes.

- e 3 καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, 'both in his bearing and his words' (Church). Here ἐὐδαίμων ἐφαίνετο takes the construction of εὐδαιμονίζειν, for which see Crito 43 b 6 quoted in the next note. (The reading τῶν λόγων (TW) is better attested than τοῦ λόγου, which is a mere slip in B corrected by Arethas.)
- e 5 ὤστε μοι . . . παρίστασθαι, 'so that I was made to feel', 'so that I realized'. In the act. παριστάναι τί τινι is 'to impress a thing on some one's mind'. Cp. Dem. Cor. I τοῦτο παραστῆσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῦν, 'that the gods may put it into your hearts,' Mid. 72 τὸ δεινὸν παραστῆσαι τοῦς ἀκούουσιν, 'to make the audience realize the outrage.' In the mid. we can say δόξα μοι παρίσταται, 'the belief impresses itself upon me,' 'the thought comes home to me' (cp. 66 b I), or the verb may be used impersonally as here and Alc.² 143 e 8 εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρεσταίη, 'if it should come into your head.'

ἄνευ θείας μοίρας, lit. 'without a divine dispensation'. The meaning is that 'Providence' would watch over him on his way. The phrase θεία μοίρα is common in Plato and Xenophon as the religious equivalent of τύχη. Hdt. iii. 139 says θείη τύχη. Cp. Xen. Apol. 32 έμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεὶ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι (Σωκράτης).

- 59 a 2 παρόντι πένθει, 'one who takes part in a scene of mourning.' The meaning of παρείναι was so fixed in this connexion (57 a I n.) that no Greek would be tempted to take it as neuter in agreement with πένθει. It is dependent on εἰσιέναι to be supplied from εἰσήει, and governs πένθει.
 - a 3 ούτε αὖ: the first οὔτε is at 58 e 2.

ἐν φιλοσοφία ὅντων, ' occupied with philosophy.' Heindorf compares Xen. Cyr. iii. 1. 1 ὁ μὲν δὴ Κῦρος ἐν τούτοις ἦν, iv. 3. 23 οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τούτοις τοῦς λόγοις ἦσαν. See below 84 a 8 ἀεὶ ἐν τούτω (τῷ λογι-σμῷ) οὖσα.

a 4 τοιοθτοί τινες, i. e. philosophical.

- a 4 ἀτεχνῶs, 'just.' The phrase is equivalent to ἀτεχνῶs ἄτοπόν τι ἔπαθον, for which cp. Symp. 198 c 2 ὥστε ἀτεχνῶs τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου ἐπεπόνθη, Arist. Clouds 408 νη Δι' ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀτεχνῶs ἔπαθον τουτί ποτε Διασίοισιν. In this connexion the adverb means that the description of the πάθοs is to be taken 'literally', as we say.
- a 8 γελώντες...δακρύοντες: the participles explain οὖτω, and are not dependent on διεκείμεθα.

ἐνίστε δέ: a variation of the usual τστὲ δέ. Cp. Theaet. 150 a 9 ἐνίστε μὲν . . . ἔστι δ' ὅτε . . . , Soph. 242 d I ἐνίστε . . . τστὲ δὲ . . . Plato avoids formal symmetry with μέν and δέ.

2 9 καὶ διαφερόντως, 'quite exceptionally' (καί as in καὶ μάλα). Cp.
 61 ε 1; 117 c 4.

'Aπολλόδωροs is mentioned as a disciple in Apol. 34 a 2, and Plato has chosen him as the narrator of the Symposium. In that dialogue, the friend to whom he narrates it says (17 3 d 4) 'Aεὶ ὅμοιος εί, ω 'Απολλόδωρε' ἀεὶ γὰρ σαυτόν τε κακηγορείς και τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκείς μοι ατεχνώς πάντας αθλίους ήγεισθαι πλήν Σωκράτους, από σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. Xenophon mentions him along with Antisthenes (Mem. iii. 11. 17) 'Απολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ 'Αντισθένην οὐδέποτέ μου ἀπολεί- $\pi \epsilon \sigma \theta a \iota$), so he seems to have belonged to the Cynic section of the Socratic circle, which agrees very well with the tendency to κακηvopia and with other traits mentioned in the Symposium. In the Xenophontean Apology 28 we are told that he was ἐπιθυμητης μέν ισχυρώς αὐτοῦ (Σωκράτους), ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης (naif, 'silly'). In most editions of the Symposium we read that he had the nickname (ἐπωνυμία) of μανικός (173 d 8), but μαλακός has better MS. authority and suits the context better. His friend says he does not know how Apollodorus got the name of 'soft'; for he is always savage with himself and every one but Socrates. Certainly his conduct here and at 117 d 3 is madaría rather than maría.

- b 6 τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, 'of native Athenians.' Cp. Prot. 315 b 2 ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χομῷ (as opposed to the ξένοι, whom Protagoras brought in his train), Rep. 327 a 4 ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωμίων πομπή (as opposed to the Thracian procession).
- b 7 Κριτόβουλοs, son of Crito, was chiefly known for his beauty. In Xenophon's Symposium Socrates undertakes to prove himself to be more beautiful than Critobulus.

δ πατήρ αὐτοῦ: W adds the name Κρίτων, and so B2; but he was

so well known that this is unnecessary. Crito was of the same age and deme ('Αλωπεκῆθεν) as Socrates (Αροl. 33 d 9 ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης), and Plato has drawn a touching picture of his devotion here and in the *Crito*. We gather that he watched over his friend and master's worldly interests without fully understanding his philosophy.

b 7 Έρμογίνης, brother of Callias son of Hipponicus, who had spent more money on 'sophists' than any man of his time (Apol. 20 a 4), and in whose house the scene of the Protagoras is laid. Hermogenes is one of the speakers in the Cratylus, where the poverty into which he had fallen is alluded to (Crat. 384 c 5), and he is included in Xenophon's list of the inner Socratic circle (Mem. i. 2. 48). In Mem. ii. 10 Socrates persuades his friend Diodorus to assist him, and in iv. 8. 4 he is quoted as the authority for the trial of Socrates, which took place after Xenophon left Athens.

Έ 8 Έπιγένης: cp. Apol. 33 e 2 'Αντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὐτοσί, 'Επιγένους πατήρ. This Antiphon must not be confused with the orator, who was τῶν δήμων 'Ραμνούσιος. There is a conversation with Epigenes in Xen. Mem. iii. 12, where Socrates says to him ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς ('in bad training') τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, ὡ 'Επίγενες, and urges him to take more exercise.

Aἰσχίνης: i. e. Aeschines Socraticus, so called to distinguish him from the orator. Cp. Apol. 33 e I Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ. After the death of Socrates, he appears to have fallen into great poverty, but was given some place at the court of Dionysius II on the recommendation of Plato (or Aristippus). He was one of the most highly appreciated writers of Socratic dialogues. The Axiochus, the Eryxias, and the Περὶ ἀρετῆς were at one time ascribed to him and have been edited under his name, but are certainly of later date.

'Aντισθένης is the well-known founder of the Cynic school. The date of his birth is uncertain, but he certainly belonged to the generation before Plato. He is probably the source of a good many things in Xenophon's account of Socrates. It has been held in recent times that many of Plato's dialogues were directed against Antisthenes, and references to him have been discovered in a great many places. It is well, however, to be sceptical regarding these. We really know very little about Antisthenes, and it is not safe to

59

reconstruct him from doubtful allusions. So far as the *Phaedo* is concerned, we may be sure there are no attacks upon him in it, seeing that he is supposed to be present.

- b 8 ħv, 'there was also.' Though it is true that compound verbs are repeated by the simple (60 b 3 n.), it is not necessary to take ἡν here as equivalent to παρῆν. Cp. Prot. 315 e 3 τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειρακιον, καὶ τὸ 'Αδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, Rep. 615 d 7 ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶταί τινες.
- b 9 Κτήσιππος: in the Euthydemus he is called (273 a 7) νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα καλός τε κάγαθὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστὴς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. He also appears in the Lysis.

Mevégevos: the same after whom the Menexenus is called. He was son of Demopho and cousin of the Ctesippus just mentioned, as we learn from the Lysis (206 d 3), in which dialogue he plays a leading part as the young friend of Lysis. He must not be confused with his namesake, the son of Socrates (60 a 2 n.).

- b 10 Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἦσθένει. Many strange things have been written about this simple statement. Of course, it is an advantage from a dramatic point of view for Plato to keep himself out of his dialogues; and, as a matter of fact, he only mentions his own name in two other places (Apol. 34 a I and 38 b 6). At the same time, it is hardly credible that he should represent himself as absent on this occasion unless he had actually been so. It has been said that, had Plato really been ill, he would have had no occasion to make the reservation implied by οἶμαι. He must have known whether he was ill or not. That is so; but it does not follow that Phaedo was equally well informed, and he is the speaker, not Plato.
 - 2 Ι Σιμμίας...καὶ Κέβης. These are the chief interlocutors in the Phaeuo. We shall see presently that they were disciples of Philolaus at Thebes, which, like Phlius, was a city of refuge for the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 99). From the Crito (45 b 3) we learn that they had brought a sum of money from Thebes to aid the escape of Socrates, another case of Pythagorean devotion to him. It is all the more important to observe that Xenophon confirms this by including Simmias and Cebes in his list of true Socratics (Mem. i. 2. 48). Cp. also Mem. iii. II. 17 (immediately after the mention of Antisthenes and Apollodorus) διὰ τί δὲ (οἴει) καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; It is probable that Σιμίας is the

correct form of the name (from σιμός), but I have not ventured to introduce it.

C 2 Φαιδώνδηs: the MSS. vary between this form and Φαιδωνίδηs. Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 48) mentions him along with Simmias and Cebes as a true Socratic, giving the correct Boeotian form of his name, Φαιδώνδαs.

Eὐκλείδηs: Euclides was the head of a philosophical school at Megara, which held a form of the Eleatic doctrine. He is also represented in the *Theaetetus* as devoted to the memory of Socrates.

Τερψίων. All we know of Terpsion is that he is associated with Euclides in the dramatic introduction to the *Theaetetus*, which serves to dedicate that dialogue to the Megarians just as the *Phaedo* is dedicated to the Pythagoreans.

C 3 'Αρίστιπποs. Many anecdotes are told of Aristippus of Cyrene, which may be apocryphal, but agree in representing him as a versatile cosmopolitan (omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, Horace, Ep. i. 17. 23). Many allusions to his doctrine have been found in Plato's writings; but the same caution applies here (cp. b 8 n.) as in the case of Antisthenes.

Κλεόμβροτοs: Callimachus has an epigram (24) on Cleombrotus of Ambracia who threw himself into the sea after reading the *Phaedo*, and he has often been identified with the Cleombrotus mentioned here. Nothing, however, is known of him.

C 4 ἐν Αἰγίνη γὰρ κτλ. In antiquity this was supposed to be an innuendo. Demetrius says (Περὶ ἐρμηνείας 288) that Socrates had been in prison for a number of days and they did not take the trouble to sail across, though they were not 200 stades from Athens. To make this more pointed, Cobet inserted οὐ before παρεγένοντο, and took the clause as a question, which only proves that the innuendo is not very apparent in the text as it stands. We must be very careful in reading such covert meanings into Plato's words. Athenaeus (504 f) makes it a grievance that he does not mention Xenophon here, though Xenophon had left Athens two years before. If the words Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἦσθένει had been used of any one else, that would have been set down to malice. As we shall see, it had only become known the day before that the ship had returned from Delos, and we learn from the Crito (43 d 3) that the news came from

Sunium where she had touched. Aristippus and Cleombrotus could hardly have heard this in time, if they were in Aegina. There is no evidence that they had been there during the whole of the thirty days, as Demetrius suggests.

Introductory Narrative.—The attitude of Socrates towards death (59 c 8—70 c 3).

- (1) Preliminary Narrative (59 c 8-63 e 8).
- d 8 τη ... προτεραία: Attic usage seems to require either τη προτέρα ήμέρα or τη προτεραία. I have therefore followed Hermann in bracketing ήμέρα.
- 6 4 ὑπακούειν, 'to answer the door.' Cp. Crito 43 a 5 θαυμάζω ὅπως ἢθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.

εἶπεν περιμένειν, 'told us to wait.' T has ἐπιμένειν, which seems less suitable. It would mean 'to stay as we were' (Riddell, Dig. § 127).

- ε 5 κως ἄν: we should expect πρὶν ἄν after πρότερον, but καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι is merely a 'polar' antithesis placed διὰ μέσου and does not affect the construction.
- e 6 οἱ ἔνδεκα: on the Eleven and their functions, see Arist. 'Αθ. πολ.
 52, where we are told that the people elected them inter alia ἐπιμελησομένους τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίφ.
- e 7 ὅπως ἀν...τελευτά, 'are giving instructions for his death to-day.' For this rare construction after verbs of commanding, where the dependent clause contains the substance of the order, cp. Gorg. 523 d 7 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται ('instructions have been given') τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἀν παίση, Isaeus 7. 27 διεκελεύεσθ' ὅπως ἄν, εἴ τι πάθοι πρότερον, ἐγγράφωσί με. The present τελευτά (T) is more likely to have been altered to τελευτήση (B) than vice versa.

οὐ πολὺν . . . χρόνον ἐπισχών, lit. 'after waiting (ἐπέχω intrans.) no long time'. Cf. 95 e 7 συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχών. Similarly 117 e 7 διαλιπὼν χρόνον, 118 11 ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπών, 'after a short interval.'

e 8 ἐκέλευεν: W has ἐκέλευσεν (and so, accordingly, B²), but this is less idiomatic. The English verbs 'send' and 'bid' refer to the starting of the action, but πέμπειν and κελεύειν operate throughout the action. 'The thought follows the motion' (Gildersleeve). The imperfect is therefore natural where we should expect the acrist.

It is for the same reason that $\pi \epsilon \mu \pi \epsilon \iota \nu$ can mean 'convey', 'escort', and $\kappa \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \dot{\nu} \epsilon \iota \nu$, 'urge on', 'incite'.

- e 8 εἰσιόντες: W has εἰσελθόντες (and so B²), but the present pcp. goes better with κατελαμβάνομεν. There were a number of them, so the action is resolved into successive parts ('as we entered, we found...').
- **60 a 1** κατελαμβάνομεν, 'we found.' When καταλαμβάνειν is used in this sense, it takes the construction of verbs of knowing.
 - a 2 Ξανθίππην. There is no hint in the Phaedo, or anywhere else in Plato, that Xanthippe was a shrew. Xenophon makes her son Lamprocles say of her (Mem. ii. 2. 7) οὐδεὶς ἀν δύναιτο αὐτῆς ἀνασχέσθαι τὴν χαλεπότητα, and in Xen. Symp. 2. 10 Antisthenes says she was the most 'difficult' (χαλεπωτάτη) of all wives, past, present, or future. The traditional stories about her appear to be of Cynic origin.

τὸ παιδίον. Socrates had three sons (Apol. 34 d 6 εἶs μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία). The μειράκιον must be the Lamprocles mentioned by Xenophon (see last note). There was one called Sophroniscus after his paternal grandfather, so he would be the second. The child here mentioned must accordingly be Menexenus (not to be confused with Menexenus, son of Demopho, cp. 59 b 9 n.). It is worthy of note that the names Xanthippe and Lamprocles suggest aristocratic connexions, and possibly Lamprocles was called after his maternal grandfather (cp. Arist. Clouds 62 sqq.). Socrates was not always a poor man; for he had served as a hoplite, and in Apol. 23 b 9 he ascribes his poverty to his service of Apollo (ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν). This may explain the χαλεπότης of Xanthippe, if such there was.

a 3 ἀνηψήμησε ought to mean 'raised a cry of εὐφημεῖτε' (bona verba, favete linguis), and that gives a perfectly good sense. The rule was ἐν εὐφημία χρὴ τελευτᾶν (117 e 1), and εὐφημεῖτε was therefore a natural address to people approaching a scene of death. That she should use it and then break the εὐφημία herself is only human—and feminine. Byzantine scholars took, however, another view. In the recently discovered portion of the Lexicon of the Patriarch Photius (ninth cent. A.D.) we read ἀνευφήμησεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐθρήνησεν (Reitzenstein, Anf. des Phot. p. 135), and the rest follow suit. It was explained κατ' ἀντίφρασιν, i. e. by a curious figure of

60

speech which consisted in saying the opposite of what you meant (lucus a non lucendo). Very similar is Soph. Trach. 783 äπas δ' ἀνηνφήμησεν οὶμωγή λεώς (where G. Hermann took the word in its natural sense) and Eur. Or. 1335 ἐπ' ἀξίοισί τἄρ' ἀνενφημεί δόμος. In both these cases death is imminent. It may be said that the οὶμωγή itself is δύσφημον, but that is not necessarily so; at any rate εὐφήμοις γόοις is quoted from Aeschylus (fr. 40 Sidgwick).

- a 4 οἶα δή: these words might have been used even without εἰώθασιν, in the sense of 'just like'. Cp. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2 οἶα δὴ παῖς ('just like a boy'), Thuc. viii. 84. 3 οἷα δὴ ναῦται.
- a 5 υστατον δή, 'so this is the last time that . . .' Cp. 89 b 4 αυριον δή.
- a 7 ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτήν κτλ. With this reading (that of B: TW have ταύτην) the words are kindly and considerate. Xanthippe had apparently passed the night with Socrates and their child (at any rate she was found there when the doors were opened), and it was only right she should go home and rest. She is sent for again just before the end to say farewell. I do not see any ground for the remarks which some editors take occasion to make here on the Athenians' treatment of their wives. Would it have been right to keep Xanthippe there all day, in her overwrought condition, and allow her to witness the actual agony? Some women would have insisted on staying, but we can find no fault with the behaviour of Socrates in the matter.
- a 9 τινες των του Κρίτωνος, 'some of Crito's people.'
- b I κοπτομένην: the original meaning of κόπτεσθαι was 'to beat the breasts', but it came to mean simply 'to lament' (cp. the κομμός in tragedy). The history of the Lat. plango (whence planctus, 'plaint') is similar.

ἀνακαθιζόμενος: the use of this verb in the medical writers shows that the meaning is 'sitting up'. Cp. Hippocrates, Progn. 37 ἀνακαθίζειν βούλεσθαι τὸν νοσέοντα τῆς νόσου ἀκμαζούσης πονηρόν. We might expect ἐν τῆ κλίνη, but (ἶζεσθαι) καθίζεσθαι sometimes retain the construction of (ἄζω) καθίζω, which are verbs of motion. The variant ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην (W and B^2) may be due to the idea that the verb means residens, 'sitting down.' Wohlrab argues that Socrates must have got up to welcome his friends, and adopts ἐπί accordingly; but this would spoil the picture. We are led to understand that he put his feet on the ground for the first time at 61 c 10. The

fetters had just been struck off, and at first he would be too stiff to get up.

b 2 συνέκαμψε: this verb is specially used of bending the joints. Cp.
 Arist. Hist. An. 502 b 11 πίθηκος πόδας συγκάμπτει, ὥσπερ χείρας.
 It is opposed to ἐκτείνω.

έξέτριψε, 'rubbed down,' as with a towel. Athenaeus (409 e) quotes Philoxenos for ἔκτριμμα in the sense of χειρόμακτρον.

b 3 τρίβων: the compound verb is regularly repeated by the simple.
 Cp. 71 e 8 ἀνταποδώσομεν . . . ἀποδοῦναι, 84 c 7 διεξιέναι . . . διελθείν,
 104 d 10 ἀπεργάζηται . . . εἰργάζετο.

ůs ἄτοπον...π: the unemphatic τις is often postponed by hyperbaton (Riddell, Dig. § 290 c).

- b 4 ως θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρός, 'how strangely it is related to —.'

 Relation is expressed by πεφυκέναι πρός..., design or adaptation
 by πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ...
- b 5 τὸ ἄμα μὲν κτλ., 'to think that they will not —.' The exclamatory infinitive is often used after some expression of feeling (in the present case ὡς θανμασίως) which it serves to justify. Cp. Eur. Alc. 832 ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι, 'Out on thee! to think thou didst not tell!', Med. 1051 ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, τὸ καὶ προέσθαι κτλ., Arist. Clouds 819 τῆς μωρίας, τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὅντα τηλικουτονί. This explanation, which is due to Riddell (Dig. § 85), makes it unnecessary to read τῷ with inferior MS. authority and Stobaeus.
- b 6 μη θίλειν: editors speak of personification and 'the lively fancy of the Greeks' here, but even we say 'won't' in such cases.
- b 7 σχεδόν τι ... ἀεί, 'in almost every case.' The omission of ἀεί in B is probably accidental. The relativity of pain and pleasure is a Heraclitean doctrine, cp. fr. 104 Bywater νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ, κακὸν ἀγαθόν, λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσιν, and it is not, perhaps, fanciful to suppose that this is intended to prepare us for the Heraclitean arguments as to the relativity of life and death below (70 d 7 sqq.).
- C I Αίσωποs: Aesop was a Phrygian slave of whom many odd tales were told (cp. Wilamowitz-Marchant, Greek Reader, ii, p. 1), and

the Athenians attributed to him the beast-fables which play so large a part in all popular literature. The prose collection which has come down to us under the title of $Ali\sigma\dot{\omega}\pi\sigma\sigma\nu$ $\mu\dot{\nu}\theta\sigma\iota$ is of Byzantine date; but many of the fables were well known from popular verses and Archilochus.

- C 3 αὐτοῖs: this is rather neater than the variant αὐτῶν. 'He fastened their heads together for them.'
- C 5 αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, sc. ἐπακολουθεῖν. The clause ἐπειδὴ κτλ. is in apposition (asyndeton explicativum), and the original statement is, as usual, restated more fully after the explanation (a b a).
- c 6 ύπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ: cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους, prae metu.
- C 8 ὑπολαβὼν... ἔφη, 'rejoined' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The meaning of ὑπολαμβάνειν is not 'to interrupt', but 'to rejoin' or 'retort'. Cp. Lat. suscipere (Aen. vi. 723 suscipit Anchises) and contrast παραλαμβάνειν (τὸν λόγον) excipere.
- C 9 εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με, 'thank you for reminding me' (synchronous aor. pcp.). So Euthyd. 282 c 6 εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς. Cp. Hdt. v. 24 εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπικόμενος, Eur. Med. 472 εὖ δ' ἐποίησας μολών.
- 1 1 ἐντείνας, 'setting to music.' Cp. Prot. 326 b 1 ποιήματα . . . εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες. This seems to come from the geometrical use of the term which we find in Meno 87 a 1 εἰ οἰόν τε εἰς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον . . . ἐνταθήναι, where it refers to the 'inscription' of rectangular figures in a circle (for which Euclid uses ἐγγράφειν). That in turn, like many geometrical terms (e. g. arc, chord, subtend, hypotenuse, cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 116 n. 1), comes from the use of ropes or strings in geometrical constructions. The Pythagoreans were much concerned with the inscription of polygons in circles and polyhedra in spheres (cp. 110 b 6 n.), and it was natural that the same word should be used of making words fit into a musical scheme. Cp. also Phileb. 38 e 2 ἐντείνας εἰς φωνήν of putting thought into words.

λόγους, 'tales.' This was the usual name (cp. Ar. Birds 651 ἐν Αἰσώπου λόγοις, Herodotus ii. 134 Αἰσώπου τοῦ λογοποιοῦ); but, when it is important to mark their fictitious character, they are called μῦθοι and opposed to λόγοι (61 b 4). In Ionic μῦθοs means the same as λόγοs in Attic; the Ionic for 'fable ' is αἶνος (cp. Archil. fr. 96 ἐρέω τιν' ὑμῖν αἶνον, ὧ Κηρυκίδη).

d 2 τὸ εἰς τὸν ᾿Απόλλω προοίμιον: Thucydides (iii. 104) gives this name to the Homeric 'Hymn' to Apollo. Properly speaking, προσίμια are 'preludes' intended to attach the rhapsode's epic recitations to the praise of the god at whose πανήγυρις they were delivered. This instance shows that evreivas is 'setting to music', not merely 'versifying'; for no προοίμιον could have been in prose. In the Phaedo, Socrates is represented throughout as the servant of Apollo (cp. esp. 85 b 4 sqq.). Apollo Hyperboreus of Delos was in a special sense the god of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 97, n. 3), and there would be no difficulty in identifying him with the Pythian Apollo who had given the famous oracle, and to whose service, as we know from the Apology, Socrates regarded himself as consecrated. They were identified in the public religion of Athens (Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, iv, p. 110). Geddes's suggestions about 'the God of Day' must be rejected. Apollo was not a sungod at this date (Farnell, ib., p. 136 sq.).

καὶ ἄλλοι τινές . . . ἀτὰρ καὶ . . . So we find ἀεὶ μὲν . . . ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν (τότε) . . . In these uses ἀτὰρ καὶ . . . is equivalent to καὶ δὴ καὶ . . .

d 3 Eőŋvos: from Apol. 20 b 8 we learn that Evenus was a Parian who taught 'human goodness' for 5 minae. In Phaedr. 267 a 3 we are told that he invented certain rhetorical devices such as ὑποδήλωσις and παρέπαινος. Some said he even composed παράψογοι in metre μνήμης χάριν. He was also an elegiac poet.

πρώην, 'the other day.' We know from the Apology 20 a 3 that Evenus was at Athens about the time of the trial of Socrates.

- d 9 ἀντίτεχνος, 'competitor', 'rival'. So in År. Frogs 816 Euripides is the ἀντίτεχνος of Aeschylus.
- e 2 ἀποπειρώμενος: cp. Hdt. i. 46 τῶν μαντηΐων ἀποπειρώμενος. Plato makes Socrates confess his belief in dreams elsewhere. Cp. Apol. 33 c 5 and Crito 44 a.

άφοσιούμενος: the verb ἀφοσιοῦμαι means facio aliquid animi religione solvendi causa. Tr. 'to satisfy my conscience'.

e 3 εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις, 'on the chance that,' si forte. This use of πολλάκις is fairly common after εἰ (ἐὰν) ἄρα and μή. Cp. 61 a 6.

ταύτην την μουσικήν, 'music in the ordinary sense.' The pronoun oύτοs is often depreciatory like iste.

e 7 καὶ ἐργάζου, sc. μουσικήν. As distinguished from ποιείν, 'compose,'

έργάζεσθαι means 'to make a business of', 'practise', and is regularly used of arts and trades (L. S., s. v. II. 5, 6)

- e 8 παρακελεύεσθαι hortari atiquem ut aliquia faciat; επικελεύειν incitare facientem (Fischer). Comparatio autem aucta est ex proverbio currentem incitare (Wyttenbach). Cf. Xen. Cyr. vi. 3. 27 τοις... τὸ δέον ποιούσιν επικελεύειν.
- a 1 ωσπερ...καὶ ἐμοὶ οῦτω: the simile brings out the meaning of ἐπικελείειν and is therefore added appositively (asyndeton explicativum), after which the original fact is more fully restated (a b a). For this regular Platonic structure, cp. 109 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 209).

διακελευόμενοι: the proper meaning of διακελεύεσθαι is 'to exhort one another'. Cp. Hdt. ix. 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικί, but Plato often uses the word as equivalent to παρακελεύεσθαι. Here I think, it is merely employed for variety; it could hardly refer to the partisans of different runners exhorting their favourites.

- φιλοσοφίας ... ούσης μεγίστης μουσικής: this is a distinctively a 3 Pythagorean doctrine. We have the authority of Aristoxenus for saying that the Pythagoreans used medicine to purge the body and music to purge the soul (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 107), and Aristotle's doctrine of the tragic κάθαρσις seems to be ultimately derived from this source. We shall see that philosophy is the true soul-purge. Strabo, who had access to Italiote and Siceliote historians now lost, says, in discussing the orginstic dances of the Curetes (x. 468) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μουσικήν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Πλάτων, καὶ ἔτι πρότερον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, την Φιλοσοφίαν. Cp. also Rep. 548 b 8 της άληθινης Μούσης της μετά λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας, Laws 689 d 6 ή καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη των συμφωνιών ('harmonies') μεγίστη δικαιότατ' αν λέγοιτο σοφία. This is quite different from the metaphor put into the mouth of Laches in Lach. 188 d 3. There the μουσικός ἀνήρ is he whose character Any educated Athenian might have is tuned in a noble key. said that: but here we have a definite doctrine, which is further developed in the sequel.
- a 6 εί άρα πολλάκις: cp. 60 e 3 n.
- b r πιθόμενον: this was originally the reading of T and should, I think, be preferred to πειιόμενον if καί is deleted and the participle made dependent on ποιήσαντα. Tr. 'by composing poems in obedience to the dream'. We often find καί interpolated between two

1251 17 C

participles, one of which is subordinated to the other. It is omitted here by W, and Schanz had bracketed it without knowing this.

- b 4 μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους: cp. 60 d I n. Cp. Gorg. 523 a I ἄκουε . . . λόγου, δν σὺ μὲν ἡγήση μῦθον, . . . ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον, Prot. 324 d 6 τούτου . . . πέρι . . . οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον, Tim. 26 e 4 μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ' ἀληθινὸν λόγον. The distinction is almost the same as ours between 'fiction' and 'fact'.
- b 5 καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡ: the construction ceases to be indirect, as if ἐπειδή, not ἐννοήσας ὅτι had preceded.
- 6 ἤπιστάμην, 'knew off by heart.' Cp. Prot. 339 b 4 τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἦσμα; Gorg. 484 b 10 τὸ γὰρ ἦσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι.
 - τοὺς Αἰσώπου: the antecedent is incorporated in the relative clause (Riddell, Dig. § 218).
- b 7 οἶs πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον: the clause οὖs προχείρους εἶχον is restated after the explanation (a b a) (Riddell, Dig. § 218).
- b 8 ἐρρῶσθαι, sc. φράζε. 'Bid him farewell from me.' The regular word for delivering messages is φράζειν, and ἔρρῶσο (perf. imper. mid. of ῥόνννυμ) means 'farewell' and was regularly used in ending letters, whence Lat. vale.

αν σωφρονη, 'if he is wise,' the regular phrase in this sense, σωφρονείν being used in its originally sense of sapere, 'to be in one's right mind.' The more common meaning of σωφρονείν is an extension of the idea of 'sanity' to a wider sphere.

ώs τάχιστα: the omission of these words in T spoils the sense. Cp. Theaet. 176 a 8 πειρασθαι χρη ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε ('from this world to the other') φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα.

- C 2 oiov: an exclamation, not a question. Cf. 117 d 7 οία . . . ποιείτε.
- C 3 πολλά ... ἐντετύχηκα, 'I have had many dealings with him.' Cp. Lach. 197 d 3 ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, Crat. 396 d 5 ἔωθεν ... πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ, Parm. 126 b 9 Πυθοδώρῳ ... πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε.
- c 4 σχεδόν: used as in the phrase σχεδόν (τι) οἶδα. Tr. 'I am pretty sure that —'.

έκων είναι: always with a negative, 'if he can (could) help it.'

c 6 οὐ φιλόσοφος: as addressed to Pythagoreans, the word has a special sense (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 321), that of a man who follows a certain 'way of life'. It is much as if we should ask: 'Is he not a religious man?'

- c 8 ἐθελήσει, 'will be willing', 'will be ready', not 'will wish'. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, sc. φιλοσοφίας, regarded as an occupation. Cp. Αροί. 20 c 5 τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; The term is natural if we remember that 'philosophy' is a life.
- d 7 Φιλολάφ: Philolaus was one of the most distinguished of the later Pythagoreans, and had taken refuge at Thebes when the community was expelled from Magna Graecia (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 99). There seems to have been a regular συνέδριον at Thebes as well as at Phlius. The Pythagorean Lysis was the teacher of Epaminondas.
- d 8 οὐδίν...σαφίς, 'nothing certain' rather than 'nothing clear' (cp. 57 b I n.). We shall see that there were good reasons for the teaching of Philolaus about the soul being doubtful (86 b 6 n.). I do not think there is any reference to the Pythagoreans' custom of speaking δι' αἰνιγμάτων, as Olympiodorus fancies.
- d 10 φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν, 'I don't mind telling you.'
 - е I кай µа́диота, vel maxime. Ср. 59 а 9 п.
 - ἐκεῖσε... τῆς ἐκεῖ: the adverbs ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ are regularly used of 'this life and the next', 'this world and the other'. Cp. 64 a I; 117 c 2. So Theaet. 176 a 8 quoted in 61 b 8 n., and Aristophanes, Frogs 82 ὁ δ' εὕκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ' εὕκολος δ' ἐκεῖ. There is no need to read τῆς ἐκεῖσε for τῆς ἐκεῖ, for ἀποδημία means a residence abroad as well as a journey abroad. Tr. 'our sojourn in the other world'.
 - e 2 μυθολογεῖν, 'to tell tales.' Socrates regards all definite statements with regard to the next life as μῦθοι. Cp. Αροί. 39 e 4 where he introduces what he has to say about it by οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. The immortality of the soul is capable of scientific proof; the details of the ἀποδημία are not. Cp. below 110 b 1 n. and 114 d 1.
 - 6 4 μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμών: executions could not take place till sunset.
 Cp. 89 C 7 ἔως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν, 116 e I ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅρεσιν καὶ οὕπω δεδυκέναι.
 - 6 νυνδή, 'just now,' i.e. 'a little ago' (ὁλίγον πρόσθεν). In this sense, the grammarians accent as in the text, to distinguish the adverb from νῦν δή, 'now indeed', 'now at last' (cp. 107 c 4). As a rule the MSS, have νῦν δή in both senses.
 - e 7 ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο: it appears from these words that Philolaus had left Thebes some time before 399 B.C. We hear of him at Tarentum (Taras), which was the chief seat of scientific Pythagoreanism

19

C 2

in the fourth century B.C. The leading man then was Archytas (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 319).

62 a 2 ίσως μέντοι κτλ. As the construction of this sentence has been much disputed, I will first give what I take to be the right translation. This will be justified in the following notes, from which it will also appear how it differs from other interpretations. I render: 'I dare say, however, it will strike you as strange if this is the solitary case of a thing which admits of no distinctions—I mean, if it never turns out, as in other cases, that for man (that is at certain times and for certain men) it is better to die than to live—and, in such cases, I dare say it further strikes you as strange that it is not lawful for those for whom it is better to die to do this good office for themselves, but that they have to wait for some one else to do it for them.' This comes nearest to Bonitz's interpretation (Plat. Stud., ed. 3 (1886), pp. 315 sqq.), and I shall note specially the points in which it differs.

εὶ τοῦτο . . . ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν: I take this clause as the expression in a positive form of what is stated negatively in the next. If we must say what τοῦτο means, it will be τὸ βέλτιον είναι (ῆν ἡ τεθνάναι, but the pronoun is really anticipatory and only acquires a definite meaning as the sentence proceeds. Bonitz once took route as meaning το τεθνάναι, but in his latest discussion of the passage he substitutes τὸ αὐτὸν έαυτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι. I do not think it necessary to look backwards for a definite reference, and I think Bonitz does not do justice to the clearly marked antithesis of μόνον τῶν ἄλλων άπάντων and ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα. The ἄλλα must surely be the same in both clauses, and if so these must be positive and negative expressions of the same thought. I hold, with Bonitz, that the interpretation of most recent editors (τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν είναι αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι) is untenable, if only because it gives an impossible meaning to ἀπλοῦν. Further, no one has suggested that the lawlessness of suicide is the only rule which is absolute, and the suggestion would be absurd. On the other hand, many people would say that life is always better than death. It may be added that τοῦτο is the proper anticipatory pronoun; it is constantly used praeparative, as the older grammars say.

2 3 τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων: Riddell, Dig. § 172.

άπλοῦν: that is άπλοῦν which has no διαφοραί (cp. Polit. 306 c 3

πότερον ἀπλοῦν ἐστι τοῦτο, ἡ ... ἔχει διαφοράν). It is what admits of no distinctions such as ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἶς. Cp. Symp. 183 d 4 οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν ... οὕτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ αὐτὸ οὕτε αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν, Phaedr. 244 a 5 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι (where Socrates immediately proceeds to enumerate the different kinds of madness), Prot. 331 b 8 οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ... οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι ... ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. Τhis is the origin of the Aristotelian use of ἀπλῶς. Bonitz has shown once for all that ἀπλοῦν does not mean simpliciter verum, as many editors say after Heindorf.

a 3 οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει . . . βέλτιον ⟨ὄν⟩: these words must be taken together, whether we add ὄν, as suggested by Heindorf, or not. It is, I think, safer to add it; for the certain instances of the poetical use of τυγχάνω without a participle come from later dialogues where poetical idioms are commoner.

 $τ\hat{\phi}$ ἀνθρώπ ϕ , 'for man' generally. The dative is governed by βέλτιον, not by τυγχάνει, as some editors suppose.

2 4 ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα, 'as other things do.' Olympiodorus rightly says: ἐπαμφοτεριζόντων τῶν ᾶλλων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν δυναμένων εἶναι (the rest of his interpretation is wrong). The phrase is an abbreviation of some such clause as this: ιωσπερ ἐνίοτε ἐνίοις βέλτιον δν τυγχάνει νοσεῖν, πένεσθαι κτλ., ἡ ὑγιαίνειν, πλουτεῖν κτλ.

ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἰς: i.e. ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἔστιν οἶς, ἐνίστε καὶ ἐνίσις. Bonitz's proposal to delete the comma at τἆλλα and take ιὅστερ καὶ τἆλλα ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἶς together is at first sight attractive. It gets rid of the pleonasm of ἔστιν ὅτε after οὐδέποτε and the change from singular to plural involved in taking ἔστιν οἶς with τῷ ἀνθρώπφ. These are not, however, insuperable difficulties, and I feel that the ellipse involved in ιὅσπερ καὶ τἆλλα is easier if it is total than if it is partial.

2 5 τεθνάναι: in such phrases τεθνάναι may properly be translated 'to die'; for ἀποθνήσκειν lays stress on the process of dying, of which τεθνάναι is the completion. The translation 'to be dead' is clearly inadmissible in such common phrases as πολλάκις, μυριάκις τεθνάναι. Cp. also Crito 43 d I οὖ δεῖ ἀφικομένου (sc. τοῦ πλοίου) τεθνάναι με, 52 c 6 οὖκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, Apol. 30 c I οὖδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι, 38 e 4 πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἡ ἐκείνως ζῆν, 39 e 3 οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἶ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ

- τεθνάναι, 41a 8 πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. So below 62c3 ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, 64a6; c 5, 67e2; 81a I. Cp. the similar use of ἀπολωλέναι and that of τεθνάτω in criminal law, and see Vahlen, *Opuscula*, ii. 211 on the whole subject.
- a 8 ἴττω Ζεύς: Schol. τὸ ἵττω ἐπιχωριάζοντός ἐστι. In Ar. Ach. 911 the Boeotian says ἵττω Δεύς, 'let Zeus know' (ἴττω = Γίδτω = Att. ἵστω), 'Zeus be my witness.' The meaning is much attenuated, and the French Parbleu! comes nearest to it. Epist. vii. 345 a 3 ἵττω Ζεύς, φησὶν ὁ Θηβαῖος may or may not be a reminiscence of this passage. It is more likely that the phrase struck Athenian ears as a quaint one. The expletives of a language generally strike foreigners in this way.
- a 9 φωνη, 'dialect.' Cp. Apol. 17 d 5 and Crat. 398 d 8 ἐν τῆ 'Αττικη φωνη. So we say βοιωτιάζειν, δωρίζειν, ἐλληνίζειν, ξενίζειν τῆ φωνη. In classical Greek διάλεκτος means 'conversation', 'manner of speech'. Aristotle uses it (Poet. 1458 b 32) for 'everyday language' as opposed to the diction of poetry. It only acquires the meaning of 'dialect' at a later date.
- b ι οῦτω γ', 'put in that way.'
- b 2 ἔχει τινὰ λόγον: lit. 'it admits of something being said for it ', i. e. 'is justifiable' or 'intelligible' (opp. ἄλογόν ἐστιν, 'it is unjustifiable', 'inexplicable', syn. εὕλογόν ἐστιν). For the sense of ἔχειν cp. συγγνώμην ἔχει, excusationem habet, 'it admits of excuse, 'is excusable'. The phrase is sometimes personal as in Apol. 31 b 7 εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον, 'my conduct would be intelligible,' 34 b I τάχ' ἄν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες, 'their conduct would be explicable.' That λόγος does not mean 'reason' in this phrase is shown by the words which immediately follow in the last of these passages: τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον... ἀλλ' ἡ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον; 'what explanation can be given except the straight and honest one?'
- b 3 ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, 'in a mystery.' Cp. Eur. Rhes. 943 μυστηρίων τε τῶν ἀπορρήτων φανὰς | ἔδειξεν 'Ορφεύς. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is Orphic in origin (cp. 70 c 5 n.). There is not the slightest reason for doubting that Socrates held it, or that he derived it from this source (cp. Introd. XIII). At the same time, he always refers to the details of Orphic theology with a touch of ironical deference as here. Cp. below 69 c 4 n.

έν τινι φρουρά, 'in ward.' This is Archer-Hind's translation, and

62

conveniently retains the ambiguity of the original, which was sometimes understood to mean (1) 'watch', and sometimes (2) 'prison'. Cicero took it in the first sense. Cp. de Senectute 20, vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. In the Somnium Scipionis (3, 10) he uses the word custodia, clearly a translation of poopa: piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis, nec iniussu eius a quo ille est vobis datus ex hominum vita migrandum est. Antiphon the Sophist. a contemporary of Socrates, says τὸ (ἡν ἔοικε Φρουρα ἐφημέρω, but that may be merely a simile like the Psalmist's 'watch in the night'. The Stoic formula that we must live έως αν ὁ θεὸς σημήνη τὸ ἀνακλητικόν (dum receptui canat) seems to be derived from an interpretation of this kind, and we must remember that φρουρά is the Peloponnesian word for στρατεία. The other view, however, that φρουρά means 'prison', is strongly supported by the Axiochus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., where we read (365 e 6) ήμεις μεν γάρ έσμεν ψυχή, ζώον αθάνατον έν θνητώ καθειργμένον Φρουρίω. There is no doubt that the Orphics did speak of the body as the prison of the soul. The Christian apologist Athenagoras says (Diels, Vors.2 p. 245. 19) καὶ Φιλόλαος δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν Φρουρα πάντα ύπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περιειληφθαι λέγων, with which we may compare Plato. Crat. 400 C 4 δοκούσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ 'Ορφέα τοῦτο τὸ όνομα (σωμα), ως δίκην διδούσης της ψυχης ων δη ένεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα. Cp. also the use of ενδείσθαι 'to be imprisoned' below 81 e I (εως αν) πάλιν ενδεθωσιν είς σωμα, Q2 a I πρίν έν τῷ σώματι ένδεθήναι. So too Tim. 43 a 5 ένέδουν είς επίρουτον σωμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον, 44 b I ὅταν (ψυχή) είς σωμα ένδεθη θνητόν. Cp. also ένδεδέσθαι in the fragment of Euxitheus quoted in the next note. The φρουρά in Gorg. 525 a 7 is the 'prison-house' of the other world, not the body.

b 4 καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ κτλ. The genuinely Pythagorean origin of this is vouched for by a passage from an unknown Pythagorean called Euxitheus, quoted by Athenaeus from the Peripatetic Clearchus (Diels, Vors.² p. 245. 8), Εὐξίθεος ὁ Πυθαγορικός, ὧ Νίκιον, ὥς φησι Κλέαρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἐν δευτέρω Βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδέσθαι (cp. preceding note) τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ δεῦρο βίω τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν καὶ διείπασθαι τὸν θεὸν ὡς, εὶ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἔως ἀν έκὼν αὐτοὺς λύση, πλείοσι καὶ μείζοσιν ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμαις διὸ πάντας

εὐλαβουμένους τὴν τῶν κυρίων (i.e. δεσποτῶν, ἐπιστατῶν) ἀνάτασιν ('threat') φοβείσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἐκόντας ἐκβῆναι, μόνον τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γήρα θάνατον ἀσπασίως προσίεσθαι, πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. As Clearchus of Soli wrote about 300 B.C., this fragment is almost certainly genuine.

b 5 μέγας, 'high.' Cp. Gorg. 493 c 3, where Socrates says of the most characteristic of the Orphic doctrines ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν

ὑπό τι ἄτοπα ('rather queer').

- b 8 κτημάτων, 'chattels.' The word is often used of flocks and herds, in which sense it is opposed to χρήματα. This doctrine of the divine herdsman appears more than once in Plato's later dialogues. Cp. esp. Laws 906 a 6 σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἄμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ' αὐ κτῆμα (υ. l. κτήματα) θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. In describing the Saturnia regna he says (Polit. 271 e 5) θεὸς ἔνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, 'God was their shepherd and tended them himself.' Again, in Laws 902 b 8 we have Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα όπόσα θνητὰ ζῷα, ιωσπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.—Πῶς γὰρ οῦ ;—Ἡθη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἡ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταιτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς (i.e. τοῖς δεσπόταις ἡμῶν) ἀμελεῖν τὰν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. The similarity of phrase here points to a common Orphic-Pythagorean origin for the two passages. Cp. also Critias 109 b 6 κατοικίσαντες, οἶον νομῆς ποίμνια, κτήματα καὶ θρέμματα ἐαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον.
- C 3 τεθνάναι: cp. 62 a 5 n.
- C 7 πρὶν... ἐπιπέμψη: it is easy to insert ἄν before ἀνάγκην with Heindorf, but it is more likely that this archaic and poetical construction is used to give solemnity to the sentence. Unless we are prepared to emend a large number of passages, we must admit that Plato sometimes used it to produce a particular effect. It is especially common in the solemn, formal diction of the Laws, cp. 872 e 10 οὐδὲ ἔκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μιανθὲν πρὶν φόνον φόνφ ὁμοίφ ὅμοιον ἡ δράσασα ψυχὴ τείση.

c 10 ραδίως, 'lightly', 'without complaining', as in ραδίως φέρειν. Cp. 63 a 7.

d 2 εὐλόγως ἔχει: a frequent equivalent of εὐλογόν ἐστι (cf. supra b 2). That which it is easy to explain or justify is εὔλογον.

 $\theta \epsilon \delta v$: the transition from the popular $\theta \epsilon \delta v$ to the philosophic $\theta \epsilon \delta v$ seems quite unconscious.

- d 4 τους φρονιμωτάτους: in Plato φρόνιμος and σοφός mean exactly the same thing. Aristotle distinguished φρόνησις from σοφία as practical from theoretical wisdom, a distinction which he shows to be in conformity with popular usage. See my edition of the Ethics, p. 261 sq.
- d 5 ἐπιστατοῦσιν . . . ἐπιστάται: these are the regular terms in this connexion. Cp. Polit. 271e 5 θεὸς ἔνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν.
 - 1 6 οὐκ ἔχει λόγον, i. e. ἄλογόν ἐστι, οὐκ εὐλόγως ἔχει (cp. b 2; d 2).
 αὐτός: the shift from plural to singular is not uncommon. Cp.
 esp. 104 d I n.
- αοραμένειν, 'not to run away,' the regular opposite of ἀποδιδράσκειν.
 οὕτως, 'putting it that way,' more often οὕτω γ' as above b 1.
- τοὐναντίον... ή: we say 'opposite to'. We cannot always render ή by 'or' or 'than'; for its meaning is wider than either. Cp. especially the common διαφέρειν ή...
- e 6 ἄφροναs: as φρόνιμος = σοφός, so ἄφρων = $d\mu a\theta \eta$ s (ἄσοφος is not in ordinary use).
- 3 a I πραγματεία, 'diligence', 'painstaking', the noun of πραγματεύομαι, which is equivalent to πράγματα ἔχω, 'take pains', 'take trouble'. In late Greek πολυπραγμοσύνη is 'curiosity' in a good sense, and the meaning here is similar.
 - a 2 [6] Κέβης: it is Plato's almost uniform practice to insert the article with proper names in the narrative (cp. τοῦ Κέβητος just above) and to omit it in the dialogue when directly reported (cp. Κέβης twice in the next speech, introduced by καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας). See Beare in Hermathena, 1895, vol. ix, pp. 197 sqq. As ὁ was omitted by the first hand of T, I have ventured to bracket it.

λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾳ, 'is always on the track of some argument.' Metaphors from hunting are often used by Socrates in speaking of arguments, and the λόγος is regularly the game which is hunted. Cp. μετιέναι τὸν λόγον (88 d 9 n.) and μέθοδος (79 e 3 n.). This metaphor has survived in the word 'investigation'. (Cp. κατ' $\xi_{\nu\eta}$ 115 b 9 n.)

οὐ πάνυ... ἐθέλει, 'is not very ready to believe at once.' Note the interlaced order $(a \ b \ a \ b)$; οὐ πάνυ belongs to ἐθέλει and εὐθέως to πείθεσθαι.

4 'Αλλὰ μὴν ... γε: the emphasis is on νῦν. 'Even I think that this time ('for once') there is something in what Cebes says.'

- a 7 ραδίως, 'lightly.' Cp. 62 c 10.
 εἰς σὰ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, 'to be aiming his words at you.' For an elaboration of the same metaphor, cp. Symp. 219 b 3 ταῦτα . . . εἰπὼν καὶ ἀφεὶς ὥσπερ βέλη, τετρῶσθαι αὐτὸν ὥμην.
- b 6 παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους, sc. τοὺς χθονίους. Archer-Hind compares Laws 959 b 4 παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον. Geddes refers to Aesch. Suppl. 230 κἀκεῖ δικάζει τὰμπλακήμαθ', ὡς λόγος, | Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦσιν ὑστάτας δίκας.
- b 7 παρ' ἀνθρώπους: who these were, appears from Apol. 41 a 6, where Socrates mentions Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer (in that order) as persons whom one would give anything to meet after death.
- C I οὖκ ἃν πάνυ...διισχυρισαίμην: another touch of the Socratic irony which Plato has reproduced elsewhere. Cp. above 62 b 5 n., 114 d I n., and Meno 86 b 6, where, after explaining the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, Socrates says: καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὖκ ἃν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην, ὅτι δὲ κτλ.
- C 2 ὅτι . . . ἤξειν : the sentence begins as if it were to end ἤξειν ἐλπίζω (ἐλπίς is Orphic for ' faith' and quite in place here) εὖ ἴστε. Instead of that, it takes a fresh start at εὖ ἴστε, and the remainder of it is accommodated to the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην. In T and Stobaeus the construction is regularized by writing τό for ὅτι, but this looks suspiciously like an 'emendation'.
- C 4 ούχ ὁμοίωs, non perinds (Heindorf), 'not to the same extent,' as if I were without this hope.
- C 5 είναι τι: cp. 91 b 3 εί δε μηδέν έστι τελευτήσαντι.
- c 6 πάλαι λέγεται: we must interpret this in the light of the παλαιδε λόγος at 70 c 5, where the reference is certainly to Orphic doctrine. Such a belief as is here mentioned formed no part of ordinary Greek religion. According to that, only a few great sinners (Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion) were punished in the other world, while only a few favourites of heaven (Menelaus, Diomede, Achilles, and, in Athenian belief, Harmodius and Aristogiton) were carried off to the Isles of the Blessed.
- c 8 αὐτὸς ἔχων, 'keeping to yourself' ('aὐτός h. l. est solus,' Heindorf).
- d τ κοινόν, 'to be shared' (as in κοινός Έρμης). Cp. Phaedr. 279 c 6 κοινά γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων, which is a Pythagorean rule.

- d 2 ἡ ἀπολογία, 'the defence' (of which you spoke a little ago, 63 b).

 The article should be kept, though omitted in B.
- d 3 πρώτον δέ κτλ. This interlude marks the end of the preliminary narrative.
- d 4 πάλαι, 'for some time past.' The adverb does not necessarily refer to a long time.
- 5 Τί δέ... άλλο γε ἢ... 'Why, simply that...' The first hand of B omits δέ, but the weight of MS. authority is in its favour. Cp. Hipp. ma. 281 c 9 Τί δ' οἴει, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γε ἢ...
- d 8 προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ: as προσφέρειν means 'to apply', especially in a medical sense, the usual construction is that seen in Charm.
 157 C 4 προσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῆ κεφαλῆ.
- Ε Ι ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι κτλ. In Plut. Phocion 36 we have this story: Πεπωκότων δ' ήδη πάντων, τὸ φάρμακον ἐπέλιπε, καὶ ὁ δημόσιος οὐκ ἔφη τρίψειν ἔτερον εἰ μὴ λάβοι δώδεκα δραχμάς, ὅσου τὴν ὁλκὴν ἀνεῖται. χρόνου δὲ διαγενομένου καὶ διατριβῆς, ὁ Φωκίων καλέσας τινὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ εἰπών' Ἡ μηδὲ ἀπυθανεῖν 'Αθήνησι δωρεὰν ἔστιν, ἐκέλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῷ δοῦναι τὸ κερμάτιον. The suggestion has accordingly been made that the δημόσιος or δήμιος here was thinking less of Socrates than his own pocket.
- e 3 ἔα... χαίρειν αὐτόν, 'never mind him.' The phrases χαίρειν έὰν, and χαίρειν εἰπεῖν (' to bid farewell to ') are used of dismissing anything from one's mind. Cp. 64 c 1; 65 c 7.
- c 6 σχεδὸν μέν τι ήδη: σχεδόν τι go together and μέν is solitarium.
 Cp. Lach. 192 c 5 σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα.
 - (2) The ἀπολογία of Socrates. The philosopher will not fear death; for his whole life has been a rehearsal of death. 63 e 8—69 e 5.
- e 8 δή marks these words as a reference to 63 b 2 sqq.
- e 9 τον λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, 'to render my account' (rationem reddere) to the persons who are entitled to demand it (λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν) and to get it (λόγον λαμβάνειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν) from me (παρ' ἐμοῦ). For the article τόν cp. ἡ ἀπολογία above d 2.

ἀνὴρ...διατρίψας, 'a man who has spent,' quite general, and only a more emphatic form of ὁ διατρίψας.

 $\tau \hat{\varphi}$ ὄντι: in his earlier dialogues Plato uses only $\tau \hat{\varphi}$ ὅντι, in his latest only ὅντωs. The dialogues in which both occur are Rep., Phaedr., Theaet. In Soph. there are twenty-one cases of ὅντωs to

one of $\tau \hat{\varphi}$ $\tilde{v} \tau \iota$. The absence of $\tilde{v} \tau \omega s$ from the *Phaedo* is one reason among others for dating it before the *Republic*.

NOTES

- e 10 θαρρεῖν, 'not to fear', 'to have no fear of' (opp. δεδιέναι and φοβεῖσθαι). We have no single word for this in English. See 88 b 4 n.
- 64 а і і і і ср. 61 е і п.
 - a 4 ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν... ἀπτομένοι, 'all who really engage in'. So commonly ἄπτεσθαι γεωμετρίας, μουσικῆς, γυμναστικῆς, 'to go in for', 'to study'. For ὀρθῶς 'in the true sense of the word', cp. below 67 b 4 n.
 - a 5 λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι ..., 'it looks as if men did not know that —.' As the negative of verbs of knowing, λανθάνειν may take ὅτι as well as a participial complement.

αὐτοί, 'of themselves', 'of their own accord'.

a 6 ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, 'practise.' Cp. Cicero, Tusc. i. 30 tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem (sc. Socrates), commentatio mortis est, ib. 31 secernere autem a corpore animum ecquid aliud est quam mori discere? Seneca, Ep. xxvi egregia res est mortem condiscere ... meditare mortem. The phrase meditatio mortis means the 'practising' or 'rehearsal' of death; for meditatio is a translation of μελέτημα, 67 d 8.

ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι, 'dying' (the process) 'and death' (its completion). Cp. 62 a 5 n.

- a 9 δ ... προυθυμοῦντο: Plato often restates the first member of a period with emphasis at the end (Palindromia of the period, Schanz, Nov. Comm., p. 10). A good instance is Apol. 27 d Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι ... ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι. As the first member here is προθυμεῖσθαι ... μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ τοῦτο, ὅ must be the object of προυθυμοῦντο, and not of ἀγανακτεῖν.
- b 1 οὐ πάνυ . . . γελασείοντα, 'not very inclined to laugh', 'in no laughing mood'. In prose only the participle of desideratives in -σειω is used, though Sophocles says τί δ' ἐργασείεις; (Philoct. 1001) and Euripides φευξείω (Herc. 628). Aristophanes has δρασείει in parody (Wasps 168).
- b 2 åν ... δοκείν, 'would think.'
- b 3 εἰρῆσθαι goes closely with b 5 ὅτι. That the words καὶ συμφάναι
 ... καὶ πάνυ are parenthetical is clear; for φημί and its compounds do not take ὅτι.

- b 3 τοὺς... παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους: i.e. the Thebans (not the Athenians, as Schleiermacher held). Olympiodorus says εἰκότως θηβαῖος γὰρ ἦν ὁ Σιμμίας, παρ' οἶς καὶ ἡ Βοιωτία ὖς. That, however, is hardly adequate; for Simmias was not likely to share Athenian prejudice on this subject. More probably we have here a reflexion of the impression made by the Pythagorean refugees on the bons vivants of Thebes. The φιλόσοφοι would not appreciate Copaic eels and ducks. In any case, it is distinctly implied that the word φιλόσοφος in its technical sense was well known at Thebes before the end of the fifth century, and this confirms the view that it was originally Pythagorean (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 321 n. 2).
- b 5 θανατῶσι, 'are moribund', 'are ripe for death'. The scholium is θανάτου ἐπιθυμοῦσι, and late writers certainly use the word (or θανατιᾶν) in this sense. But it is not the meaning required here, and a glance at the list in Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 153, will show that verbs in -άω (-ιάω) express morbid states of body or mind, and are only occasionally and secondarily desiderative. Thus ναυτιᾶν is not 'to long to go to sea', but 'to have passenger-sickness', i.e. 'to be sea-sick'. For the real meaning of οἱ πολλοί cp. below ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι (65 a 6 n.). They think philosophers 'as good as dead', and look upon them as 'living corpses' (cp. Sophocles quoted l. c.). They do not trouble about their desires. 'The picture of the pale-faced students in the φροντιστήριον of the Clouds is the best commentary on this popular impression' (Geddes). Cp. v. 103 τοὺς ἀχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδητους λέγεις, 504 ἡμιθνὴς γενήσομαι (if I become like Chaerephon).

σφας, sc. τους πολλούς.

- b 6 τοῦτο πάσχειν, sc. τεθνάναι. Tr. 'It would serve them right'.
- C I χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις, 'dismissing them from our thoughts.'
 Tr. 'Never mind them, but let us discuss among ourselves'. Cp.
 63e 3n.
- C 2 ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι: Socrates regularly begins a dialectical argument by asking whether we attach a definite meaning to the name of the thing under discussion. Cp. Gorg. 464 a I σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν, Prol. 358 d 5 καλεῖτ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; Meno, 75 e I τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; 76 a I ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι; so below 103 c II θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;
- c 4 άλλο τι ή, 'anything else than.' Here the words have their full

sense; but, if we suppress the $\delta \rho a \mu \dot{\eta}$ which introduces them, we see how $\ddot{a}\lambda\lambda o \tau \iota \ddot{\eta}$ came to be used as an interrogative = nonne.

- C 5 τοῦτο: pred. 'that death is this', which is further explained by χωρὶς μὲν κτλ. The same definition is given in Gorg. 524 b 2 ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ἄν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. For τὸ τεθνάναι cp. 62 a 5 n.
- C 6 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, 'alone by itself.' The emphatic αὐτός often acquires a shade of meaning which we can only render by 'alone'. So ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῶν εἰρῆσθαι, αὐτοῖ γάρ ἐσμεν. Observe especially the substitution of μόνην καθ' αὐτήν, 67 d I.
- c 8 $\delta \rho \alpha \mu \dot{\eta} \dots \dot{\eta}$; 'surely it can be nothing else than this, can it?' The interrogative form of the idiomatic ' $\mu \dot{\eta}$ in cautious assertions' is very rare, and occurs only four times in Plato (Goodwin, M. T., § 268).
- C 10 Σκόψαι δη κτλ. Three arguments are given (1) the philosopher holds bodily pleasures cheap, (2) the body impedes the search for truth, (3) the things which the philosopher seeks to know cannot be perceived by the bodily senses.

è dv does not mean 'whether' like ei, but 'on the chance that', 'if haply', si forte. Goodwin, M. T., §§ 489-93.

- d 3 of ov has become purely adverbial and always stands outside the construction of the sentence. Cp. 73 d 3; 78 d 10; 83 c 1.
- d 6 Τί δὲ τῶς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; 'what of the pleasures of love?' Riddell (Dig. § 21) seems to be right in regarding this as a case where τί δέ stands for a sentence, or part of a sentence, unexpressed, but hinted at in a following interrogation (here δοκεῖ σοι κτλ., d 8). Cp. e.g. Phileb. 27 e I τί δὲ ὁ σὸς (βίος); ἐν τίνι γένει ... ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; and below 78 d 10.
- d 8 τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας, cultus corporis. We see here how περί c. acc. comes to be used as equivalent to a genitive. So just below, d 11.
- d 9 ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι, i.e. τιμᾶν, 'to value', 'esteem', 'appreciate' (τιμή, 'price'), opp. ἀτιμάζειν, 'to hold cheap.' διαφερόντων, 'better than other people's.'
- ε 4 πραγματεία, 'business', 'concern', rather different from 63 a 1 above.
- 65 a 5 φ μηδέν . . . μηδέ μετέχει αὐτῶν, 'that, for the man to whom none

65

of these things is pleasant, and who takes no part in them.' The rule is that, when the second relative would be in a different case from the first, it is either omitted (cp. 81 b 5; 82 d 2) or replaced by a demonstrative. Not understanding the construction BTW give $\mu \epsilon \tau \epsilon \chi \epsilon \iota \nu$, but the true reading is preserved by Iamblichus (fourth cent. A.D.).

- 2 6 ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι, 'that he runs death hard.' Cp. Rep. 548 d 8 ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν ἔνεκά γε φιλονικίας, Theaet. 169 a 9 σὶ δέ μοι δοκείς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. It seems to me that this 'objectless' use of τείνειν is derived from racing (τείνειν δρόμον, cursum tendere), and that the meaning is 'to run hard', 'to run close'. This view is confirmed by a comparison of Crat. 402 c 2 (ταῦτα) πρὸς τὰ τοῦ 'Ηρακλείτου πάντα τείνει with ib. 409 a 7 τοῦτο . . . φαίνεται τὸν 'Αναξαγόραν πιέζειν, where πιέζειν may very well mean premere, 'to press hard.' The use of τείνειν in this sense, 'to hold one's course' in a certain direction, 'to be bound for,' 'tend' points to the same interpretation. So alsο ἐγγύς, ὁμοῦ τι ἐλαύνειν. For the thought, cp. Soph. Ant. 1165 τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς | ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ' ἐγὰ | ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν. This is a good commentary on 64 b 6 θανατῶσι.
- a 9 Ti δè κτλ. The second argument. The body impedes the search for truth.

της φρονήσεως, syn. της σοφίας. Cp. 62 d 4 n.

- b 3 καὶ οἱ ποιηταί: this cannot, I think, refer to Parmenides and Empedocles, as Olympiodorus suggests and most editors repeat. They would hardly be spoken of as 'even the poets'. Epicharmus, whom he also mentions, is more possible (cp. fr. 249 νοῦς ὁρῆ καὶ νοῦς ἀκοῦει τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά). More likely still, the reference is, as Olympiodorus also suggests, to Hom. II. v. 127 ἀχλὺν δ΄ αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἡ πρὶν ἐπῆεν, | ἄφρ' εὖ γιγνώσκης ἡμὲν θεὸν ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα. At any rate, the ἀχλύς of this passage is often referred to by later Platonists as an allegory of the infirmity of sense-perception, and such allegorizing interpretation was already common in the fifth cent. B.C.
- b 4 περί τὸ σῶμα, i. e. τοῦ σώματος. Cp. 64 d 8 n.
- σαφεῖs, 'trustworthy.' Cp. 57 b I n.
 σχολῆ, vix. Cp. our phrase 'It will take him all his time'.
- C 2 ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, 'in mathematical reasoning.' The primary sense

of the word is arithmetical 'calculation' ($\psi\dot{\eta}\phi_{01}$ s $\lambda o\gamma i \zeta \epsilon \sigma \theta a\iota$), from which it was extended to geometrical demonstration, and finally to all exact and scientific reasoning. It is no paradox, but an obvious fact, that in mathematics the sense of sight only misleads, and yet we are sure that there we reach the truth. The sense of hearing is mentioned with reference to the science of 'harmonics', which was just the mathematical treatment of the octave, and is more exact than tuning 'by ear' can ever be. To take the stock instance, 'the ear' does not reveal to us the impossibility of dividing a tone into two equal semitones; we only discover that by means of $\tau \delta \lambda o\gamma i \zeta \epsilon \sigma \theta a\iota$.

- C 3 τῶν ὅντων: the term τὰ ὅντα is used very vaguely in Plato, and may generally be rendered 'things'. Here, however, it is equivalent to τῶν ἀληθῶν. The verb εἶναι often means 'to be true', especially in Herodotus and Thucydides (cp. L. S., s. v. εἶμί Α. ΙΙΙ).
- c 6 παραλυπή, 'annoys', 'irritates'. For the force of παρα-, cp. παρενοχλείν.

μηδέ τις ήδονή, 'nor any pleasure either.' This is preferable to the μήτε τις ήδονή of TW.

- c 7 αὐτή καθ' αὐτήν, 'alone by itself.' Cp. 64 c 6 n.
 ἐῶσα χαίρειν, cp. 63 e 3 n.
- c_9 τοῦ ὄντος, i. e. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Cp. above c_3 n.
- C II καὶ ἐνταθθα, 'in this case too,' i.e. ἐν τῆ τῆς Φρονήσεως κτήσει (65 a 9). Τhe καί refers to πρώτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (64 e 8).
- d 4 Τι δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε κτλ. The third argument. The things the philosopher seeks to know are not perceptible by the bodily senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

The present passage introduces us to what is generally called the 'Theory of Ideas'. The name is unfortunate; for in English 'idea' means something which is 'in the mind', and an 'idea' is often opposed to a 'reality', whereas the 'forms' $(\mu\rho\rho\phi al, \epsilon l\delta\eta, l\delta\epsilon at)$ are more real than anything else.

On the other hand, the 'forms' are not 'things' in time or space.

If we will only translate literally, and avoid loose 'philosophical' terminology, there is nothing in the doctrine here set forth which should be unintelligible to any one who understands a few propositions of Euclid and recognizes a standard of right conduct.

Let us begin with a mathematical instance. The geometer makes a number of statements about 'the triangle', as, for instance, that its interior angles are equal to two right angles, and we know that his statements are true. Of what is he speaking? Certainly not of any triangle which we can perceive by our senses (for all these are only approximately triangles), nor even of any we can imagine. He is speaking of what is 'just a triangle' (αὐτὸ τρίγωνου) and nothing more. Now, if geometry is true, that triangle must be the true triangle. It is from this consideration that the theory seems to have arisen.

The next step is to extend it to such things as 'right' $(\delta i \kappa a \iota o \nu)$ and 'beautiful' $(\kappa a \lambda \delta \nu)$. We seem to be able to make true statements about these too; and, if so, it follows that $\tau \delta \delta i \kappa a \iota o \nu$ and $\tau \delta \kappa a \lambda \delta \nu$ must be real in the same sense as 'the triangle'. We have never had experience of a perfectly right action or a perfectly beautiful thing, yet we judge actions and things by their greater or less conformity to what is 'just right' $(a \dot{\nu} \tau \delta \kappa a \iota o \nu)$ and 'just beautiful' $(a \dot{\nu} \tau \delta \kappa a \lambda \delta \nu)$.

The 'forms', then, are what we really mean by 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', and it will be found helpful to think of them in the first place as meanings. There are, of course, further difficulties, but these can be dealt with as they arise. On the whole subject see A. E. Taylor, Plato, Chap. II.

- d 4 φαμέν τι είναι ... ἡ οὐδέν; 'Do we say there is such a thing ... or not?' It is to be noticed that, in introducing the doctrine, Socrates says 'we', and Simmias, to whom it is apparently familiar, accepts it enthusiastically, also using the first person plural. The suggestion clearly is that Socrates and Simmias are using the language of a school to which both belong. The same phenomenon recurs whenever the doctrine is mentioned. Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 354 sq.
- d 5 αὐτό, 'by itself.' In this technical sense αὐτό is a development of αὐτός, 'alone.' It has become almost adverbial, as we see from such expressions as αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνη (Riddell, Dig. § 47). We come nearest the meaning by rendering it 'just'. The translation 'in itself' is highly misleading; for it suggests the modern doctrine that we cannot know the 'thing in itself', whereas the αὐνὸ τρίγωνον is just the only triangle we can know.

1251

- d 6 Φαμέν μέντοι νὴ Δία, 'I should think we do!' The particle μέντοι is used when the emphatic word of a question is repeated in an affirmative answer (cp. 81d6; 93c2), and may be further strengthened by νὴ Δία (cp. 68 b 7; 73 d II). Olympiodorus gives us the orthodox Platonist interpretation of this remark: ὁ Σιμμίας έτοίμως συγκατατίθεται ('assents') τῷ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν λόγῳ ὡς συνήθης ('familiar') Πυθαγορείοις.
- d 12 ύγιείας, ίσχύος: the addition of medical είδη like health and strength is significant. It has quite recently become known that Philolaus played an important part in the history of medicine (E. Gr. Ph.³ p. 322). If medicine is a true science, its objects must be real like those of geometry.
- d τ3 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτλ. The construction is καὶ ἐνὶ λόγω περὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, i.e. τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων is governed by οὐσίας, which is governed by περί understood. Tr. 'And, to sum up, I am speaking of the reality of all the rest, i.e. of what each of them really is '.

ἐνὶ λόγφ: this phrase is not quite accurately rendered by 'in one word'; for λόγος does not mean 'a word', nor is there any Greek word for 'a word'. A λόγος is always a statement, and in the great majority of cases consists of several 'words'.

τῆς οὐσίας, 'the reality.' In this sense the term οὐσία was not familiar at Athens (where it meant 'property', 'estate'), and it is explained by ὁ τυγχάνει ἔκαστον ὄν, 'what a given thing really is' (cp. Μεπο 72 b Ι μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν). It was not, however, invented by Socrates, and still less by Plato. In Crat. 401c3 we read ὁ ἡμεῖς "οὐσίαν" καλοῦμεν, εἰσὶν οῖ "ἐσσίαν" καλοῦσιν, οἱ δ' αὖ "ωσίαν", and we see from 401d3 that Socrates there means τὴν πάντων οὐσίαν, just as he does here. We could hardly be told more plainly that the term is Pythagorean. The fem. pcp. ἔσσα = οὖσα is genuine Doric, and ἐσσία is therefore a correct Doric form, while ἀσία, though only found now in pseudo-Pythagorean writings, may be justified by the Boeotian ἰῶσα.

e 3 αὐτὸ ἔκαστον, 'any given thing by itself,' generalizing αὐτὸ δίκαιον, αὐτὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ μέγεθος, &c. If we wish to know a thing, we must think 'just that', e. g. 'just the triangle', leaving out of account its material, colour, &c., and even its particular shape (equilateral, isosceles, or scalene).

- e 6 καθαρώτατα, 'most cleanly.' To the mathematical mind irrelevancy suggests dirt. Later mathematicians speak of the 'elegance' of a demonstration in a similar sense.
- e 7 αὐτῆ τῆ διανοία, 'with thought alone.'

μήτε... παρατιθέμενος, 'without taking into account.' As τιθέναι is used of 'setting down' an item in an account, it is probable that παρατιθέναι is here equivalent to apponere (cp. Hor. Carm.i. 9. 15 lucro appone), though I can find no exact parallel. The middle, as often, would give the sense 'setting down to his own account'. If this is correct, we must understand $\tau \hat{\alpha} \lambda ο \gamma ι \sigma \mu \hat{\phi}$ from the context.

τιν' ὄψιν: I have written τιν' for τήν as being more idiomatic, and because B has a superfluous τινά in the next line, which I take to be a correction of τήν added after the wrong μήτε.

- a I ἐφέλκων, 'trailing after him.'
 - αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτὴν . . . αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό: thought 'alone by itself' apprehends its object 'alone by itself'. Cp. 64 c 6 n.
 - a 2 εἰλικρινεῖ... εἰλικρινές: Cicero (Off. i. 4) translates sincerum, Tertullian (de An. 41) germanum. The etymology is uncertain, but the meaning is 'unmixed', 'unadulterated'. Valckenaer (quoted by Stallbaum) says: proprie significat volvendo s. volubili agitatione secretum, atque adeo cribro purgatum, and 'sifted clean' would certainly suit very well.
 - a 3 θηρεύειν: the favourite metaphor of Socrates. Cp. above 63 a 2 n.,
 and 66 c 2 την τοῦ ὅντος θήραν, 115 b 9 ὥσπερ κατ' ἔχνη.
 - των ὄντων, 'things,' apparently, but at a 8 τοῦ ὄντοs is 'the truth'.
 - b τ ἐκ πάντων τούτων, as a conclusion from the three arguments just given.
 - παρίστασθαι δόξαν, 'that a belief like this should be brought home to -.' Cp. 58 e 5 n.
 - b 2 γνησίως, 'genuinely,' much the same as ὀρθῶς (64 a 4; 67 e 4) and οικαίως (83 e 5).
 - b 3 ὤσπερ ἀτραπός [τις], 'it looks as if a sort of by-way', 'a short cut as it were'. The weight of evidence is slightly against the addition of τις (W omits it in the text, and adds it in the margin); but, whether it is added or not, the phrase is the subject of κινδυνεύει (cp. Μεπο 70 c 4 ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις, 'a sort of drought'), and there is no reason for inserting ὁ θάνατος after it with Tournier. Further, the short cut is not death—the γνησίως φιλόσοφοι know there is no

thoroughfare that way—but the $\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\tau\eta$ $\theta av\acute{a}\tau ov$ or philosophy itself. An $\mathring{a}\tau\rho a\pi \acute{o}s$ is properly a 'track' over hills or through woods (semita, sentier), which does not follow the turnings of the high road. The mountain-path taken by the Persians at Thermopylae is so called (Hdt. vii. 215, Thuc. iv. 36). There was a Pythagorean precept $\tau \grave{a}s$ $\lambda\epsilon\omega\phi\acute{o}\rho ovs~\mu \grave{\eta}~\beta a\delta i \zeta\epsilon\iota v$, 'not to walk on highways,' and Olympiodorus supposes a reference to this here. Though no doubt originally a mere taboo, it may quite possibly have received some such application as this by the end of the fifth century B. C. (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 105). The Pythagorean idea of the 'Way' ($\acute{o}\delta\acute{o}s~\beta\acute{o}v$) would naturally suggest the idea of the Narrow Path.

b 4 ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶs: as the metaphor of hunting dominates the whole passage (cp. 66 a 3 n. and c 2 τὴν τοῦ ὅντος θήραν), the meaning is really settled by Soph. Ai. 7 εὖ δέ σ' ἐκφέρει | κυνὸς Λακαίνης ὥς τις εὕρινος βάσις. 'The by-way brings us on to the trail in our hunt after truth.' It will be seen that the metaphor of the ἀτραπός gains very much when we bring it into close connexion with the hunt.

μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῆ σκέψει: these words have been variously interpreted. There is no difficulty about ἐν τῆ σκέψει except that the phrase is superfluous. As to μετὰ τοῦ λόγου it must mean the same thing as μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ above (66 a 1). Schleiermacher transposed the words, placing them after ἔχωμεν, where they make excellent sense; but, on the whole, it seems more likely that they are a marginal note on ἔχωμεν which has got into the wrong place.

b 5 ὅτι, 'because.'

συμπεφυρμένη: the word suggests the opposite of καθαρώτατα (65 e 6).

- b 7 μυρίας . . . ἀσχολίας, 'countless distractions.'
- C 2 τοῦ ὄντος: i. e. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς (cp. b 7).
- c 3 είδώλων, 'imaginations.'
- C 4 τὸ λεγόμενον, 'as the saying is.' This must refer to the phrase οὐδὲ φρουῆσαι ἐγγίγνεται, 'we don't even get a chance of thinking for it.' We do not know what quotation or proverb Socrates refers to.

ώς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι, 'in very truth.' The two phrases are placed ἐκ παραλλήλου, as the grammarians say, and their effect is cumulative. Both (and in later dialogues ὄντως) are used to emphasize the

- appositeness of quotations. We also find $d\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \hat{\omega} s$ in the same sense. Cp. 90 c4.
- C 7 διὰ γὰρ κτλ. The same account of the origin of war is put into the mouth of Socrates in Rep. 373 e 6. The dialogue of the Republic is supposed to take place during the Peloponnesian War, and that of the Phaedo while the memory of it was still fresh, and it was clearly recognized, especially by opponents of the war like Aristophanes, that commercial interests had a great deal to do with it. (Cp. the Acharnians on the Megarian decree.)
- d 3 τὸ δ' ἔσχατον, 'and the worst of all is that —.' Cp. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ὅτι (followed also by γάρ).
- d 5 παραπίπτον, 'turning up,' when you least expect it. Cp. Rep. 561 b 3 τŷ παραπιπτούση ἀεὶ (ἡδονη), Laws 832 b 6 τῷ παραπεπτωκότι λόγφ.
- e I αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, 'things by themselves', 'just the things themselves'. There is no distinction between πράγματα and ὄντα,
- e 3 φρονήσεωs is assimilated in case to the preceding relative (Riddell, Dig. § 192). The phrase φρονήσεωs ἐρασταί is an explication of the name φιλόσοφοι.
- e 4 &s δ λόγος σημαίνει, 'as the argument signifies.' This is the only rendering which will suit all the passages where this phrase occurs, so we must not think of the ἱερὸς λόγος here.
- e 5 δυοΐν θάτερον: the regular way of introducing a dilemma.
- 7 a 4 δτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη: cp. 64 e I καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν, 83 a 6 ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι.
 - a 5 μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα, 'nor suffer the contagion of.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 51 (in the description of the Plague) ἔτερος ἀφ' ἐτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιμπλάμενοι ('one catching the infection from tending another') ὥσπερ πρόβατα ἔθνησκου. So also 83 d 10 τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα.
 - a 8 μετὰ τοιούτων: sc. καθαρῶν (Riddell, Dig. § 54). Some suppose this to be neuter and refer it to αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα or ὄντα, but it is far better to take it of the 'great company' of which Socrates speaks above (63 b 8). The καθαροί are in Orphic language 'the saints'.
 - δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν: no longer 'through a glass darkly'.
 - b τ τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές, 'and that, I take it, is the truth.'
 Cp. 66 b 7 φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. No real doubt is expressed by ἴσως. Cp. opinor.
- b 2 μη ού · · · μ 'I fear it is not.' For this characteristically

Platonic idiom (he has it thirty-five times) see Goodwin, M. T., § 265.

- b 4 τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς, equivalent to τοὺς γνησίως φιλοσόφους (cp. 66 b 2); for φιλομαθής is freely used as an equivalent of φιλόσοφος, and ὀρθῶς refers to the ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων. It means those who are φιλόσοφοι 'in the true sense of the word', those who 'have a right to the name'. So in 82 c 2 οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι are the same as οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς 83 e 5. For this sense of ὀρθῶς cp. Eur. Alc. 63ϵ οὐκ ἦσθ' ἄρ' ὀρθῶς τοῦδε σώματος πατήρ; Hipp. 1169 ὡς ἄρ' ἦσθ' μὸς πατὴρ | ὀρθῶς, Androm. 376 οῖτινες φίλοι | ὀρθῶς πεφύκασ(ι).
- b 8 έλπὶς . . . κτήσασθαι: the aor, inf. is preferred after έλπίς έστιν (cp. 68 a I έλπίς έστιν . . . τυχείν).
- **b** 10 πραγματεία: ср. 64 е 4.

ήμιν: i. e. the Socratic circle.

C 2 άλλφ ἀνδρί, ' for any one else,' a more emphatic ἄλλφ τινί.

C 5 Κάθαρσις: this is the central idea of Orphicism (cp. 61 a 3 n.). The Pythagoreans seem to have added the practice of κάθαρσις by science to the original κάθαρσις by abstinence and the like (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 107).

τοῦτο is the predicate, and is used praeparative. Cp. 62 a 2 π. συμβαίνει is here personal. For the other construction cp. 74 a 2.

ὅπερ πάλαι ... λέγεται: this has not been said in the course of the present argument, and must, I think, be understood in the light of 63 c 6 ὅσπερ ... πάλαι λέγεται and the παλαιὸς λόγος of 70 c 5. Cp. also 69 c 5 πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι. It seems to be the regular way of referring to the Orphic ἱερὸς λόγος, 'as is said by those of old in the Word ' (cp. E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 146, π. 3).

c 6 το χωρίζειν κτλ. As Wohlrab justly remarked, this is to be understood in the light of the account given in Symp. 174 c and 220 c of Socrates standing still and silent for hours at a time. The religious term for this was ἔκστασις, 'stepping outside' the body.

d ι μόνην καθ' αὐτήν: syn. αὐτήν καθ' αὐτήν. Cp. 64 c6 n.

ἄσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν κτλ. There is considerable uncertainty about the reading. The commonest idiom is ἄσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν τοῦ σώματος, but sometimes the preposition is repeated (cp. 82e3; 115 b 9). In Tim. 79 a 3 we have ἄσπερ αὐλῶνος διὰ τοῦ σώματος.

d 8 ορθώς: cp. 67 b 4 n.

- e 3 Γελοῖον πῶς δ' οῦ; The MSS. have οὐ γελοῖον; and give the words to Socrates, but we should then expect ἡ οὐ γελοῖον; The Petrie papyrus has only room for seven letters, so I have deleted οὐ and given γελοῖον to Simmias.
- e 6 εἰ... διαβέβληνται, 'if they are at variance with', 'estranged from' the body. The original sense of διαβάλλειν is 'to set at variance', εἰς ἔχθραν καθιστάναι.
- e 8 εἰ φοβοῦντο: T omits εἰ, but its repetition is natural in a binary protasis like this, especially as there is a change of mood, and εἰ has a slightly different meaning in the two clauses.
- 6 9 εἰ μὴ . . . ἴοιειν: this simply repeats εἰ φοβοῦντο in a negative form (a b a). Cp. Αροί. 20 C σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου . . . εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἡ οἱ πολλοί.
- 8 a 3 ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν κτλ. A good instance of the disjunctive question, in which two statements are bound together in a single interrogation to signify that they cannot or should not both be true at once. In such questions ἄρα (a 7) is regular in the second clause. We must subordinate the first to the second ('Can it be that, whereas...?') or use two sentences. In Symp. 179 b sqq. Alcestis, Eurydice, and Patroclus are given as examples of 'human loves' whom men have gone to seek beyond the grave. Such loves are contrasted with the 'divine beloved' of which Socrates speaks in the Gorgias (482 a 4 φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά).
 - a 5 μετελθεῖν, 'to go in quest of.' The MS. authority is in favour of ἐλθεῖν, but the μετελθεῖν of T is too good for a mere error.
 - a 7 φρονήσεως . . . έρων: syn. φιλόσοφος. Cp. 66 e 3 n.
 - b 2 οιεσθαί γε χρή, 'I should think so!'
 - b 4 μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι κτλ. It is noteworthy that the reading which the original scribe (B, not B³) has added in the margin (with the monogram for γράφεται) is that of the Petrie papyrus, which was written within a hundred years of Plato's death. This shows how old some of those variants are.
 - b 5 ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, sc. 67 e 9. The antecedent to the relative is the following question.
 - b 7 μέντοι νη Δία: cp. 65 d 6 n.
 - b 8 τοῦτο is used praeparative (cp. 62 a 2 n.) and refers to the relative clause δν ἀν ἴδης κτλ. This construction is as old as Homer (//.
 xiv. 81 βέλτερον δς φεύγων προφύγη κακὸν ἢὲ ἀλώη). Cp. Thuc. vi.

- 14 τὰ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι δς ἄν τὴν πατρίδα ἀφελήση, Xen. Oec. 4.
 19 εἰγὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡγοῦμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἄρχοντος ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ὧ ἄν έκόντες ἔπωνται.
- b 9 οὐκ ἄρ' ἡν: the use of the imperfect of something just realized was first explained by Heindorf in his note on this passage. With this imperfect ἄρα represents our 'So!' of surprise. 'So he isn't a philosopher after all!'
- φιλοχρήματος και φιλότιμος: the tripartite division of the soul which plays so great a part in the Republic is here implied; for χρήματα are the object of ἐπιθυμία and τιμή of θυμός. φιλοχρήματος as a synonym of επιθυμητικός in Rep. 436a1; 549b2; 580 e 2 επιθυμητικόν γάρ αὐτό κεκλήκαμεν . . . καὶ φιλοχρήματον δή, ότι δια χρημάτων μάλιστα αποτελούνται αί τοιαύται επιθυμίαι, 58125 τοῦτο της ψυχης τὸ μέρος . . . καλοῦντες φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδές όρθως αν καλοίμεν. So φιλότιμος is a regular synonym of θυμοειδής, e.g. 551 a 7 αντί δή φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ανδρών φιλοχρηματισταί καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτώντες έγένοντο. This somewhat primitive psychology is doubtless older than Socrates; for it stands in close relation to the Pythagorean doctrine of the 'Three Lives' (E. Gr. Ph.2 pp. 108, 109, n. 1). To Plato the soul is really one and indivisible, in spite of the use he makes of the older view. Cp. Galen, de Hipp. et Plat., p. 425 ώς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐκείνου (Πυθαγόρου) πρώτου μεν είναι λέγων το δόγμα, Πλάτωνα δε εξεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκευάσαι τελεώτερον αὐτό, ib. 478 Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν, αὐτοῦ μεν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συγγράμματος οὐδενὸς εἰς ήμας διασωζομένου, τεκμαιρόμενος δε έξ ών ένιοι των μαθητών αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν. Iamblichus, ap. Stob. Ecl. i, p. 369 (Wachsmuth) Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Αρχίτας και οι λοιποι Πυθαγόρειοι την ψυχήν τριμερή αποφαίνονται. διαιρούντες είς λογισμόν καὶ θυμόν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. Posidonius is not likely to have been mistaken on such a point.

τὰ ἔτερα . . . ἀμφότερα: for the plural pronouns referring to a single fact see Riddell, Dig. § 42.

- C 5 καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη: this is more clearly expressed at c 8 ἡν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι.
- C 6 τοις ούτω διακειμένοις: this is made more explicit below, c 11.
- c 8 Οὐκοῦν is repeated by c 10 å ρ ' οὐ.

ην καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ κτλ. This is best explained by Laws 710 a 5 την δημώδη γε (σωφροσύνην) . . . καὶ οἰχ ην τις σεμνύνων ἀν λέγοι, φρόνησιν

προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν. We are not speaking here of courage and σωφροσύνη in the high Socratic sense in which they are identical with knowledge.

- c 9 ἐπτοῆσθαι, 'to be excited.' This verb suggests primarily the quickened heartbeat of fear or desire. Cp. Hom. Od. xxii. 298 φρένες ἐπτοίηθεν, Sappho 2. 6 τό μοι μὰν | καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόασεν.
- C II έν φιλοσοφία ζώσιν: Philosophy is a life. Cp. Theaet. 174 b I έν φιλοσοφία διάγουσι and 61 a 3 n.
- d 2 εί... ἐθέλεις, 'if you care.' Cp. Prot. 324 a 3; 342 d 6.

 Meno 71 a 1.
- d 6 τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν: it is unnecessary to add εἶναι to the partitive genitive, but there was evidently an ancient variant τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν εἶναι which is hardly consistent with μειζόνων κακῶν just below, by which phrase such things as dishonour and slavery are intended.
- d 9 ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν: the addition of such phrases is almost a mannerism. There is no emphasis, and the meaning is merely ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν τύχη, 'on occasion.' Cp. Euthyphro 7 d 4 ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα.
- d 12 αλογον: cp. 62 b 2 n.
 - e 2 οἱ κόσμιοι: syn. οἱ σώφρονες. Cp. 83 e 6. Attic tends to substitute less emphatic words for adjectives implying praise. So ἀγαθός is represented by σπουδαῖος, ἐπιεικής, χρηστός, μέτριος, and σοφός by χαρίεις, κομψός, &c. There is the same tendency in English; cp. 'decent', 'respectable' as substitutes for 'good'.
 - e 3 ἀκολασία τινὶ κτλ., 'it is immorality that makes them moral.'

 The appositive structure is regular after τοῦτο πάσχειν. Cp. below 73 d 7 (Riddell, Dig. § 207). The regular opposite of σωφροσύνη (the virtue of moral sanity, for which English has no name) is ἀκολασία. The literal meaning of ἀκόλαστος is 'unchastened'.

καίτοι φαμέν γε...ἀλλ' ὅμως..., 'we say, indeed... but yet...' For this combination of particles, which marks a concession afterwards partially retracted, cp. below e 7 and Euthyphro 3 c 2 καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὧν προείπον, ἀλλ' ὅμως...

e 4 συμβαίνει ... ὅμοιον, 'turns out in their case to be like this.' TW add εἶναι, but cp. Gorg. 479 c 8 συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία.

τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ κτλ., 'the condition of —' (περί, c. acc. as a genitive equivalent).

e 5 ταύτην, istam.

εὐήθη, 'naive', 'unsophisticated', 'artless'. The Petrie papyrus reads ἀνδραποδώδη, but that seems to be an anticipatory recollection of 69 b 8.

69 a 6 μη ... οὐχ αὕτη ή, 'perhaps this is not —.' Cp. 67 b 2 n.
πρὸς ἀρετήν, 'judged by the standard of goodness.' Cp. Isocr.
4. 76 οὐδὲ πρὶς ἀργύριον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔκρινον (Riddell, Dig. § 128).
We can hardly give πρώς the same sense as in the next line; for there is no question of exchanging pleasures and pains for goodness.
Goodness is the standard of value, and wisdom (φρόνησις) is the only currency in which it can be rightly estimated. Nor can πρός mean 'towards', 'in the direction of'. That interpretation is a survival from the time of the vulgate text, which omitted ἀλλαγή and had to be understood as ἡ ἀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν (sc. ὁδός). The disappearance of ἀλλαγή from the text is an interesting study in corruption. B has ἀλλά, and T must have had the same; for it presents us with an erasure of four letters. The vulgate text came from a copy of T. W and Iamblichus preserve the word.

a 7 προς ήδονάς, 'for pleasures,' contra voluptates.

a 8 μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, i. e. greater pains and fears for less, and lesser pleasures for greater, e. g. the fear of slavery for the fear of death, the pleasures of the table for the pleasures of health.

- a 9 ἀλλ' η, i. e. ἀλλὰ μὴ η, the construction being carried on from a 6. Pleasures and pains are to be exchanged for wisdom, which alone makes goodness truly good. If we give up the pleasures of the table, not merely to enjoy the pleasures of health, but because they stand in the way of the acquisition of wisdom, we may be said to exchange them for wisdom, and that is true σωφροσύνη. So, if we only face death to escape slavery, that is mere popular courage. To put the thing in a modern way, this is a sort of ethical monometallism, wisdom being the gold standard of value.
- b τ καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα κτλ. I think it certain that this sentence is interpolated. The words τούτου μὲν πάντα clearly belong to ὧνού-μενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα, and their meaning must be 'all things bought and sold for wisdom', but it is hardly credible that Plato should use ὧνούμενα as a passive, or that he should use πιπρασκόμενα at all. For ὧνείσθαι in a passive sense, the grammars can only quote Xen. Eq. 8. 2 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐωνείτο, πειρᾶσθαι ἐκελεύομεν εἰ δύναιτο

ό ἵππος ταῖτα ποιεῖν, but there it is clearly active, 'at the time he was buying it.' As to πιπρασκόμενα, Cobet's remark is true: Neque Iones neque Attici ea forma utuntur, sed apud sequiores protrita est (Nov. Lect. p. 158). It occurs only in one other place (Soph. 224 a 3), where also it seems to be interpolated. I believe, then, that τούτου μὲν πάντα ἀνούμενα καὶ πιπρασκόμενα is a scholium on καὶ μετὰ τούτου. The interpretation is wrong, as Wyttenbach saw; for we are not supposed to buy and sell goodness for wisdom, but to buy wisdom with pleasures, &c. If we take the sentence thus, the simile does not break down, as Geddes and Archer-Hind say it does.

- οι μετὰ τούτου τῷ ὅντι τζ, 'when accompanied by this (i.e. wisdom) our goodness really is goodness.' The words μετὰ τούτου are explained by b 4 μετὰ φρονήσεως and opposed to b 6 χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως. I should like to read μετὰ μὲν τούτου. If I am right about the interpolation, it implies this reading.
- b 2 καὶ ἀνδρεία κτλ. In the *Protagoras* Socrates shows that true courage only belongs to those who are θαρραλέοι μετ' ἐπιστήμης. This is the way in which he interpreted the doctrine, which was common to him and to the 'Sophists', that Goodness is Knowledge. The distinction between 'philosophic' and 'popular' goodness came to be of great importance. Cp. my edition of Aristotle's *Ethics*, pp. 65 sqq. (where, however, I have ascribed to Plato what I now see belongs to Socrates).
- b 4 καὶ προσγιγνομίνων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων, 'whether they be added or not.' The verbs are virtual passives of προστιθέναι and ἀφαιρείν, 'to add' and 'to subtract'. Cp. προσείναι, προσκείσθαι.
- b 5 χωριζόμενα δὲ κτλ. As the participle agrees with πάντα ταῦτα (b 1), i. e. pleasures, pains, &c., there is a slight anacoluthia in μη . . . η ή τοιαύτη ἀρετή. Socrates means 'the goodness which depends upon the exchange of fears, pleasures, &c., for one another apart from wisdom'.
- b 6 [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα: as καί is omitted in B, it is probably an interpolation arising from failure to see that χωριζόμενα is dependent on ἀλλαττόμενα (cp. 61 b 2 n.). The meaning will then be 'exchanged for one another apart from wisdom' (opp. μετὰ τούτου).

σκιαγραφία τις, 'a sort of scene-painting' (Cope). Cp. Photius σκιαγράφος ὁ νῦν σκηνογράφος. The term does not mean 'a rough

sketch', but implies the use of painted shadows to produce the impression of solid relief on a flat surface. This art has two chief characteristics: (1) it is deceptive, cp. Critias 107 d I σκιαγραφία... ἀσαφεί καὶ ἀπατηλφ̂, (2) it only produces its effect from a distance. Cp. Theaet. 208 e 7 ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν τως δὲ ἀφειστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι. The most instructive passage is Rep. 365 c 3 πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλφ περὶ ἐμαιτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, where the idea is that of a 'painted façade', on which columns, &c., are made to appear solid by skilful shading. Cp. also Rep. 583 b 5 and Parm. 165 c 7. When Aristotle (Rhet. 1414 a 8) compares the diction of the public speaker (δημηγορική λέξις) to σκιαγραφία, he does not mean that it is 'sketchy', but that it requires the light and shade to be 'laid on thick'.

b 7 ἀνδραποδώδηs: so in Rep. 430 b 7 Socrates opposes true courage to τὴν . . . θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, and in Phaedr. 258 e 5 he says of bodily pleasures δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται, just because they imply preceding pain (τὸ προλυπηθῆναι).

b 8 ούδὲν ὑγιὲς . . . ἔχη, 'has nothing sound about it.' The word ὑγιής is used of earthen or metal vessels which have no crack or flaw (opp. σαθρός). The old variant ἔχουσα for ἔχη gives a smoother construction, but we may easily understand ἢ after τε in b 8. See Vahlen, Opusc. ii. 361.

τὸ δ' ἀληθές, 'the real thing', of which the σκιαγραφία gives a deceptive appearance.

- C I κάθαρσις, 'purgation.' Cp. 61 a 3 n. In Xen. Symp. 1. 4 Callias son of Hipponicus uses the phrase ἀνδράσιν ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχὰς ιωσπερ ὑμῖν in addressing Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides. He seems to have heard something of Socrates' teaching on this point, unless he is merely drawing on the Phaedo.
- C 2 καθαρμός: this is the specifically religious term for the initiatory ceremony of 'purgation'. The religious poem of Empedocles was entitled καθαρμοί (Ε. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 256 sqq.).
- C 3 τὰς τελετάς: the mystic 'initiations'. The context shows that the people referred to are the 'Ορφεοτελεσταί.
- C 4 οὐτοι, isti. The touch of ironical condescension is characteristically Socratic (cp. 62 b 5 n.). It is plain that Socrates did not

think much of the actual ' $Op\phi\epsilon o\tau\epsilon \lambda\epsilon \sigma\tau al$ of his time, who are described in the *Republic* (364 e 3 sqq.) in terms which suggest the itinerant friars, pardoners, and traffickers in indulgences of the later Middle Ages.

- C 4 καταστήσαντες: cp. Eur. Bacch. 21 κάκεῖ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας εμάς | τελετάς.
- c 5 αἰνίττεσθαι, 'to speak in riddles' (αἰνίγματα). The word is regularly used of allegorical statements. It comes from Ion. αἶνος, 'fable', 'riddle' (cp. 61 b 4 n.). For πάλαι cp. 67 c 5 n.
- 6 ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, 'will lie in the Slough.' Cp. Rep. 363 d 5 (of the Orpheotelestae) τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν "Αιδου. The βόρβορος is also referred to in Ar. Frogs 145 εἶτα βόρβορον πολὺν | καὶ σκῶρ ἀείνων' ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κειμένους | εἴ που ξένον τις ἠδίκησε κτλ., and Olympiodorus is doubtless right in saying παρφδεῖ ἔπος 'Ορφικόν. Heindorf quotes a saying of the Cynic Diogenes (Diog. Laert. vi. 39) γελοῖον εἰ 'Αγησίλαος μὲν καὶ 'Επαμεινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάξουσιν, εὐτελεῖς δέ τινες μεμυημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται. We must interpret Rep. 533 d I τῷ ὅντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅμμα κατορωρυγμένον in the light of this.
- c 8 ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί: Plato often adapts the beginning of a verse to his own prose, preferring to slip into the verse rather than give a formal quotation. The original must have been πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι. The νάρθηξ (ferula communis) was the plant of which the Dionysiac thyrsus was made.
- d r βάκχοι: the true worshippers were so called (cp. the Βάκχοι of Euripides). Schol. Ar. Knights 406 Βάκχου οὐ τὸν Διόνυσον ἐκάλουν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς τελοῦντας τὰ ὅργια. See Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, vol. v, p. 151.
- d 2 oρθωs, 'in the true sense of the word.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.
 - ών . . . γενέσθαι, 'to become one of whom', 'to join whose number'.
- d 3 οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον, 'I have left nothing undone.' The phrase states negatively what is positively stated by παντὶ τρόπω προυθυμήθην (cp. Μεπο 77 a 3 προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω), 'I have done my best in every way.'
- d 5 καί τι ἡνύσαμεν: i. e. 'I and the rest of the band'. The shift from singular to plural is quite natural. Το read ἡνυσάμην with Heindorf

would make the plurals which follow (ἐλθόντες . . . εἰσόμεθα) very awkward.

- d 5 τὸ σαφές, 'for certain.' Cp. 57 b 1 n.
- d 7 ταῦτ'... ἀπολογοῦμαι ώs ..., 'this is the defence I make to show that —.' Cp. 63 e 8.
- d 8 τους ένθάδε δεσπότας: cp. 62 e I; 63 a 6 sqq.
- ет какей: ср. 64 а 1 п.
- e 3 τοῖς δὲ... παρέχει: these words seem to have been interpolated here from 70 a I. They break the sentence awkwardly and spoil the effect of the phrase when it comes in its proper place. Such things do not happen often in the text of Plato, but they happen sometimes.
 - (3) Cebes points out that all this implies the immortality of the soul, and asks that this should be established (69 e 6-70 c 3).
- e 6 ὑπολαβών: cp. 60 c8 n.
- 70 a 4 εὐθος ἀπαλλαττομένη κτλ. Riddell (Dig. § 207) takes these words down to οὐδαμοῦ η as explanatory of the preceding clause ('binary structure'). I have punctuated after a 4 σώματος with Heindorf. Then καί will co-ordinate διαφθείρηται καὶ ἀπολλύηται with οἴχηται, and ἐκβαίνουσα will belong only to the second clause. It is easy to 'understand' σώματος with it.
 - a 5 ὧσπερ πνεῦμα ἡ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα: this is the belief assumed throughout the Homeric poems. The ψυχή is the 'ghost' which a man 'gives up', the breath which he 'expires' at death. For the καπνός cp. II. xxiii. 100 ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἢὖτε καπνὸς | ὧχετο τετριγυῖα, a verse selected for special reprobation by Socrates in the Republic (387 a 1).
 - a 6 οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἢ: Homer does not go so far as this; for even in the House of Hades there is a ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον. But it might just as well be nothing and nowhere; for it is witless (ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν, Il. xxiii. 104).

αύτη καθ' αύτην συνηθροισμένη: cp. 67 c 8.

b 2 παραμυθίας, 'persuasion', 'reassurance'. Cp. Laws 720 a 1 παραμυθίας... καὶ πειθούς. The original sense of παραμυθεῖσθαι is 'to talk over' (cp. παράφημι, παρεῖπου, παραπείθω) as in 83 a 3. The meanings 'encourage', 'console', as in 115 d 5, are secondary. πίστεως, 'proof,' not 'belief'.

b 3 $\psi\nu\chi\dot{\eta}$: there seems to be no rule for the addition or omission of the article with $\psi\nu\chi\dot{\eta}$. Where MSS, differ, the less commonplace use without the article is to be preferred.

δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: even Homer allows that souls 'are somewhere' after death, but Cebes wishes to be assured that they are not merely ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα (this is the point of δύναμιν ἔχει), of whom it can be said φρένες οὖκ ἕνι πάμπαν. Here, then, φρόνησις is not equivalent to σοφία, but is used in its popular sense, answering to the Homeric φρένες.

- b 5 'Αληθη, τόρη, λέγεις, δ Σωκράτης: for the interlaced order (a b a b) cp. 77 c1; 78 a 10; 78 c5; 82 c9; 83 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 288).
- b 6 διαμυθολογωμεν: cp. μυθολογείν, 61 e 2 n. The word is specially appropriate as introducing είτε είκος κτλ.
 - τι κωμωδοποιός: Aristophanes was not the only comic poet who made fun of Socrates. Eupolis said (fr. 352) Μισῶ δὲ καὶ (τὸν) Σωκράτη, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, | ὁς τἆλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, | ὁπόθεν δὲ καταφαγείν ἔχοι τούτου κατημέληκεν, a fragment preserved by Olympiodorus in his commentary on this passage. The charge of αδολεσχία ('garrulity') was commonly brought against all men of science by the practical Athenians and the comic poets who wrote to please them.

οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων, 'about things which do not concern me', 'things I have nothing to do with'. For the position of the preposition see Riddell, Dig. § 298 and cp. 110 c 2.

First Proof of Immortality (70 c 4-77 d 5).

This proof is based upon two considerations (1) the doctrine of $\pi a \lambda \iota \gamma \gamma \epsilon \nu \epsilon \sigma l a$, (2) the doctrine of $d \nu a \mu \nu \eta \sigma \iota s$. Neither of these taken by itself furnishes a proof, though taken together they may be said to do so $(77 \, c \, 7)$.

With regard to the proofs of immortality, it should be observed that the first two are successively abandoned as inadequate, while even the third is said to require further examination (107 b 5). The proof which satisfied Plato himself is not one of them (cp. 94 b 4 n.). Nevertheless each contributes something to our knowledge of the subject.

- (1) The ancient doctrine of παλιγγενεσία is shown to rest on the law of ἀνταπόδοσις (70 c 4—72 e I).
- C 4 αὐτό, 'the matter.'
- C 5 παλαιδς...λόγος: cp. the way in which the same Orphic doctrine is introduced in Meno 81 a 5 ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα... a 10 Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἴοις τ' εἰναι διδόναι' λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. â δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτί ἐστιν*... φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν—δ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε. So Epist. vii. 335 a 2 πείθεσθαι δὲ ὅντως ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἱ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι κτλ. For παλαιός cp. 67 c 5 n. Herodotus (ii. 123) is mistaken in assigning an Egyptian origin to this doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 95).
- c 6 ὧs εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, 'that they are in the other world, having come there from this.' There is no parallel to justify us in taking εἰσὶν ἀφικόμεναι together as if it were εἰσὶν ἀφιγμέναι. Note the interlaced order (a b a b).
- c 8 πάλιν γίγνεσθαι: the regular name for this doctrine in later writers is παλιγγενεσία. The word μετεμψύχωσις, though it has found its way into all modern languages, is quite inaccurate, and is not used before Graeco-Roman times, and then very seldom (Diodorus, Galen). Cp. Servius on Aen. iii. 68 non μετεμψύχωσιν sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicit (Pythagoras). Hippolytus, Clement, and other Christian writers say μετενσωμάτωσις ('reincarnation'), which is accurate but cumbrous.
- d 2 τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, 'of the truth of this.' For the neuter plural cp. Riddell, Dig. § 41.
- d 7 κατ' ἀνθρώπων: cp. Meno 76 a 5 κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω (Riddell, Dig. § 121). Originally κατά, c. gen., is quite neutral in meaning, especially in the phrase κατὰ πάντων (Isocr. 15. 189 ταῦτα... κατὰ πασῶν λέγομεν τῶν τεχνῶν). From this use comes the Aristotelian κατηγορεῖν τι κατά τινος, 'to predicate something of anything,' and κατὰ ὅλου (Meno 77 a 6), καθ' ὅλου, καθόλου.
- e 1 åρ': indirect questions are not infrequently introduced by åρα.

Cp. Lach. 185 d 9 σκοπεῖν ἄρα . . ., Meno 93 b 2 τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἄρα . . ., Rep. 526 c 9 σκεψώμεθα ἄρα . . ., and just below e 4.

- e I οὐτωσί: this is explained by οὐκ ἄλλοθεν κτλ. Cp. 71 a 9. Socrates generalizes the Orphic doctrine that the living are born from the dead, and treats it as a case of the principle, maintained by Heraclitus, of the generation of opposites from opposites (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 186).
- e 2 ὄσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, 'everything, that is, which has an opposite,' equivalent to e 5 ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον.
- e 3 καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία κτλ. For this way of breaking off an enumeration cp. 73 d 10; 94 b 10 (Riddell, Dig. § 257).
- e 5 ὄσοις... αὐτό: for the singular pronoun referring to the plural ὅσοις cp. 104 d 2 (αὐτοῦ referring to ἄ).
- a 13 δύο γενέσειs: if opposites arise from one another, it follows that between every pair of opposites (μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων) there must be two processes (γενέσειs), one by which A arises from B, another by which B arises from A.
 - b 3 αύξησις καὶ φθίσις, 'increase and decrease.' We see from this passage that much attention had already been given to accuracy of terminology.
 - b 6 διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, 'decomposing and combining.' These terms were used by the early natural philosophers to denote the analysis of compound bodies into their constituents, and the formation of compound bodies out of something more primitive, such as what were called at a later date elements (στοιχεῖα).
 - b 7 καν εἰ μὴ κτλ. The attempt to construct an accurate terminology in any language is sure to reveal gaps. In the Ethics Aristotle often has to say that the mean, or one or other of the extremes, is ἀνώνυμον. Cp. Bywater on Poet. 1447 b 9.
 - c 9 συζυγίαν, 'pair' (originally of oxen or horses). The word may be applied, however, to a larger number of things than two. In grammar it is a 'conjugation', i.e. a class of verbs similarly inflected.

έγώ σοι, έφη, έρω, δ Σωκράτης: for the interlaced order (a b a b) cp. 70 b 5 n.

- e 4 τοιν περί ταθτα, i.e. τοιν τούτων (περί c. acc. = gen.).
- e 8 οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν; 'shall we not assign it an opposite process to balance it?'

- © 9 χωλή, 'halt', 'lame in one foot'. Cp. the advice of Cimon μήτε τὴν 'Ελλάδα χωλήν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἐτερόζυγα περιιδεῖν γεγενημένην (Plut. Cim. 16).
- e 13 ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, 'to come to life again.' Sometimes the verb is transitive, 'to bring to life again' (e.g. Crito 48 c 5); but in that case the agrist is ἀναβιώσασθαι (not ἀναβιώναι), as below 89 b 10.
- 72 a 6 ἐδόκει: 70 d 2.
 - a 11 ὅτι οἰδ' ἀδίκως κτλ., 'that we were not wrong either '. Cp. 63 b 8 ἢδίκουν ἄν, 'I should be wrong.'
 - a 12 εἰ...μἡ...ἀνταποδιδοίη, 'unless there were a constant correspondence.' The verb is here intransitive, as below b 8. Cp. L. S. s. v. ἀποδίδωμι 11.
 - b ι κύκλφ περιέντα: the κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως is Orphic. It was just from the Wheel of Birth that redemption (λύσις) was sought by means of purgatory observances (καθαρμοί). On one of the gold plates from Thurii (E. Gr. Ph.⁹ p. 88) the ransomed soul says κύκλου δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο. Here, of course, the reference is to cyclical processes generally, but that is characteristic of the way in which a scientific sense is given to religious ideas throughout the passage.
 - b 2 εὐθεῖά τις, 'in a straight line.' A rectilinear process is only in one direction, a circular has two.
 - b 3 καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι κτλ. The metaphor is taken from the δίαυλος, in which the runners turned round the καμπτήρ and came back to the starting-point (Dict. Ant. s. v. Stadium, ii. 693 b). Cp. Aesch. Ag. 344 κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν.
 - b 9 τελευτῶντα . . . ἀποδείξειεν, 'would end by making Endymion seem a thing of naught (a 'bagatelle') by comparison.' This use of ἀποδείκνυμι is fully illustrated in Wyttenbach's note. Cp. e.g. Plato, Phaedr. 278 c 6 λέγων αὐτὸς . . . τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδείξαι, Ερίσι. vii. 324 d 7 χρυσὸν ἀποδείξαντας τὴν ἔμπροσθεν πολιτείαν, 'making the previous constitution seem like gold by comparison.' Plut. C. Gracch. I ἀπέδειξε τοὺς ἄλλους ῥητορας παίδων μηδὲν διαφέροντας, Plato, Ερίσι. iv. 320 d 6 παρασκευάζου τόν τε Λυκοῦργον ἐκεῖνον ἀρχαῖον ἀποδεί ων και τὸν Κῦρον, 'to make them seem out of date by comparison.' Wyttenbach shows too that λῆρος is regularly used in such comparisons. Cp. e.g. Arist. Lys. 860 λῆρος ἐστι τἄλλα πρὸς Κινησίαν, Antiphanes fr. 232 ἄρ' ἐστὶ ληρος πάντα πρὸς τὸ χρυσίον; Χεη

- An. vii. 7. 41 'Ηρακλείδη λήρος πάντα εδόκει είναι πρὸς τὸ ἀργύριον έχειν εκ παντὸς τρόπου. The meaning is not 'to make the story of Endymion appear an idle tale', as most editors say. On the contrary, it would be all the more credible.
- C I οὐδαμοῦ ᾶν φαίνοιτο, 'he (note change of subject) would be nowhere,' an expression taken, like its English equivalent, from the race-course. Cp. Gorg. 456 b 8 οὐδαμοῦ ᾶν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρον, 'the doctor would come in nowhere.' Dem. de Cor. 310 ἐν οὖδ οὐδαμοῦ σὰ φανῆση γεγονώς, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἔκτος, οὐχ ὅποστοσοῦν.
- C 3 καθεύδειν: just as τοῦτο πάσχει &c. are regularly followed by a clause in apposition (cp. 68 e 2 n.), so τοῦτο πάσχειν (πεπονθέναι) is regularly followed by an infinitive in apposition. Cp. 73 b 7; 74 a 6; 78 c 2. There is, therefore, no reason for deleting the word with Dobree.
- C 4 τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου: cp. Anaxagoras fr. 1 ad init. 'Ομοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν (Ε. Gr. Ph.² p. 299). There is a similar jesting use of the phrase in Gorg. 465 d 3 τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου ἄν πολὺ ἦν ... όμοῦ ἄν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.
- d ι ἐκ . . . των άλλων, i. e. from some other source than the dead who were once alive.
- d 8 ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων κτλ. It is important to observe that in this passage οἱ τεθνεώτες are simply souls existing in the other world. They are certainly not dead bodies. All through this argument γένεσις means the union of soul to body and θάνατος their separation.
- e τ και ται ε μέν γε κτλ. These words appear to repeat 63 c6, where the statement is in place.
 - (2) The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις is shown to rest on the theory of Forms (72 e 3—77 a 5).
- e 3 ὑπολαβών: cp. 60 c8 n.
 καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον... e 6 καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον: the καί means 'as well as'
 according to the παλαιὸς λόγος of 70 c5.
- e 4 δν συ είωθας θαμά λέγειν: it is surely very difficult to regard this definite statement as a fiction. The doctrine is also ascribed to Socrates in the *Meno* and the *Phaedrus*. It is to be noted, further, that Cebes speaks of it as one peculiar to Socrates, while Simmias

E 2

knows very little about it. It did not, therefore, belong to fifthcentury Pythagoreanism, though there can be little doubt of its Orphic and Pythagorean origin. The legend of Pythagoras makes a point of his remembering his earlier incarnations, and Empedocles professed to remember his (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 259, n. 1). The apparent contradiction is to be explained as follows. The scientific Pythagoreans of the fifth century had to some extent dropped the religious doctrines of their founder (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 319 sqq.), and their teaching was really inconsistent with a belief in the soul's immortality (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 343). The originality of Socrates seems to have consisted just in this, that he applied the old religious doctrine of ἀνάμνησις to science, and especially to mathematical science.

- e 5 ὅτι ἡμῖν κτλ., 'that our learning is really nothing else than reminiscence,' i.e. that it is simply the process of being reminded of what we once knew. It is important to bear in mind that the process is one of being reminded, not merely one of remembering or recollection.
- e 6 καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον repeats and emphasizes κατ' ἐκεῖνον . . . τὸν λόγον above (e 3).
- e 7 & νῦν ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα, 'what we are now reminded of.' Cp.

 Meno 81 c 7 οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν...οἶόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν)

 ἀναμνησθῆναι ἄ γε καὶ πρότερον ἤπίστατο, d 2 ἔν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα—δ
 δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι—τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν.
- 73 a I πρὶν . . . γενέσθαι, ' before entering into this human frame.' Here εἶδος is practically equivalent to σῶμα. Cp. 77 b 7 πρὶν καὶ εἰς ὰνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι. So Symp. 210 b 2 τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν, Phaedr. 249 a 8 ἀξίως οὖ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίου, Rep. 402 d 1 ἔν τε τῆ ψυχῆ . . . καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει.
 - a 7 ἐνὶ μὲν λόγφ (sc. ἀποδείκνυται)... a 10 ἔπειτα... We regularly find ἔπειτα (usually without δέ) in the sense of 'secondly' after πρῶτον μὲν... 'firstly'. This fixes the meaning of ἐνὶ λόγφ here. It does not mean 'to sum up', as it does above 65 d 13, but 'by one argument'. I think Mr. R. G. Bury is right in holding (Class. Rev. xx, p. 13) that the process ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγειν is opposed to, rather than included in, the process καλῶς ἐρωτᾶν, and I would illustrate his point further from Theaet. 165 a I ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων (arguments without diagrams) πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν

ἀπενεύσαμεν. I am also inclined to accept his reading $\pi\rho\hat{\omega}\tau$ ον for ένί, though it is not absolutely necessary. The use of α' , β' , γ' as numerals has certainly affected the reading in several passages of Plato. In any case this is better than altering ἔπειτα to ἐπεί τοι with Heindorf.

- a 8 αὐτοί, 'of themselves.' Cp. 64 a 5.
- a 10 ὀρθὸς λόγος, 'a right account of the matter.' An ὅνομα is ὀρθόν when applied to something which we are justified in applying it to (cp. 69 d 2 n.). In the same way a λόγος or statement is ὀρθός when it expresses the truth. The rendering 'right reason' is misleading; for it suggests that λόγος is a mental 'faculty'.
 - b 1 int τα διαγράμματα: this seems a fairly certain reference to Meno 82 b 9 sqq., where Socrates questions a slave about a geometrical diagram, in order to prove that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις. No doubt, if we hold this doctrine and its proof to be genuinely Socratic, the reference to the Meno is less certain; but, on the whole, Plato seems to indicate that, as he has already treated it elsewhere, he need not repeat the proof here.
 - **b 2** κατηγορεῖ, 'it is proof positive' (Riddell, Dig. § 97), 'it is manifest' (velut passim occurrunt ἐδήλωσε, προσημαίνει, δείξει et id genus alia, Heindorf). The verb κατηγορεῖν is used just like the Latin arguere (L. S. s. v. II) and might very well take the impersonal construction of δηλοῦν, for which cp. Gorg. 483 d 2 δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. If the verb is personal we must supply
 - ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, which is not satisfactory.
 - b 6 αὐτὸ... τοῦτο... παθείν... ἀναμνησθῆναι, 'to have done to me the very thing we are speaking of, namely, to be reminded.' The MSS. have μαθείν, and παθείν is a conjecture of Heindorf's (not of Serranus, as Stallbaum says). The words are constantly confused; for in uncial writing M is very like II, both being written without lifting the pen. This is one of the comparatively few corrections in the text of the *Phaedo* which may be called certain, though it is not adopted in the most recent edition (Wohlrab, 1908). Cp. Gorg. 505 c 3 αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὖ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.
- b 7 ἀναμνησθηναι: in apposition to τοῦτο παθείν. Cp. 72 c 3 n.
- b 8 ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν, 'attacked the proof.' We see here the beginnings of the use of ἐπιχειρεῖν as a technical term of dialectic. Cp. also ἐπιχείρημα.

- c τ εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, 'if a man is to be reminded of a thing.'
 Cp. 72 e 7 n.
- C 5 τρόπφ τοιούτφ, 'in such a way as this.' Here τοιοῦτος refers forward, and the explanation of it is introduced by the question and answer 'What way do I mean? This.' For similar rhetorical interrogations see Riddell, Dig. § 325.
- c 6 ἐἀν τίς τι ἔτερον κτλ. Here we have a careful psychological analysis of what is meant by 'being reminded'. A modern treatise would say 'If a man, having seen A (τι ἔτερον)... also thinks of B'. The reading τι ἔτερον is sufficiently well attested (T), and the double ἄλλο is used in the same way below 74 c 13, while the other reading, πρότερον (B), is easily accounted for and yields no satisfactory sense. Recent editors mostly adopt πρώτερον and then enclose it in square brackets.

ή τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβών, equivalent to ή τινι ἄλλη αἰσθήσει αἰσθόμενος, but Plato avoids the juxtaposition of cognate words. The same phrase is used below 76 a 2.

- C 7 μἡ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ κτλ., ' not only apprehends A, but also thinks of B.'
- C 8 οῦ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη: this is an important reservation. Certain things, notably opposites, must be known together or not at all (τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη). It proves nothing that odd reminds us of even, or that darkness reminds us of light; for in this case the knowledge of the one is ipso facto knowledge of the other.
- C 9 τοῦτο: internal object of ἀνεμνησθη (cp. 72 e 7 n.) and antecedent of οὖ, 'that he was reminded of that which he thought of (B).' The words οὖ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβε refer to ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοήση above. δικαίωs is used much like ὀρθῶs. Cp. 72 a 11 n.
- d 6 πάσχουσι τοῦτο: followed as usual by a clause in apposition. Cp. 68 e 3 n.
- d 7 ἔγνωσαν: empirical ('gnomic') aorist. Cp. 113 d 3. ἐν τῆ διανοία ἔλαβον: equivalent to ἐνενόησαν, but with more emphasis on the ingressive force of the aorist.

τὸ είδοs, 'the bodily form.' Cp. 73 a I n.

- d 8 τοῦτο: pred. 'and reminiscence is just this'. Cp. 75 d 10.
- d 9 πολλάκις... ἀνεμνήσθη: empirical agrist with temporal adverb. Gildersleeve, S. C. G. § 259.
- d 10 καὶ άλλα που μυρία κτλ. Cp. 70 e 3 n.

73

- d 11 μέντοι νη Δία: cp. 68 b 7 n.
 - e 5 ιππον γεγραμμένον, 'a painted horse.' This is a more complex case. We are reminded of B not by A, but by an image of A, which we may call a.
 - e 9 αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου: Simmias as opposed to the picture of Simmias. In this case we are reminded of A by a, or of B by b. This is the case described just below as ἀφὶ ὁμείων, the two first being ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων. It is for the sake of this distinction that the point is elaborated.
- 74 a 6 ἐννοεῖν: in apposition to προσπάσχειν, cp. 72 c 3 n. When a man is reminded of A by a or of B by b, an additional thought necessarily presents itself to his mind, the thought of the presence or absence of any deficiency in the sikeness of a or b to A or B. This thought is only forced upon us when we are reminded ἀφ' ὁμοίων.

είτε τι έλλείπει τοῦτο ... ἐκείνου ..., 'whether this (a or b) falls short in any respect of that of which he has been reminded by it (A or B).' The intransitive use of ἐλλείπειν was familiar in Pythagorean geometry. Cp. Proclus, in Eucl. I, p. 419 (Friedlein) "Εστι μὲν ἀρχαῖα, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ευδημον, καὶ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων Μοίσης εὐρήματα ταῦτα, ἢ τε παραβολὴ τῶν χωρίων καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις. The use of the words parabola, hyperbola, and ellipse in Conic Sections comes from this, but Conics are post-Platonic.

a 9 φαμέν που κτλ. Cp. 65 d 4 n.

We have seen already that the 'forms' (what we really *mean* when we speak of 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', &c.) are not perceptible by the senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

We are now introduced to a second point in the theory. The 'forms' are types ($\pi a \rho a \delta \epsilon i \gamma \mu a \tau a$) to which particular sensible things approximate more or less closely. A given triangle is never what we really mean by 'triangle', nor a right action what we really mean by right.

According to this view, particular sensible things are μιμήματα or εἰκόνες of the 'forms'. There is ample evidence that a doctrine like this was held by the later Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 353 sqq.).

τι είναι ἴσον... αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: we speak of sticks and stones being 'equal', but this is not the equality with which arithmetic and geometry deal. We only call them equal at all because they remind us of what we really mean by 'equal'. This is something

74

different (ἔτερόν τι), 'over and above' all these things (παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα), which is 'just the equal' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον).

- b 1 μέντοι νη Δί(a): cp. 65 d 6 n. Simmias was not familiar with the doctrine of Reminiscence, but now he feels at home once more.
- b 2 αὐτὸ δ ἔστιν: W adds ἴσον and so do the margins of B and T. It is, perhaps, unnecessary, but gives the full technical expression for this kind of reality, 'the what it is by itself', 'the just what it is'.
- b 4 ἐξ ὧν νυνδη ἐλέγομεν: we certainly have an exact scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of equality, but we have seen (65 d 9) that equality cannot be perceived by the senses. These, then, are not the source of our knowledge. Sensible objects only remind us of equality. But we cannot be reminded of a knowledge which we never possessed.
- b 8 τῷ μὲν...τῷ δ' οῦ: there is an ancient variant τότε (i. e. τοτὲ) μὲν... τότε (i. e. τοτὲ) δ' οῦ. Either reading gives a good sense. Sticks and stones sometimes seem equal and sometimes unequal to the same persons, and they appear equal to one person, unequal to another. This shows that the 'really equal' (αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἴσον) is something different.
- C I αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα: things that are 'just equal'. There is no difficulty about the plural. When Euclid says (Ax. I) Τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἴσα, he is not speaking of sticks or stones, but of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. Cp. αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, Parm. 129 b I. The two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are an instance of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.
- C 4 ταῦτα... τὰ ἴσα: the sticks and stones mentioned above, not αὐτὸ τὰ ἴσα.
- C II Οὐκοῦν... d 3 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: this step in the argument is not, perhaps, strictly necessary, and some critics would bracket the words. It must be observed, however, that they serve to make the proof that our knowledge of the equal is reminiscence clearer, by reminding us of the preceding discussion. The equality of sticks and stones must either be like or unlike real equality, but in either case it is different from it, and our conception of real equality therefore corresponds to the account already given of reminiscence. Socrates does not assume at this stage that the equality of sticks and stones is 'like' real equality. That is the next step in the argument.

- c 13 ws &v ...: dummodo, 'so long as' ... For the formula which follows cp. 73 c 6; 76 a 2.
 - d 2 aủ tó, 'the process in question.'
 - d 4 τι τοιοῦτον refers forward. The fact here noted indicates that we have to do with ἀνάμνησις ἀφ' ὁμοίων. Cp. 74 a 5.
 - d 6 ຖ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου ... ຖ οὐδέν ; 'do they fall short of it at all ... or not?' For the rare use of ἐνδεῖν as equivalent to ἐλλείπειν cp. Rep. 345 d 4 ἔως γ' ἄν μηδὲν ἐνδεῖη τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι, 529 d I τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν. There is no need, then, to read ἐκείνω with Madvig.
 - d 7 τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἴσον, 'in being such as the equal.' For the dative of that in which one is deficient cp. Thuc. ii. 87. 1 τῆ ... παρασκευῆ ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο, Isocr. Paneg. 105 τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνδεεστέρους. Owing to a misunderstanding of this construction late MSS. insert μή after τῷ, and various conjectures have been proposed by modern critics.
 - d 9 βούλεται . . . είναι, 'aims at being.' The phrase is often used to express a tendency, especially by Aristotle.
 - e I [toov]: this seems a clear case of an 'adscript' which has crept into the text. Though it is in W it is not translated in the version of Aristippus, who has simply tale esse quale illud.
 - e 2 φαυλότερον, 'inferior.'
 - e 3 ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν, 'but of which it falls short.' The relative οῦ cannot be repeated after ῷ, though αὐτοῦ might have been added. Cp. 65 a 5 n.
 - e 9 'Aναγκαῖον ἄρα . . . προειδέναι: the point of the argument is that we could not judge the equality of sticks and stones to be defective unless we were in possession of a standard by which to judge them. Sensible things could never furnish us with such a standard, therefore we must have derived it from some other source.
- 5 a 2 ορέγεται: equivalent to βούλεται, 74 d 9.
 - a 7 ταὐτὸν δὲ κτλ., 'I count all these as the same thing' (for the purposes of the present argument, as appears from the reply). Cp.

 Μεπο 75 ε 2 πάντα ταὖτα ταὖτόν τι λέγω ἴσως δ' αν ἡμῦν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο.
 - a 11 'Aλλὰ μὲν δὴ κτλ. It can only be from the senses that our judgement of the inferiority of sensible objects originates, and yet that judgement implies previous knowledge of the standard by which we judge them and find them inadequate.

b I τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, sc. ἴσα. The phrase is modelled on the common ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς.

 $^{\circ}$ κείνου ... τοῦ δ $^{\circ}$ εστιν $^{\circ}$ τον: for the terminology cp. 74 b 2 n. and below d 2 n.

b 4 Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι κτλ. The reasoning is quite sound, as we shall see if we remember that we should never call sticks or stones equal at all, unless we knew clearly what we meant by equality.

τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι, 'make use of our other senses'; for τάλλα is

internal accusative (Riddell, Dig. § 2).

- b 6 τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων is substituted for τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεων under the influence of ἀνοίσειν. This is simply a case of the 'attraction' of prepositions with the article by verbs of motion. Cp. 76 d 9; 109 e 4.
- b 7 ἀνοίσειν, 'to refer.' Reference to a standard is regularly expressed by ἀναφέρειν πρὸς..., referre ad... Cp. 76 d 9.

δτι seems to be used as if ἀναφέροντες ἐννοήσειν had preceded instead of ἀνοίσειν. Vahlen (i. 489) proposes to insert καὶ ἐννοήσειν before ὅτι.

προθυμεῖται, 'do their best,' a still more picturesque way of expressing tendency than βούλεται or ὀρέγεται above.

πάντα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἴσα.

- b 10 γενόμενοι εὐθύς, 'immediately upon birth.'
 - c ι πρὸ τούτων: before we saw, heard, &c.
- C 7 εἰ . . . ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, sc. αὐτήν, 'if we were born with it,' i.e. the knowledge of the equal.
- C 9 το μείζον καὶ το έλαττον: the knowledge of το ἴσον implies these: for together they make up its opposite, το ἄνισον, and τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη.
- C II περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ κτλ. We see here how the theory originated in mathematics, and was thence transferred to what we call morals and aesthetics. The beautiful and the good resemble the equal in this, that they are nowhere perfectly realized.
- d 2 οἰς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα κτλ., 'on which we set the seal of αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι.' Here again we have 'we' in connexion with a technical term, and this implies the work of a school. Cp. 65 d 4 n. For the metaphor cp. Polit. 258 c 5 (τῆ πολιτικῆ) μίαν (ἰδέαν) ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, Phileb. 26 d I ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει.
 - τὸ " αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι", 'the just what it is': so I have ventured to

write for the $\tau \circ \hat{\iota} \tau \circ \hat{\iota} \circ \hat{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \iota$ of the MSS. Iamblichus has simply $\tau \circ \hat{\iota} \circ \hat{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \iota$, and it seems to me that $\tau \circ i$ must be right. The reading which I have given accounts sufficiently for the others. Most editors write $\tau \circ \hat{\iota} \tau \circ \hat{\iota} \circ \hat{\iota} \circ \hat{\iota} \circ \hat{\iota}$.

- d 2 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν κτλ.: i.e. διαλεγόμενοι, for question and answer are the two sides of the Socratic dialectic. We see from 78 d I that this phrase also was technical in the Socratic school. Cp. Crito 50 c 8 ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Rep. 534 d 9 (διαλεκτικὴ) ἐξ ἦς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι οἶοί τ' ἔσονται.
- d 7 Εί... ξκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, 'unless we forget them on each occasion' of our birth. The doctrine of παλιγγενεσία seems to be implied by ἐκάστοτε and ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι ('to be born on each occasion') below. There would be no room for reminiscence unless birth involved forgetting. Heindorf proposed to insert γιγνόμενοι after ἐκάστοτε to make this clear; but we may easily 'understand' it.
- d 9 λαβόντα κτλ., 'having acquired knowledge of a thing, to have it and not to have lost it.' ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι is an instance of 'polar expression'. Cp. 86 a 5 ἔτι εἶναι . . . καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι.
- d 10 ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν, 'loss of knowledge' (ἀπόλλυμι and ἀποβάλλω are synonyms in this sense). For other definitions of λήθη cp. Symb. 208 a 4 λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, Phileb. 33 e 3 ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος.
 - C 2 Εί . . γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, 'if we lost it in the process of birth.'
 - e 3 περὶ αὐτά: here αὐτά means simply 'the things in question'. Cp. 60c1; 76c2. There is no need to read ταῦτα with W; for the reference is plain.
 - e 4 $\pi \rho i \nu$: the use of $\pi \rho i \nu$ as an adverb almost unexampled in prose (except with the article).
 - οἰκείαν . . . ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν, 'to recover knowledge which is our own.' This is the real meaning of the whole doctrine, which can only be adequately expressed in a mystical form. The mystery of knowledge is the same as the mystery of love. It is a 'mystical union' with what at first seems alien (ἀλλότριον), but is in time recognized to be our very own.
- e 7 ὀρθῶs: cp. 62 b 2 n.

- 76 a 1 ἡ ὶδόντα κτλ. These participles are subordinate to αἰσθόμενον, 'whether by sight or hearing or any other sense.'
 - a 5 πάντες is opposed to οὖς φαμεν μανθάνειν and repeated below b 8.
 We must not, therefore, read παντός.
 - a 6 οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἥ, 'nothing but.' The phrase ἀλλ' ἥ is used after negatives and treated as a single word (cp. 68 b 4). It is wrong to write ἄλλ' (for ἄλλο) as is shown by 81 b 4 μηδὲν ἄλλο . . . ἀλλ' ἣ 97 d 2 οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . . ἀλλ' ἣ . . .
 - b 5 δοῦναι λόγον, 'to give an account of it.' This is the mark of the διαλεκτικός. Cp. Rep. 534 b 3 H καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον έκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας (cp. 78 d I); καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῷ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;
 - b 9 ων νυνδή ἐλέγομεν, sc. τοῦ ἴσου, τοῦ καλοῦ, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, &c.
 - b 11 αύριον τηνικάδε, 'this time to-morrow.' It seems to me that, if Plato originated the theory, he could not possibly have put this statement into the mouth of Simmias. Cp. Prot. 336 b 8, where Alcibiades says τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἶός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θανμάζοιμ' ἃν εἴ τφ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ (Σωκράτης).
 - C 12 ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, 'in human form.' We see from the next words how close εἶδος in such phrases comes to the meaning of σῶμα. Cp. 73 a 1 n.

καὶ φρόνησιν είχον, 'and had intelligence.' For the sense of φρόνησις here cp. 70 b 4 n. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις gives the first indication of the intelligence of the disembodied soul.

- d ι ἐν ποίφ ἄλλφ χρόνφ; sc. ἡ ἐν τῷ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. The interrogative ποίφ is not a mere equivalent of τίνι. It always expresses feeling of some sort, surprise, scorn, or incredulity. Here we may reproduce the effect by saying, 'And at what other time do we lose it, pray?'
- d 2 apri: 75 d 4.
- d 8 & θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, 'the things we are always talking of.' Once more we have the 'we' which implies that this doctrine was perfectly familiar to the school.
- d 9 οὐσία: cp. 65 d 13 n.
 τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων: cp. 75 b 6 n.
 ἀναφέρομεν: cp. 75 b 7 n.
- e 1 ήμετέραν οὐσαν: equivalent to οἰκείαν above 75 e 5.

- e 2 ταθτα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν.
 - οῦτως ὥσπερ καί, 'in just the same way that', 'just as surely as'.
- e 3 ταῦτα, sc. καλόν τέ τι κτλ. There is no real difficulty in the fact that ταῦτα here and in the next line has a different reference from ταῦτα in e 2. The reference is quite plain in all three cases.
- 6 4 ἄλλως . . . εἰρημένος, 'spoken in vain', 'this argument will go for nothing'. Cp. 115 d 5 ἄλλως λέγειν. Cp. L.S. s. v. ἄλλως II. 3.
- e 9 εἰς καλόν: this phrase can hardly have any other than its usual meaning opportunely. Cp. Meno 89 e 9 εἰς καλὸν ἡμῶν ἀνυτος παρεκαθέζετο, Symp. 174 e 5 εἰς καλὸν ῆκεις, and often. The phrase is purely adverbial, and it is not correct to say, with most editors, that it is explained by the words εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι κτλ., which depend directly on καταφεύγει.

καταφεύγει, 'is taking refuge.' The λόγος or argument is over and over again spoken of as the thing hunted (cp. 63 a 2 n., and below 88 d 9 n.). I take the meaning to be that it has 'taken cover' very conveniently for us who are hunting it. From Rep. 432 b sq. we see that the idea is that of a hare or other animal taking refuge in a bush (θάμνος), which the huntsmen surround so that it cannot escape (Adam's note in loc.). When the argument is proved, it is caught. Cp. Lysis 218 c 4 ἔχαιρον, ὥσπερ θηρευτής τις, ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς δ ϵθηρευόμην.

- 7 a 1 δμοίως, 'in the same way', 'just as surely', equivalent to οὔτως ωσπερ καὶ . . . οὖτως καί above (76 e 2).
 - a 5 ἀποδέδεικται, 'the demonstration is adequate.' The words ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ are parenthetical, and do not affect the construction. Cp. 108 d8. The omission of δοκεῖ in TW is an attempt to normalize the construction. The answer shows that δοκεῖ is right; for it is the only word that can be supplied after Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι;
 - (3) The doctrines of παλιγγενεσία and ἀνάμνησις afford an incomplete demonstration until they are combined (77 a 6-77 d 5).
 - 18 Ίκανῶς, sc. ἀποδέδεικται. Simmias and Cebes point out, however, that the argument from ἀνάμνησις only proves the antenatal existence of the soul, not its survival after death. Socrates replies that we must take the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις and that from ἀνάμνησις together. At the same time, he admits that a more thorough discussion is required.

- b 3 ἐνέστηκεν, 'there is still the objection.' This is originally an agonistic metaphor; for ἐνστῆναι is 'to stand up to'. Cp. Lysias, 3. 8 εὐθύς με τύπτειν ἐπεχείρησεν ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτὸν ἡμυνάμην ἐνστάς . . ., Isocr. 5. 39 ἐνστῆναι τοῦς εἰρημένοις. Hence comes the technical use of ἔνστασις (instantia) in dialectics of an 'objection' to an argument (ἐπιχείρημα). Plutarch uses the word for the tribunes' intercessio.
- b 4 ὅπως μὴ... διασκεδάννυται κτλ. For the use of ὅπως μἡ after verbs of fearing instead of μή cp. below 84 b 5. There are four or five instances of this construction in Plato. The verb is subjunctive and has long v, but the termination should not be accented -ἶται as if it were contracted from -ὑηται. It is really an older form of the subjunctive (Kühner-Blass, § 281.3). So διασκεδάννῦσιν, 77 e I, and the opt. πήγνυτο, II8 a 2.
- b 6 ἄλλοθέν ποθεν, 'from some other source' than from the souls in the other world which have come there from this (the ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμενωι of 70 c 6). I formerly read άμόθεν ποθέν with Bekker; but, apart from the fact that the regular phrase is άμόθεν γέ ποθεν, I now think the meaning is settled by 72 d I ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, where see note.
- C I Εὐ λέγεις κτλ. For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.
- C 5 τέλος ... ἔξειν, i. q. τελεία ἔσεσθαι, 'to be complete.' Cp. τέλος λαμβάνειν, τέλος ἐπιθείναι, &c. In Greek philosophy the word τέλος always implies the idea of completion or full growth. An animal or plant τέλος ἔχει when its growth is complete, when it is full grown. B has ἔχειν for ἔξειν, which would be equally correct. It is impossible to draw any distinction between the two constructions. For the fut. inf. in this use cp. e. g. Rep. 567 b 8 εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν.
- c 7 καὶ νῦν, 'even as it is.' The sense of νῦν is the same as in the common νῦν δὲ..., nunc vero..., 'but, as it is.'
 - συνθεῖναι...εἰς ταὐτόν, 'to combine the present argument (viz. that the soul exists and is conscious before our birth) with the argument we assented to before it.'
- d 5 ὅπερ λέγετε, 'the point you mention.' This reading comes from a late MS. and is probably due to conjecture alone. It gives, however, a much better sense than the ὅπερ λέγεται of the oldest MSS., which is supposed to mean 'as is said', i.e. 'as I say'. We should

certainly expect $\delta \pi \epsilon \rho \lambda \epsilon \gamma \omega$ in that sense, and the confusion of $-\tau \epsilon$ and $-\tau a \iota$ is common; both being pronounced alike.

(4) Practical Application.—We must rid ourselves of the fear of death at all costs (77 d 5-78 b 4).

This digression (cp. 78 a 10) marks the end of the First Argument and leads up to the Second.

- d 6 διαπραγματεύσασθαι, 'to discuss thoroughly.' Cp. below 95 e 9 and the use of πραγματεία above 63 a I.
- d 7 τὸ τῶν παίδων, 'as children do.' That the phrase does not necessarily mean 'as children say', is shown e.g. by Xen. Oec. 16.7 ἀνεμνήσθην τὸ τῶν ἀλιέων, which in the context must mean 'what fishermen do'.
- e τ διασκεδάννυσιν is probably subjunctive and to be pronounced with long v (cp. 77 b 4 n.). The indicative would not be so appropriate; for the fear refers to the future. If the verbs were indicative, we should have to render 'lest the wind puffs it away and scatters it' on each occasion when it issues from the body.
- e 2 ἐν μεγάλφ τινὶ πνεύματι, 'in a high wind,' the regular phrase. So μέγας πνεῖ ὁ ἄνεμος. This clause is, of course, a humorous addition to the theory.
- e 3 & δεδιότων, sc. ἡμῶν, in spite of the fact that strict grammar would require δεδιόταs in agreement with ἡμᾶς, the unexpressed object of ἀναπείθειν. The genitive absolute is often used in this way. Cp. Riddell, Dig. § 274.
- e 4 μαλλον δέ, vel potius, 'or rather,' the regular phrase in introducing a correction.
 - μή belongs to δεδιότων, but is anticipated for emphasis. A striking instance of this is *Crito* 47 d 9 πειθόμενοι μή τῆ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξη.
- e 5 ἐν ἡμῖν, 'in us.' It is necessary to state this, as it has been suggested that the words mean 'among us' and refer to Apollodorus!

 This makes nonsense of the passage. The 'child in us' is often referred to by later Platonist writers like Porphyry, Themistius, and Simplicius (cp. Wyttenbach's note).

δστs differs from δs as qui with the subjunctive from qui with the indicative. Its use here is justified by the preceding τis.

3 6 πειρώ μεταπείθειν was conjectured by Heindorf, and is now known

- to be the reading of W. It is far better than the πειρώμεθα πείθειν of BT; for it resumes πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν above with a slight variation which is quite in Plato's manner.
- 6 7 τὰ μορμολύκεια, 'bugbears.' Μορμώ (whose full name was Μορμολύκη) was a she-goblin used, like 'Ακκώ, 'Έμπουσα, and Λάμια to frighten naughty children. Cp. Theocritus xv. 40 οὐκ ἀξῶ τυ, τέκνον, Μορμώ, δάκνει ἵππος, Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 17 φοβείσθαι τοὺς πελταστάς, ὥσπερ μορμόνας παιδάρια, Lucian, Philops. 2 παίδων ἔτι τὴν Μορμὼ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων. According to the Platonic Lexicon of Timaeus, μορμολύκεια were masks, τὰ φοβερὰ τοῖς παισὶ προσωπεία. The verb μορμολύττεσθαι is used in Crito 46 c 4 and Gorg. 473 d 3.
- e 8 ἐπάδειν, incantare, 'to sing charms' (carmina, ἐπφδαί). Socrates makes an elaborate use of this idea in Charm. 155 e sqq., cp. esp. 157 a 3 θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη (Ζάλμοξιs), ὦ μακάριε, ἐπφδαίς τισιν, τὰς δ' ἐπφδαίς ταύτα τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἦς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥάδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῆ κεφαλῆ καὶ τῷ ἄλλφ σώματι πορίζειν. The ascription of this to the Thracian Zalmoxis shows it to be Pythagorean; for Herodotus tells us (iv. 95) that Zalmoxis (or Zamolxis) had been a slave of Pythagoras (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 93), and it goes well with what we know of the Pythagorean musical κάθαρσις (cp. 61 a 3 n.). Socrates also used the term in connexion with his μαιευτική (Theaet. 149 d 1).
- e 9 τως αν ἐξεπάσητε, 'till you have charmed it out of him.' This is another conjecture of Heindorf's which has been confirmed by fuller knowledge of the MSS.; for it is actually found in a Vienna MS. and virtually in TW. The reading of B is ἐξιάσηται, and it appears from the margin of W that this was an ancient variant. It cannot, of course, be passive; but we might supply τις as its subject. 'One must sing charms... till one has healed him.'
- 78 a 3 Πολλή... ἡ Ἑλλάς, wide enough, for instance, to include Southern Italy, where the Pythagoreans were once more becoming powerful. For this use of πολύς cp. the Homeric πολλή γαΐα, πολλή χώρη (II. xxiii. 520), Thuc. vii. 13. 3 πολλή δ' ἡ Σικελία, Theocr. xxii. 156 πολλή τοι Σπάρτη, πολλή δ' ἱππήλατος τηλις.
 - α 4 τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη: Socrates is no doubt thinking primarily of Thracians and Phrygians. The Orphic 'orgia' came from the

former, the Corybantic 'purifications' from the latter. Plato regarded the distinction between Hellenes and barbarians as an unscientific division of mankind (*Polit.* 262 d I sqq.), but it was revived by Aristotle.

- a 6 εἰς ὅτι ὧν εὐκαιρότερον: this is the reading of T and seems far better than the variant εἰς ὅτι ἀναγκαιότερον. The corruption is an extremely easy one, and the omission of ἄν in the variant is, to say the least of it, hard to justify, while the insertion of ἄν after ὅτι would spoil the rhythm. Of course εὐκαιρότερον is the comparative adverb, not the adjective.
- a 7 καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων, 'by yourselves too' (as well as by questioning Hellenes and barbarians), 'along with one another' (for joint search is the true Socratic method). We cannot take μετ' ἀλλήλων to mean 'among yourselves' as some do. Apart from the unheard-of sense thus given to μετά c. gen., the pronoun ἀλλήλων excludes such a rendering. We should have had ἐν ἡμῦν αὐτοῖς.
- a 8 ἴσως γὰρ ᾶν κτλ. The usual hint that Orpheotelestae and Corybantic καθαρταί are not to be taken too seriously. Cp. 69 c 4 n.
- a 10 ταῦτα ... ὑπάρξει, 'that shall be done', 'you may count on that'.

 For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 %.

Second Proof of Immortality (78 b 4-84 b 8).

This proof is based, not upon ancient doctrines, but on a consideration of the soul's own nature, which is shown to resemble that of the eternal forms. From this we may infer that, like them, it is indissoluble.

- b 5 ξαυτούs is an emphatic ἀλλήλους.
- b 6 τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι is better attested than the τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι of B. We have seen (72 c 3 n.) that τοῦτο πάσχειν takes an infinitive in apposition. The article is added in this case because τὸ πάθος precedes.
- b 7 και τῷ ποίφ τινί (οῦ): some of the early editors deleted και τῷ ποίφ τινί as a tautology; but the pronoun πότερον in b 8 shows that two kinds of things have been distinguished. We must therefore add οῦ with Heindorf, though it appears in no MS. and Olympiodorus did not read it; for he tries to get rid of the tautology by taking the first τῷ ποίφ τινί of things and the second of persons.

NOTES

- 78
- b 8 πότερον, 'which of the two,' not 'whether'.
- b 9 θαρρείν ή δεδιέναι, 'to fear or not to fear.' Cp. 63 e 10 n.
 - (1) Only that is dissoluble which is composite, and the things which are constant and invariable are not composite. Further, the things which are constant and invariable are invis ble. We have to ask, then, whether the soul belongs to the class of invisible, constant and invariable, non-composite things, or to that of visible, variable, composite, and therefore dissoluble things (78 c I 80 c I).
- C τ τῷ...συνθέτῳ ὅντι φύσει: if we take these words together with Wyttenbach, they add a fresh touch to τῷ συντεθέντι. That suggests an artificial combination; this refers to what is essentially and from the nature of the case composite. The addition of the participle ὅντι indicates that this is the construction and makes it very unnatural to take φύσει προσήκει together, as many editors do.
- C 2 τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθήναι: cp. 72 c 3 n. The verbs συντιθέναι, 'compound,' διαιρεῖν, 'divide,' are the regular opposites.

ταύτη ήπερ συνετέθη: e.g., if it is a compound of the four 'elements', it will be divided into these.

- c 6 κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, 'constant and invariable.' We see that this is the sense from the ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως, which is the opposite of ὡσαύτως, and μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, which is opposed to κατὰ ταὐτά. Cp. d 2; 80 b 2.
- c 7 τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλωs: the familiarity of the term may excuse the ellipse of ἔχοντα and make it unnecessary to read ἄ for τὰ with Heindorf.
- c 8 ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα: for the resumptive demonstrative with δέ cp. e. g. Lach. 194 d 2 â δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός. So below 8 o d 8; 81 b 8; 113 e 5.
- d τ ἡ οὐσία ἡ κόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι, 'the reality the being of which we give account of.' The hyperbaton of δίδομεν has misled the commentators here. We must take λόγον τοῦ εἶναι together as equivalent to λόγον τῆς οὐσίας or 'definition', and as governing the genitive ἦς. For λόγος τῆς οὐσίας cp. Rep. 534 b 3 ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβώνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; The meaning, then, is simply 'the reality which we define'. When we define 'triangle',

it is not this or that triangle, but αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι τρίγωνον, 'just what is triangle,' that finds expression in our definition.

- d r καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, i.q. διαλεγόμενοι, cp. 75 d 2 n.
 In the dialectic process it is by question and answer that definitions are reached. When we ask τί ἐστι; the answer is a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας.
- d 3 αὐτὸ ἔκαστον ὁ ἴστιν, 'what any given thing itself is' or 'is by itself', 'just what a given thing is'. Cp. 74 b 2 n.
- d 4 τὸ ὄν, 'the real,' is added to suggest the opposition of εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι.
- d 5 μονοειδες δν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, 'being uniform if taken alone by itself.' I regard αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό as a reservation here. The triangle, for instance, has more than one εἶδος. There are equilateral, isosceles, and scalene triangles. But none of these εἴδη enter into the definition of the triangle simply as such.
- d 10 Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ. (Riddell, Dig. § 27), 'what of the many beautiful things?' as opposed to τὸ αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι καλών. It is clear that we cannot retain both καλῶν here and ἡ καλῶν in e I, and most editors bracket the former. This, however, commits us to the view that there are εἴδη of men, horses, and clothes, which is a point that has not been referred to, and which raises certain difficulties which do not concern us here. It is hard to believe that ὑμάτια would have been mentioned at all except as an instance of τὰ πολλὰ καλά. I therefore take Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ἡ ἴσων together, and regard 'people, horses, and clothes' as examples of the first, just as 'sticks and stones' might be given as examples of the second. It is only as instances of καλά that people, horses, and clothes can be said to be ὁμώνυμα τῷ καλῷ (cp. e 2 n.).
 - τοιούτων: i. e. καλῶν. This, I take it, has caused the interpolation of η καλῶν.
 - e 2 πάντων των ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων, 'all the (other) things (besides καλά and ἴσα) which bear the same name as those,' i. e. as αὐτῶν ἔκαστον ὁ ἔστι. For this way of expressing the relationship between τὰ πολλὰ ἔκαστα and αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἔκαστον cp. Parm. 133 d 2 τὰ . . . παρ' ἡμῦν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις. Observe the tendency to use ταῦτα of the 'many' and ἐκείνα of the 'ideas'.

παν τούναντίον ἐκείνοις, 'just the opposite to these,' i. e. to αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, &c. What we call 'beautiful things' or 'equal things' are

67

78 NOTES

constant neither to themselves nor to one another. As we have seen (74 b 8), they do not appear beautiful or equal to different people, or even to the same person at different times.

- 79 a 3 τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, 'by thinking.' There is no distinction here between διάνοια and νοῦς. The phrase means thinking generally as opposed to sense-perception.
 - a 4 ἀιδῆ, 'invisible.' The correct form was first made known by the Flinders Petrie papyrus, and has since been found to be the reading of the first hand of T and of W. Cp. the Homeric ἀίδηλος, ἄιστος, ἀιδνός. The reading of B, followed by nearly all MSS. and editions is ἀειδῆ, which could only mean 'formless', 'unsightly', and is quite inappropriate.
 - α 6 Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει κτλ. Olympiodorus distinguishes three ἐπιχειρήματα intended to prove that the soul is more like the indissoluble than the body: (1) ἐκ τοῦ ἀοράτου αὐτῆς, (2) ἐκ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ αὐτῆς, (3) ἐκ τοῦ δεσπόζειν τοῦ σώματος. The first ἐπιχείρημα begins here.

δύο είδη τῶν ὅντων, 'two types of things.' It is important to observe that the word ὄντα is used of both. It means 'things' in the widest and vaguest sense. Of course, strictly speaking, visible things are not ὅντως ὅντα and the things invisible are not 'things' at all.

- b τ ἄλλο τι, nonne, just like ἄλλο τι ἡ . . . above (70 c 9). The words have become phraseological, but their original sense ('anything else') is so far felt that the affirmative answer is given by Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
- b 4 φαμέν ᾶν εἶναι: this seems better than the equally well attested φαῖμεν ᾶν εἶναι. In the direct speech ὁμοιότερον ᾶν εἶη would be quite natural.
- b 9 τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, sc. ὁρατὰ καὶ μή. It is left open for us to say that in some sense we may 'see' these things πρὶν ἐν ἀνθρωπείω εἴδει γενέσθαι or after the soul has left its human body. Such a beatific vision is described in the Phaedrus, but belongs to another aspect of the theory than that dwelt upon in the Phaedo.
- b 13 Οὐχ ὁρατόν. 'Αιδὶς ἄρα; cp. 105 d 15 'Ανάρτιον. The inference from 'not visible' to 'invisible' seemed more necessary to the Greeks than to us.
 - C 2 Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε κτλ. The second ἐπιχείρημα (cp. a 6 n.). The soul can apprehend the invariable best apart from the body.

- C 2 πάλαι, 'some time ago,' i.e. 65 b I sqq. For the meaning of πάλαι cp. 63 d 5 n.
- C 8 τοιούτων, sc. πλανωμένων καὶ ἐν ταραχῆ ὅντων (Riddell, Dig. § 54). The soul fluctuates and is confused because it is in contact with objects which are fluctuating and confused.
- d 3 συγγενής οὖσα: we have seen already that reality is οἶκεῖου to the soul (75 e 5), and this has been reinforced by the consideration that it is more alike to the invisible than the visible.
- d 4 καὶ έξη αὐτη, SC. μετ' ἐκείνου γίγνεσθαι.
- d 5 καὶ περὶ ἐκεῦνα... ἔχει, 'and remains ever constant in relation to them.'
- d 6 τοιούτων: i.e. κατά ταὐτά ώσαύτως έχόντων.

τοῦτο . . . τὸ πάθημα, 'this condition,' i.e. a constant relation to constant objects.

e 3 ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, 'this line of argument.' The verb μετέρχομαι (88 d 9) and its substantive μέθοδος furnish another illustration of the metaphor from hunting. The literal sense of μετιέναι is 'to go after', 'to follow up', especially of going in pursuit of game. As the λόγος is the game in the θήρα τοῦ ὅντος, the phrase μετιέναι τὸν λόγον is natural.

όλφ καὶ παντί: the usual phrase is δλφ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρειν, 'to be totally different.' Here it is used of likeness.

- e 8 "Ορα δή καὶ τῆδε κτλ. The third ἐπιχείρημα (a 6 π.). The soul rules over the body. This is the argument which comes nearest to Plato's own proof of immortality.
- 180 a 4 οἰον ἄρχειν... πεφυκέναι, 'to be by nature such as to rule and lead', 'to be naturally adapted for rule and leadership'. For this use of οἶος cp. 83 d 9; 94 e 4; 98 c 8. We must 'understand' οἶον again with ἄρχεσθαι.
 - a 10 εἰ... τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, 'whether this is our conclusion.' The results of a dialectical discussion are technically called τὰ συμβαίνουντα, and it is in the light of these that the ὑπόθεσις with which it starts must be examined. If an impossibility συμβαίνει, the ὑπόθεσις must be given up.
 - b 3 ὁμοιότατον είναι ψυχή, sc. συμβαίνει. The verb συμβαίνει in this sense is generally used personally; cp. 67 c 5 κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει...;, so there is no need to read ψυχήν. The impersonal construction also occurs; cp. 74 a 2 ἄρ' οὖν οὖ ... συμβαίνει

τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι κτλ. There is no anacoluthon; for the prospective τάδε above is merely shorthand for τῷ θείῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι Ψυχή, τῷ ἀθανάτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι Ψυχή, &c.

- b 4 ἀνοήτφ: a play on words is involved in making this the opposite of νοητφ, for ἀνόητος properly means 'senseless', 'foolish'. The true opposite of νοητός, 'intelligible', 'object of thought', is αἰσθητός, 'sensible', 'object of sense'.
- b 6 ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, 'to show that it is not so.' This meaning would be equally well expressed by ὡς which is an ancient variant and well attested. Schanz's ἢ, however, has the advantage of explaining the readings of B (ἢ) and W (ἥ). Cp. Theaet. 184 c 4 ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως . . ἦ οὐκ ὀρθή.
- b 10 ἐγγύς τι τούτου: a hint that this argument is not quite conclusive.

 The soul has only been shown to resemble the indissoluble.
 - (2) Practical Application.—We must purify our souls and purge it of the corporeal (80 c 2-84 b 8).
 - C 3 ἐν δρατῷ κείμενον, 'situated in the visible region.' Ast quaintly interprets: 'lying in a visible thing,' i.e. a coffin or tomb.
 - C 4 καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι is so well attested that its omission in B must be a slip.
 I cannot see that it is an inappropriate word to use of a dead body.
 - C 5 ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν . . . χρόνον, 'a fairly long time.' Cp. Crito 43 a 10 ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.
 - c 6 ἐπιμένει, 'remains as it is ' (dist. περιμένει, 'waits'). Cp. 59 e 4 n. ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ . . ., 'indeed, even if a man . . .' For the hyperbaton of καί Schmidt compares Prot. 323 b 3 ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν. The μέν ('indeed') is solitarium as in Prot. 361 e 3 τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνν (however it may be with others). The meaning, then, is that even if a man dies with his body in good condition, it lasts quite a long time. Of course a healthy body decomposes more rapidly than an old and withered one.

χαριέντως ἔχων, equivalent to καλῶς or εὖ ἔχων. We find μετρίως and ἐπιεικῶς used in the same sense. Cp. 68 e 2 n. There is no suggestion of 'gracefulness', but only of εὖεξία or 'good condition'.

c 7 ἐν τοιαύτη ὅρα, 'at a fine season of the year' (τοιαύτη standing for καλή implied in χαριέντως, Riddell, Dig. § 54). Decomposition is more rapid in summer than in winter. Most recent editors understand the phrase to mean 'in the bloom of youth'; but (1) ἐν

ἄρα without τοιαύτη would be sufficient for this. Cp. Meno 76 b 8; Phaedr. 240 d 7; Rep. 474 d 4; and (2) when ἄρα is mentioned in connexion with death, it means not 'youthful bloom', but 'a ripe old age'. Cp. e.g. Eur. Phoen. 968 αὐτὸς δ', ἐν ὡραίω γὰρ ἴσταμαι βίου, | θνήσκειν ἔτοιμος. On the other hand, one who dies in early youth (and in that sense ἐν ὥρφ) is said to die πρὸ ὥρας or ἄωρος. The latter word is common in sepulchral inscriptions.

- C 7 καὶ πάνυ μάλα, sc. συχνὸν χρόνον, 'for quite a long time.' συμπεσόν, 'reduced to bones and muscle', 'emaciated'. This clause justifies the preceding ἐὰν μέν τις κτλ. An emaciated body remains almost entire for an inconceivable time, and even a body in good condition lasts quite a long time. For συμπίπτειν cp. Hdt. iii. 52 ἀσιτίησι συμπεπτωκότα. In the medical writers σύμπτωσις is technical for emaciation.
- c 8 και ταριχευθέν: there is nothing unnatural in Socrates' frequent references to Egypt, which was always an object of interest to the Greeks. Socrates must have known many men who had fought there in 460 B.C. This passage has strangely been supposed to prove Plato's Egyptian journey.
- c 9 ολίγου ελον μένει, sc. τὸ σῶμα, 'remains all but entire.'
- d I καὶ ἀν σαπῆ, sc. τὸ (ἄλλο) σῶμα. νεῦρα, 'sinews.' Cp. below 98 c 7 n.

τοιοῦτον... ἔτερον, 'just like itself' (cp. 58 d 8 n.), not equivalent to $\partial u \partial \hat{\eta}$, for that is expressly mentioned besides. The meaning is that expressed throughout the preceding argument by $\delta \mu o \iota o \nu$.

- d 6 εἰς "Αιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, 'to the House of Hades in the true sense of the word.' This refers to the commonly accepted etymology of the word, for which cp. Crat. 404 b I καὶ τό γε ὅνομα ὁ ἱ "Αιδης'...πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς (sic BT) ἐπωνομάσθαι. The denial of the etymology here shows that (rightly or wrongly) it was commonly accepted.
- d 7 τον ζγαθον καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν: in the mystic theology Hades or Zeus Chthonios is called Eubouleus, and Eubouleus is also found (e.g. at Eleusis and on the Orphic gold plates of Southern Italy) as an independent god. I suspect that Socrates is here alluding to this sacred name.

- d 8 αΰτη δὲ δή resumes ή δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα after the parenthesis.
- 6 2 ἐἀν μὲν κτλ. The protasis is interrupted at e 5 and resumed by 81 a 4 οὖτω μὲν ἔχουσα. Then ἐἀν μέν is answered by 81 b 1 ἐὰν δέ γε.
- е 3 колушую воа: imperfect participle.
- e 4 ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, 'so far as it could help it' (61 c 4 n.). The reservation is the same as that implied in ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη 67 a 4.
- e 6 τὸ δέ: this is the reading of the Petrie papyrus, and is more likely to have been altered than the τοῦτο δέ of the MSS.
- 1 τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδίως, 'practising death without complaining.'

 Most editors emend or delete ῥαδίως, which is found not only in all MSS. and citations, but also in the Petrie papyrus. The use of the perfect infinitive need cause no difficulty; for it is often used of the moment of death which completes the process of τὸ ἀποθυήσκειν (62 a 5 n.). Vahlen (Opusc. ii. 213) proposes to construe ῥαδίως with μελετῶσα, but there has been no question of complaining about the practice of death, while we have had ῥαδίως ἀν ἐθέλειν ἀποθυήσκειν (62 c 10) and ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν (63 a 7) explained just below by οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις. The opposite is ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυήσκοντας (62 e 6). All these passages are quoted by Vahlen himself.
 - a 8 κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, 'of the initiated.' Cp. 70 d 7 n. This resembles the fairly common use of κατά c. gen. with ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and the like.
 - a 9 διάγουσα: after ἀπηλλαγμένη we expect διαγούση, which Heindorf proposed to read. It would be easier to write ἀπηλλαγμένη, for there is no reason why the grammatical construction of ὑπάρχει should be kept up. The general sense of the sentence suggests the nominative.
 - b 3 έρωσα, sc. αὐτοῦ.

γοητευομένη is read by T as well as by the papyrus. It is not easy to decide between it and the equally well attested γεγοητευμένη.

τε is connective here. This is a poetical usage, and becomes increasingly frequent in Plato's later style. For a striking instance from his middle period cp. Phaedr. 267 a 6 Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε.

- b 4 δοκείν, 'to think': cp. 64 b 2.
- b 5 άλλ' ή ...: cp. 68 b 4 n.; 76 a 6 n.

81

- b 5 ov: the relative cannot be repeated in a different case (cp. 65a5n.), so the ő and တို which are logically required as the sentence proceeds, are simply omitted.
- b 7 φιλοσοφία αιρετόν: Stallbaum compares Tim. 29 a 6 λόγφ και φρονήσει περιληπτόν.
- b 8 тойто бè...: ср. 78 с 8 n.
- C 4 διειλημμένην, 'broken up by', 'patched with the corporeal'.

 The meaning of διαλαμβάνειν is best seen from 110 b 7. As applied to colours, it means 'to pick out', distinguere, as in a quilt or tartan. Cp. Milton, Comus 453-75.
- C 6 σύμφυτον: though σύμφυτος and συμφυής usually mean 'congenital', that sense is excluded by ἐνεποίησε. We also find both words in the sense of 'grown together' (from συμφῦναι, 'to coalesce'), and this must be the meaning here. We also find σύμφυσις as a medical term, especially of bones.
- d τ κυλινδουμένη, 'haunting.' I have not ventured to write καλινδουμένη, though Cobet says (N. L. p. 637) 'Platonica sunt καλινδείσθαι έν αμαθία, έν πάση ἀμαθία, et odiose έν δικαστηρίοις καλινδείται, quemadmodum quis proprie έν πηλῷ aut ἐν βορβόρω dicitur καλινδείσθαι'. Very like the present use of the word is Rep. 479 d 4 μεταξύ που κυλινδείται τοῦ τε μὴ ὅντος καὶ τοῦ ὅντος εἰλικρινῶς. The suggestion is that of a restless spirit which cannot tear itself away from the body. Cicero, Somn. Scip. 9 says circum terram ipsam volutantur of such souls.
- d 4 διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται, 'which is just why they are visible.' There is a touch of Socratic playfulness in this theory. If the soul is invisible, we must give some such account of ghosts as this.
- d 6 Εἰκὸς μέντοι: cp. 65 d 6 π.
 οῦ τι ... ἀλλὰ ..., a common formula in Plato. The γε belongs to καί.
- d 8 τροφης, practically equivalent here to διαίτης, 'way of life.' Cp. 84 b 4; 107 d 4.
- e 2 ἐνδοῦνται: cp. 82 e 2 n. For similar doctrine see Phaedr. 249, Rep. 618 a, 620 sq., Tim. 42 b, 91 sq.
- e 3 ήθη: we can say 'bad characters' for people who have bad characters, though we should hardly use the word of the lower animals. Very similar to the English use are Rep. 496 b 2 γενναΐον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος, 503 c 9 τὰ βέβαια ταῦτα ἤθη quoted by Bywater on Ar. Poet. 1454 a 23.

- e 6 καὶ μἡ διηυλαβημένους: an instance of 'polar expression'; for διευλαβείσθαι means 'to avoid carefully' or 'scrupulously' (εὐλαβῶς).
- 82 a 7 ἡ αν... τοι, 'the way they would take,' a variation for ot, which some late MSS. unnecessarily read.

ἕκαστα, 'each class' Note how the gender is varied (1) τοὺς ... προτετιμηκότας, (2) τὰς τοιαύτας (sc. ψυχάς), (3) ἕκαστα.

- a 10 καὶ τούτων: i.e. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. There are degrees of happiness even among souls which are not wholly purified.
- a 11 τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν, 'popular goodness, the goodness of the good citizen.' This is related to philosophical goodness just as true belief is related to science. Socrates admits the relative value of both. For the phraseology cp. Rep. 619 c 7 ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. Here πολιτική means 'belonging to citizens' (cp. Gorg. 452 e 4), not 'political'.
- b 5 τοιοῦτον κτλ., 'a race civilized and tame like themselves.' The regular opposite of ημερος is ἄγριος, and both words are used of men, animals, and plants. They mean 'civilized', 'tame', 'cuitivated', as opposed to 'savage', 'wild'.
- b 8 ἄνδρας μετρίους, 'good men,' though of course only in the popular sense. We might have had ἐπιεικεῖς or σπουδαίους with the same meaning. Cp. 68 e 2 n.
- b 10 μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ: the tendency to 'polar expression' here asserts itself at the expense of logic. The sentence ends as if οὐδενί had preceded. We must remember that φιλόσοφος and φιλομαθής are synonyms (Rep. 376 b 8 'Αλλὰ μέντοι . . . τό γε φιλομαθές καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν;). For ἀλλ' ή cp. 68 b 4 n.
 - c 3 οι όρθως φιλόσοφοι: cp. 67 b 4 n.
 - c 5 οἰκοφθορίαν, 'waste of substance.'
 - οί... φιλοχρήματοι are contrasted with οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι just below. Here once more we have the Pythagorean doctrine of the tripartite soul and the 'Three Lives'. Cp. 68 c 1 n.
 - c 8 επειτα emphasizes the preceding participles.
 - d ι μέντοι μά Δία: cp. 65 d 6 n.
- d 3 σώματι πλάττοντες ζώσι: most editors suspect πλάττοντες, and it has been emended in various ways. The true interpretation, however, was given by Vahlen long ago (cp. Opusc. i. 83). He pointed out that πλάττειν is used much in the same sense as θεραπεύειν in

64 d 8 and 81 b 2, and compared Rep. 377 c 3 καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τὰ σώματα ταῖς λερσίν, to which passage may be added Tim. 88 c 3 τόν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα. Cp. also Plut. Εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή 439 f ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι ταῖς χερσίν τὸ σῶμα πλάττουσιν and Coriolanus 32. Vahlen holds further that σώματι is governed by ζῶσι, and that the meaning is 'live for the body, moulding it into shape', though the only example of ζῆν c. dat. in this sense which he quotes is in [Dem.] 7. 17 Φιλίππφ ζῶντες καὶ οὐ τῆ ἐαυτῶν πατρίδι. Perhaps Eur. Ion 646 ἔα δ' ἐμαντῶ ζῆν με may be added. If this is not accepted, I would rather read σώματα with TW than have recourse to conjecture. The σώματι of B is, however, the difficilior lectio, and I believe Vahlen's interpretation to be right. His discussion (loc. cit.) of the use of participles with an object to be understood from the context should be read.

- d 3 χαίρειν εἰπόντες, 'dismissing from their thoughts.' Cp. 63 e 3 n.
- d 6 τῆ ἐκείνης λύσει: this, as well as καθαρμός, is Orphic. Olympiodorus quotes some Orphic verses, which at least contain some old ideas: "Οργια ἐκτελέσουσι, λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων | μαιόμενοι σὺ δὲ τοῖσιν ἔχων κράτος οὖς κ' ἐθέλησθα | λύσεις ἔκ τε πόνων χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀπείρονος οἴστρου.
- e ι παραλαβοῦσα, 'taking in hand,' as a doctor takes his patient in hand for treatment. The vb. παραλαμβάνειν is technical in this sense, especially of teachers taking pupils. Cp. Rep. 541 a 1 τοὺς δὲ παίδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες.
- e 2 διαδεδεμένην: cp. 62 b 3 n. It is noteworthy that Socrates now adopts and expounds the very doctrine which he had put aside as 'too high'; for the είργμός is clearly the φρουρά. The reason is that he is now able to give a more scientific account of it.
- e 4 κυλινδουμένην: cp. 81 d 1 n. Here the word means simply 'wallowing'. Cp. Polit. 309 a 5 τοὺς . . . ἐν ἀμαθία . . . καὶ ταπεινίτητι πολλῆ κυλινδουμένους, Theaet. 172 c 8 οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις . . . κυλινδούμενοι.
- e 5 την δωνότητα, 'the cleverness', 'the ingenuity'. So far as I can see, none of the editors take the word in this sense; but surely the point is just that the prison-house is ingeniously contrived so as to make the prisoner co-operate in his own imprisonment.
 - ότι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, sc. ὁ είργμός, 'that it is effected by means

- of desire,' i.e. 'that it has desire as its instrument'. As we shall see, pleasures and pains, with which ἐπιθυμία is concerned, are the agents by which the soul is imprisoned (83 d 4; 84 a 4).
- ώς αν...είη. This is an extremely rare construction in Attic prose, the nearest parallel being Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 8 καὶ διδόασι τοῖς τρισὶ δακτύλοις όχοῦντες τὴν φιάλην καὶ προσφέρουσιν, ως αν ἐνδοῖεν τὸ εκπωμα εὐληπτότατα τῷ μέλλοντι πίνειν. It is equivalent in sense to οπωs c. fut. ind. after verbs of 'ways and means' (the idea of contrivance being implied in δεινότητα). In other words, ώς is a relative adverb of manner, and $\tilde{a}\nu$ is to be taken closely with the optative. Tr. 'so as best to secure the prisoner's co-operation in his own imprisonment '.
- τοῦ δεδέσθαι: the MSS. have $\tau \hat{\varphi}$, but Heindorf's τοῦ restores the normal construction of συλλαμβάνειν, 'to co-operate' (dat. of the person with whom, gen. of the thing in which). Cp. Eur. Med. 946 συλλήψομαι δε τοῦδε σοι κάγω πόνου, Xen. Mem. ii. 2.12 ίνα . . . άγαθοῦ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ, ib. 7. 32 άγαθή συλλήπτρια των έν εἰρήνη πόνων.
 - ούτω . . . εχουσαν go together, 'in this state.'
 - παραμυθείται: cp. 70 b 2 n.
 - ότι âν . . . των όντων: here it is once more implied that both the objects of sense and the objects of thought are οντα. Cp. 79 a 6.
 - δι' άλλων, opp. αὐτή καθ' αὐτήν, and virtually equivalent to διὰ τών b 2 αἰσθήσεων.
 - έν άλλοις ον άλλο, opp. αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, 'that which varies in varying conditions,' as opposed to το αεὶ ώσαύτως έχου.
 - ουτως emphasizes the preceding participles. Tr. 'It is just because she does not think it right to . . . that she . . . '
 - καὶ φόβων is omitted by T, the Petrie papyrus, and Iamblichus. It looks as if it had been inserted to make this clause symmetrical with the next, in which ή λυπηθη appears to have been inserted for a similar reason. Plato avoids exact symmetry of this sort, though his editors, ancient and modern, often foist it on him.
 - τοσοῦτον, here practically 'so small'.
 - c 1 &v: Iamblichus has ws, which would be more regular, but is to be rejected for that very reason. The partitive genitive is used as if only οὐδέν, not οὐδέν τοσοῦτον, preceded.
 - καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό, 'and does not take it into account.' C 3
 - ἀναγκάζεται ἄμα τε ... καὶ ...: the emphasis falls on ἄμα. Α C 5

belief in the reality of its object must arise simultaneously with any strong feeling of pleasure or pain. We have really to deal, therefore, with a wrong view as to what is real, which is another way of saying that goodness is knowledge.

c 8 (τά) seems necessary and could easily have been dropped by

haplography after μάλιστα.

ώσπερ ήλον έχουσα, 'with a rivet,' like Κράτος and Βία in the d 4 Prometheus, as Geddes suggests. It is pleasure and pain that rivet the fetters of the bodily prison-house.

d o oia: cp. 80 a 4 n. καθαρώς: Heindorf conjectured καθαρός, comparing 67a7; 80 e2;

82 c I; but the Petrie papyrus confirms the adverb.

d 10 ἀναπλέα, 'contaminated', 'tainted'. Cf. 67 a 5 n., and Symp. 211 e Ι είλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, άλλα μή ανάπλεων σαρκών τε ανθρωπίνων και χρωμάτων. The feminine form is Ionic.

έμφύεσθαι: cp. Tim. 42 a 3 όπότε δη σώμασιν έμφυτευθείεν έξ ανάγκης

(wuxai).

οί δικαίως φιλομαθείς, synonymous with οί ορθώς φιλόσοφοι, 'those who deserve the name of philosophers.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

κόσμιοι, equivalent to σώφρονες. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

ούχ ὧν . . . ἔνεκά φασιν, 'not for the reason given by the mass of men' (cp. 82 c 5 sqq.). It is not necessary to discuss the precise nature of the ellipse here; for the meaning is plain. The Petrie papyrus omits φασιν, as Hermann originally proposed to do. This is the only case where it confirms a modern conjecture.

84 a 2 οὐ γάρ, 'No, indeed.' It is better to punctuate after γάρ than to take οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά together with the older editors and Riddell (Dig.

\$ 156).

την μέν φιλοσοφίαν κτλ. We must subordinate and say 'that, while it is philosophy's business to release the soul, the soul should hand itself over to pleasures and pains to fasten its chains once more'.

a 4 αὐτήν, 'of itself', 'of its own accord'. Cp. 64 a 5. παραδιδόναι (cp. 82 c 4) is the correlative of παραλαμβάνειν (82 e 1 n.). Once more pleasures and pains are represented as the agents of the soul's imprisonment. The είργμός is δι' ἐπιθυμίας (82 e 5).

έγκαταδείν, sc. τώ σώματι. Cp. 62 b 3 n. ανήνυτον έργον . . . μεταχειριζομένης, ' to engage in the endless task of a Penelope handling her web in the opposite way.' The vulgate μεταχειριζομένην is a late conjecture and has nothing to commend it. I formerly read μεταχειριζομένη with Peipers, which is certainly better (cp. R. G. Bury in Class. Rev. xx, p. 13). But μεταχειριζομένηs is the reading of BTW, attested by the Petrie papyrus and Iamblichus, and would not be a natural mistake. It would be safer to write τινόs for τινά if any change were required; but the web is the real point of the metaphor, and the indefinite pronoun may attach itself to ἱστόν for that reason.

- a 7 τούτων, SC. τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.
- a 8 ἐν τούτω οὖσα: cp. 59 a 3 n.

το ἀδόξαστον, 'what is not the object of beiief (δόξα),' but of knowledge. The word is found only here in this sense. Cp. the similar use of ἀνόητον above 80 b 4.

- b 3 ἀπηλλάχθαι, sc. οἴεται, not οἵεται δεῖν, as is shown by the nominative ἀφικομένη. The soul believes that after death she is done with all human ills.
- b 4 οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ, 'there is no danger of her fearing.' Cp. Apol. 28 b I οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ, 'there is no fear of my being the last', Gorg. 520 d 5 οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῆ, Rep. 465 b 8 οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή ποτε ... διχοστατήση.
- b 5 [ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα]: I take this to be an explanation of, or more probably an ancient variant for, ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς. Το change δ' into γ' with Stephanus and most editors is to hide the wound, not to heal it.

όπως μή . . .: cp. 77 b 4 n.

b 6 ἐν τῆ ἀπαλλαγη τοῦ σώματος: i.e. ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγη τοῦ σώματος (70 a 2). The whole clause refers back to what Cebes said at 70 a.

Narrative interlude. Socrates is as ready as ever to hear objections to what he says (84 c 1-85 b 9).

This long interlude marks off the first part of the dialogue from the second, in which more serious objections have to be faced than those of $vi \pi o \lambda \lambda o i$. There are scientific objections too.

C 2 πρὸς τῷ...λόγῳ ἡν, 'was absorbed in the foregoing argument.' Cp. Phaedr. 249 C 5 πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστιν, d I πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνό μενος, Rep. 567 a I ἵνα ... πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται εἶναι, Dem. 19. 127 ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήμματι.

- 6 3 & s ίδειν έφαίνετο, lit. 'as he appeared to look at', 'to judge from his appearance'. In this usage the epexegetic ἰδειν means much the same as τὴν ὄψιν. Cp. Tim. 52 e I παντοδαπὴν ἰδειν φαίνε τθαι, Eur. Her. 1002 εἰκών, ὡς ὁρῶν ἐφαίνετο, Παλλάς.
- C 4 σμικρὸν... διελεγέσθην, 'went on talking in a low voice' (not 'for a little'). The opposite of (σ)μικρὸν λέγειν, &c., is μέγα λέγειν, &c. 'to speak loud.'
- C 6 ξχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς: 'it admits of, suggests, gives room for many misgivings and is open to many forms of attack' (ἀντιλαβή, like ἀντίληψις, 87a 6, is a metaphor from wrestling, 'the opponent's grip').
- d 3 εὐπορήσειν, 'that you will find a way out of your difficulty,' εὐπορία being the opposite of ἀπορία.
- d 5 πάλαι, 'for some time.' Cp. 63 d 5 n.
- e 2 μη ... διάκειμαι of fear for something in the present, whereas d 7 $\mu \dot{\eta}$... $\dot{\eta}$ refers to the future, 'lest it should prove to be'. It is incorrect to say that the present indicative implies certainty.
- 6 4 τῶν κύκνων: for the 'swan-song' cp. Aesch. Ag. 1444 ἡ δέ τοι (Cassandra) κύκνου δίκην | τὸν ὕστατον μέλψασα θανάσιμον γόον | κεῖται. Aristotle, Hist. An. 615 b 2 ῷδικοὶ δὲ (οἱ κύκνοι) καὶ περὶ τὰς τελευτὰς μάλιστα ἄδουσιν' ἀναπέτονται γὰρ καὶ εἰς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ τινες ἥδη πλέοντες παρὰ τὴν Λιβύην περιέτυχον ἐν τῷ θαλάττη πολλοῖς ἄδουσι φωνῷ γοώδει, καὶ τούτων έώρων ἀποθνήσκοντας ἐνίους. Cp. D'Arcy Thompson, Glossary of Greek Birds, p. 106 sq.
- 5 a 1 κάλλιστα: this is Blomfield's correction of the MS. μάλιστα, and is now known to be the reading of W, though the first hand has written καὶ μάλιστα above the line. We cannot defend μάλιστα by interpreting it as 'loudest'. That would be μέγιστον, which I had conjectured before the reading of W was known.
 - a 2 τὸν θεόν: Apollo, as we presently learn, and, in particular, Apollo Hyperboreus who, as I have shown in E. Gr. Ph.² p. 97, n. 3, was the chief god of the Pythagoreans (cp. 60 d 2 n.). Aristophanes too was aware that the swans sang to Apollo. Cp. Birds 769 τοιάδε κύκνοι ... συμμιγῆ βοήν, όμοῦ πτεροῖς κρέκοντες, ἴακχον ᾿Απόλλω ... ὅχθω ἐφεζόμενοι παρ' Ἔβρον ποταμόν.
 - a 3 το αὐτῶν δίος τοῦ θανάτου, 'their own fear of death.' (Some editors wrongly take τοῦ θανάτου with καταψεύδονται.)
 - a 5 εξάδειν, 'to sing a song of departure.' There is some reason to

believe that the last song of the chorus was spoken of as τὰ ἐξωδικά as well as τὸ ἐξώδιον. The scholiast on Ar. Wasps 270 says so, though the text is generally emended to τὰ ἐξοδικά, and Plotinus, Enn. 6. 9. 8 (p. 1404. 10) says οἶον χορὸς ἐξάδων. Cp. Polyb. xxxi. 20. 1 μάτην ἐξάσας τὸ κύκνειον, Plut. Symp. 161c (of Arion) ἐξᾶσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν βίον τελευτῶν, καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι κατὰ τοῦτο τῶν κύκνων ἀγεννέστερος.

- a 7 ἥ τε ἀηδών καὶ χελιδών καὶ ὁ ἔποψ (note how Plato avoids the formalism of the article, Riddell, Dig. § 237). These are the three birds of Attic legend, Procne, Philomela, and Tereus. Procne, not 'Philomel', is the nightingale in Athenian legend.
- b 3 διαφερόντως ή, 'in a higher degree than,' cp. below 95 c 3. The construction διαφέρειν ή is as regular as διαφέρειν c. gen.
- b 5 ໂερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ: we know from the Apology that Socrates regarded himself as consecrated to Apollo by the answer given to Chaerephon at Delphi. The view that Plato invented this does not merit discussion. With the expression ὁμόδουλος cp. Apol. 23 c I διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.
- b 6 οὐ χεῖρον . . . ἔχειν, 'that I possess the art in no inferior degree', 'that I am not worse provided than they are with the gift of prophecy at my Master's hands'. Cp. Hdt. iii. 130 φλαύρως ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην.
- b 8 τούτου γ' ενεκα, 'so far as that is concerned.' Cp. 106 d 2.
- b 9 'Aθηναίων: the absence of the article is normal, and the position of the word suggests the official style.

The Objections of Simmias and Cebes (85 b 10-95 e 6).

- (1) The Objection of Simmias (85 b 10-86 d 4).
- C 3 τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι, 'sure knowledge.' As we have seen (62 b 5), Plato represents Socrates as speaking with a certain reserve as to the details of the doctrine.
- C 4 μὴ οὐχὶ ... καὶ μὴ ...: the negatives are not co-ordinate. The first is dependent on μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός (which implies a negative and therefore takes μὴ οὐ). The second merely introduces a negative statement of παντὶ τρόπφ ἐλέγχειν. Tr. 'To fail to test them in every way without desisting till one is utterly exhausted by examining them on every side, shows a very poor spirit'.

- C 7 ἡ μαθεῖν . . . ἡ εὐρεῖν, 'either to learn (from another) or find out (for oneself).' This contrast had an almost proverbial currency. Cp. Soph. fr. 731 τὰ μέν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εύρετὰ | ζητῶ΄ τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἢτησάμην. So below 99 c 8.
- C 8 εί ταῦτα ἀδύνατον: cp. Parm. 160 a 2 ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.
- d I ὀχούμενον: cp. Ar. Knights 1244 λεπτή τις ἐλπίς ἐστ' ἐφ' ἡς ὀχούμεθα. ώσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας: cp. Cic. Tusc. i. 30 tamquam in rate in mari immenso nostra vehitur oratio. Simmias is thinking of the raft of Odysseus.
- d 3 λόγου θείου τινός: this must refer to the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine of the soul. It is quite in keeping with all we can make out as to the history of Pythagoreanism that Simmias and Cebes should feel regretfully that they can no longer accept the λόγος of their society. We are just about to learn that they had adopted a view of the soul which was wholly inconsistent with it. I assume that Heindorf is right in deleting η; for otherwise the whole phrase must go. The conjunction η is never used to introduce an explanation. Even, however, if η λόγου θείου τινός is an adscript, or a question asked by some reader, it gives a perfectly correct explanation of the meaning, as is shown by c 9 των ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων.
- d 7 προς έμαυτόν: cp. 95 e 7 προς έαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος.
- e 3 τμοιγε, sc. οὐ φαίνεται ἰκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.

περὶ ἀρμονίαs, 'with regard to the tuning of a lyre and its strings.' It is important to remember here that ἀρμονία does not mean what we call 'harmony'. It has its literal sense of 'tuning' in a certain key or mode, from which its other senses, 'scale' and 'octave', are easily derived. What we call 'harmony' is in Greek συμφωνία. Cp. 86 a I ἐν τῆ ἡρμοσμένη λύρα, 'in the tuned lyre.'

- *6 a 3 κατάξη refers to the framework of the lyre, διατίμη and διαρρήξη ('cut and break') to the strings. Schanz (Stud. p. 36) regards διατέμη as an adscript to διαρρήξη. It is true that in a 7 we have only διερρωγυιών and not διατετμημένων, but that is just Plato's way of avoiding formal symmetry.
 - a 6 οὐδεμία... ἀν εἴη: Bekker brackets ἄν, which restores the normal construction on the assumption that εἴη is indirect speech for ἐστί. But the direct speech might very well be ἀν εἵη, which would remain unchanged in oratio obliqua.
 - b 2 άλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη...εἶναι: the original protasis εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο.
 1251 81 G

86 NOTES

- ... ὡς κτλ. is resumed, but in oratio recta, as is natural after the parenthesis. Of course, φaίη still depends upon εἰ in a 4, but has no effect upon the construction. It is the parenthetical φησἱ, inquit, adapted to the construction of the long protasis. We might write ἀλλὰ (φαίη) ἀνάγκη κτέ.
- b 5 καὶ γὰρ οὖν κτλ.: Simmias here interrupts himself. He thinks he may as well drop the imaginary τις and state plainly that the comparison of the soul to a ἀρμονία is their own doctrine. The hesitation with which he does so is responsible for the cumbrousness of the sentence, and is the natural consequence of the feelings which he expressed in the interlude.

καὶ αὐτόν σε κτλ.: it is assumed that Socrates is familiar with the recent developments of Pythagoreanism, though he may not accept them.

- b 6 ὑπολαμβάνομεν: who are 'we' this time? Most editors suppose that no particular school is meant, and that the theory under discussion was simply a popular belief. This is most improbable. It has all the marks of being a medical theory, and we now know that Philolaus was a medical writer (E. Gr. Ph. 2p. 322). Further, the doctrine was held at a later date by Aristoxenus, who was acquainted with the last of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph. p. 320), who were disciples of Philolaus like Simmias. We shall see below (88 d 3) that Echecrates, another disciple of Philolaus, had accepted it too. I have pointed out elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.2 pp. 339 sqq.) how such a doctrine would naturally arise from the attempt to adapt Pythagoreanism to the views of the Sicilian school of medicine, which were based on the Empedoclean doctrine of the four 'elements' identified with the 'opposites' hot and cold, wet and dry (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 235). Further confirmation of this view will be found in the following notes. Aristotle says (De An. A. 4, 407 b 27 καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχης, πιθανή μεν πολλοις οὐδεμιας ήττον των λεγομένων, λόγους δ' ώσπερ εὐθύνας δεδωκυία καὶ τοίς έν κοινώ γινομένοις λόγοις (i. e. dialectical discussions) άρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτήν λέγουσιν καὶ γὰρ τὴν άρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν έναντίων είναι, καὶ τὸ σωμα συγκείσθαι έξ έναντίων.
- **b** 7 ωσπερ έντεταμένου κτλ. The body is thought of as an instrument tuned to a certain pitch, the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry taking the place of high and low (ὀξὺ καὶ βαρύ) in music.

NOTES 86

b 8 καὶ συνεχομένου, 'and held together.' It is the presence of the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry which keeps the body together, so long as neither opposite prevails unduly over the other (cp. Zeno, ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 29 καὶ ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάργειν έκ τῶν προειρημένων (the four opposites) κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν).

ύπὸ θερμοῦ κτλ. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian school. Cp. Anon. Lond. xx. 25 (from Meno's 'Iarpiká) Φιλιστίων δ' οίεται έκ τεττάρων ίδεων συνεστάναι ήμας, τουτ' έστιν έκ τεττάρων στοιχείων πυρός, άέρος, ύδατος, γης. είναι δε καὶ εκάστου δυνάμεις, τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν, τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος τὸ ψυχρόν, τοῦ δὲ ὕδατος τὸ ύγρου, της δὲ γης τὸ ξηρόν. Cp. the speech of the physician Eryximachus in Symp. 186 d 6 έστι δὲ ἔχθιστα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, ψυχρὸν θερμώ, πικρου γλυκεί, ξηρου ύγρώ . . . τούτοις επιστηθείς ερωτα εμποιησαι καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος 'Ασκληπιος . . . συνέστησεν την ἡμετέραν τέγνην.

κρασιν, temperaturam. The word was properly used of the b 9 mixture of wine and water in the κρατήρ in certain fixed proportions. This seems to have been an earlier way of describing what the later Pythagoreans called a ὁρμονία. Parmenides (fr. 16) already speaks of the κρασις μελέων, and Diogenes Laertius ix. 29 ascribes the theory to Zeno (cp. above b 8 n). The whole doctrine of the 'temperaments' is a development of this. Eryximachus (Symp. 188 a 1) uses both terms in connexion with climate (ή τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις) which is good έπειδαν ... πρὸς ἄλληλα ... τά τε θερμα καὶ τὰ ψυχρά καὶ ξηρά καὶ ύγρὰ . . . άρμονίαν καὶ κράσιν λάβη σώφρονα.

C 2 εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει κτλ., 'if then our soul is just a tuning.' After the explanation given in the last parenthesis, the protasis is resumed (hence οὖν) in another form. For the present εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο

κτλ. is dropped.

όταν χαλασθή: χαλάν is a regular synonym of ἀνιέναι, relaxare, to loosen a string. The opposite is ἐπιτείνειν, intendere.

c 6 έν τοις φθόγγοις, 'in musical notes.' In Attic the word φθόγγος is practically confined to the meanings 'note' (whether in music or the notes of birds) and 'accent'.

opa ouv: this introduces the apodosis, which also contains, in the words car the agioi, a reminiscence of the original protasis et tis

διισχυρίζοιτο.

- d 3 τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι, of the elemental opposites (hot-cold, wet-dry) of which the body is composed.
 - (2) The objection of Cebes (86 d 5-88 b 8).
- d 5 Διαβλέψας, 'with a broad stare' (aor. pcp. synchronous to έφη). This verb occurs nowhere else before Aristotle Περὶ ἐνυπνίων 462 a 12 ένίοις γάρ των νεωτέρων και πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν, έαν ή σκότος. φαίνεται είδωλα πολλά κινούμενα, where it plainly means 'having the eyes wide open'. The words $\tilde{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$... $\epsilon l\dot{\omega}\theta\epsilon\iota$ suggest that the reference is to the well-known peculiarity of Socrates' eyes described in Theaet. 143 e 9 as τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὅμματων, a peculiarity also referred to in Xen. Symp. 5. 5, where Socrates says that his eyes are able to see, not only what is in front of him $(\tau \delta \kappa a \tau' \epsilon \vartheta \theta \vartheta)$, but also τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου (obliquely) διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι είναι (because they are d fleur de tête). That this is the meaning of τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὁμμάτων is, I think, proved by the opposition of $\xi \delta \phi \theta a \lambda \mu os$ (so Plato, Theaet. 209 c I) to κοιλόφθαλμος in Xen. Eq. 1.9, though in itself Campbell's suggestion that τὸ ἔξω refers to the position of the eyes and the width between them is perfectly possible. It is the same peculiarity which Aristophanes intends when he makes the Clouds say to Socrates (Clouds 362) τώφθαλμώ παραβάλλεις. If this is so, διαdoes not mean 'through', but 'apart', as in διαβαίνω, so we must not translate 'with a piercing glance'. The phrase ταυρηδών ὑποβλέwas below (117 b 5) means something rather different.
 - 7 τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; the aorist in such questions expresses impatience. Cp. Gorg. 509 e 2 τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω; So already Hdt. ix. 48 τί δὴ οὐ . . . ἐμαχεσάμεθα;
- d 8 ἀπτομένω τοῦ λόγου, 'handling the argument.' Cp. Euthyd. 283 a 2 ἐπεσκόπουν τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἄψοιντο τοῦ λόγου. Heindorf's view that ἄπτεσθα is here used reprehendendi et impugnandi potestate seems improbable, though adopted in L. and S.
- e Ι χρόνου ἐγγενομένου, 'when we have had time.' Cp. Symp. 184 a 6 του χρόνος ἐγγένηται. The phrase is common in Thucydides.
- ε 2 ἔπειτα [δέ]: the balance of evidence is in favour of omitting δέ.
 Cp. 73 a 7 n.

συγχωρείν, SC. δοκεί χρηναι.

e 3 αὐτοῖς, sc. Σιμμία καὶ Κέβητι.

έάν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, 'if it appears that they are at all in tune.'

The voice and the accompanying instrument are said $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\dot{q}\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$ or $\dot{a}\pi\dot{q}\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$. Socrates gently rallies the musical terminology of the Thebans. Cp. 92 c 5.

- e 3 οὕτως ἥδη, tum demum, 'then and not till then.' There is a slight anacoluthon, as ἥ has preceded.
- e 4 ὑπερδικεῖν is a poetical word found only in late prose.
- e 5 τὸ...θρᾶττον, 'what is troubling you.' Here we have an old word (Pind., Aesch.), though with Att. -ττ- for -σσ-. Cp. the Homeric τέτρηχα. The reading τό is well attested, so ἀπιστίαν παρέχει is probably due to the same hand as the interpolation at 6g e 3. The change of τό to δ in later MSS. is clearly a 'conjecture'.
- e 6 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ . . . εἶναι, 'to have got no further.'
- e 7 ὅπερ...ταὐτὸν... ἔχειν, 'to be open to the same criticism as we made in our former argument' (77 b I sqq.).
- 87 a 2 τόδε τὸ είδος, 'this (human) body.' Cp. 76 c 12.

οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι, ' I do not retract,' a metaphor ἀπὸ τῶν πεττευόντων καὶ τὰς κεκινημένας ἥδη ψήφους (' pieces ') διορθούντων (Harpocration). Cp. Hipparch. 229 e 3 ὥσπερ πεττείων ἐθέλω...ἀναθέσθαι. It takes the construction of verbs of denying.

- a 3 χαριέντως, syn. εὐ, καλῶς. Cp. 80 c 6 n.
 - έπαχθές, 'exaggerated.' The word is applied not only to arrogant self-praise (Dem. Cor. 10 ἵνα μηδὲν ἐπαχθες λέγω) but also to 'overdone' or 'fulsome' praise of others. Cp. Lacus 688 d 6 λόγω...σε, & ξένε, ἐπαινεῖν ἐπαχθέστερον. It is just this sensitiveness to τὸ ἐπαχθές which accounts for the way of speaking described in 68 e 2 n.
- a 5 οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε, sc. ἰκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, 'I think the demonstration is deficient in this respect.'
- a 6 ἀντιλήψει, 'objection,' a metaphor from wrestling; cp. 84 c 7 ἀιτιλαβάς.
- 8 7 τί οὖν ἀν φαίη ὁ λόγος: the argument is often personified in this way. Cf. Soph. 238 b 4 ὧς φησιν ὁ λόγος. For the position of ἄν cp. 102 a 1. The parenthesis was so familiar that φαίη ἄν was not consciously to the speaker a separate clause. (Riddell, Dig. § 295.)
- b 4 ὁμοίωs... ἄσπερ ἄν τις... λέγοι, ' with as much right as if.' The whole of this section is thrown into the form of a reported dialogue between ὁ λέγων and ὁ ἀπιστῶν.

- b 5 ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου, simply 'an old weaver'. It is idiomatic to add ἄνθρωπος to the names of trades. In Scots we might say a 'webster body'.
- b 6 ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν κτλ., 'that the man is not dead, but is safe and sound somewhere.' Of course this is not supposed to be an argument for the continued existence of the weaver's soul, but is meant to disprove the fact of his death in the ordinary sense of the word. The weaver corresponds to the soul, and the garment to the body.
- 5 7 σωs: all MSS. have ἴσωs, but it is difficult to reject Forster's correction σωs in view of the next line and c 5 below.

αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος: this touch is not necessary to the argument, nor indeed is it strictly necessary that the old man should be a weaver at all; but Cebes has in view a theory of the soul weaving the body as its garment, which is pretty nearly the opposite of the view that it is the ἀρμονία οτ κρᾶσις of the elementary opposites. The latter makes the soul a resultant of the bodily organization, the former makes it the organizing principle. The view that the body is the garment of the soul is primitive (cp. the Orphic χιτών, and Empedocles, fr. 126 Diels σαρκῶν ἀλλόγνωτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι, E. Gr. Ph.² p. 258, n. 1); but the theory of Simmias is essentially Heraclitean. Such eelecticism was characteristic of the time.

- C r ἀπιστοίη is Heindorf's correction of the MS. ἀπιστών, which seems to involve an incredible anacoluthon; seeing that ἀνερωτώη must have the τις in b 4, not that in b 8, for its subject.
- C 3 τινος strikes me as a not very successful attempt at botching the sentence after ἀπιστοίη had been corrupted into ἀπιστῶν. The argument surely requires that the person asked, not 'some one', should give the answer, and we can easily supply αὐτοῦ from the context.
- c 6 τὸ δ(έ), 'whereas,' cum tamen. This is a fairly common Platonic idiom (cp. 109 d 8), though it can hardly be said that it has been satisfactorily explained.
- C 7 πῶs [γὰρ] ὧν ὑπολάβοι, 'any one would retort,' rather than 'every one would understand'. The γάρ is more likely to have been inserted in B than dropped in TW. The asyndeton is quite correct.

οτι εύηθες λέγει κτλ., 'that this is a silly argument.' The verb is used twice over in order to make the construction personal.

- c 8 outos, iste, 'this weaver of yours.'
- d 4 ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα, 'the relation of soul to body will admit of the same comparison.'
- d 5 μέτρι(a) ... λέγειν: i. q. εὐ λέγειν. Cp. 96 d 6.
- d 7 åv φαίη: cp. 87 a 7 n.
- d 8 εἰ γὰρ ρέοι κτλ., 'for, even if the body is in a state of flux and is perishing while the man is still living, yet the soul always weaves afresh the web that is worn out.' This is a parenthesis intended to justify the statement that each soul wears out many bodies. The optative is regular in the parentheses of indirect speech, and ἀλλά means at. For the theory (which is just that of modern physiology) cp. Tim. 43 a 4 τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον. It is essentially Heraclitean (E. Gr. Ph. pp. 161 sqq.).
 - e 3 τυχείν . . . ἔχουσαν, 'it must have at the time.'
- e 4 την φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας, 'its natural weakness.' Such words as φύσις are often used with the genitive to form a mere periphrasis for the noun which they govern, but their proper meaning may emerge more or less, as here.
- e 5 ἐπιδεικνύοι . . . διοίχοιτο: the construction reverts to d 5 μέτρι' ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς . . . All this is still the speech of ὁ ἀπιστῶν.

 There is a much stronger instance of an oblique optative with nothing to depend on below 95 d 3.
- 88 a I εἰ γάρ τις κτλ. These words are addressed, not (as Heindorf and Stallbaum thought) by Cebes to Simmias, but by the supposed objector to Cebes. 'Even if,' he says, 'we were to make a still greater concession to the man who uses this argument (τῷ λέγοντι: than the concession which you (Cebes) mention' (above 87 a I sqq.).
 - a 6 aὐτ6, 'the thing in question,' i. e. the soul. Cp. below 109 a 9.
 - a 7 ψυχήν (τὴν ψυχήν W) is added for clearness after γιγνομένην. The more regular construction would be to say either αὐτήν οr γιγνόμενον.
 - a 8 μηκέτι συγχωροι: these words continue the protasis and still depend on εί, 88 a 1. 'If, having granted this, he were to stop short of making the further admission that . . .'

πονείν was technical for λυπείσθαι in fifth-century philosophy. Cp. Anaxagoras (quoted in Aristotle's Ethics 1154 b 7) ἀεὶ πονεί τὸ ζώον.

b 3 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει κτλ. The original protasis, εἰ...τις... συγχωρήσειεν, which has just been continued by b 2 φαίη, is dropped, and a new protasis, resuming the argument of τις, is begun.

οίδενὶ προσήκει, 'no one has a right', 'is entitled'. Stephanus reads προσήκειν.

- b 4 θάνατον θαρροῦντι: as θαρρεῖν is equivalent to οὐ (μὴ) φοβεῖσθαι
 (cp. 63 e 10 n.) it naturally takes an object accusative.
- b 6 ἀνάγκην είναι is dependent on b 2 φαίη. The reported speech which is dropped for a moment at b 4 προσήκει reasserts itself here.

Dramatic Interlude. The effect of the objections (88 c 1-89 a 8).

The importance of this break in the argument is marked by the fact that it takes us back to Phlius and Echecrates, and that the dramatic form is resumed. It has to be shown that current Pythagorean views about the soul are inadequate and that we must go deeper.

- C 4 είς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλείν: cp. Phileb. 15 e 4 είς ἀπορίαν αύτὸν . . . καταβάλλων.
 - οὐ μόνον τοῖς . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τά . . . The change of construction is characteristic.
- c 6 μη ... εἶμεν ... η : the change of mood is due to the fact that the first verb refers to the present, the second to the future. The opt. μη εἶμεν is the indirect form of μη ... ἔσμεν, while μη ... η means 'lest they should prove to be'. The subj. here might also have become opt., but this would have obscured the difference of meaning. For other instances cp. Riddell, Dig. § 89.
- d ι ἐπέρχεται, 'it is borne in upon me.'
- d 2 ωs...ων: exclamations, like interrogations, may be conveyed by a participial phrase.
- d 4 ἀντιλαμβάνεται: this is a different application of the metaphor from wrestling, explained 84 c 6 n. Cp. Parm. 130 e 2 οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται.
- d 9 μετήλθε τὸν λόγον: cp. 76 e 9 n. The λόγοs is the game which is hunted. So Meno 74 d 3 εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετήει τὸν λόγον, Soph. 252 b 8 ἔτι τοίνυν ἀν . . . καταγελαστότατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον. That this is the meaning appears from the equivalent phrase διώκειν τὸν λόγον Theaet. 166 d 8.

- e I τι is internal object of αχθόμενος.
- e 2 ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ. Here we have a different, but almost equally common, metaphor.
- 89 a Ι ἀκείνος: cp. Riddell, Dig. § 194.
 - a 2 ως ήδέως κτλ.: cp. 58 e 4 n.
 - 2 3 ἀγαμένως: Plato often uses ἄγαμαι of the effect produced on Socrates by his interlocutors.

Protreptic interlude (89 a 9 — 91 c 5). A Warning against μισολογία.

- b Ι ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός: Χαμαίζηλος διφρίον μικρόν, ἡ ταπεινὸν σκιμπόδιον (Timaeus, s. v.).
- b 2 καταψήσας οὖν κτλ. This is imitated in Xenophon's Apology 28 τὸν δὲ λέγεται καταψήσαντα αὖτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν κτλ. In Xenophon, however, it is the head of Apollodorus that Socrates strokes. This is pointless; for he would hardly wear his hair long like the youthful Phaedo. It appears from the following words that Socrates wishes to see how Phaedo will look with his hair cropped as a sign of mourning.
- b 8 'Aλλà τί; 'What then?' Heindorf shows from Aristophanes that this was a regular colloquial formula.
- b 10 ἀναβιώσασθαι: cp. 71 e 13 n. The metaphor here implied is the same as in βοηθείν τῷ λόγῳ, 88 e 2.
 - C I εί... με διαφεύγοι: here we have the other metaphor, the hunting of the λόγος.
 - C 2 ωσπερ 'Αργείοι: Hdt. i. 82 'Αργείοι μέν νυν ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου κατακειράμενοι τὰς κεφαλάς, πρότερον ἐπάναγκες κομέοντες, ἐποιήσαντο νόμον τε καὶ κατάρην μὴ πρότερον θρέψειν κόμην 'Αργείων μηδένα . . . πρὶν Θυρέας ἀνασώσωνται.
 - C 5 πρὸς δύο . . . οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς: the proverb is more fully explained in Euthyd. 297 C I τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὅς οὐχ οἶός τε ἦν τῆ τε ΰδρα διαμάχεσθαι . . . καὶ καρκίνω τινὶ . . . ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένω . . . ὅς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ . . . δάκνων, τὸν Ἰόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν.
 - C 7 కως έτι φως έστιν: cp. 61 e 4 n.
- C 10 τον Ἡρακλή: the poetical form (cp. Soph. Trach. 476) is purposely

- used to suggest a poetical reminiscence (Vahlen, Opusc. i, p. 485).
- d r μισόλογοι, 'haters of discourses' or 'arguments' (not 'reason'), as appears from d 3 λόγους μισήσας. Minucius Felix, Octav. xiv. 4, quoted by Geddes, translates quite correctly igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus.
- d 2 τούτου cp. Crito 44 c 2 τίς αν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα η δοκείν κτλ. Riddell, Dig. § 163.
- d 5 ανευ τέχνης: the meaning of this is made clear by e 5 ανευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια.
- e 2 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιές : cp. 90 c 3, Ar. Plut. 362 ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ὑγιές ἐστιν οὐδενός. So Crat. 440 c 6 καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός. For the meaning of ὑγιές cp. 69 b 8 n.
- 90 a Ι σφόδρα qualifies χρηστούς καὶ πονηρούς, not όλίγους, as is shown by a 4 τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων.
 - a 8 τὰ . . . ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων: the ἔσχατα are opposed to τὰ μεταξύ, and the ἄκρα are the extremes of these.
 - b 2 φανήναι: cp. 72 c I n.
 - b 4 ταύτη μέν οὐχ . . . ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ή . . ., 'that is not the point of comparison but this . . .'
 - b 7 τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης: the term Logic (λογική, sc. τέχνη) originated from phrases like this, though neither ἡ λογική nor τὰ λογικά are used till a far later date. Logic is thought of here as an art of dealing with arguments, just as the art of life (ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τέχνη 89 e 5) teaches us to deal with men.
 - b 8 ων, 'being so.' We cannot take ων here as equivalent to 'being true' with some editors. If anything, it is ψευδής that must be supplied.
 - b 9 καὶ μάλιστα δη κτλ. The protasis which began at b 6 ἐπειδάν is forgotten and never resumed.
 - οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες: the true originator of ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι was Zeno of Elea, who was some twenty years older than Socrates (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 358). From quite another point of view Protagoras maintained δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἄπαντος πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις, οἶς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας (Diog. Laert. ix. 51). Cp. 101 e 2.
 - C 4 ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπφ: the current in the Euripus was said to change its direction seven times a day (Strabo ix. 403). In reality

the $\pi a \lambda l \rho \rho o i a$ is more irregular, being partly tidal and partly due to seiches. Cp. Pauly-Wissowa, vi, col. 1283. The current is strong enough to stop a steamer. For $d\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \hat{\omega} s$ introducing such expressions cp. 59 a 4 n.

- C 5 ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται κτλ. The language of this sentence is just that which is elsewhere used of the followers of Heraclitus (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 417 n. 3). Cp. Crat. 440 c 6 αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὅντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρω νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὖτως οἶεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. Now, in the Theaetetus Plato makes Socrates say that Protagoras justified his πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος by basing it on the doctrine of Heraclitus. It seems, then, that Protagoras is mainly intended here. It is certain, at any rate, that Plato would not have made Socrates refer in this way either to Antisthenes or Euclides; for both are supposed to be present.
- c 9 δή τινος: the particle δή follows the interrogative τίς but precedes the indefinite τις. Cp. 107 d 7; 108 c 1; 115 d 4.
- d ι ἔπειτα marks inconsistency or inconsequence by emphasizing the preceding participle.
- d ο μη παρίωμεν, 'let us not admit' (from παρίημι).
- e 2 πολύ μαλλον: we must supply ἐννοῶμεν or some such word from the context.
- 31 a 2 οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι: here we have the beginnings of the characteristic Aristotelian use of ἀπαιδευσία for ignorance of Logic. Aristotle applies the word to the followers of Antisthenes (Met. Z. 3. 1045 b 24 οἱ ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι), but no such reference is admissible here. Cp. 90 c 5 n.
 - a 3 φιλονίκως: the MSS., as usual, have -εί- for -ί-, but it is very doubtful whether there ever was such a word as φιλόνεικος, 'strifeloving,' and Plato certainly derives φιλόνικον from νίκη in Rep. 581 b 2 (see Adam, in loc.). In every passage where the word occurs in Plato the meaning 'victory-loving' is appropriate. Here the sense is clearly that Socrates may seem to be arguing for victory rather than truth.
 - a 5 å αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο, 'what they themselves have laid down,' their own

- 2 8 εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, 'except incidentally.' Cp. Polit. 286 d 5 πλὴν εἰ (εἰ μὴ Τ) πάρεργόν τι.
- b I ως πλεονεκτικως: Socrates playfully suggests that he is taking an unfair advantage. It is 'Heads I win; tails you lose'.
- b 3 ἀλλ' οὖν... γε, 'at any rate.' The emphatic word is placed between ἀλλ' οὖν and γε in this combination.
- b 4 ἡτ. ν . . . ἀδυρόμενος, I shall be less likely to distress the company by lamentations.'
- b 5 ἄνοια, 'folly.' Most editors follow Stephanus in reading ἄγνοια, apparently without MS. authority. B has διάνοια, a mistake due to the resemblance of A and Δ. Schanz's ἡ δὲ δὴ ἄγνοια implies a much less likely corruption.
- C 3 εὐλαβούμενοι is omitted in B, but this may be an accident.
- C 5 το κέντρον έγκαταλιπών: cp. the description of the oratory of Pericles by Eupol's (fr. 94 Kock) οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων | τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις.

Reply to the objection of Simmias (91 c 6-95 a 3).

The objection of Simmias is fully dealt with, but that of Cebes is found to raise a larger question, and leads up to the Third Proof of Immortality.

- C 7 Σιμμίας μὲν γὰρ κτλ. The two views are resumed and carefully distinguished. There is (1) the view that the soul is the ἀρμονία of the body and must therefore perish even before the body, and (2) the view that the soul weaves for itself many bodies, but perishes with, or even before, the last of them.
- c 8 ὅμως...ὄν, 'in spite of its being.' The adv. ὅμως is 'attracted' by the participle.
- d ι ἐν ὁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα, a periphrasis which only differs from ὁρμονία οὖσα by being more emphatic. Cp. above 87 e 4 τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας.
- d 3 τόδε άδηλον παντί, sc. φάναι to be supplied from συγχωρείν.
- d 7 ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται, 'is unceasingly perishing.' Cp. 87 d 8 εἰ γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Distinguish οὐδὲν παύεται, finem nullum facit, from οὐ παύεται.
- 92 a I ένδεθηναι: cp. 62 b 3 n.
 - a 5 άλλο ποτέ τι: I now observe that Heindorf suggested this reading, though he did not print it in his text.

- a 6 'Αλλὰ ἀνάγκη κτλ. It is shown first that the view of the soul as a άρμονία is inconsistent with the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which Simmias accepts. A άρμονία could exist before the body of which it is the attunement just as little as it could survive it. This brings out the fundamental inconsistency of the later Pythagorean doctrine.
- a 8 ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι, 'to be composed of' the elementary opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, which are here spoken of as the strings of the body.
- b Ι σαυτοῦ λέγοντος: for the phrase cp. 92 e 2; 96 e 7. It is mere superstition to read αύτοῦ because B has αὐτοῦ.
- b 4 συμβαίνει: the regular term for the consequences of a ὑπόθεσις.
 Cp. d6n.
- b 5 είδός τε καὶ σῶμα: the two terms are synonymous. Cp. 73 a 1 n.
- b 8 & ἀ απεικάζεις: i.e. οἶον ὧ ἀπεικάζεις, 'like the thing you are comparing it to.' Cp. Rep. 349 d 10 τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶσπερ ἔοικεν;
- C 3 πως συνάσεται; cp. 86 e 3 n.
- d Ι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ' without demonstration, from a specious analogy.' Cp. Theaet. 162 e 4 ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν λέγετε ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ῷ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεύδωρος ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἀν εἴη, Ευτhyd. 305 e Ι πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου . . . οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ ὅ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.—Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως . . . εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἡ ἀλήθειαν.
- d 2 τοῖς πολλοῖς... ἀνθρώποις, 'most people' who do hold it. We cannot infer from this expression that it was a widespread popular belief.
- d 4 ἀλαζόσιν, 'impostors.' Cp. Lys. 218 d 2 φιβοῦμαι...μὴ ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις ἀλαζόσιν λόγοις τισὶν τοιούτοις [ψευδέσιν] ἐντετυχήκαμεν. Rep. 560 c 2 ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες...λόγοι τε καὶ δύξαι.
- d 6 δι ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι: Socrates assumes that the meaning of ὑπόθεσις is familiar to his hearers from its use in geometry, which is illustrated in a well-known passage of the Meno (86 e sqq.). Even Xenophon knew the term: cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περί του ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως... φάσκων κτλ..., ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπαυῆγεν ἃν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως κτλ. We shall learn shortly exactly what a hypothesis is. It

will be sufficient to say here that it is a statement of which the truth is postulated and from which we deduce its consequences $(\tau \dot{a} \sigma \nu \mu \beta a i \nu \nu \tau a)$. The phrase literally means 'the argument proceeded ($\dot{b} \lambda \dot{b} y o s \dots \dot{\epsilon} \ddot{l} \rho \eta \tau a u$) by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance'.

d 7 ἀξίας ἀποδίξασθαι: we are not told here, nor were we told above, why the hypothesis in question is worthy of acceptance. We only know that Cebes and Simmias accepted it at once. The position of the argument, then, is this: Simmias declares that he cannot give up the doctrine that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις so long as he accepts the hypothesis, and this he will not give up.

ἐρρήθη γάρ που κτλ. The ὑπόθεσις is given formally above 76 d 7 εἰ...ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία... Now it has been shown that we refer all our sensations to this standard, and that this means that our soul already possesses it and rediscovers it in the process of learning. From this it followed in turn that our soul must have existed before entering into a human body. These steps have been rigorously demonstrated (ἰκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται), and therefore, so long as we accept the ὑπόθεσις, we must accept the conclusion.

- E I ταύτην, sc. τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. There is no doubt about the conclusion (τὸ συμβαῖνον) being correctly demonstrated; what Simmias says here is that he firmly believes himself to be justified (ὀρθῶs) in accepting the ὑπόθεσις which forms the major premise.
- e 4 Τί δὲ . . . τηθε; the following argument proceeds on independent

lines, and is based upon the nature of $\delta\rho\mu\nu\nu\dot{u}a$ itself. Socrates first gets Cebes to make two admissions. These are (1) that every $\delta\rho\mu\nu\nu\dot{u}a$ is determined by its component elements, (2) that no $\delta\rho\mu\nu\nu\dot{u}a$ admits of degrees.

- 6 4 δοκεῖ σοι κτλ. The first ὁμολόγημα (92 e 4—93 a 10). Every άρμονία is determined by its component elements. The note which anything will give out depends entirely upon what it is made of. It does not lead; it follows.
- 3 a 8 Πολλου...δει: the subject is άρμονία.

ëvavría... κινηθήναι... ή φθέγξασθαι, 'to move (vibrate) or give out a sound in opposition to its parts,' i. e. to the tension and relaxation which produces it, as explained below 94 c 3.

a II Τί δέ; κτλ. The second ὁμολόγημα (93a II-b 7). No ἀρμονία admits of degree. A string is either in tune or it is not. To use the language of the Philebus, ἀρμονία is a form of πέρας and does not admit τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἣττον.

οὕτως... ὡς διν ἀρμοσθη, 'just as it is tuned,' i.e. according as it is tuned to the fourth (διὰ τεσσάρων), the fifth (διὰ πέντε), or the octave (διὰ πασῶν). Modern editors suppose the meaning to be just the opposite and vainly try to explain in what sense one ἀρμονία can be more a ἀρμονία than another; but the meaning is stated quite clearly below 93 d 2. Olympiodorus, representing the school tradition, is quite explicit: ὑποτίθεται μὴ εἶναι ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας πλείω μηδὲ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον.

- a 14 μαλλον...καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον: Olympiodorus refers the first term to pitch (ἐπίτασις and ἄνεσις) and the second to the intervals. If a string is in tune it cannot be made more in tune by tightening or loosening. Nor is it correct to say that the octave is more of a ἀρμονία than the fifth or the fifth than the fourth.
- b ι είπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, 'supposing this possible,' a plain indication that it is not possible. Socrates is only explaining what would be implied in saying that one ἀρμονία is more a ἀρμονία than another. It would mean that it was more tuned, which is absurd; for, as we learn from Rep. 349 e 11 the musician, in tuning a lyre, will not be willing μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῆ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν.
- b 2 ήττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων: some inferior MSS. read ἦττόν τε, which is more symmetrical, but the evidence is against it.

b 4 *H οὖν κτλ. That being so, we must further admit that, if the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another. Socrates does not express a view one way or the other on this point. He only wishes an admission from Simmias that, on his ὑπόθεσις, it must be so.

εστι... ωστε... So below 103 e 2. Cp. Lat. est ut.

- b 5 μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἔτέρας: some editors bracket μᾶλλον here, and it is in a sense redundant. We may say that it is more fully expressed by the words ἐπὶ πλέον... ἡττον.
- b 8 Φέρε δή κτλ. Socrates now proceeds to make use of the two ὁμολογήματα, but in the reverse order. We have seen that, if the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another, i. e. more or less a ἀρμονία. But goodness is also a ἀρμονία, and souls differ in that one is better than another, which would imply that one ἀρμονία is more or less of a ἀρμονία than another, which is absurd.
- C 3 τί... ὄντα; 'being what?' We can say τί ἐστι ταῦτα; and the question may be asked by a participle in Greek. We must render 'What will he say that these things are which are in our souls?' (εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς go together).
- C 6 την μεν ήρμόσθαι κτλ. Are we to say that both the good and the bad soul are άρμονίαι, but that the good soul also has a άρμονία and is in tune, while the bad soul has none and is out of tune? If we say that the soul is a tuning, we shall have to say that a tuning may be tuned or untuned.
- d 2 τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, 'this is just our admission.' Here we have an explicit statement that our admission was that no ἀρμονία can be more or less a ἀρμονία than another. Editors who do not see this are obliged to bracket ἀρμονίαs in d 4, or to explain it unnaturally as 'the particular harmony which is the soul'.
- d 6 την δέ γε, sc. άρμονίαν. The application of this to ψυχή only begins at d 12. The point here made depends on 93 a 14, where it was shown that being more or less tuned would involve being more or less a άρμονία, which is absurd.
- d 9 ἔστιν ὅτι πλέον . . . μετέχει ; 'does it partake more in —?' Here ὅτι is acc. neut. of ὅστις. Cp. e 7 ἀρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας . . . μετέχοι ;
- 94 a 1 Μαλλον δέ γέ που . . ., 'yes, or rather, surely —.'
 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, 'according to the right account of the

matter," 'to put the matter correctly.' It the soul is a $\delta\rho\mu\rho\nu la$, no soul can be better than another (for no $\delta\rho\mu\rho\nu la$ can be more in tune than another). Indeed, no soul can be bad at all (for no $\delta\rho\mu\rho\nu la$ can be out of tune).

- 2 πάσχειν ἃν ταῦτα, 'Do you think this would happen to our argument if our ὑπόθεσις were right?' Here the συμβαίνοντα are inadmissible, and therefore the ὑπόθεσις is destroyed (ἀναιρεῖται). For the use of πάσχειν in dialectic cp. Parm. 128 d 4 τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἃν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἕν εἶναι.
 - b 4 Τί δί; Socrates now takes up the first of the two ὁμολογήματα and tests the hypothesis by it. It is the soul which rules the body, whereas a άρμονία is dependent upon that of which it is the άρμονία (93 a 6).
 - c 3 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: 92 e 4.
 μήποτ' ἃν . . . c 6 οῦποτ' ᾶν . . . Both negatives are legitimate after ὁμολογεῖν. Here they are alternated for variety.
 - C 4 οἶs ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλώτο ... ἐκείνα: equivalent to ταῖs ἐπιτάσεσιν καὶ χαλάσεσιν ... ἐκείνων, οἶs representing τούτοις α, where α is internal accusative. This is a favourite construction with Demosthenes (cp. Shilleto on de Fals. Leg. 415), but is not common in Plato. Observe that χαλῶν is equivalent to ἀνιέναι (remittere) the usual opposite of ἐπιτείνειν (intendere).
 - c 5 ψάλλοιτο is the reading of Stobaeus and seemingly of T before correction. As ψάλλειν is the proper word for striking strings, it is very appropriate here. The vulgate reading πάλλοιτο is supposed to refer to vibrations. The verb is used of 'brandishing' weapons and shaking lots, and in the passive of the heart 'quaking', but never of strings or instruments.
 - d 5 ταις έπιθυμίαις . . . διαλεγομένη: the comma after νουθετοῦσα is due to Hermann and makes the construction more regular. It is to be observed, however, that such a construction as τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταις ἐπιθυμίαις is not indefensible.
 - d 6 & 'Οδυσσεία: Od. xx. 17. The passage is quoted in a similar connexion in Rep. 390 d 4; 441 b 6.
 - e 5 ἡ καθ' ἀρμονίαν: in such phrases κατά means 'in a line with', 'on the level of'. Tr. 'far too divine a thing to be compared with a ἀρμονία.' Aristotle made use of the preceding argument in his

Ευαθεπικ. Cp. Olympiodorus: ὅτι ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ σύτως ἐ εχειρεῖ τῆ ἀρμονία εναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τη ψυχῆ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον οὐσία γάρ. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα δῆλον. ἔτι εἶ ἀναρμοστία τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ ζώου νόσος, ἡ ἀρμονία εἴη ἃν ὑγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ψυχή.

Reply to the Objection of Cebes begun, but broken off (95 a 4-e 6).

95 a 4 Είτν δή κτλ. Socrates now goes back to the objection of Cebes. The transition is effected by means of a pleasantry about Harmonia of Thebes (Θηβαϊκῆς, not Θηβαΐας, for the κτητικόν, not the ἐθνικόν, is used with names of women). She has become fairly propitious, and we must now tackle Cadmus (who married Harmonia in the Theban legend), i. e. the objection of Cebes. There is no need to seek a deeper meaning in the words.

a 8 θαυμαστώς . . . ώς are to be taken together. Cp. 102 a 4.

a 9 ὅτε: Forster's conjecture ὅτι (or, as I prefer to write in accordance with ancient practice, ὅτι) is attractive, but it is hard to account for the ὅτε of all MSS. unless it is original. Linde proposes ὅ γε ἢπόρει.

b 1 τι . . . χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγφ: cp. Theaet. 165 b 7 τί γὰρ χρήση ἀφύκτω ἐρωτήματι;

b 5 μἢ μέγα λέγε, 'do not boast.' Cp. μέγα φρονείν, 'to be proud' (the other sense 'do not speak loud' is less appropriate here). Cp. Hipp. ma. 295 a 7 A μἢ μέγα . . . λέγε. Eur. Her. 1244 ἴσχε στόμ', ὡς μἢ μέγα λέγων μείζον πάθης.

b 6 βασκανία, 'malign influence,' lit. fascination of the 'evil eye', to the effects of which those who boast of their luck are specially exposed.

περιτρίψη, 'turn to flight,' keeps up the metaphor of έφοδος above.

- b 7 'Ομηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες, 'coming to close quarters.' The metaphor is kept up. Homer nowhere uses the phrase ἐγγὺς ἰόντες, and Herwerden would read ἀσσον ἰόντες, but 'Ομηρικῶς may mean 'like Homeric warriors', not 'in Homeric phrase'.
- b 8 τὸ κεφάλαιον, 'the sum and substance.' The word is derived from the ancient practice of writing the sum of an addition at the top. Cp. Lat. summa (sc. linea).
- C 7 ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ . . . 'not immortality, but only that—.'
- d 3 ζώη ... ἀπολλύοιτο: the optatives are due to the indirect speech,

though there is no principal verb with δn (or δs) on which they can be said to depend. They cannot, as some editors say, depend on c 7 $\phi \eta s$, for $\phi \delta n$ only takes acc. c. inf. Cp. above 87 e 5 n, where also the optatives occur after a clause introduced by $\partial \lambda \lambda \partial n$ ∂n . Riddell, Dig. § 282.

d 7 εἰμὴ...εῖη: the simplest explanation of this optative is to regard τῷ μὴ εἰδότι as equivalent to εὶ μὴ εἰδείη.

Narrative Interlude. The origin of the new Method (95 e 7—102 a 2).

- e 8 Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, 'no light matter,' 'no easy task.' Cp. L. S. s. v. I. 1.
- 6 9 περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν, 'the cause of coming into being, and ceasing to be.' Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς is the title of one of Aristotle's most important treatises, best known by the scholastic name De generatione et corruptione. Περί c. gen. is used instead of the simple gen. or περί c. acc. under the influence of the verb διαπραγματεύσασθαι. Cp. 96 e 6; 97 c 6; 97 d 2; 98 d 6, and 58 a 1 n.
- supposed—so unwilling are interpreters to take the *Phaedo* in its plain sense—that these are either Plato's own experiences or 'an ideal sketch of the history of the mind in the search for truth.' Besides the general considerations stated in the Introduction, there is this special point to be noted, that the questions raised are exactly such as were discussed in the middle of the fifth century B.C., when Socrates was young, and that they correspond closely with the caricature of Aristophanes in the *Clouds*, which was produced in 423 B.C., when Plato was a baby. By the time of Plato's youth quite another set of questions had come to the front at Athens.
 - a 8 περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: this is the oldest name for what we call 'natural science' (cf. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 14 n. 2). Heraclitus (fr. 17) said that Pythagoras had pursued ἱστορίη further than other men, and it appears that even geometry was called by this name in the Pythagorean school (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 107 n. 1). The restriction of the term to what we call 'history' is due to the fact that Herodotus followed his predecessors in calling his work ἱστορίη, and his pre-

96

decessors belonged to Miletus, where all science went by that name (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 28). The term 'Natural History' partly preserves the ancient sense of the word, a circumstance due to the title of Aristotle's $\Pi \epsilon \rho i \ \tau \dot{\alpha} \ \zeta \phi a \ i \sigma \tau o \rho i a \ (Historia Animalium)$.

- a 8 ὑπερήφανος agrees with σοφία or ἱστορία and εἰδέναι is added to it epexegetically. Heindorf compares Gorg. 462 c 8 οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ὑητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἶόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; The ὑπερήφανον of Eusebius and Stobaeus would simplify the construction, but the evidence is against it.
- b 1 ἄνω κάτω: we say 'backwards and forwards'. Cp. 90 c 5 and Gorg. 481 d 7 ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου,
- b 3 ως τινες έλεγον. This is the doctrine of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, and, according to a statement already known to Theophrastus, the teacher of Socrates (cp. Phys. Op. fr. 4 'Aρχέλασς ό `Αθηναίος ώ καὶ Σωκράτη συγγεγονέναι φασίν, 'Αναξαγόρου γενομένω $\mu a \theta \eta \tau \hat{\eta}$, Diels, Vors.² 323, 34; 324, 26). The following are the relevant quotations and rest ultimately on the authority of Theophrastus. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9, 2 είναι δ' ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως (τὸ) ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ib. i. 9. 5 περὶ δὲ ζώων φησίν ὅτι θερμαινομένης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει, ὅπου τὸ θερμον και το ψυχρον εμίσγετο, ανεφαίνετο τα τε άλλα ζώα πολλά και ανθρωποι, απαντα την αιτην διαιταν έχοντα έκ της ίλύος τρεφόμενα. Diog. Laert. ii. 17 γεννασθαι δέ φησι τὰ ζώα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἰλὺν παραπλησίαν γάλακτι οίον τροφήν ανιείσης. This last touch explains the reference to putrefaction (σηπεδών). As Forster already pointed out, early medical theory made $\pi \acute{\epsilon} \psi \iota s$, cibi concoctio, a form of $\sigma \hat{\eta} \psi \iota s$, and Galen says (in Hippocr. Aph. vi. I) παλαιά τις ην συνήθεια τούτοις τοις ανδράσιν ασηπτα καλείν απερ ήμεις απεπτα λέγομεν. Now Aristotle criticizes Empedocles for applying the only to milk. Cp. Gen. An. 777 a 7 το γάρ γάλα πεπεμμένον αξμά έστιν, άλλ' οὐ διεφθαρμένον, Ἐμπεδοκλης δ' η οὐκ ὀρθώς ὑπελάμβανεν η οὐκ εὖ μετήνεγκε (' used a bad metaphor') ποιήσας ώς τὸ γάλα 'μηνὸς ἐν ὀγδοάτου δεκάτη πύον επλετο λευκόν, σαπρότης γάρ και πέψις έναντίου, τὸ δέ πύον σαπρότης τίς έστιν, τὸ δὲ γάλα τῶν πεπεμμένων. The meaning is, then, that the warm and cold gave rise by putrefaction (σηπεδών) to a milky slime (iλύs) by which the first animals were nourished. We are thus able to give συντρέφεται its natural sense. It is significant that Socrates should mention the theory of Archelaus first.

- b 4 φ φρονοῦμεν, 'what we think with.' The question of the 'seat of the soul' or sensorium was keenly debated in the first half of the fifth century B.C. The views that the soul is blood or breath are primitive, but both had just been revived as scientific theories. Empedocles had said (fr. 105 Diels) αἶμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα, and he was the founder of the Sicilian school of medicine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 288 n. 3). The doctrine that the soul is air was as old as Anaximenes, but had just been revived by Diogenes of Apollonia (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 414), and is attributed in the Clouds (230) to Socrates. The Heracliteans at Ephesus of course maintained their master's view that the soul was fire.
- b 5 δ δ' ἐγκέφαλος κτλ. The credit of being the first to see that the brain was the seat of consciousness belongs to Alcmaeon of Croton (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 224), and the same view was upheld in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates and his school. It is one of the strangest facts in the history of science that Aristotle, followed by the Stoics, should have gone back to the primitive view that the heart was the seat of sensation.
- δ 7 γίγνοιτο: the optative is due to the general sense of indirect speech.
 δ 8 κατὰ ταῦτα: equivalent to οὖτως.

γίγνεσθαι: note ἐστιν (b 5)... γίγνοιτο (b 7)... γίγνεσθαι (b 8), 'a gradual transition from the direct to the most pronounced form of the indirect speech' (Geddes).

ἐπιστήμην: Diels (Vors.² 102, 18) attributes to Alcmaeon this explanation of knowledge as arising from memory and belief 'when they have reached a state of quiescence'. We seem to have an echo of it in Aristotle An. Post. B. 19. 100 a 3 sqq. ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθί,σεως γίγνεται μνήμη, . . . ἐκ δὲ μνήμης ἐμπειρία, . . . ἐκ δ᾽ ἐμπειρίας ἐκ παντὸς ἢρεμί,σαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῷ ψυχῷ . . . τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης. From Gorg. 448 c 4 sqq. we learn that Polus of Agrigentum derived τέχνη from ἐμπειρία. There is no reason for doubting that the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is pre-Platonic. It is alluded to by Isocrates in Helena 5 ὅτι πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, and Blass dates the Helena before 390 B. C. Antisthenes is said to have written four books Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης (Diog. Laert. vi. 17).

b 9 τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν (i.e. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) . . . πάθη: it is highly

96

characteristic of the middle of the fifth century B. C. that the theory of $\tau \dot{\alpha} \mu \epsilon \tau \dot{\epsilon} \omega_{\rho} a$ is mentioned last and in a somewhat perfunctory way. For the time, the rise of medicine had brought biological and psychological questions to the front, while astronomy and cosmology remained stationary in eastern Hellas until new life was given them by the Pythagoreans. The state of science here indicated is quite unlike any we know to have existed either at an earlier or a later date. It belongs solely to the period to which it is here attributed, a period which I have endeavoured to characterize in E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 405, 406.

- c 2 ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα: the Ionic χρῆμα only survives in Attic in a few phrases like this (L. S. s. v. II 3.) The Athenians only used freely the plural χρήματα, and that in the sense of 'property'. Cp. Laws 640 c 5 ὡς οὐδενί γε πράγματι.
- C 5 έτυφλώθην (sc. ταῦτα): cp. Soph. O. Τ. 389 τὴν τέχνην δ' ἔφυ τυφλός.
- c 6 α πρό τοῦ ώμην είδέναι repeats c 4 α καὶ πρότερον κτλ. (a b a).
- d ι ἐπειδὰν γὰρ κτλ.: this refers to another great question of the time. Socrates means that his former beliefs were upset by the question of Anaxagoras (fr. 10) πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἐκ μἢ τριχὸς γίνοιτο θρὶξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μἢ σαρκός; This led to the doctrine that there were portions of everything in everything. Cp. also Aët.i. 3. 5 (Dox. 279 a) ἐδόκει αὐτῷ ἀπορώτατον εἶναι πῶς ἐκ τοῦ μἢ ὅντος δύναταὶ τι γίνεσθαι ἢ Φθείρεσθαι εἶς τὸ μἢ ὄν. τροφὴν γοῦν προσφερόμεθα ἀπλῆν καὶ μονοειδῆ, ἄρτον καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τρέφεται θρὶξ φλὲψ ἀρτηρία σὰρξ νεῦρα ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια. τούτων οὖν γινομένων, ὁμολογητέον ἐστὶν ὅτι ἐν τῆ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερομένῃ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ὅντα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὅντων πάντα αὕξεται. (Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 303.)
- d 6 μετρίως, i. q. καλώς. Cp. 68 e 2 n.
- d 8 φμην γὰρ κτλ. This refers to another set of questions, which stand in a close relation to Zeno's criticism of the Pythagoreans. Roughly, we may say that the difficulty here touched upon is the nature of the unit, whether in measuring, weighing, or numbering.
- e 1 αὐτῆ τῆ κεφαλῆ, 'just by the head.' This is an example of a popular unit of measurement. Cp. Il. iii. 193 μείων μεν κεφαλῆ 'Αγαμέμνονος.
- e 3 προσείναι (TW) is virtual passive of προσθείναι, which is the reading of B. That is a natural slip.

- e 6 περὶ τούτων...την αἰτίαν: cp. 95 e 9 n.
- e 8 ἐπειδὰν ἐνί τις προσθη ἔν κτλ. The difficulty here is what is meant by the addition of units. How can it be that when one is added to one the result is two? How can either the original one or the one which is added to it become two; or how can the one which is added and the one which is added to it become two? The nature of the unit involved real difficulties which we need not discuss here; it is more important for our purpose to observe that in the Parmenides Plato actually represents the young Socrates as discussing such subjects with Parmenides and Zeno. The two dialogues confirm each other in the most remarkable way; for here too we are dealing with the youth of Socrates.
- 97 a 2 εἰ ὅτε μὲν . . ., ἐπεὶ δ' . . . Another instance of the disjunctive hypothetical sentence (cp. 68 a 3 n.) What causes surprise is that the two things should be true at the same time.
 - a 4 αῦτη, 'this,' sc. τὸ πλησιάσωι ἀλλήλεις, but assimilated in gender to the predicate αἰτία, and further explained by ἡ σύνοδος κτλ.
 - a 5 ή σύνοδος τοῦ . . . τεθήναι, 'the coming together which consists in their juxtaposition.'
 - οὐδέ γε ὡς . . . πείθεσθαι ὡς . . . The repetition of ὡς is a colloquialism. We are still dealing here with the difficulty of conceiving a unit. In the *Republic* (525 d 8 sqq.) Socrates refers to the same difficulty, but he is not troubled by it, for he has come to see that the unit is an object of thought and not of sense. Plato can hardly have felt it seriously at any time.
 - b 4 δι' ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται, 'how a unit comes into being at all.' Cp. Arist. Met. Μ. 6. 1080 b 20 ὅπως δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν συνέστη ἔχον μέγεθος, ἀπορεῖν ἐοικασιν (οἱ Πυθαγύρειοι).
 - b 6 τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, 'method of investigation.' The noun μέθοδος by itself came to bear this meaning, as 'method 'always does in our usage.
 - b 7 αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω, 'I make up a confused jumble of my own.'

 There can be no doubt that φύρειν is 'to make a mess' (cp. 101 e 1), and εἰκῆ, temere, emphasizes that meaning. Cp. Aesch. P. V. 450 ἔφυρον εἰκῆ πάντα. Of course, Socrates has not the slightest doubt of the superiority of his new method, and this description is only a piece of characteristic εἰρωνεία.
 - b 8 τινός, . . . άναγιγνώσκοντος: it is natural to think of the Anaxa-

gorean Archelaus, who was said to be the teacher of Socrates (cp. 96 b 3 n.).

- C I ώς άρα κτλ. The actual words of Anaxagoras were (fr. 12 Diels) καὶ ὁποία ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποία ἦν, ἄσσα νυν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὁποία ἔστι, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς. The familiar πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, εἶτα νοῦς ελθῶν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν (Diog. Laert. ii. 6) is not a quotation, but a summary of the doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 299, n. 1).
- C 7 περὶ ἐκάστου: cp. 95 e 9 n.
- d 2 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου: de illo ipso, sc. περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. I formerly bracketed ἐκείνου, which rests only on the authority of B; but Vahlen has since shown (Opusc. ii. 558 sqq.) that αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου is too idiomatic to be a mistake.
- d 7 κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, 'to my mind,' as we say. I cannot believe that this common phrase involves any reference to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras. Such a joke would be very frigid.
- d 8 πλατεῖα . . . ἡ στρογγύλη: this was still a living problem in the days when Socrates was young, but not later. The doctrine that the earth is spherical was Pythagorean; the Ionian cosmologists (including Anaxagoras himself and Archelaus) held it was flat, with the single exception of Anaximander, who regarded it as cylindrical.
- e 3 ἐν μέσφ: so far as we can tell, this was not only the doctrine of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, but also of the early Pythagoreans. It is important to observe that the geocentric theory marked a great advance in its day as compared, e. g., with the belief of Thales that the earth was a disk floating on the water (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 32). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates refer to the later Pythagorean doctrine that the earth revolved with the planets round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.). That was familiar enough in the fourth century B. C., but would have been out of place here.
- 98 a I ποθεσόμενοs: this is now known to be the reading of T as well as of Eusebius. B has ὑποθέμενος, which cannot be right, and the ὑποθησόμενος of W looks like an emendation of this.
 - α 4 τάχους . . . πρὸς ἄλληλα, 'their relative velocity.'
 τροπῶν, 'turnings.' This refers to the annual movement of the sun from the 'tropic' of Capricorn to that of Cancer and back again, which is the cause of summer and winter. The Greeks gave

the name of τροπαί to what the Romans, from a slightly different point of view, called solstitia.

- a 6 å πάσχει: symmetry would require the addition of καὶ ποιεί, but Plato avoids such symmetry.
- b Ι ἐκάστφ . . . καὶ κοινῆ πᾶσι, 'to each individually and to all collectively.'
- b 3 οὐκ ᾶν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ, 'I would not have sold for a large sum.'
- b 7 ἀχόμην Φερόμενος: this is a slight variation on the usual phrase ἀπ' ἐλπίδος κατεβλήθην, κατέπεσον, 'I was dashed down from my hope' (cp. Euthyphro 15e 5 ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλών μεγάλης).
 Socrates speaks as if he had been cast down from Olympus like another Hephaestus (πᾶν δ' ἦμαρ Φερόμην, II. i. 592).
- b 8 ἄνδρα, 'a man.' The word expresses strong feeling, here disappointment. Wyttenbach compares Soph. Aias 1142 ἤδη ποτ' ἐἶδον ἄνδρ' ἐγὼ γλώσση θρασύν, 1150 ἐγὼ δέ γ' ἄνδρ' ὅπωπα μωρίας πλέων (cp. Arist. Ach. 1128).

τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον: Plato expresses the same feeling in his own person in Laws 967 b 4 και τινες ἐτόλμων τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ παρακινδυνεύειν καὶ τότε, λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανόν. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ ... ἄπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν κτλ. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 7. 6) preserves a faint echo of this criticism of Anaxagoras. Aristotle (Met. A. 985 a 18) simply repeats it (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 309 sq.).

- b 9 οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον, sc. τὸν νοῦν, 'nor ascribing to it any causality.' For the double acc. cp. Dem. Phorm. 25 τίν' ἀν ἐαυτὸν αἰτίαν αἰτιασάμενος . . . δικάζοιτο; Antipho, I. 29 ἃ ἐπαιτιῶμαι τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν.
- C 7 νεύρων, 'sinews,' 'tendons,' not nerves. The nervous system only became known in the third century B. C. Cp. Galen, de plac. Hipp. et Plat., p. 647 'Ερασίστρατος μὲν οὖν (floruit 258 B. C.), εἰ καὶ μὴ πρόσθεν, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ γήρως γε τὴν ἀληθῆ τῶν νεύρων ἀρχὴν κατενόησεν 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ μέχρι παντὸς ἀγνοήσας εἰκότως ἀπορεί χρείαν εἰπείν ἐγκεφάλου.
- C δ διαφυάς έχει, 'are jointed.' The διαφυαί are the same thing as the συμβολαί (d 3), looked at from another point of view. Cicero, de Nat. D. ii. 139 says commissurae.
- d 2 αἰωρουμένων ... έν ταις ... συμβολαις, 'swinging in their sockets.'

- d 5 συγκαμφθείς: cp. 60 b 2.
- d 7 φωνάς τε κτλ. Cp. e. g. Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels, Vors.⁹ p. 332, 14) τοῦ ἐν τῆ κεφαλῆ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς τυπτομένου καὶ κινουμένου (τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι).
- e 4 παραμένοντα, 'not running away.' We have no English word for παραμένειν, any more than for θαρρεῖν (cp. 63 e 10 n.). It is the negative of ἀποδιδράσκειν (99 a 3). Cp. 115 d 9.
- e 5 νη τὸν κόνα: such euphemisms seem to occur in all languages. Cp. parbleu! ecod! It is true that in Gorg. 482 b 5 Socrates says μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν (Anubis), but that seems to be only a passing jest. A euphemistic oath of this kind was called 'Paδαμάνθυος ὅρκος (Suid. s. v.).
- 99 a I περί Μίγαρα ἡ Βοιωτούς: cp. Crito 53 b 4 where it is suggested that Socrates might escape ἡ θήβαζε ἡ Μέγαράδε. He would have found friends in both places, as we know. This whole passage is reminiscent of the Crito.
 - a 8 καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, 'and that too though I act from intelligence,' as was admitted above, 98 c 4. The MSS. have πράττω, but Heindorf's πράττων is a great improvement and gives καὶ ταῦτα its proper idiomatic force.
 - b 2 το γαρ μη ... οιόν τ' είναι κτλ. is another instance of the exclamatory infinitive justifying a strong expression of feeling. Cp. 60 b 5 n. and Symp. 177 c 1 το οὖν τοιοίτων μεν πέρι πολλήν σπουδήν ποιήσασθαι, Ερωτα δέ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι . . . ἀξιως ὑμνῆσαι.
 - b 3 ἄνευ οὖ: here we see the beginning of the technical term οὖ (or ὧν) οὖκ ἄνευ, the conditio sine qua non. Such causes are called συναίτια in the Timaeus. Cp. 46 c 7 Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα ἔστιν τῶν συναιτίων οἶς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσιν χρῆται, τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν' δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναίτια ἀλλὰ αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων κτλ.
 - b 4 ψηλαφῶντες, 'groping in the dark.' Cp. Ar. Peace 690 προ τοῦ μεν οὖν εψηλαφῶμεν εν σκότω τὰ πράγματα, Acta Apostolorum xvii. 27 εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν.
 - b 5 ἀλλοτρίω ὀνόματι, 'by a name that does not belong to them,' which is not their οἰκεῖον ὅνομα. The vulgate ὅμματι cannot be defended, though it is the reading also of BW.
 - b 6 αὐτό repeats ő (cp. 104 d 2 n.).

- δ δ μέν τις κτλ. Once more we have the scientific problems of the middle of the fifth century. The first theory is that the earth does not fall because of the rapidity of the revolution of the heavens. This was the western theory, and was originated by Empedocles, who supported it by the experiment of swinging a cup full of water rapidly round (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 274). Cp. Arist. de (aelo 295 a 16 οί δ' ὥσπερ Έμπεδοκλῆς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσαν καὶ θᾶττον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάθοις ἔδωρ' καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυάθου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὅμως οὐ φέρεται κάτω πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. The vortex theory of Leucippus was more subtle than this (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 399) and is not referred to here. In Clouds 379 Aristophanes makes fun of the αἰθέριος Δῖνος who has taken the place of Zeus.
- b 7 ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν: these words are to be taken together, as Geddes says (after Hermann) and μένειν is a virtual passive, 'is kept in its place by the heavens.'
- b 8 ὁ δὲ κτλ. This is the eastern theory, which originated with Anaximenes and was still upheld by Anaxagoras and Democritus. As Aristotle tells us (de Caelo 294 b 14), they said τὸ πλάτος αἴτιον εἶναι...τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν οὐ γὰρ τέμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν. Its breadth prevents it from cutting the air beneath it, and it lies on it 'like a lid' (πῶμα). It is absurd to suppose that Plato was ever troubled by crude notions of this kind, and even Socrates must soon have learnt better from his Pythagorean friends. Everything points to the Periclean age and no later date.

καρδόπω, 'a kneading-trough'. This, however, does not seem to be a very appropriate image, and I believe we should read καρδοπίω from Hesychius Καρδόπιον τῆς καρδόπου τὸ πῶμα, 'the lid of a kneading-trough'; cp. Aristotle's ἐπιπωματίζειν quoted above. The discussion of the word κάρδοπος in Arist. Clouds 670 has another bearing. It refers to the speculations of Protagoras about grammatical gender.

C I τὴν δὲ τοῦ κτλ. Constr. τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὕτω νῦν (αὐτὰ) κεῖσθαι ώς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι. As we see from the following words, δύναμιν has its full meaning. The fact that they are in the best possible place is regarded as a force which keeps them there.

That being so, ταύτην (την δύναμιν) is the subject of δαιμονίαν ίσχὺν ἔχειν.

- C 3 τούτου ... Ισχυρότερον, 'an Atlas stronger than this one' (τούτου is masc.).
- C 9 τον δεύτερον πλοῦν: the paroemiographers say this expression is used ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, καθόσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. According to this, the reference would be rather to a less adventurous than to a 'second-best' course. See, however, Eustathius in Od. p. 1453, 20 δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται ὅτε ἀποτυχών τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέη κατὰ Παυσανίαν. Cp. also Cic. Tusc. iv. 5, 'where pandere vela orationis is opposed to the slower method of proceeding, viz. dialecticorum remis' (Geddes). In any case, Socrates does not believe for a moment that the method he is about to describe is a pis aller or 'makeshift.' The phrase is ironical like εἰκῆ φύρω above. Cp. Goodrich in Class. Rev. xvii, pp. 381 sqq. and xviii, pp. 5 sqq., with whose interpretation I find myself in substantial agreement.
- d I ή πεπραγμάτευμα: these words depend on ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι and govern τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν.
- d 5 τὰ ὅντα like τὰ πράγματα just below (e 3) are 'things' in the ordinary sense of the word. It seems to me quite impossible that these terms should be applied to the ὅντως ὅντα, τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅντα. They must be the same as τὰ ὅντα in 97 d 7 τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὅντων, that is, the things of the visible world. It is quite true that Plato makes Socrates use the expression τὸ ὅν for τὸ ὅντως ὅν, but I know of no place in which he is made to use τὰ ὅντα simpliciter of the είδη. Further, the whole point of the passage is that Socrates had become exhausted by the study of physical science, and what he calls the δεύτερος πλοῦς is, we shall see, nothing else than the so-called 'Theory of Ideas.'

τον ήλιον ἐκλείποντα, 'the sun during an eclipse.' This is a mere illustration. Socrates keeps up the irony of the phrase δεύτερος

 $\pi\lambda o \hat{v}$ by suggesting that his eyes are too weak to contemplate the things of the visible world. He had to look at them in a reflexion, he says.

- e 3 τοις έμμασι και έκάστη των αίσθήσεων: this makes it quite clear that τὰ ὄντα, τὰ πράγματα are the things of sense.
- e 5 εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα, 'taking refuge in the study of propositions' or 'judgements', or 'definitions'. It is not easy to translate λόγους here; but at least it is highly misleading to speak of 'concepts' (Begriffe), nor is there any justification in Plato's writings for contrasting Socratic λόγου with Platonic εἴδη. It is just in λόγου that the εἴδη manifest themselves, and what Socrates really means is that, before we can give an intelligible answer to the question 'what causes A to be B', we must ask what we mean by saying 'A is B'. So far from being a δεύτερος πλοῦς, this is really a 'previous question.'
- 6 ἴσως μὲν οὖν κτλ. Here Socrates distinctly warns us not to take his ironical description too seriously. It is not really the case that the λόγοι are mere images of τὰ ὅντα οτ τὰ πράγματα. On the contrary, it will appear that the things of sense may more fitly be called images of the reality expressed in the λόγοι. To use the language of the Republic, we must not confuse διάνοια and ἐπιστήμη with εἰκασία.

🆸 εἰκάζω: i.e. τούτω ὦ εἰκάζω τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὅντα.

- 20 a 2 ἐν [τοῖs] ἔργοις, 'in realities'. The word ἔργα is equivalent to ὅντα and πράγματα, and is used here because it is the standing opposite to λόγοι.
 - 3 οποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε κτλ., 'in any given case assuming as true.' This amounts to saying that Socrates had recourse to the method of deduction. Here it is important to remember, first, that in the fifth century B.C. geometry had advanced far beyond all other sciences, just because it had adopted the deductive method, and, secondly, that this advance was due to the Pythagoreans. The ideal is that all science should become 'exact science'.
 - a 4 δν ἃν κρίνω κτλ. We start from a proposition (λόγος) which we judge not to be open to attack. If this is admitted, we may proceed; if not, we cannot do so until we have established our $i\pi\delta\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$.
 - b Ι οὐδὲν καινόν: if Plato had been the real author of the 'Theory of

Ideas', and if, as is commonly believed, it was propounded for the first time in the *Phaedo*, this sentence would be a pure mystification.

- b 2 οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι. 'Οὐ παύεται et οὐδὲν παύεται sic different ut Latine: finem non facit et finem nullum facit,' Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 500.

τῆς αἰτίας τὸ είδος, 'the sort of causation I have worked out'. A phrase like this shows how far είδος is from being a technical term. When Socrates wishes to be technical, he speaks of the 'just what it is' (τὸ αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν).

- b 4 ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα: cp. 76 d 8 ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί. Here once more the doctrine of εἴδη is assumed to be well known and generally accepted. What is new is the application of it, the method of ὑπόθεσις and deduction. This time it is Cebes who assents to the doctrine without hesitation; last time it was Simmias.
- b 8 τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς: there is a curious and characteristic interlacing of words here (a ὁ a ὁ); for τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνευρήσειν and ἐπιδείξειν ὡς would naturally go together. Riddell, Dig. § 308 classes this under the head of Hysteron proteron.
- C I ώς διδόντος σοι κτλ., 'You may take it that I grant you this, so lose no time in drawing your conclusion.' Cp. Symp. 185 e 4 οὐκ ἄν Φθάνοις λέγων.
- C 3 Σκόπει... έάν... Cp. 64 c 10 n.
- c 5 οὐδὲ δι' έν is more emphatic than δι' οὐδέν.
 - ħ διότι μετέχει κ.τ.λ. If we say that a, a, a are beautiful, that implies (I) that 'beautiful' has a meaning quite apart from any particular instance of beautiful things, and (2) that this meaning (A) is somehow 'partaken in' by the particular instances a, a, a. These have a meaning in common, and their relation to it is expressed in the relation of subject to predicate. This too Cebes admits at once.
- d r χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον, 'because it has a bright colour'. The participle explains δι' ὅτι, which is the indirect form of διὰ τί. The adjective εὐανθής is common in Hippocrates, especially of the bright red colour

of blood, &c. As applied to colour, $\tilde{a}\nu\theta\sigma_0$ is 'bloom', 'brightness', and is sometimes almost synonymous with $\chi\rho\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$. Cp. Rep. 429 d 8 and 557 c 5 with Adam's notes. The point is that it is meaningless to say a, a, a are A because they are x, y, z, unless we have first shown that x, y, z necessarily 'partake in' A.

- d 5 είτε παρουσία κτλ. The precise nature of the relation between predicate and subject may be expressed in various more or less figurative ways. We may say that the predicate is 'present to' the subject, or that the subject 'partakes' in the common nature of the predicate. Socrates will not bind himself to any of these ways of putting it; he only insists that, however we may express it, it is beauty that makes things beautiful.
- δπη δή καὶ ὅπως κ.τ.λ. These words are an echo of the formula used in the public prayers, for which cp. Crat. 400 e I ωσπερ έν ταις εὐγαις νόμος έστιν ήμιν εύχεσθαι, οιτινές τε και όπόθεν χαίρουσιν ονομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς θεοὺς) καλεῖν. It seems to me, therefore, that Wyttenbach's suggestion, προσαγορευομένη for προσγενομένη, must certainly be right, though he did not adopt it himself. The manuscript προσγενομένη goes well enough with παρουσία, but not with the other terms. The whole question is one of names; for Socrates has no doubt as to the fact. Plato elsewhere represents him as making use of this formula. Cp. Prot. 358 a 7 εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνον λέγεις . . . είτε όπόθεν καὶ όπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, Phileb. 12 C 3 την μέν 'Αφροδίτην, όπη έκείνη φίλον, ταύτη προσαγορεύω. So Tim. 28 b 2 ὁ δη πας οὐρανὸς η κόσμος η καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' αν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἡμίν ωνομάσθω, Larus 872 d 7 ὁ γὰρ δὴ μύθος ή λόγος ή ὅτι χρη προσαγορεύειν αὐτόν. The formula arose from fear that the gods should be addressed by the wrong name. Cp. Aesch. Ag. 160 Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ' αὐ τῷ φίλον κεκλημένω, | τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω. This connexion is made quite clear in the passage from the Philebus quoted above, which is introduced by the words Τὸ δ' έμον δέος . . . ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οἰκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου.
- d 6 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κτλ., 'I do not go so far as to insist on that'. Cp.

Aristotle Met. A. 6. 987 b 13 την μέντοι γε μέθεξεν η την μίμησιν, ητις αν εἶη τῶν εἶδῶν, ἀφεῖσαν (sc. οἱ Πνθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων) ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν, i.e. 'they left it as a point for dialectical inquiry' (for this meaning of ἐν κοινῷ cp. de An. A. 4. 407 b 29 quoted in 86 b 6 n.). I think Aristotle is referring to the present passage. He is quite clear about the Pythagorean origin of the theory.

- d 8 [γίγνεται] is omitted both here and below e 3 by B; and W, which inserts it in e 3, has it in a different place from T. Most likely, then, it is an interpolation, and the formula τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά is much neater without it.
- d 9 τούτου έχόμενος, 'holding to this.' Cp. 101 d 1 έχόμενος έκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως.
- 101 a 5 φοβούμενος οἶμαι κτλ. The Euthydemus shows that Socrates is making no extravagant supposition in suggesting that the ἀντιλογικοί might make such criticisms as (1) if A is taller than B 'by a head', B is also smaller than A 'by a head', therefore the same thing is the cause of greatness and smallness, and (2) that a head, being small, cannot be the cause of greatness.
 - a 6 έναντίος λόγος: for the personification of the λόγος cp. 87 a 8 n.
 - b I τέρας, 'a portent.' The word seems to have been common in dialectic as equivalent to ἄτοπον or ἀδύνατον. Cp. Meno 91 d 5 καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ..., Parm. 129 b 2 τέρας ἃν οἶμαι ἢν, Theaet. 163 d 6 τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη δ λέγεις, Phil. 14 e 3 τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι.
 - b 9 την πρόσθεσιν . . . c I την σχίσιν: addition of unit to unit or division of the unit into fractions. Cp. above 96 e 7 sqq.
 - C 2 άλλως πως... ἡ μετασχὸν κτλ., 'otherwise than by participation in the proper reality of any given form (ἐκάστου) in which it participates.' The theory is thus summed up by Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. 335 b 9 άλλ' οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν ὡἡθησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἶδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσαις τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὅντων τὰ μὲν εἴδη, τὰ ὁὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἔκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίγνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν, καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολήν. Observe that Aristotle does not ascribe this theory to Plato, but to 'Socrates in the Phaedo.'
 - C 4 έν τούτοις, 'in the cases just mentioned.'
 - C 5 μετάσχεσιν, i. q. μέθεξιν. The form seems to occur here only.
 - c 8 κομψείαs: Wyttenbach points out that Socrates has in mind the

words of Euripides' Antiope which Plato makes him quote in Gorg. 486 c 6, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς (σοφίσματα). It is part of the irony that the plain man's way of speaking is described as a 'subtlety', while the new theory of predication is called artless and naïve.

- C 9 δεδιώς... την σαυτοῦ σκιάν: Aristophanes is said to have used this expression in the *Babylonians*. It probably (like our phrase take umbrage) referred originally to horses shying at their shadows. We have to go warily with so many ἀντιλογικοί lying in wait for us.
- d ι ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου κτλ., 'holding fast to the safe support of the ὑπόθεσις' (cp. 100 d 9), which is regarded as a staff (Ar. Ach. 682 οἶς Ποσειδῶν ἀσφάλειὸς ἐστιν ἡ βακτηρία).
- d 3 εί δέ τις κτλ. It does not seem possible to take ἔχεσθαι here in the sense of 'attack', and Madvig's conjecture ἐφοῖτο is the reverse of convincing. It does, however, seem possible to render 'if any one fastens on ' or 'sticks to the ὑπόθεσις', that is, if he refuses to consider the συμβαίνοντα till the ὑπόθεσις has been completely established. The method of Socrates is different. He first considers the συμβαίνοντα to see whether they involve any contradiction or absurdity. If they do, the hypothesis is ipso facto destroyed. If the συμβαίνοντα are not contradictory or absurd, the ὑπόθεσις is not indeed established, but it has been verified, so far as it can be, by its application. When we have seen that the axioms of geometry lead to no contradictions or absurdities in their application, they are at least relatively established. Cp. Meno 86 e 2 συγχώρησον εξ υποθέσεως αυτό σκοπείσθαι. For the terminology of the method cp. Parm. 135 e 9 εί εστιν εκαστον ('a given thing') ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπείν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως. Cp. e.g. the example immediately after (a 5) εἰ πολλά ἐωτι (the ὑπόθεσις), τί χρη συμβαίνειν κτλ. The method of experimental science is the same. The ὑπόθεσιι is first tested by seeing whether it is verified or not in particular instances: the deduction of the ὑπόθεσις from a higher one is another matter, which must be kept distinct.
- d 4 κως ἀν κτλ. It is doubtful whether ἄν can ever be retained with the opt. in oratio obliqua, though there are several examples in our texts (G. M. T. § 702). The better explanation is that given in L. & S. (5.7). ἐως I. c) that 'ἄν... is added to the Optat. (not to ἔως) if the

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event is represented as conditional'. In that case, the real construction is εως... σκέψαιο ἄν, and ἄν is anticipated. Cp. Isocrates, 17. 15 μαστιγοῦν... εως ᾶν τάληθη δόξειεν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. The meaning, then, will be 'till you have a chance of considering'.

- d 4 τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα: i.e. τὰ συμβαίνοντα. In e 2 below the phrase is τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, and those who regard the sentence as spurious hold that the aorist participle is incorrect. But (1) the aorist is appropriate, because it is only after the consequences have been drawn that we can compare them with one another, and (2) it is more likely that Plato himself should vary the tense than that an interpolator should do so.
- d 5 et... διαφωνεί: Jackson holds that this clause is inconsistent with the account of the method given at 100 a 4 å μεν ἄν μοι δοκη τούτφ συμφωνείν τίθημι ως ἀληθη ὅντα κτλ., but that is a different stage in the process. We first posit as true whatever agrees with the ὑπόθεσις, and then we test the hypothesis by considering whether the things thus posited agree with one another.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ κπλ. Socrates recognizes that the ὑπόθεσιs is not established by the process described so far. That can only be done by subsuming it under some higher ὑπόθεσιs, and that in turn under a higher, till we come to one which is unassailable. This is the process described at greater length in Rep. 533 c 7 sqq.

- d 7 των ἄνωθεν, 'higher,' i.e. more universal. Cp. Rep. 511 a 5 των ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν.
- e i ἐπί τι ἰκανόν: i. e. to an ἀρχή which no one will question. This is not necessarily an ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος (Rep. 510 b 7). A ὑπόθεσις may be, humanly speaking, adequate without that (cp. below 107 b 9).

οὐκ ἀν φύροιο, 'you will not jumble the two things together.' Though the middle does not appear to occur elsewhere, φύρεσθαι τὸν λόγον, 'to jumble one's argument,' seems very natural Greek, and it is hardly necessary to read φύροιο. Otherwise we must take φύροιο as passive, comparing Gorg. 465 c 4 φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ... σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες.

ἄσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί: Socrates is no doubt thinking of the attacks on mathematics made by Protagoras and others. When we study geometry, we must accept its fundamental ἱποθέσεις; the question of their validity is a different one altogether, and one with which the

geometer as such has nothing to do. Only hopeless confusion can result from mixing up the two things.

- e 2 τῆs ἀρχῆs, 'your starting-point,' i. e. the ὑπόθεσιs. Though ἀρχή is sometimes used of an ultimate ἀρχή as opposed to an ὑπόθεσιs, it can be used of any starting-point whatsoever. When we are discussing the συμβαίνοντα, we take the ὑπόθεσιs as our ἀρχή and decline to give any account of it.
- E 5 ίκανοὶ . . . ὁπὸ σοφίας κτλ., 'their cleverness enables them . . .'
 There is a slight redundance in the use of δύνασθαι after ἰκανοί, but
 it is easily paralleled. They can make a mess of everything without
 disturbing their own self-complacency.
- 22 a 3 Νη Δία κτλ. The distinction which Socrates has just made appeals at once to a Pythagorean mathematician. We are taken back to Phlius for the last time, in order that the next stage of the argument may have its full weight.

Third Proof of Immortality (102 a 10-107 b 10).

The first two proofs were based upon analogy. They both depended upon the Doctrine of Forms; but in neither was Immortality deduced from that doctrine. The Third Proof is intended to be such a deduction.

- b 2 τάλλα: i. e. particular things.
 - τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, 'are called after them.' This is how Socrates expresses the 'extension' of a class as opposed to its 'intension'. Cp. Parm. 130 e 5 δοκεί σοι . . . εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν. Cp. 78 e 2 πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων.
- b 8 'Aλλὰ γὰρ κτλ. The notion here formulated is that of the essential attribute. We say, indeed, as a façon de parler (τοῖς βήμασι) that Simmias is greater than Socrates; but it is not qua Simmias or qua Socrates that they stand in this relation, but only in so far as greatness and smallness can be predicated of them. The emphatic words are πεφυκέναι and τυγχάνει έχων. The first expresses participation in an είδος which belongs φύσει to the subject, the latter participation in an είδος which belongs to the subject as a matter of fact, but not essentially. The sentence is anacoluthic; for the subject τὸ ... ὑπερέχειν is dropped and a new subject τὸ ἀληθές is substituted.

C 10 ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει . . είναι, 'has the name of being.' Heindorf

- quotes Hdt. ii. 44 ίρον 'Ηρακλέος ἐπωνυμίην ἔχοντος Θασίου εἶναι. So often ὀνομάζειν εἶναι.
- C 11 τοῦ μὲν κτλ., 'submitting his smallness to the greatness of A (Phaedo) to be surpassed by it, and presenting his own greatness to B (Socrates) as something surpassing his smallness.' The reading ὑπέχων is not merely a conjecture of Madvig's, as even the most recent editors say, but the best attested MS. reading (TW). The meaning of ὑπέχειν is much the same as that of παρέχειν, and it takes the same construction, the epexegetic infinite active (ὑπερέχειν), which we express by a passive. Cp. Gorg. 497 b 9 ὑπόσχεις Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι.
 - d 2 *Εοικα . . . συγγρα μικῶς ἐρεῖν, 'it looks as if I were about to acquire a prose style.' Wyttenbach took συγγραφικῶς as referring to the language in which ψηφίσματα were drafted, comparing Gorg. 451 b 7 ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι. Heindorf derived it from συγγραφή, a 'bond' or 'indenture', and thought of legal phraseology. On the whole, it seems to me more likely that there is a reference to the balanced antitheses of Gorgias and his followers, of which the preceding sentence certainly reminds one. The word συγγραφικός only occurs in late writers, but there it is the adjective of συγγραφεύς and always refers to prose style. This interpretation makes the fut. inf. ἐρεῖν more natural than the others.
 - d 7 τὸ ἐν ἡμῶν μέγεθος: the form of greatness, so far as it 'is present' in us or we 'participate' in it.
- d 9 δυοῖν τὸ ἔτερον κτλ. This alternative is important for the argument, and the terminology should be noticed. If any form is 'in' a given thing, that thing will not admit (δέχεσθαι) any form which is opposed to it. The original form will either (1) withdraw from (or 'evacuate') the thing, or (2) perish. The metaphors are military throughout this discussion.
- e 2 ὑπομένον δὲ κτλ. These words explain the following. 'It refuses to be something other than it was by holding its ground and admitting smallness.' Here ὑπομένειν 'to hold one's ground' is used as the opposite of ὑπεκχωρεῖν 'to get out of the way', 'to withdraw in favour of' (its opposite).
- e 3 ωσπερ έγω κτλ. Socrates can 'admit' either greatness or smallness without ceasing to be Socrates; but the greatness which is 'in' Socrates cannot 'admit' smallness.

- e 5 τετόλμηκεν seems to be suggested by the military metaphor.
- 03 a Ι ἐν τούτφ τῷ παθήματι, 'when this happens to it,' i. e. when it is attacked by its opposite.
 - a 4 οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι is probably nothing more than a touch of realism. We need not look for covert meanings.
 - a 5 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . . . λόγοις: 70 d 7 sqq.
 ἡμῶν is the reading of W, but ὑμῶν (ΒΤ) is also possible.
 - a 8 αὕτη εἰναι, 'to be this,' a change of construction from τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι. Both the personal and the impersonal construction are admissible with ὡμολογεῖτο.
 - a II παραβαλών την κεφαλήν, 'turning his head' as one naturally would to a new speaker (not 'bending').
 - b 3 τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα: i.e. the thing in which there is an opposite form. It is a cold thing that becomes hot and a hot thing that becomes cold; hot does not become cold, or cold hot. In the previous illustration Socrates is the σμικρὸν πρᾶγμα which may become μέγα, though smallness cannot admit greatness.
 - b 5 τὸ ἐν τῆ φύσει (sc. ἐναντίον) is the opposite form αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό as opposed to τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν which is chosen as an instance of the form so far as it is 'in' a thing. For this way of speaking of the εἴδη cp. Rep. 597 b 5 where the 'ideal bed' is spoken of as ἡ ἐν τῆ φύσει οὖσα, and Parm. 132 d 1 τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὅσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῆ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι. All Greek thinkers use the word φίσις of that which they regard as most real. The Ionians meant by it the primary substance (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 13); Socrates means by it the world of εἴδη.
 - b 6 των έχόντων τὰ έναντία: a clearer expression for των έναντίων πραγμάτων.
 - b 7 τη ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμία: cp. 102 b 2.
 - b 8 ων ενόντων: governed by την επωνυμίαν (not gen. abs.).
 - C Ι γένεσιν άλλήλων, 'becoming one another', 'turning into one another'.
 - C 5 Οὐδ' αὖ κτλ. On previous occasions (77 a 8; 86 e 5) we have heard of the doubts of Cebes, but 'he does not feel his doubts return on this point' (Geddes).

καίτοι οὖτι λέγω κτλ. Here we have another hint that the doctrine is not fully worked out. Cp. above 100 d 5 and below 107 b 5.

- C 10 Έτι . . . καὶ τόδε κτλ. We now advance beyond the merely tautological judgements with which we have been dealing hitherto, to judgements of which the subject is a thing and the predicate a form. We have seen that hot will not admit cold or cold heat; we go on to show that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. We advance from the judgement 'A excludes B' to 'a excludes B'.
- C II θερμόν τι καλεις: cp. 64 c 2 n. It will be found helpful to keep this simple instance in mind all through the following passage.
- C 13 ὅπερ is regularly used to express identity. A is not identical with a nor B with b.
 - е 2 "Ести... йстє: cp. 93 b 4 n.
 - e 3 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος, 'its own name,' the name of the εἶδος, e.g. hot or cold (ἀξιοῦσθαι, 'to be entitled to').
 - e 4 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, sc. ἀξιοῦσθαι αὐτοῦ, i. e. τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ εἴδους,
 e. g. fire and snow; for fire is always hot and snow is always cold.
 - e 5 τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν: i.e. τὴν ἐκείνου ἰδέαν, τὸ ἐκείνου εἶδος. The three words are synonyms. Observe how the doctrine is formulated. There are things, not identical with the form, which have the form as an inseparable predicate (ἀεί, ὅτανπερ χ).
 - δεῖ . . . τυγχάνειν, i. q. ἀξιοῦται.
 ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν, SC. τὸ περιττόν.
- 104 a 2 μετὰ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ὀνόματος, 'along with its own name,' whatever that may be. In addition to its own name we must also call it odd (τοῦτο καλεῖν, sc. περιττόν) because it is essentially (φύσει, cp. πεφυκέναι) odd.
 - a 3 λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι κτλ., 'I mean by the case mentioned (αὐτό) such a case as that of the number three,' which is not only entitled to the name 'three', but also, and essentially, to the name 'odd'. Similarly fire is not only entitled to the name 'fire', but also, and essentially, to the name 'hot'.
 - a 6 ὅντος οὐχ ὅπερ κτλ. Most editors adopt Heindorf's conjecture οὖπερ for ὅπερ, which is demanded by grammar; for ὅπερ ought to be followed by ἡ τριάς (sc. ἐστίν). On the other hand, it may be urged that ὅπερ was so common in geometry, especially to express ratios, that it may hardly have been felt to be declinable. It is a symbol like: or =, and nothing more.
 - **a** δ ημισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας, 'one whole half of the numerical series.' For ὁ ημισυς instead of τὸ ημισυ see L. & S. s v. I. 2, and, for

the expression, Theaet. 147 e 5 τον ἀριθμον πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν ('we divided into two equal parts').

- b 2 ὁ ἔτερος . . . στίχος, 'the other row' or 'series'.
- b 10 ἐπιούσης . . . c 2 ὑπομεῖναι: the military metaphors are still kept up. Cp. 102 d 9 n.
 - C I ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα, as if dependent on φαίνεται, b 7, the intervening ἔοικε being ignored. We are now able to say that things which have opposite forms as their inseparable predicate refuse to admit the form opposite to that which is 'in' them, but either perish or withdraw at its approach. The simplest instance is that of snow which is not opposite to heat, but melts at its approach.
 - d I τάδε . . . & κτλ. We are not defining a class of ϵἴδη, but a class of things (c 8 ἄλλ' ἄττα) which are not αὐτὰ ἐναντία to the 'attacking' form. It has not been suggested in any way that fire and snow are ϵἴδη, and it seems improbable that they are so regarded. On the other hand, 'three,' which, for the purposes of the present argument, is quite on a level with fire and snow, is spoken of (d 5) as an ἰδϵα. It is this uncertainty which creates all the difficulties of the present passage. That, however, is not surprising; for, in the Parmenides, Plato represents Socrates as hesitating on this very point, and as doubtful whether he ought to speak of an ϵίδοs of 'man, fire, or water'. This, however, does not affect the argument. We need only speak of 'things' without deciding whether they are 'forms' or not.

å ὅτι ἀν κατάσχη κτλ. Things which, though not themselves opposite to a given thing, do not withstand its attack, are 'those which, if one of them has taken possession of anything, it compels it not only to assume its own form, but also in every case that of something opposite to it' (i.e. to the attacking form). The illustration given just below makes it quite clear that this is the meaning, though the pronouns are a little puzzling, and will be dealt with in separate notes. The verb κατέχειν keeps up the military metaphor; for to 'occupy' a position is χωρίον κατέχειν.

d 2 τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν, sc. τὴν τοῦ κατασχόντος. There is nothing abnormal in the shift from plural (ä) to singular in a case like this. After an indefinite plural some such subject as 'any one of them' is often to be supplied, and κατάσχη is felt to be singular in meaning as well

as in form, as is shown by ὅτι ἄν and αὐτό, whereas at d 5 we have â âν κατάσχη duly followed by αὐτοῖς. For the change of number cp. also 70 e 5 n. and Laws 667 b 5 δεῖ τόδε . . . ὑπάρχειν ἄπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεταί τις χάρις, ἡ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον (sc. τὴν χάριν) αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι κτλ.

- d 2 αὐτό refers to ὅτι ἀν κατάσχη, the thing occupied. For the slight pleonasm cp. 99b6; III c 8. The meaning is fixed by d 6 ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖε referring to ἀ ἀν . . . κατάσχη.
- d 3 αὐτῷ is omitted by most editors, but the meaning of ἐναντίου is by no means clear without a dative. If we remember once more that we are defining a class of things which do not hold their ground before the onset of an opposite, it is not difficult to interpret αὐτῷ as 'the opposite in question' implied in τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα above. This is also borne out by the illustration given below. It is the form of the odd which prevents the approach of the even to three, just as it is the form of cold which prevents the approach of heat to snow. (Cp. below e 9 τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιψέρει. This last passage is strongly against the reading δεῖ for ἀεί, which
- d 12 ἡ περιττή, sc. μορφή. There does not seem to be any other instance of this brachylogy. The normal use is seen just below in ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου.

I regard as a mere corruption (AΕΙ, ΔΕΙ).

- e 5 'Aνάρτιος άρα. The precise point of this step in the argument only emerges at 105 d 13 sqq. The term περιττός, 'odd,' does not at first seem parallel to a term like ἀνθάνατος. As Wohlrab says, the point would not require to be made in German; for in that language the odd is called das Ungerade.
- e 7 δρίσασθαι: W has όρίσασθαι δείν, which gives the meaning, but is probably due to interpolation. Tr. 'What I said we were to define'.

ποῖα κτλ. Fire, for instance, is not opposite to cold nor snow to heat, yet fire will not admit cold, nor will snow admit heat.

e 8 αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον. It is plain from αὐτὸ δέχεται in the next line that αὐτό must refer to the same thing as τινί, and, in that case, τὸ ἐναντίον can only be added if we suppose τινί to mean virtually τῶν ἐναντίων τινί, 'one of a pair of opposites,' and take αὐτό as 'the opposite in question'. I cannot attach any appropriate sense to the vulgate αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, which ought to mean 'what is actually

opposite to it', which would imply e.g. that snow will not admit the cold. The same objection applies to the variant αὐτφ τὸ ἐναντίον adopted by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum. Wyttenbach proposed either to delete τὸ ἐναντίον or to read τὸ οὐκ ἐναντίον. The former proposal would simplify the sentence; the latter shows that he understood it.

- e 8 vûv, 'in the present case.'
- e 10 ἐπιφίρει is another military metaphor (cp. ἐπιφέρειν πόλεμον, bellum inferre, ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν &c.). Tr. 'it always brings into the field its opposite', i. e. τὸ περιττόν. It is very important to notice that ἐπιφέρειν is always used of the thing 'attacked', while ἐπιέναι and κατέχειν are used of the thing which 'attacks' it. 'Επιφέρειν refers to the means of defence. It is, we may say, τὸ ἀμυνόμενον which ἐναντίον τι ἐπιφέρει τῷ ἐπιάντι. Further, ἐπιέναι is not the same thing as κατέχειν, which implies a successful ἔφοδος.

ή δυας τῷ περιττῷ, SC. τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπις έρει, i. e. τὸ ἄρτιον.

- a I άλλ' δρα κτλ. ἀλλά resumes after the parenthesis with a slight anacoluthon.
- a 2 μὴ μόνον κτλ. Taking the same instance as before, not only does cold refuse to admit its opposite, heat, but so does snow, which always brings cold (which is the opposite of heat) into the field against it in self-defence.
- a 3 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο κτλ. All editors seem to take ἐκεῖνο as subject of δέξασθαι and antecedent to δ ἄν ἐπιφέρη, but that leads to great difficulties, the chief of which are that we have to refer εκείνω to something other than ἐκείνο and to take ἐφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτὸ ἵη of the thing which is being attacked instead of the attacking form. Riddell (Dig. § 19) took ἐκεῖνο (sc. ὁρίζη) as an accusative pronoun in apposition to what follows. I prefer to take it as the object of δέξασθαι and closely with ἐφ' ὅτι ἄν αὐτὸ ἵη. The subject of δέξασθαι will then be δ ἄν ἐπιφέρη τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνω. Then αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον repeats δ ἄν ἐπιφέρη κτλ. and τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα repeats ἐκεῖνο. We have thus an instance of interlaced order (a b a b) which is, I take it, what Socrates means by speaking συγγραφικώς.
- a 5 οὐ . . . χεῖρον, 'it is just as well.'
- a 6 την του άρτίου, sc. ιδέαν. Cp. 104 d 14.
- 2 7 το διπλάσιον, in apposition to τὰ δέκα, 'which is the double of five,' and therefore an even number.

- a 8 τοῦτο μέν οὖν κτλ. I formerly inserted οὐκ before ἐναντίον with most editors, but this leaves καί and the concessive μέν οὖν without any meaning. I now interpret: 'It is quite true that this (the double) is itself opposite to another thing (viz. the single, $\tau \delta (\hat{a}\pi\lambda \hat{o}\hat{v}\nu)$; but at the same time it will also refuse to admit the form of the odd' (to which it is not itself opposite). The reason is, of course, that τὸ διπλάσιον always ἐπιφέρει τὸ ἄρτιον, brings the even into the field to resist the attack of the odd; for all doubles are even numbers. It goes without saying that it will not admit τὸ άπλοῦν which is its own opposite.
- οὐδὲ δὴ κτλ. The almost accidental mention of double and single b i suggests another opposition, that of integral and fractional. With Heindorf, I take the construction to be οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον $(\frac{3}{2})$ οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ημισυ $(\frac{1}{2})$ καὶ τριτημόριον αν $(\frac{1}{3})$ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα (δέχεται) τὴν τοῦ ὅλου (ἰδέαν). If we observe the slight colloquial hyperbaton of τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, there is no need to interpret τὸ ημισυ in an artificial way (as 'fractions whose denominator is 2', like $\frac{3}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$) or to delete it. No given fraction is itself opposite to τὸ ὅλον, but they all 'bring into the field' την του μορίου ιδέαν in self-defence against the attack of τὸ ὅλον.
- ο αν έρωτω, 'in the terms of my question' (Church). The b 5 readings of the MSS. vary considerably, but the meaning is clear from the sequel.

b 6 λίγω δη κτλ., 'I say this because, as a result of our present argument, I see another possibility of safety over and above (παρ') that safe answer I spoke of at first' (100 d 8).

- φ αν τί κτλ., 'what must be present in anything, in its body (i.e. 'in a thing's body'), to make it warm?' The text is not quite certain, and it would no doubt be simpler to omit ἐν τῷ with Stephanus, thus making the construction the same as in c 3. It is possible, however, to understand $\epsilon \nu \tau \hat{\omega} \sigma \hat{\omega} \mu a \tau \iota$ as a further explanation of ω αν έγγένηται, so I have let it stand.
- την έμαθη, 'foolish.' Cp. 100 d 3. The irony is kept up.
- κομψοτίραν: κομψός is the urbane equivalent of σοφός, and αμαθής is the regular opposite of σοφός (cp. 101 c 8). We are taking a step. towards the κομψείαι which we deprecated before. έκ τῶν νῦν: cp. b 7. φ αν πῦρ. It is safe to say this because θερμότης is an inseparable predicate of $\pi \hat{v} \rho$, and so the presence of fire is a sufficient airia of

122

bodily heat. This does not mean in the least that fire is the only such cause, as appears clearly from the other instances. There are other causes of disease than fever, and other odd numbers than the number one $(\hat{\eta} \mu \nu \nu \hat{u} s)$.

- d 3 Ψυχὴ ἄρα κτλ. Previously we could only say that participation in the form of life was the cause of life; but, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων, we may substitute ψυχή for ζωή, just as we may substitute πῦρ, πυρετός, μονάς for θερμότης, νόσος, περιττότης. There is not a word about the soul being itself a form or είδος, nor is such an assumption required. The soul may perfectly well be said to 'occupy' the body without being itself an ἰδέα. It is a simple military metaphor (cp. 104 d 1 n.), and implies no metaphysical theory.
- d το Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ κτλ. The point is that, though ψυχή itself is not opposite to anything, it always 'brings into the field' something which has an opposite, namely life. We may say, then, that soul will not admit that opposite (i. e. death), but must either withdraw before it or perish.
- d 13 Τί οὖν κτλ. The point here is mainly verbal. It has to be shown that what does not admit θάνατος may be called ἀθάνατος.
 - e 1 "Αμουσον . . . τὸ δὲ ἄδικον stands for τὸ μὲν ἄμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον by an idiom of which Plato is specially fond. Cp. Prot. 330 a 3 ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, Theaet. 181 d 5 δίο δὴ λέγω . . . εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν, Rep. 455 e 6 γυνὴ ἰατρική, ἡ δ' οὕ, καὶ μουσική, ἡ δ' ἄμουσος φύσει.
- e 10 Τί οὖν κτλ. It has been proved that the soul will not admit death; but we have still to deal with two possible alternatives; for it may either 'withdraw' or 'perish'. This alternative actually exists in all other cases; but in the case of τὸ ἀθάνατον the second is excluded; for τὸ ἀθάνατον is ipso facto ἀνώλεθρον. Therefore the soul must 'withdraw' at the approach of death.
- 6 a τ ἄλλο τι... ἥ, nonne. The interposition of the subject is unusual, but cp. 106 e 1. There is no contradiction in saying that 'the uneven' is perishable. If there were, three would be imperishable because it may be substituted for 'the uneven'.
 - a 3 τὸ ἄθερμον, though the reading rests only on the authority of the corrector of T, must be right (θερμὸν BTW Stob.). The word is coined, like ἀνάρτιος, to furnish a parallel to ἀθάνατος. Snow is to τὸ ἄθερμον as soul is to τὸ ἀθάνατον.

- a 4 ἐπάγοι: another military metaphor.
- **a** 8 τὸ άψυκτον: Wyttenbach conjectured ἄψυχρον to correspond with ἄθερμον, but ἄψυκτον, 'what cannot be cooled,' is a better parallel in sense, if not in form, to ἀθάνατον.
- C Ι αὐτοῦ, SC. τοῦ περιττοῦ: ἀντ' ἐκείνου, SC. ἀντὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ.
- d 2 τούτου γε ένεκα: cp. 85 b 8.
- d 3 μη δέχοιτο: I can find no parallel to this use of μη. There are instances of μη with the potential optative in interrogations introduced by πῶs or τίνα τρόπον. We might have had πῶs αν... μη δέχοιτο; 'how could anything else avoid receiving?' and this is virtually what the sentence means (G. M. T. § 292).
- 107 a 5 ἀναβάλλοιτο is an instance of the optative without ἄν often found after such phrases as (οὐκ) ἔσθ' ὅστις . . . , (οὐκ) ἔσθ' ὅπως.
 - b 6 ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον, if the text is sound, is a very striking anacoluthon due to the parenthesis. This sentence is just like the reference to the μακροτέρα όδός in Rep. 435 d and the μακροτέρα περίοδος, iδ. 504 b. It is clear that the πρῶται ὑποθέσεις which are to be re-examined are just those mentioned above, 100 b 5, that is to say, the 'Theory of Ideas' in the form in which it is presented to us in the Phaedo. Whether Socrates was conscious that the theory required revision, I am not prepared to say; but it is clear that Plato was. The re-examination of these ὑποθέσεις is to be found chiefly in the Parmenides and the Sophist, both dialogues in which Socrates does not lead the discussion.
 - b 9 τοῦτο αὐτό, viz. that you have followed up the argument as far as is humanly possible. If you make sure (σαφές) of this, you need seek no further. The argument ends with a fresh confession of the weakness of human arguments. Cp. 85 c 1 sqq.

οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω: cp. Tim. 29 c 8 ἀγαπᾶν χρή, μεμνημένους ώς ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν.

The conclusion of the whole matter. The Myth (107c1-115a8).

C 2 είπερ ή ψυχή ἀθάνατος κτλ. Cp. Rep. 608 c 9 Τί οὖν; οἴει ἀθανάτφ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός;

- C 3 ἐν ῷ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, 'for which what is called life lasts.' For this way of speaking cp. Π. xi. 757 κ.ιὶ 'Αλησίου ἔνθα κολώνη | κέκληται. Wyttenbach quotes several poetical parallels and Xen. Hell. v. 1. 10 ἔνθα ἡ Τριπυργία καλείται.
- C 4 νθν δή, nunc demum. Cp. 61 e 6 n.
- C 6 ἔρμαιον, 'a godsend,' Schol. τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος. The word was properly used of treasure-trove ('windfall,' aubaine), which was sacred to Hermes. Cp. Symp. 217 a 3 ἔρμαιον ἡγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχη ια ἐμὸν θαυμαστόν and the expression κοινὸς 'Ερμῆς, 'Shares!' (Jebb on Theophrastus, Characters, xxvi. 18).
- c 8 νῦν δέ, 'but, as it is . . . '
- d 4 τροφής: cp. 81 d 8 n.

λέγεται, sc. έν τῷ λόγῳ, in the mystic doctrine. Cp. 67 c 5 n.

- d 6 δ ἐκάστου δαίμων: cp. for the mystic doctrine of the guardian δαίμων Menander (fr. 550 Kock) "Απαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται | εὐθὺς γενομένω μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου. The idea that the δαίμων has a soul allotted to it as its portion appears in the Ερίταρλίος of Lysias 78 ὅ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῦραν εἰληχώς, and Theocritus iv. 40 αἰαῖ τῶ σκληρῶ μάλα δαίμονος ὅς με λελόγχει. It was doubtless the common view, but is denied by Socrates in the Myth of Er (Rep. 617 e 1), where the προφήτης says: οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε.
- d 7 είς δή τινα τόπον κτλ. We learn what the place was from Gorg. 524 a I οὖτοι οὖν . . . δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι. The 'meadow' of Judgement is Orphic. Note the use of δή τις in allusion to something mysterious. Cp. 108 c I; 115 d 4. So δς δή, 107 e I, 2. All through this passage δή is used to suggest something known to the speaker and to those whom he addresses, but of which they shrink from speaking.
- d 8 διαδικασαμένους κτλ. In Rep. 614 c4 we read that the Judges, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, bade the righteous proceed to the right upwards and the wicked to the left downwards. The active is used of the judges and the middle of the parties who submit their claims to judgement (cp. 113 d 3). The meaning cannot be, as has been suggested, 'when they have received their various sentences,' for that would require the passive, and διαδικάζεσθαι always means 'to submit rival claims to a court'.
- e I ώδή: cp. d 7 n.

- e I τους ένθένδε: cp. 76 d 8 n.
- 6 2 ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν: cp. d 7 π. I have adopted δή from Stobaeus rather than the MS. δεῖ, which reads awkwardly. Cp. Crat. 400 c 5 ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα δίδωσιν (referring to the Orphic doctrine).
- 6 4 ἐν πολλαῖς . . . περιόδοις (ἐν of the time a thing takes cp. 58 b 8 n.).
 In Rep. 615 a 2 we have a χιλιέτης πορεία, consisting of ten περίοδοι of a hundred years each. In the Phaedrus (249 a) the περίοδοι are longer.
- e 5 ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος. The references to this quotation in other writers seem to be derived from the present passage, not from the original play.
- 108 a 4 σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους, 'partings of the way and bifurcations.' The reading τριόδους was that of Proclus and Olympiodorus and is much better than the MS. περιόδους, which is probably due to περιόδους in e 4. It is the only reading which gives a proper sense to the next clause (see next note), and goes much better with σχίσεις. Cp. also Gorg. 524 a 2 ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῷ τριόδω ἐξ ἡς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. Virgil, Aen. vi. 540 Hic locus est partes ubi se via findit in ambas.
 - a 5 θυσιῶν is better attested (TW Stob.) than the ὁσίων of B, though that is an ancient variant (γρ. W). The MS. of Proclus, in Remp. (85. 6 Kroll), has οὐσιῶν, which explains the corruption (0 for θ). The reading θυσιῶν alone fits the explanation of Olympiodorus, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τριόδοις τιμῶν τῆς Ἑκάτης (cp. last note). The sacrifices to Hecate (Trivia) at the meeting of three ways are well attested, and Socrates means that these shadow forth the τρίοδος in the other world.
 - 2 7 οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα: i.e. the purified soul is familiar with the region through which it must travel.
 - α 8 έν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν: 81 C 10.
 - περὶ ἐκεῖνο (sc. τὸ σῶμα)... ἐπτοημένη, 'in eager longing for'. The verb πτοεῖσθαι always refers to fluttering or palpitation of the heart, often, as here, caused by desire. For desire of the corporeal in a disembodied soul cp. 81 e 1.
 - b 4 ὅθιπερ: Cobet proposed οἶπερ, but cp. 113 a 2 οὖ · · · ἀφικυοῦνται (where, however, Schanz reads οἶ). The poetical form is not out of place here.

- b 5 τοιοθτον: i. e. ἀκάθαρτον.
- b 7 ταύτην μέν resumes την μέν above.
- b 8 συνέμπορος: συνοδοιπόρος Timaeus. The word is poetical, like the use of the simple ἔμπορος for 'wayfarer'. αὐτή, 'by itself', 'alone'.
- C I κως ἃν . . . γένωνται, 'till they have passed.' The χρόνοι are the περίοδοι. Cp. Prot. 320 a 7 πρὶν έξ μῆνας γεγονέναι.
 δή τινες: cp. 107 d 7 n.
- C 2 ὧν ἐλθόντων, 'when they are gone,' i.e. when they have passed. ὑπ' ἀνάγκης is equivalent, as often, to ἐξ ἀνάγκης. There is no personification.
- С 3 μετρίως: i. e. καλώς. Ср. 68 e 2 n.
- C 7 τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν. From the time of Anaximander and Hecataeus the construction of γῆς περίοδοι had been a feature of Ionic science (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 53, n. 4). Aristophanes mentions a περίοδος containing the whole earth as among the furniture of the φροντιστήριον (Clouds 206). In this passage, as we shall see, Socrates abandons the central doctrine of Ionian geography.
- C 8 υπό τινος πέπεισμαι. It is best not to inquire too curiously who this was. It was not Archelaus; for he believed the earth to be a flat disk hollow in the centre. It was not Anaximander; for he regarded the earth as cylindrical. It was not a Pythagorean; for the 'hollows' are distinctively Ionian. The influence of Empedocles on the details of the description is well marked. Such an attempt to reconcile opposing views may well have been made at Athens during the second half of the fifth century B.C., but hardly at any other time or anywhere else. Personally, I am quite willing to believe that the theory is that of Socrates himself. It can scarcely have been seriously entertained by Plato at the time he wrote the Phaedo: but it continued to have great influence. The cosmology of Posidonius, as we know it from the Περὶ κόσμου wrongly included in the Aristotelian corpus, is based upon that of the Phaedo, and it was in substance the cosmology of Posidonius which ultimately prevailed over the more scientific doctrines of the Academy, and dominated European thought till the time of Copernicus. The leading thought is that, if the earth is spherical, there must be other οἰκούμεναι than the one we know; for our οἰκουμένη is but a small portion of the surface of the sphere.

- d 4 οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη: Eusebius has οὐχὶ ἡ, so perhaps we should read οὐχὶ for οὐχ ἡ with Heindorf, who shows that later writers quote the proverb in this form. The paroemiographers give several explanations of it, the simplest of which is that it comes ἀπὸ Γλαύκου Σαμίου ὁς πρῶτον κόλλησιν ἐφεῦρε σιδήρου (cp. Hdt. i. 25). I believe, however, that the more complicated explanation is right, and that the reference is to a working model of the harmony of the spheres' originally designed by Hippasus, for which see Appendix II.
- d 5 α γ' έστίν, sc. å πέπεισμαι, ώς μέντοι άληθη, sc. πέπεισμαι, χαλεπώτερον, sc. διηγήσασθαι.
- d 9 ἐξαρκεῖν is the best attested reading, but that of B, ἐξαρκεῖ, might stand, if we take μοι δοκεῖ as a parenthesis.
- e 4 Πέπεισμαι ώς . . . δείν: anacoluthon.
- e 5 ἐν μέσφ . . . περιφερής οὖσα: the original Pythagorean doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 345). Note the propriety with which οὖρανός is used for 'the world', i.e. everything contained within the heavens (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 31). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates adopt the later Pythagorean view, that the earth revolves round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.).
- 109 a 1 dépos: the accepted lonian doctrine (cp. 99 b 8 n.).
 - την ομοιότητα, 'its equiformity.' This is another instance of a 2 historical accuracy in terminology; for the terms ομοιος and όμοιότης were originally employed where toos and loorns would have been used later. Cp. Proclus' Commentary on the First Book of Euclid, p. 250. 22 Friedlein λέγεται γάρ δή πρώτος έκεινος (Θαλής) έπιστήσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ως ἄρα παντὸς Ισοσκελοῦς αἱ πρὸς τῆ βάσει γωνίαι ίσαι είσίν (Eucl. i. 5), ἀρχαϊκώτερον δὲ τὰς ίσας όμοίας προσειρηκέναι. Just as what we call equal angles were called similar angles, so a sphere was said to be 'similar every way'. Aristotle ascribes both the theory and the use of the term όμοιότης to Anaximander (de Coelo 295 b 11 εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁ μοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν γῆν) μένειν, ωσπερ των ἀρχαίων 'Αναξίμανδρος' μαλλον μεν γάρ οὐθεν ἄνω ἡ κάτω ή είς τὰ πλάγια Φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ίδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίως πρός τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον, ἄμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τάναντία ποιείσθαι τὴν κίνησιν' ωστ' έξ ανάγκης μένειν. It is quite wrong to take όμοιότης as referring to homogeneity of substance or density. As we shall see, the world is not homogeneous in substance at all.
 - a 3 της γης αὐτης την ισορροπίαν, 'the equilibrium of the earth itself.'

Anaximander's cylindrical earth could hardly be called lσόρροπον like the Pythagorean spherical earth in the centre of a spherical world (οὐρανός).

- 6 ὁμοίως . . . ἔχον is equivalent to ὅμοιον ὅν (πάντη). Cp. Aristotle loc. cit. (a 2 n.) ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον.
- a 8 Καὶ ὀρθῶs γε. The ready assent of Simmias marks the doctrine, so far, as Pythagorean.
- 3 πάμμεγά τι είναι is a direct contradiction of Archelaus, who said κείσθαι δ' εν μέσω (την γην) οὐδεν μέρος οὖσαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, τοῦ παντός (Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9. 3).
 αὐτό, sc. τὴν γην. Cp. 88 a 6.
- D I τοὺς μέχρι κτλ. The Pillars of Herakles are well known as the boundary of the οἰκουμένη on the west, and Aeschylus spoke of the Phasis as the boundary of Europe and Asia (fr. 185) δίδυμον χθονὸς Εὐρώπης | μέγαν ἢδ' ᾿Ασίας τερμόνα Φᾶσιν), cp. Hdt. iv. 45. So Eur. Ηἰρφ. 3 ὅσοι τε Πόντου τερμόνων τ' ᾿Ατλαντικῶν | ναίουσιν εἴσω.
- b 2 περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, 'dwelling round the Mediterranean (the θάλαττα κατ' ἐξοχήν) like frogs or ants round a swamp.' (Cp. Εt. Μ. τέλμα* τόπος πηλώδης ὕδωρ ἔχων.)
- b 3 καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι κτλ. As Wyttenbach saw, this part of the theory comes from Anaxagoras (and Archelaus). Cp. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 8. 9 εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν γῆν) κοίλην καὶ ἔχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασιν (᾿Αναξαγόρας φησίν), ib. 9. 4 λίμνην γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον (τὴν γῆν), ἄτε κύκλῳ μὲν οὖσαν ὑψηλήν, μέσον δὲ κοίλην (᾿Αρχέλαός φησιν), a view which is obviously a generalization from the Mediterranean basin. Here it is combined with the theory of a spherical earth (Anaxagoras and Archelaus believed in a flat earth), and it is assumed that there are several such basins with water in the middle and inhabited land round them. According to Posidonius, too, there were many οἰκούμεναι, but they were islands, not hollows.
- b 6 τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. Here again Plato correctly represents fifth-century science, according to which water is condensed air, mist being the intermediate state between them (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 79, n. 1). The discovery of atmospheric air as a body different from mist was due to Empedocles (ib. p. 263) and Anaxagoras (ib. p. 309); but it appears that the Pythagoreans adhered to the older view. Cp. Tim. 58 d I ἀέρος (γένη) τὸ μὲν εὐαγέστατον ἐπίκλην αἰθὴρ καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ θολερώτατος ὁμίχλη τε καὶ σκότος.

- b 7 αὐτὴν... τὴν γῆν: the true surface of the earth (called below 'the true earth'), as opposed to the basins or 'hollows'. It rises above the mist and 'air'. It is clear that we are to suppose considerable distances between the basins.
- b 8 aiθέρα: aiθήρ is properly the sky regarded as made of blue fire. This, as we see from the passage of the Timaeus quoted in the last note, was supposed to be air still further rarefied. It is the intermediary between fire and air, as $\delta\mu i\chi\lambda\eta$ is that between air and water.
- C I τοὺς πολλούς κτλ. This implies that Socrates knows the divergent views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former of whom gave the name αἰθήρ to atmospheric air (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 263 sq.), while the latter used it of fire (ib. p. 312 π. 1).

τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν: I do not know any other instance of περὶ c. acc. after λέγειν in Plato (Gorg. 490 c 8 is not one; for πλέον ἔχειν is 'understood' and λέγεις is parenthetical). I am inclined to think the words εἰωθότων λέγειν have been wrongly added from 108 c 7. For the resulting phrase cp. Phaedr. 272 c 7 ον (λόγον) τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἀκήκοα, ib. 273 a 5 τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

- c 2 ὑποστάθμην, 'sediment,' lit. 'lees' (τρυγία, τρύξ Hesych.). Note that air, mist, and water are the sediment of the αἰθήρ.
- d 4 παρὰ σφίσι: Socrates is thinking of a whole people dwelling at the bottom of the sea. This is not inconsistent with εἴ τις above (c 4); for εἴ τις is continued by a plural oftener than not.
- d 7 δια τούτου, SC. δια του άέρος.
- d 8 το δε είναι ταὐτόν, 'whereas it is just the same thing' with us as with the imaginary dwellers at the bottom of the sea. For το δε cp. 87 c 6 n. I see no reason to suspect the text. The asyndeton explicativum is quite in order; for είναι ταὐτόν is explanatory of ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι (cp. 72 c 3 n.).
- e 2 ἐπ' ἄκρα: the surface of the 'air' is parallel to that of the sea (d I).
- e 3 κατιδείν (ἄν): the δή of Eusebius is probably a trace of the lost ἄν (ΑΝ, ΔΗ), which might easily be dropped by haplography.
- 6 4 ἀνακύπτοντες: cp. Phaedr. 249 c 3 (ψυχή) ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ δυ ὅντως. The position of the attributive participle outside the article and its noun is normal when there is another attribute. Cp. Phil. 21 c 2 τῆς ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης.

- 6 5 οῦτως ἄν τινα . . . κατιδεῖν is a good instance of a form of 'binary structure', noted by Riddell (Dig. § 209), in which 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it' (a b a).
- e 7 ὁ ἀληθῶs . . . τὸ ἀληθινὸν . . ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς: observe how Plato varies the expression.
- O a I ἥδε . . ἡ γῆ, 'this earth of ours,' i.e. the hollow in which we dwell and which we take to be the surface of the earth.
 - a 5 σήραγγες, σηραγέ, υφαλος πέτρα ρήγματα έχουσα, Hesych., Suid.
 - a 6 ὅπου ἀν καὶ [ἡ] γῆ ἡ, 'wherever there is earth' to mix with the water. Though there is no good authority for the omission of ἡ, it is certainly better away.
 - a 8 ἐκεῖνα, the things above on the true earth which are in turn (αὖ) as superior to what we have as those are to the things in the sea.
 - b I εἰ γὰρ δὴ . . . καλόν is far the best attested reading, though B omits καλόν and alters δή to δεῖ. Olympiodorus apparently had δεῖ and καλόν, for he finds it necessary to explain why the μῦθος is called beautiful. It is to be observed that a μῦθος is only in place where we cannot apply the strictly scientific method. There is nothing 'mythical' about the εἴδη, but all we call 'natural science' is necessarily so, as is explained at the beginning of the Timaeus. It is, at best, a 'probable tale'. Cp. Taylor, Plato, pp. 50-2.
 - b 6 ἡ γῆ αὐτή, 'the true earth.'
 - ἄσπερ αὶ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, 'like balls made of twelve pieces of leather.' This is an allusion to the Pythagorean theory of the dodecahedron, which was of special significance as the solid which most nearly approaches the sphere (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 341 sq.). To make a ball, we take twelve pieces of leather, each of which is a regular pentagon. If the material were not flexible, we should have a regular dodecahedron; as it is flexible, we get a ball. This has nothing to do with the twelve signs of the zodiac, as modern editors incorrectly say. Cp. Tim. 55 c 4 ἔτι δὲ οὕσης συστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτης (a fifth regular solid besides the pyramid or tetrahedron, the cube, and the icosahedron), ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῆ κατεχρήσατο ἐκείνο διαζωγραφῶν ('when he painted it', see next note). The author of the Timaeus Locrus is perfectly right in his paraphrase of this (98 e) τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαίρας ἐόν. The whole matter is fully explained in Wyttenbach's note,

from which it will be seen that it was clearly understood by Plutarch, Simplicius, and others. Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid, shows how the whole edifice of the Elements leads up to the inscription of the regular solids (κοσμικὰ οτ Πλατωνικὰ σχήματα) in the sphere.

- b 7 χρώμασιν διειλημμένη. The true earth is represented as a patchwork of different colours (for διειλημμένη cp. 81 c 4 n.). This must be the explanation of the words ἐκείνο διαζωγραφῶν, 'painting it in different colours' (cp. διαποικίλλω). Each of the twelve pentagons has its own colour.
- b 8 δείγματα, 'samples.' In the same way our precious stones are 'pieces' (μορία) of the stones of the true earth (below, d 8).
- C 2 πολύ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων: for the position of ἐκ cp. 7ο c 1 n. ἢ τούτων: the case after ή assimilated to that before it (Riddell, Dig. § 168). Cp. Meno 83 c 8 ἀπὸ μείζονος . . . ἡ τοσαύτης γράμμης, Laws 892 b 1 οὔσης γ' αὐτῆς (sc. ψυχῆς) πρεσβυτέρας ἡ σώματος.

την μέν ..., sc. $\gamma \hat{\eta} \nu$, 'one portion of it,' one pentagon.

- C 4 την δε σση λευκή, 'all the part of it which is white.'
- c 6 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κτλ. The meaning is that, as the basins or 'hollows' are full of 'air' and water, the surfaces of these produce the appearance of glistening patches among the other colours, so that the general appearance is that of a continuous (συνεχές) surface of various colours (ποικίλον).
- C 7 ἔκπλεα is quite a good word, and there is no need to read ἔμπλεα with inferior authorities.
- d 3 avà λόγον, 'proportionally.'
- d 6 τήν τε λειότητα: so W. B makes the almost inevitable mistake την τελειότητα, and so at first did T, but erased it in time.
- d 7 ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα, 'the precious stones that are so highly prized in our world.' Prof. Ridgeway has some interesting observations on the relation between the Pythagorean solids and natural crystals in Class. Rev. x (1896) p. 92 sqq.
- e 1 οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ, 'every one of them.' The phrase is regularly treated as a single word equivalent to πάντα. Hence the plural καλλίω.
- e 3 οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι κτλ. Another instance of interlaced order (a b a b); for ωσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο συνερρυηκότων go closely together, and ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης goes with διε-

- φθαρμένοι (so Stallbaum). The συνερρυηκότα are water, mist, and air (cp. 109 b 6).
- c 5 τοῖs ἄλλοις, 'to animals and plants besides.' Cp. Gorg. 473 c 7 ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων.
- 1 a ι ἐκφανῆ, 'exposed to view,' not, as with us, hidden beneath the earth.
 - a 6 ἐννήσοις κτλ. This is an attempt to fit the old idea of the Islands of the Blest into the mythical landscape. Cp. Pindar, Ol. ii. 130 ἔνθα μακάρων | νᾶσος ἀκεανίδες | αὖραι περιπνέοισιν, which is humourously paraphrased by το περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα, the air being the sea in which these islands are. But they are 'close to the mainland', otherwise we should see them from our hollow! The suggestion of Olympiodorus, that these men feed on the apples of the Hesperides, is therefore not so wide of the mark as might appear.
 - a 7 ὅπερ... τοῦτο..., the regular way of expressing a proportion. Cp. 110 d 5 ἀνὰ λόγον.
 - b 2 κράσιν, 'temperature.' In Greek, however, as in French, the word has a wider sense than in English. It is not only the due temperamentum of the hot and cold, but also that of the wet and dry (cp. 86 b 9 n.). The κράσις τῶν ὡρῶν is 'climate'.
 - b 4 φρονήσει: sight and hearing stand for the senses generally (hence πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα), to which intelligence must of course be added. It is, therefore, wrong to read ὀσφρήσει with Heindorf. Cp. Rep. 367 c 7 οἷον ὀρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν.
 - b 6 ἄλση: T has έδη, and this reading was adopted by Heindorf from the apographa. In the Lexicon of Timaeus we read έδος τὸ ἄγαλμα. καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ὡ ἴδρυται, and, as the word does not occur elsewhere in Plato, this may indicate that Timaeus read it here, but ἄλση seems better. Cp. Livy, xxxv. 51 in fano lucoque.
 - 6 7 φήμας, 'sacred voices.' Like φάτις and κληδών, φήμη is used of omens conveyed by the hearing of significant words. Virg. Aen. vii.
 90 Et varias audit voces, fruiturque deorum | colloquio.
 - b 8 alσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν: not in dreams or visions, as some say. The point is just that they see the gods with their waking senses.
 - C I αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς, 'face to face.' Here πρὸς αὐτούς (τοὺς θεούς) belongs to συνουσίας and αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) to γίγνεσθαι (a b b a).
 - C 2 οἶα τυγχάνει ὄντα, 'as they really are.' This is an astronomer's vision of blessedness.

NOTES

- c 6 τοὺς μἐν κτλ. Three sorts of τόποι are enumerated (1) deeper and broader (than the Mediterranean basin), (2) deeper and narrower, (3) shallower and broader. The fourth possibility, shallower and narrower, is not mentioned. Plato does not care for symmetry of this kind.
- c 8 αὐτούs: Heindorf read αὐτῶν from inferior MSS., and I formerly conjectured αὖ. No change, however, is necessary. For the pleonasm cp. Riddell, Dig. § 223. It assists the shift from ὄντας to ἔχειν.
- d 2 ὑπὸ γῆν...συντετρῆσθαι, 'are connected by subterranean openings.' This seems to come from Diogenes of Apollonia. Cp. Seneca, Nat. Quaest. iv. 2. 28 sunt enim perforata omnia et invicem pervia. The geological conformation of the country made such views seem very credible in Greece.
- d 5 ωσπερ εἰς κρατήρας: cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1593 κοίλου πέλας κρατήρος ('near the basin in the rock', Jebb). A scholium on this passage of Sophocles runs: τοῦ μυχοῦ τὰ γὰρ κοίλα οὕτως ἐκάλουν ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Αἴτνη κοιλώματα κρατήρες καλοῦνται. Cp. such names as 'The Devil's Punchbowl' in English. It is easier to understand how the crater of a volcano got its name, if we may trust this scholium, and the rocky basins fit in very well with the present context.
- e τ ἐν Σικελία κτλ. This seems to come from the Sicilian Empedocles, who explained the hot springs of his native island by comparing them to pipes used for heating warm baths (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 277). The ῥύαξ is the lava-stream. Cp. Thuc, iii. 116 ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης.
- e 3 ως αν: the MSS, have ων αν, but Stallbaum's conjecture ως αν is now confirmed by Stobaeus.
- e 4 ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κτλ. The theory is thus stated in Aristotle's Μετεωρολογικά, 355 b 32 sqq. τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένον περί τε τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄπαντα μὲν εἰς ἄλληλα συντέτρηται ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων εἴη καὶ πηγὴ τῶν ὑδάτων ὁ καλούμενος Τάρταρος, περὶ τὸ μέσον ὕδατος τι πλῆθος, ἐξ οὖ καὶ τὰ ῥέοντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ῥέοντα ἀναδίδωσι πάντα' τὴν δ' ἐπίρρυσιν ποιείν ἐφ' ἔκαστα τῶν ῥευμάτων διὰ τὸ σαλεύειν ἀεὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν' οὐκ ἔχειν γὰρ ἔδραν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλεῖσθαι (Ι. ἵλλεσθαι, ' oscillate') κινούμενον δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιείν τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τῶν ῥευμάτων. τὰ δὲ πολλαχοῦ μὲν λιμνάζειν, οῖαν καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι θάλασσαν, πάντα δὲ

πάλιν κύκλφ περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅθεν ἤρξαντο ρεῖν, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἶον εἰ ρεῖν ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. εἶναι δὲ μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τὴν κάθεσιν τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν πρὸς ἄναντες ἤδη πᾶσιν εἶναι τὴν Φοράν. τοὺς δὲ χυμοὺς καὶ τὰς χρόας ἴσχειν τὸ ὕδωρ δι' οῖας ἄν τύχωσι ρέοντα γῆς.

- 6 4 ὅσπερ αἰώραν τινά (cp. 66 b 4 n.), 'a sort of see-saw,' ἀντιταλάντωσις Olympiodorus, cp. French balancement from bilancem. The term αλώρησις, gestatio, was familiar in medical practice, where it was used of any exercise in which the body is at rest, sailing, driving, &c. (cp. Tim. 89 a 7), and αλώρα meant a 'swing' or 'hammock' (Laws 789 d 3). Aristotle's paraphrase has διὰ τὸ σαλεύειν. The whole description shows that a sort of pulsation, like the systole and diastole of the heart, is intended. The theory is, in fact, an instance of the analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 79), and depends specially on the Empedoclean view of the close connexion between respiration and the circulation of the blood (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 253).
- 12 a I διαμπερès τετρημένον, 'perforated right through.' Tartarus has another opening antipodal to that first mentioned. We are not told that it is a straight tunnel, but that seems likely, and we shall see that it passes through the centre of the earth. So, too, Dante's Hell is a chasm bored right through the earth (Inferno, xxxiv, sub fin., Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 101).
 - a 2 "Ομηροs: II. viii. 14. 'The Arcadian form of βέρεθρον, scil. ζέρεθρον, was the special name for the singular "Katavothra" of Arcadia' (Geddes). Cp. Strabo, p. 389 τῶν βερέθρων, ἀ καλοῦσιν οἱ ᾿Αρκάδες ζέρεθρα, τυφλῶν ὅντων καὶ μὴ δεχομένων ἀπέρασιν. The whole account of Stymphalus, from which this is taken, is very suggestive of the present passage.
 - a 4 αλλοθι: 11. viii. 481.
 - a 7 δι' οἴας δν...γης: Aristotle (l. c. sub fin.) specifies taste and colour as the characteristics the rivers derive from the earth they flow through.
 - b 2 πυθμένα . . . βάσιν: Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἔδραν. There is no bottom at the centre of the earth. 'On comprendra la pensée de Platon en se rappelant que théoriquement une pierre jetée dans un puits traversant la terre selon un diamètre irait indéfiniment d'une extrémité à l'autre' (Couvreur). We must keep in mind

throughout this passage that everything falls to the earth's centre. The impetus $(\delta\rho\mu\dot{\eta})$ of the water takes it past the centre every time, but it falls back again, and so on indefinitely.

b 3 αἰωρεῖται δὴ κτλ. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλεῖσθαι, for which we must read ἴλλεσθαι, the proper word for oscillatory or pendulum motion. (Cp. Tim. 40 b 8, where I take the meaning

to be the same. E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 346 sq.)

καὶ κυμαίνει: the doxographical tradition connects this with the tides Cp. Aëtius on the ebb and flow of the tides (Dox. p. 383) Πλάτων ἐπὶ τὴν αἰώραν φέρεται τῶν ὑδάτων εἶναι γάρ τινα φυσικὴν αἰώραν διά τινος ἐγγείου τρήματος περιφέρουσαν τὴν παλίρροιαν, ὑφ' ἦς ἀντικυμαίνεσθαι τὰ πελάγη. From this we may infer that there are two oscillations a day.

- b 4 τὸ περὶ αὐτό, sc. τὸ περὶ τὸ ὑγρόν. The πνεῦμα is mentioned because the whole theory is derived from that of respiration. Cp. the account of ἀναπνοή in Tim. 80 d I sqq., where much of the phraseology of the present passage recurs: τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς... γέγονεν... τέμνοντος μὲν τὰ σιτία τοῦ πυρός, αἰωρουμένου δὲ ἐντὸς τῷ πνεῦματι συνεπομένου (cp. b 4), τὰς φλέβας... τῆ συναιωρήσει (cp. b 7) πληροῦντος τῷ... ἐπαντλεῖν (cp. c 3). Brunetto Latini 'speaks, very much in the same way as Plato does, of waters circulating in channels through the Earth, like blood through the veins of the body '(Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 103).
- b 5 eis τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα . . . eis τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, 'in the direction of the further side of the earth' (the antipodes), 'in the direction of the hither side'.
- C 2 τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον: the words δή and καλούμενον are a protest against the popular view that the antipodes are 'down'. It is just to avoid this incorrectness that Socrates says τὰ ἐπ' ἐκείνα, οr τὰ κατ' ἐκείνα.

τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα . . . εἰσρεῖ, ' the streams flow into the regions on the further side of the earth,' as opposed to τὰ ἐνθάδε. I apprehend that τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα must be explained in the same way as b 5 τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα, and in that case τὰ ῥεύματα must be the subject. Further, if we omit διά in c 3 with Stobaeus, we may take τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς together. Even if we retain διά I have no doubt that we must ' understand' τῆς γῆς after τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα. Cp. Aristotle's paraphrase (loc. cit. III e 4 n.) τὴν δ' ἐπίρρυσιν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ἔκαστα τῶν ῥευ-

- μάτων, where τῶν ῥευμάτων is governed by επίρρυσιν, and ἐφ' ἔκαστα means ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἐπὶ τάδε.
- C 3 ἄσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες, sc. πληροῦσιν, 'like irrigators.' The word ἐπαντλεῖν is used of raising water to a height for purposes of irrigation (Dict. Ant. s. v. Antlia). No stress is to be laid on the particular process by which this is done; the point of the simile lies in the way the water rises to a point further from the centre (whether on this side of it or the other) and then flows off through the channels (δχετοἱ, rivi) like irrigation waters.
- C 4 ἐκείθεν . . . δεύρο, 'from the antipodes . . . towards us.'
- C 6 els τοὺς τόπους κτλ. All the streams are raised by the αἰώρα above the centre (on either side) and are drained off to τόποι on the surface of the earth, from which they once more find their way back to Tartarus by subterranean channels.
- C 7 ἐκάστοις ὑδοποίηται, 'a way is made for each of them.' The simile of the irrigation-channels is kept up. The εἰδοποιεῖται of W confirms the ὑδοποίηται of Stobaeus, and T has ἐκάστοις as well as Stobaeus. The reading of B (εἰς οὖς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται) is inferior to this.
- d 3 $\langle \hat{\eta} \rangle_{\hat{\eta}}$: there is some doubt as to the necessity of inserting $\tilde{\eta}$ here and in d 5. It seems safer, however, to insert it. In Symp. 173 a 6 B has $\hat{\eta}$ and TW $\hat{\eta}$ $\hat{\eta}$. In Crito 44 a BTW have $\hat{\eta}$ $\hat{\eta}$.
- d 4 ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς, 'at a lower level than the point of issue' really means nearer the centre of the earth, not nearer the antipodes.
- d 5 καταντικρύ... κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος: Aristotle (loc. cit. 111 c 4 n.) interprets these words by κάτωθεν and ἄνωθεν, by which he clearly means 'on the other side' and 'on this side of' the earth's centre. The choice of words is unfortunate (especially as he bases his criticism on them); for we have been warned (c 1) that to call the antipodes 'down' is only a popular way of speaking. In substance, however, Aristotle seems to me quite right in his interpretation. I do not see how κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος can mean 'on the same side of Tartarus', as many recent editors suppose. The phrase must surely be interpreted in the light of e 2 τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν...μέρος, which certainly refers to the sections of Tartarus on either side of the earth's centre. The difficulties which editors have raised about this interpretation are purely imaginary. So long as a stream falls

into Tartarus at a point nearer the earth's centre than it issued from it, it may correctly be said to fall into it $\dot{\nu}\pi o\kappa \dot{\alpha}\tau \omega$ $\dot{\tau}\eta s$ $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa \rho o\eta s$ quite irrespective of whether it debouches on this side of the earth's centre or on the other.

- d 5 $\langle \hat{\eta} \rangle \hat{\eta}$ [είσρεῖ] ἐξέπεσεν, sc. εἰσρεῖ. If we omit εἰσρεῖ with Stobaeus we can take $\hat{\eta}$ (or $\hat{\eta}$ $\hat{\eta}$) ἐξέπεσεν together as equivalent to τῆς ἐκροῆς. It is important to observe that ἐκπίπτειν is the verb corresponding to ἐκροή, and that the reference is to the point at which the stream issues from Tartarus.
- d 6 ἔστι δὲ ἃ κτλ. We have had the case of streams which issue from Tartarus in one hemisphere and fall into it in the other; we are now told of streams which come back to the hemisphere in which they started after circling round the other. They may even make this circuit several times, but with each circuit they will be 'lower', i.e. nearer the earth's centre. Their course will therefore be a spiral, and that is the point of περιελιχθέντα . . . ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφειs, for ελιξ means just 'spiral'. As to περὶ τὴν γῆν it does not necessarily mean 'round (the outside of) the earth'. Cp. 113 b 1 n.
- d 8 καθέντα is intransitive or rather 'objectless'. Cp. Ar. Knights 430 ἔξειμι γάρ σοι λαμπρὸς ἤδη καὶ μέγας καθιείς (of a wind), and συγκαθιέναι (sc. ἐαυτόν), 'to condescend.'
- e τ ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, 'in either direction as far as the middle,' that is to say, from either opening of Tartarus to its middle, which coincides with the centre of the earth.
- e 2 ἄναντες γὰρ κτλ., 'for the part (of Tartarus) on either side (of the centre) is uphill to both sets of streams,' i. e. both to those which fall into it καταντικρὺ ἢ ἢ εξέπεσεν and to those which fall into it κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. The πρός which B and W insert in different places is probably due to an ancient variant πρόσαντες. How old that variant must be is shown by the fact that Aristotle (loc. cit.) has πρὸς ἄναντες. Heindorf conjectured πρόσω, and recent editors follow him, but that is a non-Attic form and not used by Plato.
- e 5 τυγχάνει δ' άρα όντα κτλ. Cp. Od. xi. 157 μέσσω γὰρ μεγάλοι ποταμοὶ καὶ δεινὰ ῥέεθρα, | 'Ωκεανὸς μὲν πρῶτα κτλ., ib. x. 513 ἔνθα μὲν εἰς 'Αχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσι | Κωκυτός θ', ôς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ.
- e 6 εξωτάτω, 'furthest from the centre.'
- e 7 περὶ κύκλω, 'round in a circle.' There seems to be no doubt that

περί can be used as an adverb in this phrase. Cp. Tim. 40 a 6 νείμας περὶ πάντα κύκλω τὸν οὐρανόν, Laws 964 e 4 περὶ ὅλην κύκλω τὴν πύλιν ὁρᾶν. The phrase is also found written in one word (v. L. & S. s. v. περίκυκλος) and this is how B writes it here. Perhaps Hermann is right in accenting πέρι to show that it is an adverb. We are not told that the λίμνη made by Oceanus is the Mediterranean, but that is doubtless so.

- e 7 καταντικρύ, 'diametrically opposite,' i.e. on the opposite side of the centre of the earth (cp. 112 d 5 n.). Acheron is the antipodal counterpart of Oceanus, running in the opposite direction. It is fitting that the place of the dead should be in the other hemisphere. In the Axiochus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., we are told (371 b 2) that 'the gods below' took possession of τὸ ἔτερον ἡμισ ψαίριον.
- 13 a Ι ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων: the Acherusian Lake is subterranean.
 - a 2 où: cp. 108 b 4 n.
 - τῶν πολλῶν: all except ai τῶν ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντων. Cp. 114 b 6 sqq.
 - a 5 εἰς τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις, 'for the births of animals.' Cp. 81 e 2 sqq. τούτων κατὰ μέσον: i. e. at a point intermediate between Oceanus and Acheron. As Oceanus flows ἐξωτάτω, i. e. furthest from the centre (112 e 6 n.), Acheron will branch off from Tartarus nearer the centre, but on the other side. The point intermediate between these ἐκβολαί will therefore be above the centre on the same side as Oceanus.
 - a 6 ἐκβάλλει, 'issues', 'branches off' (from Tartarus). The word is synonymous with ἐκπίπτει (112 d 5 n.) and so is ἐκβολή with ἐκροή.
 - a 7 πυρί... καόμενον. It seems to me that this may have been suggested by the remarkable statements in the Περίπλους of the Carthaginian Hanno (§§ 11-14) about the regions blazing with fire which were seen on the voyage southward from Cape Verde to Sierra Leone. If so, Pyriphlegethon is doubtless the Senegal. The Περίπλους, if genuine, would be well known in Sicily in the fifth century B.C.
 - b ι περιελιττόμενος... τῆ γῆ is generally assumed to mean 'winding round the earth', whereas it is clear that, like Cocytus (c 3), Pyriphlegethon must go under the earth after leaving the λίμνη in order to reach the Acherusian Lake, which is certainly subter-

ranean. In the erroneous belief that Eusebius omits τη γη, most editors bracket the words; but this is quite unnecessary. They can quite well mean 'coiling itself round inside the earth' (ambire terram intus in ipsa, Stallbaum); cp. Il. xxii. 95 έλισσόμενος περί $\chi \epsilon \iota \hat{\eta}$ of a serpent 'coiling himself round (the inside of) his nest' (Monro). Cp. 112 d 8 ωσπερ οἱ οφεις.

οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι: cp. Il. ii. 753 οὐδ' οι γε (sc. Τιταρήσιος) Πηνειώ συμμίσγεται άργυροδίνη, Ι άλλά τέ μιν καθύπερθεν επιρρέει ηὐτ'

έλαιον | όρκου γάρ δεινοῦ Στυγός ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ.

b 4 κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου, 'at a lower point in Tartarus,' i.e. nearer the earth's centre than the Acherusian Lake, which must itself be nearer the centre than the ἐκβολή of Pyriphlegethon, though on the opposite side.

b 6 οπη αν τύχωσι της γης, 'at various points on the earth's surface.' This shows that Pyriphlegethon in its subterranean spiral course passes under Etna. For the puakes cp. III e I n.

τούτου . . . καταντικρύ: i. e. on the other side of the earth's centre, but nearer it than the ἐκβολή of Acheron, though further from it than the Acherusian Lake.

- h 8 οιον ὁ κυανός: it is not certain what substance is intended. In Theophrastus κυανός is lapis lazuli and that stone is probably meant here. In any case, we are to think of a bluish grey, steely colour, in strong contrast to the fiery plain of Pyriphlegethon.
- ον δή, sc. τόπον (not ποταμόν). For δή cp. 107 e I n.
- d 2 διεδικάσαντο: cp. 107 d 8 n.

βιώσαντες: the Ionic participle is in place in a solemn passage like this, though in 95 c 3 we have the Attic Blovs. Later, the Ionic form became trivial, as in the λαθέ βιώσας of Epicurus.

of ... αν δόξωσιν, 'those who are found to have -,' a regular forensic expression.

μέσωs, ' middlingly,' to be distinguished from μετρίως which stands for ev.

- d 5 å δή κτλ. Another allusive and mysterious δή (cp. 107 e 1 n.). The ἀχήματα on which they embark must be boats of some kind. Charon's bark is familiar, but there are other boats of the dead besides that.
- d 6 την λίμνην, sc. την 'Αχερουσιάδα.
- d 7 καθαιρόμενοι: Purgatory is an essentially Orphic idea. Cf. Suid.

(s. v. 'Αχέρων) ὁ δὲ 'Αχέρων καθαρσίω ἔοικε καὶ οὐ κολαστηρίω, ῥύπτων καὶ σμήχων τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. They are purified by fire as well as by water.

- d 7 διδόντες δίκας is subordinate to καθαιρόμενοι, 'purged by punishment.'
- d 8 εὐεργεσιῶν, 'good deeds,' seems to have been the regular word in this connexion (opp. ἀδικήματα). Cp. Rep. 615 b 6 εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν.
- e 2 ἀνιάτως έχειν κτλ. The doctrine of the incurable sinners occurs also in the myths of the Gorgias (525 c sqq.) and the Republic (615 e sqq.). The rudiments of it are to be found in the picture of the three great sinners—Tantalus, Ixion, and Sisyphus—in the Nέκυια of the eleventh book of the Odyssey. From the Gorgias we learn that they are eternally punished as παραδείγματα,
- e 6 οὔποτε, 'nevermore,' is more solemn than the everyday οὐδέποτε, 'never.' The Neoplatonists are very anxious to get rid of the doctrine of eternal punishment, but it is stated quite explicitly.
- 14 a 1 μεταμέλον: accusative absolute, cum eos paenituerit. Tr. 'and have lived (aor. subj.) the rest of their life in repentance'. Any impersonal verb may take this construction: cp. Apol. 24 d 4 μέλον γέ σοι, Rep. 346 b 4 συμφέρον αὐτῷ, 'when it is good for him.'
 - a 2 τοιούτω τινὶ άλλω τρόπω, 'in some other way of the same sort,' viz. as those who have done wrong ὑπ' ὀργῆς.
 - a 5 τὸ κῦμα, 'the reflux.' Cp. 112 b 3 κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω. This fits in well with the general scheme. Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus rise in opposite hemispheres. When the water in Tartarus rushes ἐπὶ τάδε it casts them out by Pyriphlegethon, when it rushes ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνα by Cocytus.

κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, 'down Cocytus.' Heindorf compares Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. 16 τὸ ὕδωρ κατὰ τὰς τάφρους ἐχώρει. In a 7 κατὰ τὴν λίμνην we have another meaning of κατά, 'on the level of', 'opposite to'. It must be remembered that the waters of Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus do not mingle with the Purgatorial Lake.

b 7 διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, 'to have led exceptionally holy lives,' as contrasted with those who have lived μέσως (113 d 4). We must 'understand' ζῆν or some such word with ὁσίως. For such an ellipse Stallbaum compares Ευτήνο. 281 a 5 τὸ ὀρθῶς (sc. χρῆσθαι) ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη, Symp. 181 b 6 ἀμελοῦντες δὲ

τοῦ καλῶς (sc. διαπράξασθαι) ἡ μή, Phileb. 61 d I ἀρα . . . τοῦ καλῶς ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν; For similar brachylogies designed to obviate the repetition of the same word cp. Prot. 325 b 3 σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί (sc. ἀγαθοί), 344 e I τῷ δὲ κακῷ (κακῷ) οὐκ ἐγχωρεί γενέσθαι, Meno 89 a 6 οὐκ ἀν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί (sc. ἀγαθοί). The προκεκρίσθαι added by Theodoret is an obvious interpolation.

- c 2 έπι γης: i. e. on the 'true earth', the Earthly Paradise.
- C 3 ἄνευ... σωμάτων: cp. 76 c 12 χωρὶς σωμάτων. This is the statement which brought upon Plato the condemnation of the Church as being inconsistent with the resurrection of the body. Eusebius has καμάτων for σωμάτων, which looks like a deliberate falsification.
- C 4 οἰκήσεις . . . τούτων καλλίους. 'We are to think, perhaps, of the natal stars of the *Timaeus*' (Stewart, *Myths of Plato*, p. 109). In any case, those alone reach the Celestial Paradise who have undergone the philosophic κάθαρσις. The ordinary purgation is not sufficient.
- c 7 πῶν ποιεῖν, 'to leave nothing undone.' Cp. Gorg. 479 c ι πῶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι.
- C 8 καλὸν . . . τὸ ἄθλον: cp. Rep. 608 b 4 Μέγας . . . ὁ ἀγών, . . . μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, C I Καὶ μὴν . . . τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν.
- d r Το μεν οὖν κτλ. The difference between scientific knowledge and a 'probable tale' is once more insisted on. For the expression cp. 63 c I sqq., 108 d 5 sqq., Meno 86 b 6 καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὖκ ἃν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου δισχυρισαίμην, ὅτι δὲ..., περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἃν διαμαχοίμην. Contrast d 4 ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα ('evidently is').
- d 5 πρέπειν, Sc. διισχυρίσασθαι.

άξιον, sc. $\epsilon l \nu a \iota$, 'that it is worth while to take the risk of thinking it is so.' Cp. 85 d ι.

- d 7 ἐπάδειν: cp. 77 e 8.
- e 3 πλόον θάτερον... ἀπεργάζεσθαι, 'to do more harm than good.'

 The phrase occurs twice in the Euthydemus 280 e 5 πλέον γάρ που οἶμαι θάτερόν ἐστιν, ἐάν τις χρῆται ὁτφοῦν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἡ ἐὰν ἐῷ, 297 c 7 ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἶκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν (sc. Ἰόλεως Ἡρακλεῖ), ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἃν θάτερον ποιήσειεν. Cp. also Isocr. Aeg. 25 τοῦτον τὸν ταλαίπωρον οὐδεὶς τῶν συγγενῶν... ἐπισκεψόμενος ἀφίκετο, πλὴν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς, αἷ πλέον θάτερον ἐποίησαν. I do not think that, in these places, the meaning is 'to make bad worse' (Hein-

dorf), or that $\theta \acute{a}\tau \epsilon \rho o \nu$ has anything to do with Pythagorean views about 'the other'. We should hardly find the phrase in a private speech of Isocrates if it had. More likely it is a colloquialism like $\pi \lambda \acute{\epsilon} o \nu \tau \iota \pi o \iota \epsilon \acute{\iota} \nu$, $o \wr \delta \acute{\epsilon} \nu \pi \lambda \acute{\epsilon} o \nu \tau \iota \pi o \iota \epsilon \acute{\iota} \nu$, $o \wr \delta \acute{\epsilon} \nu \pi \lambda \acute{\epsilon} o \nu \tau \iota \pi o \iota \epsilon \acute{\iota} \nu$,

- 15 a 2 ώs...καλη̂: Hirschig for once seems to be justified in an ἀθέτησω. It is very difficult to believe that Plato should spoil the effect of his own words two lines below by anticipating them here.
 - 2 5 φαίη αν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, 'as the man in the play would say'. The phrase does not occur in any extant tragedy.
 - a 8 νεκρὸν λούειν: for the construction cp. Μεπο 76 a 9 ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Practical Application. The real Socrates will not die (115 b 1-116 e 7).

- b 2 ἐπιστέλλεις is the vox propria for the last wishes of the dying. Cp. 116 b 4.
- b 9 ἄσπερ κατ' ἴχνη: cp. Rep. 365 d 2 ώς τὰ ἵχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. The hunting metaphor once more.
- C I οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε, nil proficietis, 'you will do no good', 'it will profit nothing'.
- C 6 Οὐ πείθω κτλ. Aelian, V. H. i. 16, has another version of this, which he is not likely to have composed himself: Καὶ πῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καλῶς ᾿Απολλόδωρος δοξάζει, εἴ γε αὐτὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐξ ᾿Αθηναίων φιλοτησίαν καὶ τὸ τοῦ φαρμάκου πῶμα ἔτι ὄντως ὄψεται Σωκρατήν; εἰ γὰρ οἴεται τὸν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐρριμμένον ἐν ποσὶ καὶ κεισόμενόν γ' ἐμὲ εἶναι, δῆλός ἐστί με οὐκ εἰδώς. This may be a fragment of Aeschines or another.
- c 7 οὖτος Σωκράτης, 'Socrates here.' The omission of 6 is idiomatic when the pronoun is used δεικτικῶς.
- d I πως με θάπτη: indirect deliberative. Goodwin, M. T. § 677.
- d 4 δή τινας: once more the allusive and mysterious δή. Cp. 107 d 7 n.
- d 5 άλλως λέγειν: cp. 76 e 4.
- d 7 ຖືν οὖτος... ἡγγυᾶτο does not refer to the offer of Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, to become security for the fine of 30 minae which Socrates proposed in his ἀντιτίμησις (Apol. 38 b 6). We may infer from Crito 44 e 2 sqq. that Crito had further given security that Socrates would not run away (ἢ μὴν παραμενείν).

- **e** 3 προτίθεται κτλ. The πρόθεσις ('laying out for burial') and the ἐκφορά ('carrying to the tomb') are the regular parts of the ceremony before the actual burial. The middle voice of προτίθεσθαι is justified because people lay out 'their dead'. Cp. Eur. Alc. 663-4 καὶ θανώντα σε | περιστελοῦσι καὶ προθήσονται νεκρόν, Thuc. ii. 34. 2 τὰ μὲν ὀστὰ προτίθενται ... ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ἦ ... ξυνεκφέρει ... ὁ βουλόμενος.
- e 5 εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, 'so far as the thing itself (inaccurate language) goes'.

 The Closing Scene (116 a 1—118 a 17).
- 116 a 2 ἀνίστατο εἰς: cp. Prot. 311 a 4 εξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν. οίκημα means 'a room '.
 - a 5 τοτè δ' αὖ, as if τοτè μέν had preceded. Cp. the omission of ὁ μέν, 105 e 1 n.
 - b I δύο γάρ κτλ. Cp. 60 a 2 n.
 - b 2 at οίκεται γυναῖκες . . . ἐκεῖναι is certainly the original reading and ἐκείναις (to be construed with διαλεχθείς) is apparently a conjecture. It seems to be implied that the women of Socrates' family were well known to Echecrates and his friends. In fact, ἐκείναι has much the same effect as the γιγνώσκεις γάρ with which Xanthippe is introduced (60 a 2). It is surely impossible to believe with some editors that Xanthippe is not included among the οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες. The mere fact that the youngest child is brought back seems to show that she is.
 - b 3 διαλεχθείε, sc. αὐτοῖε, i.e. τοῖε παιδίοιε καὶ ταῖε γυναιξίν. The vulgate reading ἐκείναιε would imply that he had no last words for his sons.
 - b 6 χρόνον... πολύν κτλ. As the conversation recorded in the *Phaedo* began in the morning, and it is now close upon sunset on one of the longest days of the year, it is plain that Socrates spent several hours alone with the women and children. There is no trace of indifference to them. Cp. 60 a 7 n. Of course Phaedo can only narrate conversations at which he was present.
 - b 8 στας παρ' αὐτόν, 'stepping up to him.'
 - C 5 ἐν τούτφ τῷ χρόνφ, during the thirty days (cp. 58 a 4 n.) for which Socrates had been in prison.
 - d 6 ἀνδρῶν λῷστος, 'the best of men.' In Attic λῷστος is confined to a few phrases.

- d 7 αποδακρύει: cp. 117 c 8 απέκλαον.
- d 9 δ ἄνθρωπος. It is to be observed that the man who administers the hemlock-draught is not the same person as the officer of the Eleven. The seeds were pounded in a mortar to extract the juice. Cp. App. I.
- E I ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι κτλ., 'that there is still sunlight on the hilltops.' For this sense of ἥλιος cp. Hdt. viii. 23 ἄμα ἡλίω σκιδνυμένω. The meaning cannot be that the sun has not yet sunk behind Cithaeron; for Crito says οἶμαι. He means that, though no longer visible, it is still shining on the hilltops.
- 7 a 2 γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, 'to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.'

φειδόμενος οἰδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος, 'sparing the cup when there is nothing in it,' a proverbial way of speaking. Cp. Hesiod, Έργα 367 μέσσοθι φειδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φείδω. For the Latin version of the saying cp. Seneca, Ep. 1 nam, ut visum est maioribus nostris, sera parsimonia in fundo est, 'Begin to spare halfway, it is a sorry saving when you reach the lees' (Geddes).

- a 3 μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, 'don't refuse me,' a common colloquialism. Cp. Crito 45 a 3: Rep. 328 a 10.
- a 4 τῷ παιδί, 'to his servant.'
- b 1 αὐτὸ ποιήσει, 'it will act of itself.' In the medical writers ποιείν is used technically of the action of drugs. Heindorf quotes Dioscorides
 i. 95 ποιεί πρὸς φάρμακα, 'it acts against poisons.'
 - 3 καὶ μάλα ικέως, 'very cheerfully indeed.' For καὶ μάλα cp. 61e 1 n. ικέως is the adverb.
- b 4 οὐδὲ διαφθείραs: Plutarch uses φθείρειν and φθορά of mixing colours (L. S. s. vv.), and the expression employed here seems to be derived from that technical use. Cp. II. xiii. 284 τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ οὕτ' ἄρ τρέπεται χρώς κτλ.
- b 5 ταυρηδον ὑποβλέψας. This does not seem to have anything to do with ταυροῦσθαι, ἀποταυροῦσθαι, which refer to the glare of an angry bull. An angry or threatening look would be quite out of the picture here. In Arist. Frogs 804 ἔβλεψε γοῦν ταυρηδὸν ἐγκύψας κάτω is, indeed, given as a sign that Aeschylus βαρέως φέρει, but ὑποβλέψας is quite different from ἐγκύψας κάτω, which suggests the bull about to toss. It means 'to look askance at' (ὑπώδρα), and, from its use in Hippocrates and Aristotle (L. S. s. v.), we see that

the original meaning was to look with the eyes half open. It is, then, a 'mischievous look' rather than a threatening one.

- b 6 πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι. Perhaps Socrates thought of pouring a libation in homour of Anytus, just as Theramenes had toasted Critias in hemlock-juice. Cp. Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 56 καὶ ἐπεί γε ἀποθνήσκειν ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ κώνειον ἔπιε, τὸ λειπόμενον ἔφισαν ἀποκοτταβίσαντα εἰπεῖν αὐτόν Κριτία τοῦτ ἔστω τῷ καλῷ. For the use of πρός cp. Symp. 174 b I πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἀν lέναι ἄκλητος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον.
- C 4 ἐπισχόμενος... ἐξέπιεν, 'he held his breath and drank it to the last drop.' Stallbaum shows that πίνειν ἐπισχόμενος was a standing phrase. Cp. e. g. Stesichorus fr. 7 Σκύφιον δὲ λαβὼν δέπας ἔμμετρον ὡς τριλάγυνον | πί' ἐπισχόμενος κτλ. The rendering 'putting it to his lips', though grammatically possible, does not seem strong enough for this and other passages where the phrase occurs, so I prefer K. F. Hermann's interpretation. The sense assigned to ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ἀτα.

καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς, 'without the very least disgust'. As δυσχερής means 'fastidious' and δυσχεραίνειν fastidire, the meaning is that he drank the poison as if it was quite a pleasant drink.

C 5 ἐπιεικῶς, 'fairly', 'pretty well'.

- C 7 ἀστακτί: not in single drops, but in a flood. Cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1251 ἀστακτὶ λείβων δάκρυον, 1646 ἀστακτὶ ... στένοντες. W has ἀσταλακτί, which would mean the same thing, and also preserves an ancient variant ἀβαστακτί, which would mean 'unbearably'.
- c 8 ἀπέκλαον έμαυτόν, ' I covered my face and wept for my loss.'
- c 9 οἴου ἀνδρὸς κτλ., 'to think what a friend I was bereft of.' This is another 'dependent exclamation'. Cp. 58 e 4 n.
- d 5 κατέκλασε, which Stephanus conjectured for κατέκλαυσε, is actually the reading of T. Cp. Homer, Od. iv. 481 κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ, Plut. Timoleon 7 τὸ δὲ Τιμολέοντος . . . πάθος . . . κατέκλασε καὶ συνέτριψεν αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν.
- e I έν εὐφημία: cp. 60 a 3 n.
- 118 a 1 τὰς κνήμας: cp. Arist. Frogs 123 'Αλλ' ἔστιν ἄτραπος ξύντομος τετριμμένη | ή διὰ θυείας.— Άρα κώνειον λέγεις; | Μάλιστά γε.— Ψυχράν γε καὶ δυσχείμερον | εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀποπήγνυσι τἀντικνήμια.
 - α τήγνυτο: cp. 77 b 4 π.
 καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο, 'the man himself' (not Socrates). It is im-

NOTES 118

plied that the others had touched Socrates by the executioner's directions.

- 2 5 τὸ ἦτρον: ὁ μεταξὺ ὀμφαλοῦ τε καὶ αἰδοίου τόπος Timaeus, ἦτρον... ᾿Αττικῶς ὑπογάστριον Ἑλληνικῶς Moeris.
- a 7 τῷ ᾿Ασκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: for the offering of a cock to Asklepios cp. Herondas iv. II ὅλεφ δεῦτε | τοῦ ἀλέκτορος τοῦδ' ὅντιν οἰκίης τοίχων | κήρυκα θύω, τἀπίδορπα δέξαισθε. Socrates hopes to awake cured like those who are healed by ἐγκοίμησις (incubatio) in the Asklepieion at Epidaurus.
- a 16 ἡμεῖs, 'we,' his disciples.
 - τῶν τότε, 'of the men of his time.' The phrase is regular in such appreciations. Stallbaum compares Hdt. i. 23 ᾿Αρίονα . . . κιθαρωδὸν τῶν τότε ἐόντων οὐδενὸς δεύτερον, Χεη. Απ. ii. 2. 20 κήρυκα ἄριστον τῶν τότε. Cp. Plato, Ερίστ. vii. 324 d8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη, ὅν ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιότατον εἶναι τῶν τότε.
- 2.17 καὶ ἄλλως, 'and in general.' The calm of the closing sentence is characteristically Attic. We find the same thing in tragedy and in the Orators.



APPENDIX I

DEATH BY HEMLOCK

IT is expressly stated by Xenophon (Hell. ii. 3, 56) that Theramenes was put to death by a draught of κώνειον, and Plutarch says the same of Phocion (Phoc. 36). As described in the Phaedo, the drug acts by producing a gradual refrigeration proceeding from the feet upwards to the heart. Death ensues when the heart is affected, and is accompanied by a spasm or convulsion (ἐκινήθη, 118 a 12). The same symptoms are implied in the passage of Aristophanes (Frogs 123) quoted in the note on 118 a 1, where κώνειον is mentioned by name, and where we are told that it was pounded, as the drug referred to in the Phaedo also was (117 a 6). Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxv. 95) speaks of the vis refrigeratoria of the cicuta, and says that the juice was prepared from pounded seeds. It is to be noted further that wine was used as an antidote in cases of such poisoning. Pliny tells us this of cicuta (Hist, Nat, xiv. 7), and Plato himself implies the same of κώνειον in the Lysis. This agrees very well with the warning given to Socrates by the expert not to talk too much (Phaed. 63 d 5 sqq.). He explains that this will impede the action of the drug by heating him. Wine would act in the same way. There can be no doubt, then, that Socrates was poisoned by κώνειον, or that κώνειον is cicuta. That cicuta is 'hemlock' is shown by the use of the word in the Romance languages (Fr. ciguë).

In the face of all this, it is disturbing to be told, as we are by some authorities, that hemlock-juice would produce quite different symptoms. I cannot pronounce an opinion on that; but I have submitted the case to an eminent pharmacologist, my colleague Professor C. R. Marshall, who says that 'as evidence against the view that Socrates died of conium poisoning I do not think the statements' (of the authorities referred to) 'worthy of serious consideration. Personally I am decidedly of opinion that his death

Lys. 219 e 2 οἴον εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο αὐτὸν (τὸν ὑὸν) κώνειον πεπωκότα, ἄρα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτ' ἄν οἵνον, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἡγοῖτο τὸν ὑὸν σώσειν;

APPENDIX II

was due to conium. It is difficult to be absolutely positive on the point, as conium is somewhat peculiar in its action, and the symptoms produced vary with the dose and probably with the individual'. From this it appears that there is certainly no scientific ground for rejecting the philological evidence.

APPENDIX II

Γλαύκου τέχνη

The correct text of the scholium in Ven. T is as follows:

παροιμία ήτοι ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥαδίως κατεργαζομένων, ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνυ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ ἐντέχνως εἰργασμένων. Ἰππασος γάρ τις κατεσκεύασε χαλκοῦς τέτταρας δίσκους οὖτως, ὥστε τὰς μὲν διαμέτρους αὐτῶν ἴσας ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἡμιόλιον δὲ τοῦ πρώτου δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον, κρουομένους δὲ τούτους ἐπιτελεῖν συμφωνίαν τινά, καὶ λέγεται Γλαῦκον ἰδόντα τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν δίσκων φθόγγους πρῶτον ἐγχειρῆσαι δι' αὐτῶν χειρουργεῖν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγεσθαι τὴν καλουμένην Γλαύκου τέχνην. μέμνηται δὲ τούτων ᾿Αριστόξενος περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, καὶ Νικοκλῆς ἐν τῷ περὶ θεωρίας. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἑτέρα τέχνη γραμμάτων, ἡν ἀνατιθέασι Γλαύκῳ Σαμίῳ, ἀφ' ῆς ἴσως καὶ ἡ παροιμία διεδύθη. οὖτος δὲ καὶ σιδήρου κόλλησιν εὖρεν, ὥς φησιν Ἡρόδοτος.

This comes from the paroemiographer Lucillus Tarrhaeus (cp. L. Cohn, Quellen der Platoscholien, pp. 836 sqq.), and the reference to Aristoxenus takes us back to the time when there was a living Pythagorean tradition. Eusebius, c. Marc. 15 D (quoted by Heindorf), is fuller, and mentions some other versions. One says that Glaucus was drowned at sea (just like Hippasus!) before his invention was spread abroad; another agrees with the story in the scholium; a third refers to Glaucus of Samos and the ἀνάθημα at Delphi. The fourth is as follows: ἔτερος δὲ Γλαῦκον αὐτὸν ἀναθεῦναι τρίποδα χαλκοῦν δημιουργήσαντα τοῦς παχέως τε (τοῦς πάχεσιν ιώστε?) κρουομένου τοὺς τε πόδας ἐφ' ὧν βέβηκε καὶ τὸ ἄνω περικείμενον καὶ τὴν στεφάνην τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λέβητος καὶ τὰς ῥάβδους διὰ μέσου τεταγμένας φθέγγεσθαι λύρας φωνῆ. If this is genuine tradition, as it appears to be, it is not without significance that Socrates should allude to a distinctively Pythagorean invention.

INDEX TO THE NOTES

I. PROPER NAMES

Acheron 112e7; 113a5 Acherusian Lake 113 a 1; 113 b 1 Aegina 59 c 4 Aeschines Socraticus 59 b 8 Aeschylus 107 e 5 Aesop 60 c 1 Alcmaeon 96 b 5 Anaxagoras 72 c 4; 96 b 3; 96 d1; 97c1; 97d9; 99b8; 109 b 3; 109 b 6; 109 c I Anaximander 97 d 9; 108 c 8 Anaximenes 96 b 4; 99 b 8 Antiphon 62 b 3 Antisthenes 59 b 8 Apollodorus 59 a 9; 115 d 7 Apollo Hyperboreus 60 d 2; 85 a 2 Apollo Pythius 60 d 2 Archelaus 96 b 3; 97 b 8; 108 c8; 109 b 3 Archytas 61 e 7 Argives 89 c 2 Aristippus 59 c 3 Aristophanes 70 c 1; 96 a 2 Aristotle 91 a 2; 94 e 5; 96 b 3; 96 b 5; 111 e 4 Asclepius 118a7 Athenagoras 62 b 3

Callimachus 59 c 3 Cebes 59 c 1 Clearchus 62 b 4 Cleombrotus 59 c 3 Cocytus 113 b 1; 114 a 5; 114 a 6 Copernicus 108 c 8 Corybantes 78 a 4; 78 a 8 Crito 59b7; 115d7 Critobulus 59b7; 115d7 Ctesippus 59b9

Democritus 99 b 8 Diogenes of Apollonia 111 d 2

Echecrates 57 a 1; 86 b 6
Egypt 80 c 8
Elis 57 a 1
Empedocles 65 b 3; 69 c 2; 96
b 3; 96 b 4; 99 b 6; 108 c 8;
109 b 6; 109 c 1; 111 e 1; 111
e 4
Epaminondas 61 d 7
Epicharmus 65 b 3
Epigenes 59 b 8
Eretria 57 a 1
Eubouleus 80 d 7
Euclides 59 c 2

Euclides 59 c 2 Eupolis 70 c 1 Euripus 90 c 4 Euxitheus 62 b 4 Evenus 60 d 3

Hades 80 d 6
Heracles 89 c 5; Pillars of 109 b 1
Heracliteans 96 b 4
Heraclitus 60 b 7; 70 e 1; 87 b 7; 90 c 5.
Hermogenes 59 b 7
Herodotus 96 a 8
Homer 70 b 3; 112 a 2
Homeric Hymn 60 d 2

Iolaus 89 c 5

INDEX TO THE NOTES

Ionian philosophy 109 a 1

Lamprocles 60 a 2 Lysis 61 d 7

Menexenus 59 b 9; 60 a 2 Meno 73 b 1

Neoplatonists 113e6

Oceanus 112e7; 113a5 Odysseus 94d7 Olympiodorus 65d6; 93a11 Orpheotelestae 69c3; 78a8 Orphicism 62b3sqq.; 63c7; 67a8; 67c5; 70c5; 70e1; 72b1; 78a4; 82d6; 85d3; 107d7; 113d7

Parmenides 65 b 3; 96 e 8; 104 d 1; 107 b 6 Phaedo 57 a 1 Phaedondas 59 c 2 Philolaus 59 c 1; 61 d 7; 61 e 7; 65 d 11; 86 b 6 Phlius 57 a 1; 57 a 7; 59 c 1; 61 d 7 Phrygians 78 a 4 Plato 59 b 10; 97 a 6; 107 b 6; 115 d 7 Posidonius 108 c 8; 109 b 3 Purgatory 113 d 7 Pyriphlegethon II3 a 7; II3 b 1;
II3 b 6; II4 a 5; II4 a 6
Pythagoras 57 a I; 96 a 8
Pythagoreans 57 a I; 96 c I; 60
d I; 6I a 3; 6I c 6; 6I d 7;
6I d 8; 6I e 7; 62 b 4; 63 d I;
64 b 3; 66 b 4; 67 c 5; 72 e 4;
77 e 8; 85 a 2; 85 d 3; 92 a 6;
96 c I; 97 d 9; 97 e 3; 100 a 3;
109 b 6
Pythian Apollo 60 d 2

Sicily 111 e 1 Sicyon 57 a 1 Simmias 59 c 1; 65 d 4 Sophists 69 b 2 Sophroniscus 60 a 2 Stoics 62 b 3; 96 b 5 Stymphalus 112 a 2

Tarentum 61 e 7 Tartarus 112 a 1 Telephus 107 e 5 Terpsion 59 c 2 Thebes 59 c 1; 61 d 7; 61 e 7 Thracians 78 a 4

Xanthippe 60 a 2 Xenophon 59 c 1

Zeno 90 b 9 Zeus Chthonius 80 d 7

II. GREEK WORDS

ἀγαμένως 89 a 3 ἀδόξαστος 84 a 8 ἀηδών 85 a 7 ἄθερμος 106 a 3 ἀιδής 79 a 4 αιδήρ 109 b 8 αινίττομαι 69 c 5 αιδωρα 111 e 4 αιδωρα 112 b 3 ἀκολασία 68 e 3 ἀλαζών 92 d 4

dλεκτρυών 118 a 7 dληθώς 80 d 6 αλλο τι ή 64 c 4 dλλότριος 99 b 5 αλλως 76 e 4 αλοσος 111 b 6 αμαθής 62 e 6; 105 c 1 αναβιώσκομαι 71 e 13; 89 b 10 ανακαθίζομαι 60 b 1 ανακαμπτω 72 b

II. GREEK WORDS

ανακύπτω 109 e 4 αναλαμβάνω 75 e 5 άναμιμνήσκω 72 e 7 ανάμνησις 72 e 4 sqq. άνάντης ΙΙ2 e 2 άναπίμπλημι 67 a 5 ανάπλεως 83 d 10 ανατίθεμαι 87 a 2 αναφέρω 75 b 7; 76 d 9 ανδραποδώδης 69 b 7 άνερευνώ 63 a.2 άνευφημώ 60 a 4 άνήρ 57 a 5 ἀνιάτως ΙΙ3 е 2 άνύητος 80 b 4 avota 91 b 5 ἀνταποδίδωμι 71 e 8 ; 72 a 12 άνταπόδοσις 70 C4 sqq. άντιλαβή 84 c 6 αντιλαμβάνω 87 a 6; 88 d 4 άντιλογικός 90 b 9 ; 101 e I autitexvos 60 d 9 *ἀπάγω* 58 b 3 απαίδευτος 9I a 2 απλούς 62 a 3 αποβολή 75 d 10 απογίγνομαι 69 b 4 άποδακρύω 116 d 7 άποδείκνυμι 72 b 9; 77 a 5 άπόδειξις 92 d I αποδίδωμι 63 **e** 9 ἀποθνήσκω 62 a 5 ; 64 a 6 άποκλάω 117 C 8 απολαμβάνω 5 b8 άπολείπω 69 d 3 άποπειρώμαι 60 e 2 απόρρητος 62 b 3 αποσπένδω 117 b 6 аптона: 64 a 4; 86 d 8 *ãpa* 68 b 9; 80 d 5 άρα 70 e I άρμόζω 93 α 11; 93 C 6 άρμονία 85 е 3 ἀρχή 101 e 2 άστακτί ΙΙ7 С 7 ασχολία 66 b 8 drexpus 100 d 3

ἀτεχνῶς 59 a 4; 90 C 4 ἀτριπός 66 b 3 αῦξησις 71 b 3 αὐτός 58 c 1; 65 d 5; 65 e 3 αὐτός καθ΄ αὐτόν 64 c 6; 65 c 7 ἀφοσιοῦμαι 60 e 2 ἄφρων 62 e 6 ἄψυκτος 106 a 8

βάκχοι 69 d I βάρβαροι 78 a 4 βασκανία 95 b 6 βέρεθρον 112 a 2 βοηθῶ 88 e 2 βόρβορος 69 c 6 βούλομαι 74 d 9

γελασείω 64 b I γένεσις 71 a I 3; 95 e 9 γνησίως 66 b 2 γοητεύω 81 b 3

δαίμων 107 d 6 δείγμ**α 1**10 b 8 δεινός (οὐδεν δεινόν) 84 b 4 δεινότης 82 e 5 δευρο 58 b 7 δημοτικός 82 a II διαβάλλω 67 e 6 διαβλέπω 86 d 5 διάγραμμα 73 b I διαδικαζομαι 107 d 8; 113 d 3 διαιρώ 78 C 2 διάκειμαι 68 c 6; 84 e 2 διακελεύομαι 61 a I διακρίνω 71 b6 διαλαμβάνω 81 c 4; 110 b 7 διαλεκτικός 76 b 5 διάλεκτος 62 a 9 διαμυθολογῶ 70 b 6 διάνοια 65 е 7 διανοίας λογισμός 79 a 3 διαπραγματεύομαι 77 d 6 δίαυλος 72 b 3 διαφερόντως 85 b 3; 114 b 7 διαφέρω 64 d 9 διαφυή 98 C 8

INDEX TO THE NOTES

διαφωνῶ 101 d 5 διευλαβοῦμαι 81 e 6 δικαίως 73 c 9 δὶς ἐπτά 58 a 11 δοκῶ 64 b 2; 81 b 4 δωδεκάσκυτος 110 b 6

έάν 64 c 10 έγγύς τι τείνειν 65 a 6 έγγίγνομαι 86 e 1 έγκαταδώ 84 a 5 έγκοίμησις 118 27 έθέλω 61 c8; 68 d 2 eίδος (syn. σωμα) 73 a I; 73 d 7; 76c12; 87a2; 92b5 eidos, 'sort' 100 b 3 είδωλον 66 c 3 Elkij 97 b 7 είλικρινής 66 a 2 είσερχομαι 58 е 2 έκάστοτε 100 a 3 έκβάλλω 113 a 6 е́кей 61 е I ; 64 а I έκλείπω 99 d 6 έκπλεως ΙΙΟΟ7 έκροή 112 d4 έκστασις 67 c 6 έκτρίβω 60 b 2 έκφανής ΙΙΙ α Ι έκφέρω 66 b 4 έκφορά 115 е 3 έκών 61 c4; 80e3 έλλείπω 74 α 6 έλπίς 67 b 8 έμφύομαι 83 e I έν 58 b 8 ένδεεστέρως 74 e 3 ενδεκα, οί 59 e 6 ένδέχομαι 93 b I ένδέω 74 d 6; 92 a I ένίσταμαι 77 b 3 έννοω 74 a 6 έντείνω 60 d I; 86 b 7 έντιμος 64 d 9 έξάδω 85 a 5 έξεπάδω 77 e 9 έξόδιον 85 a 5

έξωδικόν 85 a 5 έπάγω 106 a 4 έπάδω 77 e8; 114 d7 έπαιτιώμαι 98 b 9 έπαντλῶ 112 c 3 έπαχθής 87 a 3 έπειτα 90 d I έπέρχομαι 88 d I; 104 b 10 έπέχομαι 117 C 4 έπιδείκνυμι 100 b 8 έπιεικώς 80 c 5; 117 c 5 έπιμένω 80 c 6 έπισκοπῶ 107 b 6 επίσταμαι 61 b 6 έπιστάτης 62 d 5 έπιστατώ 62 d 5 έπιστέλλω 115 b 2 έπιστήμη 96 b 8 έπισφραγίζομαι 75 d 2 έπιτείνω 94 C 4 έπιτηδεύω 64 a 6; 84 b 5 έπιχειρώ 73 b 8 έπιχωριάζω 57 a 7 έπιχώριος 59 b 6 έπιφέρω 104 e 10 έποψ 85 a7 έπωνυμία 102 b 2; 102 c 10 έργάζομαι 60 e 7 έργον 100 a 2 ερμαιον 107 c 6 ἔρρωμαι 61 b 8 έρχομαι 100 b 3 έρώτησις 75 d 2 έσχατος 90 a 8 εὐανθής 100 d I εὐδαίμων, εὐδαιμονίζω 58 e 3 εύεργεσία 113 d 8 εὐήθης 68 e 5 εύκαιρότερον 78 a 6 εὐλόγως 62 d 2 εύπορῶ 84 d 3 εύφημία ΙΙ7 e Ι εύχερως 117 C 4 έφελκω 66 α Ι έχειν λόγον 62 b 2; 62 d 6 έχειν εὐλόγως 62 d 2 εως αν 74 C 13

II. GREEK WORDS

ηθος 81 e 3 ηλιος 116 e 1 ηλος 83 d 4 ητρον 118 a 5

θανατῶ 64 b 5 θαρρῶ 63 e 10 ; 78 b 9 ; 88 b 4 θάτερον 114 e 3 θεία μοῦρα 58 e 5 θεωρία 58 b 2 θεωρία 58 a 10 θηρεύω 66 a 3 θράττω 86 e 5 θρυλῶ 76 d 8 θυσία 108 a 5

ieρόs 85 b 5 τλέως 117 b 3 ισορροπία 109 a 3 ιστορία 96 a 8 ιστός 65 d 12 ιστώς 67 b 1 ιττω Ζεύς 62 a 8 τχνος 115 b 9

κελεύω 59 e 8

κέντρον 91 C 5

καθαρεύω 58 b 5 καθαρμός 69 C 2 κάθαρσις 67 C 5 ; 69 C I καθαρώς 65 e 6 καθίστημι 69 C 4 Kai 59 a 9 καλός (είς καλόν) 76 e 9 καπνός 70 a 5 κάρδοπος 99 b 8 ката с. gen. 70 d 7 ката с. асс. 94 е 5 καταβάλλω 88 C 4 κατακλάω 117 d 6 καταλαμβάνω 60 a I καταντικρύ 112 d 5; 112 e 7; 113 καταφεύγω 76 е 9 καταψάω 89 b 2 κατέχω 104 d I κα**τ**ηγορῶ 73 b 2

κεφάλαιον 95 b **8** κεφαλή 96 е Ι κινώ 93 a 8 κομψεία ΙΟΙ C 8 κομψός 105 C 2 κόπτομαι 60 b I κόσμιος 68 e 2; 83 e 6 κρᾶσις 86 b 9; 111 b 2 κρατήρ III d 5 κτημα **62** b 8 κυανός 113 b 8 κύκλος της γενέσεως 72 b I κύκ**νος** 84 e 4 κυλινδούμαι 81 d I; 82 e 4 κῦμα ΙΙ4 α 5 κυμαίνω 112 b 3

λανθανω 64 a 5
λειμών 107 d 7
λειότης 110 d 6
λογίζομαι 65 c 2; 83 c 3
λογισμός 79 a 3
λόγον δοῦναι 76 b 5
λόγον ἔχειν 62 b 2; 62 d 6
λόγος 60 d I; 61 b 4; 65 d I 3
λόγος τοῦ εἶναι 78 d I
λύσις 82 d 6
λῶστος 116 d 6

μακάρων νησοι 63 c 7; 111 a 6 μέγα λέγω 95 b 5 μέγας 62 b 5 μεθοδος 79 e 3; 97 b 6 μελετώ 8Ι α Ι μέν solitarium 63 e 6 μέσως 113 d 4 μεταχειρίζομαι 84 a 5 μετεμψύχωσις 70 c 8 μετενσωμάτωσις 70 C 8 μετέρχομαι 68 a 5 μετέχω 93 d 9 μετέωρος 96 С Ι μέτριος 82 b 8 μετρίως 96 d 6; 108 c 3 μή 64 c 8 μισύλογος 89 d I μοίρα (θεία) 58 e 5

INDEX TO THE NOTES

μονοειδής 78 d 5 μορμολύκειον 77 e 7 Μορμώ 77 e 7 μορφή 103 e 7 μυθολογείν 61 e 2 μύθος 61 b 4

ναρθηκοφόρος 69 c 8 νεῦρον **80 d** I ; 98 c 7

όδοποιῶ 112 C 7 οία δή 60 a 4 οίκησις ΙΙ4 C 4 οίκοφθορία 82 C 5 'Ομηρικώς 95 b 7 δμίχλη 109 b 6 ομοιότης 109 a 2 όμώνυμος 78 е 2 ον, τό 65 c 9 οντα, τά 65 c 3; 99 d 5 οντι, τώ 63 е 9 οντως 63 е 9 οπως αν 59 e 7 οπως μή 77 b 4 δρατός 80 c 3 όρεγομαι 75 a 2 ορθός 73 a 10; 94 a I ορθως 64 a 4; 69 d 2; 82 c 3 δρμηθέντα, τά 101 d 4 οὐδαμού 72 C I ουρανός 108 e 5 ovoía 65 d 13 όχετός 112 C 3 δχημα 113 d 5 όχουμαι 85 d I

πάθημα 79 d 6; 103 a 1
πάθος 68 e 4; 96 a 2; 96 c 1
πάλαι 63 d 4; 79 c 2; 84 d 5
παλιιός 70 c 5
παλιγγενεσία 70 c 4; 75 d 7
πάρος οὐ 57 a 7
παραβάλλω 103 a 11
παραγίγνομαι 57 a 1; 58 c 7; 58 e 1
παραδίδωμι 84 a 4
παρακελεύομαι 60 e 8
παραλαμβανω 82 e I
παραλαμώ οῦ 5 c 6

παραμένω 62 e 2; 98 e 4 παραμυθία 70 b 2 παραπίπτω 66 d 5 παρατίθημι 65 е 7 πάρειμι 59 a 2 πάρεργου 91 a 8 παρίημι 90 d 9 παρίστημι 58 e 5 ; 66 b I πάσχω 94 a 12 περί c. gen. 58 a 1 περί c. acc. 58 c 6; 64 d 8; 65 b 4; 68 e 4 περὶ κύκλω 112 e 7 περιελίττω 112 d 6 περίοδος 107 e 4 περιτρέπω 95 b 6 περιττός 104 d 12 περιφερής 108 e 5 πίστις 70 b 2 πλάττω 82 d 3 πλεονεκτικώς 91 b 1 πνευμα 70a5; 112b4 ποικίλος 110 C 6 ποιῶ ΙΙ7 b Ι πολιτικός 82 a 11 πολλά 61 c 3 πολλάκις 60 e 3; 61 a 6 πολυθρύλητος 100 b 4 πολύς 78 a 3 πονῶ 88 a 8 πράγμα 61 c 8 πραγματεία 63 a I ; 64 e 4 πρίν 75 e 4 πρόθεσις 115 e 3 προθυμούμαι 75 b 7 προσίμιον 60 d 2 $\pi \rho \dot{o} s 69 a 6; 117 b 6$ προσάδω 86 е 3 προσγίγνομαι 69 b 4 προσήκω 88 b 3 προσφέρω 63 d 8 προτεραία 59 d 8 προτίθεμαι 115 e 3 πτοούμαι 68 c 9; 108 b 1

ραδίως 62 c 10; 63 a 7; 81 a 1 ρύαξ ΙΙΙ e I

II. GREEK WORDS

σαφής 57b1; 61d8; 65b5; τροπαί 98 a 4 69 d 5; 85 c 3 τροφή 81 d 8 σηραγέ 110 a 5 σκιαγραφία 69 b 6 στέφω 58 a 6 στίχος 104 b 2 στρογγύλος 97 d 9 συγγενής 79 d 3 συγγραφικώς 102 d 3 συγκάμπτω 60 b 2; 98 d 5 σύγκειμαι 92 a 8 συγκρίνομαι 71 b 6 συζυγία 71 09 συμβαίνω 67 c 5; 80 b 1; 80 b 3; 92 b 4; 101 d 3 ύπό 60 c 6 συμβολή 98 d 2 συμπίπτω 80 c 7 συμφυής 81 c 6 συμφύρω 66 b 5 σύμφυσις 81 c 6 σύμφυτος 81 C 6 συνάδω 92 C 3 συνέμπορος 108 b 8 συνεχής 11006 συνέχω 86 b 8 σύνθετος 78 С Ι σύνοδος 97 a 5 συντετραίνω 111 d 2 συντίθημι 77 C7; 78 C2 συντρέφω 96 b 3 σφαίρα 110 b 6 σχεδόν τι 6Ι C 4 σχίσις 108 a 4 σχολή 65 b 5 σωφρονείν 61 b8 σωφροσύνη 68 c 8 ταριχεύω 80 c 8 ταυρηδόν 117 b 5 TE 81 b3 τείνω 65 α 6 τελετή 69 С 3

τέλος 77 C 5

τέρας 101 b 1 τίθεμαι 91 a 5

Tò ∂€ 87 C 6

Tpiodos 108 a 4

τυγχάνω 58 a 6; 58 b 8; 58 c 3; 58 d 3; 62 a 3; 86 c 2; 111 c 2 τυφλούμαι 96 c 5 τύχη 58 a 6 ύγίεια 65 d 12 υγιής 69 b 8; 89 e 2 **ύ**πακούω 59 e 4 ύπάρχω 78 α ΙΟ ύπεκχωρῶ 104 C **I** υπερδικώ 86 **e** 4 ύπερήφανος 96 a 8 ύποβλέπω 117 b 5 υπόθεσις 92 d 6; 101 d 3 ύπολαμβάνω 60 c 8; 69 e 6; 72 e 3 ύπομένω 102 e 2 ; 104 b 10 ύποστάθμη 109 C 2 ύπο**ψία 84 c** 6 φάρμακον 57 a 2 φαῦλος 95 e 8 φείδομαι 117 a 2 φήμη III b 7 φθέγγομαι 93 a 8 ψθείρω 117 b 4 $\phi\theta i\sigma is 71 b 3$ φθόγγος 86 c 6 φθώνος 61 d 10 φθορά 95 e 9 φιλομαθής 67 b 4 φιλοσοφία 61 a 3 φιλόσοφος 61 c 6; 64 b 3 φιλότιμος 68 с Ι φιλοχρήματος 68 с 1; 82 с 5 φράνησις 62 d 4; 66 e 3; 70 b 3; 76 C 12; 111 b 4 Φρόνιμος 62 d 4 φρουρά 62 b 3 φύρω 97 b 7; 101 **e 1** φύσις 87 e 4 φωνή 62 a 9 χαίρω (ἐᾶν χαίρειν) 63 e 3 ; **65** c 7 :

(χαίρειν είπειν) 82 d 3

INDEX TO THE NOTES

χαλῶ 86 c 3; 94 c 4 χαμαίζηλος 89 b 1 χαριέντως 80 c 6; 87 a 3 χελιδών 85 a 7 χρῆμα 96 c 2 χρῶμα 100 d 1; 110 b 7 χρῶμα 195 b 1 χωλός 71 e 9 ψάλλω 94 c 5 ψηλαφῶ 99 b 4 ψυχή 70 a 5 ; 70 b 3

ωρα 80 c 7 ως 58 e 4 ως αν 82 e 6

III. GRAMMATICAL

āv, omission of 62 c 7
Aorist in impatient questions 86 d 7
Aorist participle (synchronous) 58 b 8; 58 e 1; 60 c 8; 60 c 9
Aorist, empirical 73 d 7; 73 d 9
Asyndeton explicativum 61 a 1
Attraction of prepositions 75 b 6
Crasis 58 e 3
Disjunctive question 68 a 3
Infinitive, epexegetic 84 c 3; exclamatory 60 b 5; 99 b 2
Metaphors from hunting 63 a 2; 66 a 3; 66 b 4; 76 e 9; 79 e 3; 88 d 9; 89 c 1; 115 b 9; from wrestling 84 c 6; 87 a 6; 88 d 4; military 104 b 10; 106 a 4
Optative 87 e 5; 107 a 5

Optative 87 e 5; 107 a 5
Polar expression 59 e 5; 81 e 6; 82 b 10
Relative 65 a 5

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